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Since the 2006 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
announced a strengthened relationship between China and Africa, there has been 
increasing interest about what that may mean for the forms and consequences of 
Chinese educational aid. This thesis aims to contribute to that discussion by 
comparing the Chinese approach to educational aid with the traditional Western 
model. These differences are investigated theoretically and empirically. The first 
part of the thesis compares the approaches at the level of 'donor logic', the 
assemblage of assumptions, histories, relationships, practices and motives that 
characterise and distinguish them. These are broadly summarised as the traditional 
logic (from the West) of 'enabling catch up' and China emphasising'win-win'. This 
is done through systematic reviews of the literature, with particular emphasis on 
the Chinese literature. 
The second part of the thesis consists of reports on a series of empirical 
investigations into how the forms of aid were experienced by their recipients, and 
particularly whether differences in 'donor logic' were recognised. These include 
periods of field work in Tanzania and China, involving interviews with Chinese 
and Tanzanian officials, administrators in higher education, and Tanzanian 
students returning from China. Reports on Chinese training programmes for 
African educationalists were analysed using Critical Discourse Analysis. 
The thesis concludes that there are differences between Western and Chinese 
donor logics and practices of educational aid, and that these are recognised 'on the 
ground', and it speculates on the possibility of the emergence of a Chinese model 
as an alternative to the Western model of educational aid. 
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Chapter One Introduction 
1. Research background 
1.1 How I became interested in this topic 
Although I was a student of comparative education at Beijing Normal University 
for some years, I didn't start to think about `aid' until the China-Africa 
relationship became a hot topic from 2006, when the Chinese government invited 
leaders from 48 African countries to Beijing in November to build up a new 
strategic partnership and economic 'win-win' (mutual beneficial) relation with 
Africa. This was the third Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (also called Beijing 
Summit), the largest international summit ever held within China. The summit 
called for the establishment of `a new type of strategic partnership' between China 
and Africa, which features `political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win 
cooperation and cultural exchanges' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 
11/16/2006a). This issue inevitably caused a huge amount of discussion from West 
to East, with several sceptical and critical comments and analysis about China's 
aid approaches and motives. Crucially, though, the existence and the nature of the 
summit did represent a clear contrast with, and possible challenge to, both the 
Western conception and practices of aid. According to Glosny (2006: 9), 
Although China may still be a net recipient of aid and may not think of 
itself as a donor nation, the PRC government has become more actively 
involved in emergency and development aid and has indicated it will 
focus even more on assisting the developing world to meet its economic 
and social challenges. As it continues to play this more active role in the 
donor community, China, the other members of the donor community, 
and the rest of the developing world will be better served by increased 
exchanges and interaction and the opportunity for donors to learn from 
each other. 
This stimulated me to develop a comparative study on China's educational aid to 
Africa and compare it with the Western aid, in terms of their different discourses 
and practice. 
As a researcher in the field of education, I found that during the Beijing Summit, 
in contrast to the Western donors who were emphasizing universal primary 
education (UPE), the Chinese government decided to focus more on government 
scholarships, teacher secondment, vocational and applicable technological 
education (FOCAC, 2006b), and these educational actions are closely related with 
other principles on China's policy - as `China has a view of human resource and 
social development that covers education, health, culture and people-to-people 
exchange and collaboration' (King, 2007: 338). ' Although there is now growing 
evidence and concern about `China in Africa', and this is extended to education, 
there was at that time still very little academic work about educational practice 
between China and Africa compared with the vast amount of literature regarding 
their economic relations. In particular, most of the discussion on China's action 
and motives in Africa was based on the assumption that China and the West were 
both operating on a similar logic, albeit in different ways; this means they assume 
that the rationale of Chinese intervention in Africa is similar to that followed by 
the West, though with a more overt emphasis on `benefits' to China, in exchange 
for `aid'. 
This gradually inspired me at a deeper and more ambitious level to reflect upon 
the term `aid', especially international aid to education, and to consider the 
possibility that there are deeper and more profound differences between the logic 
of Western and Chinese aid in an era of neo-liberal globalisation. This became 
even more interesting when I took into account the ambiguity of `aid' in Chinese - 
the term `yuan zhu'. Though China translated it in English as `aid' in a lot of 
official resources, the Chinese characters `yuan zhu' (means `assistant', `help', 
`support') doesn't contain any Western context (such as `aid' as foreign aid, for 
international development especially economic development after Second World 
1 The goal for pri mary education is from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of United Nations (see 
MDGs table in Robertson et al., 2007: 88). Aiming for poverty reduction, as a central agenda for the new 
century by United Nations, MDGs will be discussed more in the following parts. 
2 
War). At one level, this means that we cannot assume that what China might mean 
by educational aid has the same scope and intention as we have become used to in 
thinking about educational aid from the West to developing countries. It seemed 
that there may be wider issues involved, such as whether China is developing as a 
new model of aid to Africa, or a new hegemony, or even a repetition of the old 
colonist in contemporary international relations? Does China want to be a donor, a 
friend, an exploiter, or an example for African countries? How do the recipients 
and the other donor countries respond? Can China offer a different style of aid 
from the Western way in this new era? With these inquires, I started my journey 
on exploring aid, donors and aid logics. 
1.2 How have aid and educational aid been understood? 
Though there has been a very large literature on educational aid from Western 
developed countries to developing countries, the fundamental logic of that aid has 
been largely taken for granted. Most of the work on aid to education is concerned 
with the Western model, and an assumption that a basically similar logic of the 
donor-recipient relationship continues across the whole period of aid development. 
China-Africa relations have quickly come to the attention of global academic 
work, as well as a `new frontier' in China. 2 However there has been little 
empirical research on educational practice between China and Africa (especially 
regarding China as a donor). Apart from some official data from the Chinese 
government, many unanswered questions remain regarding Chinese educational 
ZT here have been a number of scholars commenting on China and Africa's recent cooperation since 2006, 
such as Allen and Davies (2006), Gountin (2006), Li, A. S. (2006) and Li, B. P. (2007). Compared with 
Western countries, China is late in recognising African culture, history and art, and has only started its African 
studies 50 years ago (Liu, 2009: 7). In recent years, African studies have gradually become a 'new frontier' in 
China's academic domain. Liu (2009: 4) notes, `as China continuously moves to integrate itself with the 
outside world and strives to build itself into a strong nation with global influence in order to keep tempo with 
the accelerating pace of globalisation, opening of the new frontier of African studies has become all the more 
important for improvement of China's modern academic attributes such as expansion of global horizon, 
fostering of universal values, awakening of subjective consciousness and development of Chinese 
characteristics'. Besides the studies on 'Western knowledge and culture', 'Japanese reform' and the 'Russian 
revolution', an `Africology' with Chinese characteristics could be created in the future. Liu (2009: 13) 
believes that as China's academic circles try to build theoretical systems with Chinese characteristics for the 
science of international relations and foreign affairs, the China-Africa relationship will offer an important 
showcase of China's practice with its own approaches and mechanisms; this will also have implications on 
how the world studies international relations. These opinions are from the recent edited book, written in 
English by Chinese scholars, entitled 'Fifty Years of Sino-African Cooperation: Background, Progress and 
Significance---- Chinese Perspectives on Sino-African Relations', was published in 2009 by Yunnan 
University. 
3 
aid to African countries 3 
To make some contribution to understanding international aid to education in this 
study, it was necessary to look closely at the related conceptions of aid, education, 
development, globalisation. They all seem related, but individually and 
collectively they are complicated. `Aid' can be seen as a word which is aiming for 
equity, because theoretically when we aid others, the fact is that resources flow 
from a rich place to a poor place. But, why make this flow? What is the 
motivation of aid? It varies from country to country and from actor to actor, and 
its forms have also changed significantly during the last fifty years 
(Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2003: 7). The definition of aid is 
not as neutral as helping and redistribution; it carries clear strategies and motives, 
and contains complex relations. When we regard aid as a kind of activity by a 
country, an organisation, or an individual, under different historical contexts, aid 
has different explanations. This becomes even more complex when `new' 
donors are emerging. 
This then led me to the crucial recognition that the issue is not about the definition 
of the term, `aid', but about the nature of the relationships between donors and 
recipients. Thus, the perspective on educational aid adopted in this thesis focuses 
on its inner mechanisms and causal relations rather than its contribution to 
economic performance, or pedagogic issues. Most important, aid is not a single 
thing to be understood. It is a multi-dimensional complex. The term embraces the 
ways that donors justify their strategies and actions to both the recipients and their 
sponsors (e. g. foundations, enterprises, governments, etc. ). It also contains donor 
ideologies, philosophies, motives and rationales, and how they legitimate their 
actions. In the next section, we start to clarify the aim of the study and the key 
terms involved in talking about `donor logic' as a complex assemblage of 
components. 
3 See the official website of the Beijing Summit (http: //english. focacsummit. orgl), and the book 
`China-Africa education cooperation' (in Chinese) by Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of 
China. The noticeable literature on this topic are the papers from Kenneth King who has researched Africa, 
aid and education for many years, and given a series of comments on China-Africa relationship particularly in 
the educational field since Beijing summit (King, 2006; 2007). 
4 
1.2.1 The place of `aid' in this study: 'donor logic' and its essential elements 
As noted above, aid is a complex rather than a simple concept. In enquiring into 
the meanings of `aid', we start from a critical look at the donors' logic. We can 
sense the differences here, but it is more difficult to capture them in ways that can 
be researched. So, while it may be possible to point to some broad differences 
between the West and China in the `logic' of aid, such as `catch up' and `win-win', 
if we are to be able to investigate empirically the nature of that difference, we 
need to deconstruct these broad labels somewhat. Terms like `catch up' and 
`win-win' are very evocative and useful labels, but to be analytically useful they 
have to be operationalised, through the identification of their component parts and 
dimensions. This involves seeing `donor logics' as assemblages of components 
involved in aid policy and aid practice. What are these complex components 
which are continuingly considered and amended by donors and hold the whole 
`architecture' of aid? 
In the course of the theoretical investigation of the two models, a number of 
dimensions of the difference became evident. These can be reduced to six main 
elements. 
The first concerns the `what' of aid, which refers to `what is given' to the 
recipients. In the educational field, we can see broadly that China's main focus is 
on offering higher education and vocational training to Africa, which contrasts 
with the focus on primary education which now dominant the Western educational 
aid `offer', following the goal of UPE emphasised in the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). 4 
The second difference concerns the `motives' of aid, `why' `aid' is given. 
Although `catching up to the developed countries' was the fundamental basis of 
Western aid, there were also some specific changes according to particular 
historical stages; such as aid for two superpowers' client states, and aid 
particularly for security after September 11,2001. With motives more focused on 
`partners', China was doing aid from building political alignment to achieving 
° MDGs and its goal of U PE will be talked later in chapter two. 
5 
economic mutual benefit. 
The third is the economic and political `condition' of aid. Conditionality could be 
seen as the core mechanism of the Western aid (especially as structured through 
the Washington Consensus), although it is under a changing modification by 
Western donors and one of the trends is that `conditionality' may not happen 
under some aid reforms. UK Department for International Development (DFID)'s 
white paper in 2009 stated that, `the old Washington Consensus - with its 
advocacy of structural adjustment and a one size fits all approach to policy 
making - failed because it was imposed from the outside and was not tailored to 
country circumstances. '5 On the other hand, it is notable that China has declared 
that it will `never attach conditions' and is committed to `non-intervention' (Naidu 
and Mbazima, 2008: 752) in its aid policies. 
The fourth is the `logic of intervention of aid' which refers to the aspect of the 
`how' of `aid'. `Logic of intervention' has a clear resemblance with the more 
commonly used conception `aid paradigm', which typically refers to the 
`modalities' of aid (King and Buchert eds., 1999), or architecture of aid, the 
structures and processes through which it is delivered. Western aid, for instance, 
moved from Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) to Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Programmes (PRSPs), normally in a top-down way, while China, with less 
structured aid modality, always insisted on self-help and a two-way cultural and 
educational exchange. 7 
S In May 2009 DFID issued a new guidance note to staff on implementing its conditionality policy which 
appears to be backtracking on their 2005 commitment not to use economic policy conditionality. The note is 
not supposed to change the 2005 policy which stated that DFID `will not make our aid conditional on specific 
policy decisions by partner governments'. (DFID, 13/08/2009) 
6` Never attach conditions' was stated in China's `Eight principles of Chinese economic and technological aid' 
in 1964. `Non-intervention' was stated in China's 'Five Point Proposal' for China-Africa relationship by 
President Jiang in 1996. These terms will be elaborated in Part one of this study. However, China's relation 
with Taiwan is sometimes argued as a kind of condition within the China-Africa relationship. According to 
China's African policy (2006), `the one-China principle is the political foundation for the establishment and 
development of China's relations with African countries and regional organizations'. 
Buchert (2000: 406) talked about the 'new modality' for overcoming the deficiencies of the previous 
project assistance mode. Buchert (ibid: 407) gives suggestions on the `new modality': that governments and 
agencies work according to objectives, goals and targets stipulated in a government policy programme which 
is based on a clear vision for development; that there has to be policy dialogue in order to agree on the 
specific objectives, goals and targets; that there has to be co-ordination of the agencies by the government; 
that there has to be ownership of the development process and its outcomes by the government; that there has 
to be accountability to the stakeholders and transparency throughout the process; that the government has to 
lead and the agencies have to follow on terms agreed upon in negotiation between two equal parties; and that 
there has to be partnership between government and agencies and, preferably, other civil society institutions, 
including the private sector. 
6 
The fifth element is the basic pattern and principles of aid delivery practices that 
characterise the two paradigms. In what has been described as its `technocratic 
frame' (Kothari, 2005: 443), Western aid is typically delivered through 
bureaucratised and professionalised consultants and specialist agencies and 
organisation, often competitive between NGOs, and between countries, and prone 
to corruption This is one of the main reasons for negative views of Western aid. 8 
Differently, China has little delegation to, or participation/ involvement of local 
actors, and puts considerable emphasis on direct constructions by Chinese 
engineers, or direct transferring and sharing its own experience as a developing 
country. This has been subject to other criticisms, referring to the limiting of 
learning opportunities for developing countries. 
And finally the different logics are characterised by the historically different aid 
relationship the West and China have had with developing countries. This 
involved on the one hand a colonial relation between West and Africa, and on the 
other, a shared experience of being `underdeveloped', and a `brothers' (including 
socialist brothers) connection between China and Africa. These histories have 
produced what are seen as a contemporary paternal and hierarchical relationship 
between West and Africa, and a fraternal and reciprocal relationship between 
China and Africa. 
So, `donor logic' may be seen as an overarching category that emerges as a kind 
of summary of the possible considerations of aid differences between the two sets 
of components. We can see a list of dimensions of `donor logic' and a comparison 
between China and the West in terms of these components in the following table: 
Table 1.1 The dimensions for examining `donor logic' 
B Through looking at the 'development experts', Kothari (2005) argues that 'increasing professionalisation 
within the development industry supports the neoliberal development agenda', and she particularly concerns 
'the limitations of spaces available to locate development outside this technocratic frame'. Kothari quoted 
Crush (1995: 6)'s words that, to move outside of the managerial, technical, professionalised and expert-led 
field and frame of development, however, has become increasingly difficult as 'the (development) machine is 
global in its reach, encompassing departments and bureaucracies in colonial and post-colonial states 
throughout the world, Western aid agencies, multilateral organisations, the sprawling global network of 
NGOs, experts and private consultants, private sector organisations such as banks and companies that marshal 
the rhetoric of development, and the plethora of development studies programmes in institutes of learning 
worldwide'. 
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Dimensio ns of `donor WEST CHINA 
Logic' (educational aid) 
What is given/ aid Firstly primary University scholarships 
approaches education, also including and trainings, teacher 
secondary and higher secondment, cultural 
education - by giving activities, school building 
money and programmes and small number of 
donation 
Why aid/ aid motives Western economies, Cold Political alignment to 
War struggles; security, economic cooperation 
etc. 
Any condition attached Yes No; principle of 
(economic or political) `non-interference 
How aid/ Logic of From intensive economic Mutually beneficial; 
intervention/ aid adjustment to `softer' two-way 
modalities/ aid paradigms governmental advice; exchange/cooperation; 
from project to budget Chinese pragmatism; 






Technocratic frame of aid Aid delivered by Donor carries out work 
practice professional, with its own labour and 
bureaucratised specialist resources; little 
and agencies and workers involvement of local 
labour 
Aid relationships (donor Paternal, hierarchical, Reciprocity/ win-win, 
and recipient) top-down, colonial fraternal, equality 
legacy 
The term `Donor logic' is not often directly mentioned in the research literatures, 
but we do find evidence of similar identifications of aid components. For instance, 
similar contrasts are well exemplified in a comparison of Nordic and Chinese aid 
to Tanzania by Sandvand (2008). She examines the differences between the 
Nordic and Chinese aid in terms of `policy' and `practice', and the contrastive 
terms she makes can resonate clearly with our components for `donor logic'. She 
points out that, 
In policy, Nordic aid is poverty-oriented, principled and rights-based, 
while Chinese aid is growth-oriented, practical, and frictionless. 9 In 
practice, Nordic aid to Tanzania is evolving, it is politically conditional, 
predominantly grants-based, un-tied, poverty-oriented, influenced by 
international trends, advocating an equitable and integrated development 
strategy, whereas Chinese aid to Tanzania is consistent, it is politically 
un-conditional, sporadic, predominantly loans-based, tied, 
growth-oriented, determined mainly by own experience and philosophy, 
advocating a centralist, mercantilist development strategy, where aid is 
but one integrated element of China's Africa strategy. (Sandvand, 2008 
5) 
We see a very similar contrast in Welle-Strand (2010: 11)'s conclusion on 
`emerging donors' (and China is the main one in her article) - `the emerging 
donors provide foreign aid on different terms, in different sectors, through 
different organisational structures, and with different goals than do the traditional 
donors'. She looks at `four main ways' China challenges the current foreign aid 
paradigm: 
The donor-recipient relationship is challenged by a partnership of equals; 
The modes of provision are challenged by China's focus on aid that is 
mutually beneficial; The use of conditionalities is challenged by China's 
insistence on sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs; 
Multilateralism is challenged by China's preference of going the major 
9 This is similar to the Chinese donor logic we conclude from this study. This similar donor logic also has 
been mentioned by He (2008; 2010: 138) when she considers the changes of China from 'a more 
ideologically driven orientation' to 'a more pragmatic and economically motivated one'. These changes of 
China will be illustrated in chapter three to four. 
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foreign aid projects alone (Welle-Strand 2010: 3). 
Steiner-Khamsi (2008: 3) mentions `donor logic' in her paper `Donor logic in the 
era of Gates, Buffett, and Soros'. In her study of Mongolia's educational `imports', 
the support from the lender was driven more by what they had to offer than by 
what the borrower actually needed. She also looked at the logic of NGOs, and 
encouraged us to put more interest on the `unruly' and `very generous private 
funders' rather than the `rule-abiding and rule-enforcing multilaterals' aid practice, 
in order to make some effort to change the aid environment (2008: 6). The paper 
indicates how some lenders' logic may be `illogical' to the recipients. Similarly, 
Cammack (2007: 600) observed a number of `neopatrimonial' practices in Africa 
and attempts to explain the `logic' that underpins them. He argues that certain 
political logics, under `much centralisation of power' and `little accountability and 
transparency' in some poor performing and fragile African countries, `undermine 
economic development and democratic consolidation' (2007: 61), and these lead 
the author to suggest that recipient governments should be driven by the needs 
and desires of their people, not by donors. King (1992) earlier examined external 
aid agenda and internal educational reform, calling for clearer definition of 
foreign aid policies. As he pointed out, `if therefore the new aid paradigm is more 
invasive of national policies and politics than ever before, it looks as if the logic 
of the new approach should lead to as much rethinking of the aid process in the 
donor countries as of reform in the recipients'(1992: 262). Here, he could be seen 
to be suggesting that a shift in the logic of intervention may require a more 
profound reappraisal of the fundamental donor logic. From those discussions we 
can say that there seems usually a gap between what donors think about, and 
claim for, `aid', and what recipients need and how they perceive `aid'. 
Drawing on literatures that operate at the level of aid paradigms and modalities, 
rather than providing evaluations of the effectiveness of aid, for instance, this 
study attempts a more systematic exploration of essential factors within `aid' 
which structure the `donor logic', before going on to examine empirically how 
these are expressed and perceived. The core of the thesis, then, is a theoretical and 
empirical comparison between the Western and Chinese `donor logic' of 
educational aid. We will now outline the structure of the thesis and the ways that 
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these issues and questions will be addressed. 
2. Structure and outline of the research 
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part One reviews and compares the literatures 
on the two models, and Part Two examines donors' action empirically, 
investigating whether the different aid logic result in practices that are recognised 
as different, based upon how people on ground recognise the educational aid from 
China. 
2.1 Research questions and outline of Part One 
This thesis aims to address two main questions; (1) Are there different logics 
behind `Western' and Chinese educational `aid'?; (2) If -so, are these differences 
recognised `on the ground' and what are the consequence? 
Research question (1) is addressed in Part One, which is mainly based on 
literature, and provides broad evidence through a documentary and historical 
research approach. It includes a series of summaries of the aid models and related 
theories (which are presented in both of my texts and the tables), and makes some 
arguments considering the different conceptions of aid and development (e. g. the 
Chinese pragmatism). One of the difficulties in dealing with these literatures is the 
large range of both English and Chinese texts. 10 
Part One consists of Chapters two to four. These chapters are based on: 
Q1A. General context- How can we understand international aid to education in 
the context of globalisation? What are the main features of the orthodox Western 
model? 
* What are the changing logics of intervention for development since the 50s until 
10 The citations of two Chinese documents are translated from Chinese into English by myself. One is the 
book `China Africa Education Cooperation' by Ministry of Education and Beijing University, and another is 
the Zhejiang Normal University training reports used for a critical discourse analysis in Part Two. The other 
Chinese references are noted in the bibliography. 
today, as well as the changing motives and features of international aid? i I 
* What is educational aid about, and what is its contemporary global situation? 
* What are the supporting theories, main approaches and typical donors in the 
Western model? 
QIB. Chinese model, compared with the Western model 
(a)What are the main features of the Chinese model? 
* What are the Chinese conceptions of foreign relations and development? How 
does China consider the role of education? 
* What is the historical development of the China-Africa relation and their 
relation in the educational field? 
* What are the main approaches of Chinese aid compared with the Western 
model? 
(b) What is the logic of the Chinese model? 
*What is the distinctive meaning of the Chinese `win-win' model? 
*What are the changing drivers, positions and power dynamics of educational 
cooperation by China to Africa? 
(c)Is there any distinctive difference between the Chinese model and the Western 
model, in theories (economically and politically), approaches and historical 
relations? 
The three chapters in Part One: chapter two is about the Western context of aid, 
while chapter three and four are about the Chinese context of aid. To improve the 
possibilities of comparison, the three chapters share the common framework set 
out above. In other words, both the Western and Chinese context are theoretically 
explored by these indicators 
On the grounds that the Western background is well known and well discussed in 
Western academic work, this study puts more focus on the Chinese model, where I 
am able to draw on both English language and Chinese sources. This enables me 
to give a fuller picture than is possible on the basis of English texts only. Two 
chapters are designed to address the theoretical basis and assumptions of Chinese 
11 The questions with * are sub-questions. 
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logic of intervention and donor logic. Chapter three is about the `broader context' 
of China's donor logic, including the changing foreign policies of China, and 
chapter four looks at the `specific context' of China's relationship with Africa, as 
well as the educational cooperation between them. With a similar framework to 
chapter two, chapter three gives a historical review of China's changing motives 
in international relations: from a politically oriented diplomatic logic, to an 
economically based diplomatic logic. The last section of chapter three concludes 
that it is `Chinese pragmatism' that is directing the conception of development by 
China. Chapter four goes further to talk about the China-Africa relationship. It 
includes three sections: how China's logic for Africa has been changed since the 
PRC was founded; how this relation is currently based upon, and how this is 
represented in the field of education. Finally in tabular form the different periods 
of China's strategies and logics are compared with the Western aid. 
2.1.1 Western context 
Firstly, the Western context is divided into a historical review of international aid 
from several key milestones - post-colonial, Cold War, Washington Consensus and 
the Post Washington Consensus, and a discussion of the current conception of aid 
and its characteristics (conditionality and the `new aid architecture') in the era of 
globalisation. In this study chapter two generally shows how `orthodox' aid has 
developed, and how donors adjust the aid discourse. 
`Aid' as an international concept emerged in the West towards the end of the 
Second World War and the establishment at Bretton Woods, in 1944, of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, more commonly known 
as the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These 
organisations were designed to provide a more stable economic situation and 
create freer trading conditions throughout the world (Garrett, 1994: 1). From this 
emergence it is not difficult to understand why `aid' is also called development 
assistance, and this indicates that aid means `help' for economic development. 
Thus, several questions should be asked: is `development' a normative term and if 
yes, who set this norm? Is there a model of development? 
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In the Western context, the fundamental logic of aid has been the logic of 
`catching up', which has set a paternal and hierarchical donor-recipient relation 
since 1950s. Although it has taken various forms, this underlying logic of Western 
donors has been quite consistent, assuming that developing countries need `help', 
including the area of education. This `help' is to enable them to `catch up' with the 
developed countries which represent the model to be attained - `developing' to 
`developed' is the process, and this goal is supported by aid, including educational 
aid. 
Aid has been operating within a changing global situation from the colonial time 
to the era of globalisation; it has operated under the struggle between two super 
powers, and also under a series of adjustments from Washington Consensus to 
Post Washington Consensus. During this process of change, globalisation has had 
a large impact on aid discourse and mechanisms. Even though `aid' has been 
around for much longer than `globalisation', this global transformation has added 
more complexity within a `dynamic and open-ended' process (Mann, 1997; Held, 
1999) and thus added more meaning and possibilities for'aid'. 12 One key aspect 
of the economic and structural influences of neo-liberal globalisation, is the 
increasing importance of a `knowledge based economy'; education is becoming 
one of the most crucial contributors to economic growth. At the same time, with 
the increasing South-South cooperation and the faster economic development of 
some developing countries, the norm of Western aid has come under 
re-consideration, and this has been increasingly recognised. In very recent 
discussions of `challenging the aid paradigm', Sörensen (2010: 3) points out the 
challenge to Western aid clearly: 
However, although there is, with some variation, a general Western 
consensus, which is also the international mainstream operating through 
the major institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the World 
Trade Organisation, there has now for the first time since the fall of the 
Soviet Union emerged an actually existing alternative in what is 
12 The term of `globalisation' has been used by economists since the 1980s, however its concepts did not 
permeate popular consciousness until the latter half of the 1990s (Robertson et al., 2007: 9). 
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sometimes called South-South cooperation. This is especially the case 
with Chinese aid and investment, in Asia, Africa and, to a growing extent, 
Latin America. 
2.1.2 Chinese context 
Within Southern cooperation, China is playing an increasingly important role on 
the world stage, with its rapid economic development and domestic reforms, and 
its increasing cooperation with the other developing countries. For example, 
China became the largest foreign investor in Cambodia in 2005 and its foreign aid 
is double that of the United States in Indonesia, three times as large in Laos, and 
four times as large in the Philippines (Kurlantzick, 2006: 3). In additional, the 
Sino-Africa relationship has caught attention in recent years, although it is still on 
a lower scale when compared with the Western donations (Gu et al, 2008: 13). 
From the Western perspectives, critics argue that China is simply joining the 
modern scramble for Africa, usually ignoring human rights and environmental 
standards, and failing to attach demands for transparency to aid, loans and 
investment (International Herald Tribune, 2006). It is trying to expand it political 
influence on African countries by employing `neo-liberalism with Chinese 
characteristics' (Sautman, 2006). Many works stress this relationship with trade 
and oil. Some scholars argue that these economic relations, to some extent, could 
have mixed effects, and that the political influence was considered as `deleterious' 
(Tull, 2006: 468). 
However, Mawdsley (2008: 511) argues that `the main determiner of Western 
images of China is the West itself (Mackerras: 1989). ' In terms of aid to Africa, 
her observations show that, although newspapers tend to report a range of 
problematic Chinese engagement in Africa, the reality is that the West and China 
both have more complex relations with different parts of Africa and with each 
other (Mawdsley, 2008: 525). Within this complexity, some scholars discuss the 
two-side effect of China-Africa issues. Breslin (2007: 132) suggests that people 
who would like to engage are the `cultural relativists', or those interested in 
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Chinese philosophical, cultural and historical traditions. Moreover, the `material 
relativists' are those who believe that China is still a poor country where 
socio-economic rights must take the priority over political rights for some time. 
Finally there are those who think `engagement' is a special opportunity which is 
not be missed; in other words that it is an opportunity to engage and promote 
certain political influences and social changes in China, and to promote their own 
security. From the sceptical point of view on the other hand, people who prefer to 
contain Chinese activities in the world are worried about the human right issues 
within China, and they believe this situation is worsening as China engages more 
with the international economy. Sceptical opinions are also drawn from anxieties 
relating to weapon and environment reasons. Zafar (2007: 125) argues that this 
relationship may help accelerate economic growth in Africa and bring a Chinese 
`low-transactions-cost' (2007: 126) way of doing business and its non-interference 
in countries' internal affairs, on the other hand this is based on capital-intensive 
natural resource extraction and may lead to an increase in energy prices. Thus as 
Zafar says Chinese economic boom is `a mixed blessing' (2007: 125). 
Quite a number of scholars have pointed to the distinctiveness of China. They find 
a growing realisation that, `poor nations might find appropriate, low-cost and 
sustainable solutions to their problems in other developing countries rather than in 
the rich north' (Owen and Melville, 2005: 1). They notice that the role of China is 
different from the Western donors - `unique, has one foot in the developing world 
and another in the developed one, with a seat on the UN Security Council', and 
this dual status gives it a considerable political and diplomatic advantage in the 
pursuit of its interest (Muekalia, 2004: 5). During the Beijing Summit, King (2006: 
4) found, `what is absolutely clear today, four decades later, is how China's 
discourse about common economic benefit, common political exchange, and 
common cultural cooperation appears to have been fully accepted by its African 
partners', and he found two-way trade was `one of the key messages of the 
Beijing Summit' (King, 2006: 12). Zafar believes that the Chinese way of aid will 
influence both Africa and Western donors, and thus the West should creatively 
bring the Chinese model into the broader development platform (2007: 126). 
Furthermore, some scholars apply special terms or `names' to define the Chinese 
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model, such as Gu and Messner (2007: 7) who note the mixture of three elements 
including `interdependence, identity dilemma and pragmatism', and China's 
`developmental evangelism' in Africa, named by Owen and Melville (2005: 2) 
who worry that, with increasing commercial relations between China and Africa, 
there will be increasing strain on the `non-interference' declaration. Alden et al. 
(2008) argued that the Chinese government's distinctive mode of conducting 
relations with the continent, which might be broadly labelled Chinese 
`exceptional ism', is characterised in the official language as being fundamentally 
different from all previous external powers; this difference is related to China's 
`win-win' and `mutual beneficial' discourse. 
Here, three reasons can be advanced for China's distinctiveness: firstly, China has 
never been colonised, although it has a `Century of Humiliation' -1840-1949- 
with the West's expansion in nineteenth century (Scott, 2008: 1), while Hong 
Kong was a special case, colonised by Britain during 1843-1997 (Liu, 1997); 
secondly, China itself is a developing country even when it plays a role as a 
`donor'; thirdly, China, has never been attached to Western theories of modernity 
and has found a Chinese way to modernisation since the People's Republic of 
China was founded. China has been pursuing a way of `Chinese style socialism' 
and a `Chinese style market economy' based on its own `Four Modernisations' (in 
1975), followed by the opening-up policy (in 1978). By contrast, firstly the West 
were colonisers; secondly, Western aid flows from developed to developing 
countries; and thirdly the West is rooted in the philosophy of the Western 
modernity. 
2.2 Research questions and outline of Part Two 
Part Two of the thesis presents the results of the empirical investigations carried 
out in Tanzania and China. It is structured around the following questions: 
(a) How are Western and Chinese models understood and experienced in Tanzania 
and in China? 
* What is the historical relationship between Tanzania and China, especially in the 
17 
field of education and cultural cooperation? 
* What is the contemporary practice between Tanzania and China for educational 
development? 
* What are the Tanzanian officials' and scholars' opinions and experiences of 
China-Africa cooperation? 
* What are the viewpoints and experience of African students who are receiving 
Chinese scholarships and studying in the universities in China? 
* What are the official explanations of the Chinese model and its future prospects? 
* What are the differences between the two models as they are experienced by 
recipients? 
(b) How can we understand Chinese discourse about their practice in Africa? 
* What do the report texts represent? 
* What are the aims of the writers, and who are the audiences supposed to be? 
* What kind of the social relations and logics are behind the texts? 
Part Two analyses the findings from empirical work done by field interviews and 
by textual data collection in Tanzania and China. Tanzania, the biggest aid 
recipient of China in Africa (Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, 2008b) (chosen 
with both historical and practical reasons), and Chinese cities - Beijing, Tianjin 
and Jinhua (in Zhejiang) - are the main places for field work. The interview data 
was collected from different groups of people, mainly Chinese and Tanzanian 
officials, Tanzanian returning students who have studied in China, principals of 
Tanzanian institutions, and Chinese university scholars who are doing related 
research. 
In terms of the research procedures, it is useful to borrow Wengraf's (2001: 55) 
`Rose - Wengraf model of the research process': 
(A) Theory: a descriptive or an explanatory statement about social phenomena 
(here the theory about globalisation, education and aid); 
(B) Theoretical propositions: specific propositions to be investigated in the study 
(here the argument about `is Chinese model of educational aid distinctive, and 
with what kind of logic'? ); 
(C) Operationalization/instrumentation: decisions made as to how to carry out 
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empirical work- design of indicators for concepts, choices of units, sampling, 
technique of data collection (i. e. the empirical questions discussed before, with 
mixed methods of documentary analysis and field work by interview); 
(D) Fieldwork: collecting interview and other data; 
(E) Results: data-processing and analysis through strategies and procedures of 
interpretation lead to findings; their interpretation leads back to (C), (B), (A) as 
well as, sometimes, to modifications of central research question and conceptual 
framework (this will be discussed in the following part). 
Thus chapter five outlines the methodology of this study. It contains the design of 
the empirical research and the related reasons; the methods and processes of the 
data collection and analysis, and some reflective thinking of the reliability, 
validity and other consideration of the research. It decides to use a qualitative, 
semi-structural interview to conduct the fieldwork study, triangulated with some 
discourse analysis for texts gained from the ground. Particularly, it discusses the 
fieldwork plan, from the reason of choosing Tanzania and China, to the details of 
the field `stories'. 
Following the methodology, Part Two of the thesis outlines and presents, as we 
designed, the findings of the empirical work carried out in Tanzania and China. 
Chapter six looks at China's relation with Tanzania (China's biggest recipient in 
Africa), and how Tanzanian and Chinese people (particularly the officials) 
compare aid from the West and China. This includes firstly my personal 
perception; secondly the Tanzanian situation as a recipient country, especially the 
officials' introduction of their `bible'- Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania 
(JAST) (which helps engage a new relationship between donor and recipient); 
thirdly a review on the distinctive China-Tanzania relationship, and fourthly the 
perception of China's motives. 
Chapter seven shows the most important approach of China. It is the Chinese 
government scholarships to Africa. This chapter also provides the case of Dar es 
Salaam Institute of Technology (DIT). It reveals both the DIT principal's 
perception of how the institution cooperates with China, and the voice of 
returning Tanzanian students about their personal experience and view of study in 
19 
China. 
Chapter eight goes on to introduce more variance of China's aid action. In terms 
of short term training, the chapter takes Zhejiang Normal University (ZJNU) as an 
example of an organiser of the training practice. This is analysed by critical 
discourse analysis through four pieces of ZJNU training reports, that show how 
while the `words' may be the same as we might find in the West, their meaning 
may be different. In terms of cultural activities, this chapter gives two examples - 
the Culture Centre in Mkapa High School and the planning of the Confucius 
Institute in Dar es Salaam. All of these cases are presented and analysed to reveal 
China's action in Africa, how officials translate this action, and how recipient 
institutions and individuals see and understand the action. 
Finally is chapter nine which is the conclusion of the thesis. 
Above all, it is hoped that, this study can achieve the following contributions: 
(a) The theoretical framework of a comparison between the Western model and 
Chinese model of development and international cooperation/foreign aid in the 
field of education (changing discourse, mechanisms and logic of intervention); 
( b) The historical review and summary of China's foreign policies and changing 
relation with Africa (I summarised it as `Chinese pragmatism'); 
(c) The empirical findings of people's voice towards China-Africa relations and 
China's action in Africa (with the Tanzania case), including both of official people 
(who present more for their department or institution) and individual person (who 
present about their own experience); 
(d) The findings from particular institutions (such as DIT in Tanzania, ZJNU in 
China) which offers much evidence of the progress of China-Africa educational 
cooperation; 
(e) The first hand data (from officials and scholars) on China's educational 
cooperation approaches, including governmental scholarships, short term training, 
and the Confucius Institute. 
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Chapter Two Western context: changing discourses and logics 
of international aid 
Introduction 
This chapter gives an overview of the international aid in the West, termed in this 
thesis, the orthodox model of aid. In order to talk about educational aid to Africa 
in this study, it is first necessary to understand who is playing the main role in 
international aiddiscourse, and also what the features of their approaches are. The 
Western discourses and mechanisms of aid remain dominant in this global era, and 
this Western ideology has been developed under a changing international situation 
since the post-colonial period. 
The meaning of `development' has been dominated by the theory of 
modernisation, which has been a central part of academic literature since the 
1950s. Rostow proposed `stages of economic growth' (1960), wherein he 
theorised that `traditional societies' could achieve development in the same 
manner as more developed countries with mature economies. Development 
assistance is needed for realizing the aims of modernisation. Following this logic, 
theoretically every country must experience an economic take-off towards a more 
developed system similar to their Western donors. With developments in 
international relations and the reforms of Southern countries however, there is 
some evidence which indicates that economic development may be realised via 
different models and ideologies. Therefore the logic of `catching up' with Western 
developed economies, has come into question. 
In this study, a variety of terms are used to describe development assistance for 
developing countries including: foreign aid, international assistance, international 
aid, and international cooperation. Development assistance, as referred to here, is 
complex in its paradigms and architecture. The history of development assistance 
spans from modernisation to globalisation, from the Washington Consensus to 
post Washington Consensus, from before to after the Cold War. Over this history, 
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with its changing logics of intervention, the discourse of aid also has changed. 
Today, most donors claim that aid is a tool to reduce poverty. Orthodox donors 
(traditional Western donors) are attempting to change aid conditionalities by 
insisting that more social factors and effectiveness measures are tied to their aid 
approaches. Aid to education is of increasing importance given the call for 
`Education for All' (EFA) and the `Knowledge Economy' (KE). The world's 
biggest multilateral donor to education, the World Bank (UNESCO, 2009), is 
evidently driven by the neo-liberal agenda which, in turn, drives Western aid logic 
(Robertson et al., 2007). Yet aid practice in developing areas, especially in Africa, 
has sparked criticism by either recipient or academic work as to its motives and 
the conditions it imposes (Jones, 1992; Easterly, 2003; Easterly et al., 2004; 
Woods, 2008). New understandings of international aid are arriving in the global 
political economy, driven chiefly by the rising Third World; collaborative 
activities among developing countries, such as China-Africa cooperation, have 
introduced a new aid model which is not in line with the West-oriented discourse. 
This chapter provides an in depth historical background focusing upon the 
changing logics and strategies of global donors (i. e. not just the sequence of 
`events', but the changing discourse and motives behind these events) in section 1. 
At the end of this background part, a table is formed to give a framework of what 
we discuss about `aid'. Next is an exploration of the contemporary international 
aid and aid to education, specifically how it has been developed and criticised, is 
provided in section 2. 
1. Changing logics and discourses: from modernisation to globalisation 
1.1 Modernisation: decolonisation and the beginning of aid 
The 1960s were labelled the `development decade' by the United Nations, and 
such a label corresponded with the `departing of colonialism' (United Nations, 
1961: 17). The concept `decolonisation' refers to the achievement of 
independence by former Western colonies in Africa and protectorates in Asia 
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following the Second World War (United Nations, 1961; Laenui, 1999). During 
these transitions from colony to nation-state, the theory of modernisation began to 
play a key role (Berger, 2003). 
Originating from Western countries, modernisation theory contends that 
`low-income countries could improve the living condition of their populations by 
a set of prescriptive policies to encourage economic `taking off' (Robertson et al., 
2007: 11). The American economist, Rostow, introduced five stages of economic 
growth experienced by countries with investment, consumption and social trends 
at each stage, during the process of modernisation; he argued that the most 
important stage is centred upon the `taking off' stage. 13 This has been called the 
`Rostovian take-off model', and certain concepts developed by him have been 
become central to modernisation theory (Rostow, 1960). The idea that all 
countries could become `modern' and `catch up' with the West, if they followed 
the same stages as Western countries, can be seen as a theory and a prescription 
(Dale, 1982). This logic has set the basis of the Western model of development. 
It is noticeable that education is important within the context of modernisation 
theory (Robertson et al., 2007: 19); this is evident in Schultz's (1961: 3) human 
capital theory ---- capital produced by investing in knowledge. 
14 Human capital 
theory suggests that education or training raises the productivity of workers by 
imparting useful knowledge and skills, and thereafter raises workers' future 
income by increasing their lifetime earnings (Becker, 1964). Education, therefore, 
plays the role of creating `modern' individuals and `unlocks the door to 
modernisation' (Harbison and Myers, 1964: 3). 
13 The fi ve stages are: Traditional societies (which have pre-scientific understandings of gadgets and no norm 
of economic growth), Preconditions to Take-off (which are a degree of capital mobilization, especially 
through the establishment of banks and currency), Take-off (that occurs when sector led growth becomes 
common and society is driven more by economic processes than traditions, and the norms of economic 
growth are well established), Drive to Maturity (which is a process with regular growth of economy to extend 
the modem technology, including the increasing new industries, international economy and the diversity of 
economy), Age of High Mass Consumption (which has a mature economy: the leading sectors shift towards 
durable consumers' goods and services. It is as Rostow says, 'a phase from which Americans are beginning to 
emerge... Western Europe and Japan are beginning energetically to probe; and with which Soviet society is 
engaged in an uneasy flirtation'). (Rostow, 1990: 4-11) 
14 Schu Itz (1961) inquired as to why post-World War II Germany and Japan recovered at near miraculous 
speeds from the widespread devastation, as contrasted with the United Kingdom which rationed food long 
after the war. His conclusion was that the speed of recovery was due to a healthy and highly educated 
population; education makes people productive and good healthcare means the education investment is able 
to produce for a long time. Schultz's contribution was later termed Human Capital Theory, and significantly 
influenced work in international development. 
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With the principal aim of catching up with developed countries, aid during this 
time meant the West helping low-income countries follow the same path to 
modernisation that the West had followed; this included the aid of education being 
regarded as a key promoter for economic growth (Robertson et al., 2007: 19). This 
conception, therefore, is the traditional logic of aid, accurately termed the Western 
logic of aid. 
1.2 Cold War: two eras and the changing motivations of aid 
The motives of aid shifted significantly during the Cold War time (1945-1991), 
when significant changes occurred in regards to the intention, content and 
direction of aid by both multinational and national agencies (Buchert, 1995). Yet 
as the Cold War came to its dramatic end with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 
November 1989, more changes happened in the donors' motivation with the 
changing nature of international relations. 
We can identify two eras in aid, during and after the Cold War. Although the 
phenomenon of some global activities started hundreds of years before the Cold 
War, the most impressive period of the globalisation of international relations is 
the post Cold War era. A central reason for this is the tremendous global 
development which occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and an associated 
reason being the reconstruction of the world structure. More specifically, with the 
disappearance of the struggle between the two superpowers the bi-polar world 
structure featured during the Cold War was replaced by one built in a global era; a 
structure featuring international dependency, international inequality and 
international organisations (Yan, 2001: 17). 
The end of the Cold War and a short period of large fiscal deficits in leading donor 
countries led directly to a dramatic fall-off in aid-giving by official development 
assistance (ODA) (Riddell, 2007: 38). During the Cold War, both the United 
States and the Soviet Union had client countries which were backed and 
influenced significantly by the policies by either power. Both sides supported 
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regimes in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to secure their power. Western 
governments, especially the USA, supported several repressive and authoritarian 
regimes in return for alliance and help against communist expansion. With the end 
of the Cold War however, aid from the two super powers to their client states 
declined (Robertson et al., 2007: 56). Perhaps Griffin (1991) best shows what the 
Cold War brings to international aid from what he says, 
Foreign aid as it is understood today has its origins in the Cold War. It is 
largely a product of the ideological confrontation between the US and the 
Soviet Union which dominated international politics for forty-five years 
between 1945 and 1990 (Griffin, 1991: 645). ... for without the Cold War 
it would have been impossible to generate the domestic political support in 
the donor countries necessary to sustain foreign assistance for more than 
four decades (Griffin, 1991: 647)... 
Moreover, Eastern European countries had been important for a small group of 
developing countries for many years, even though they have not given as much 
aid as DAC countries. 15 Yet these donor countries disappeared with the end of 
Cold War, and transformed to a group of recipient countries since the early 1990s 
(Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2003: 23). In short, the donors 
reduced, but the recipients increased. 
In the Cold War context, national security played a significant role in maintaining 
the level of foreign aid given the rivalry between the Eastern and Western 
countries, especially the USA. Thus with the end of Cold War, many DAC 
countries lost motivation for giving aid because of the reduced importance of 
national security interests (ibid, 2003: 23). Yet this attitude quickly changed when 
the new structure created national and ethical conflicts in areas which were once 
under the control of two superpowers. As Novelli and Robertson (2007: 250) 
described, there was `an increase in conflict in many low-income countries, which 
predates the events of September 11,2001' which `appear to be radically altering 
'S The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the principal body through which the OECD deals with 
issues related to co-operation with developing countries. The Western donors to African countries mentioned 
in this study refer mostly to DAC countries such as Germany, France, Japan, UK, US, Switzerland, etc. These 
compare with the new donors to Africa such as China. 
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the geopolitical and geostrategic activities of the dominant Western powers and 
posing a challenge to the global consensus that emerged towards the end of the 
last century around the United Nations MDGs'. Aid thereafter turned to focus 
more on the international security and development. 
Boyce (2002: 62) talks about the geopolitical aims of aid: aid was not just aiming 
for peace since Cold War. He notes, 'far from promoting the peaceful resolution of 
social tensions, the Cold War rivalry between the industrial democracies and the 
Soviet bloc helped to fuel violent conflicts across Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
Official aid donors on both sides readily embraced conditionality- not for peace, 
but for Cold War aims. Aid was one weapon in the global contest'. 
1.3 Washington Consensus: neo-liberalism and economic globalisation 
Since the 1990s there has been an increase in analysts who use the word 
`neo-liberalism' to describe the global market, liberalism and free-trade policies. 
The `Washington Consensus' can be seen as significant issue for the world's 
transition to an economic, neo-liberal style of globalisation. A key milestone in the 
spread of neo-liberalism to low-income countries was the 1982 Mexico debt crisis 
(Branford and Kucinski, 1988) which created `a dramatic shift in the policies of 
the World Bank and the IMF who developed a set of policies (now referred to as 
neo-liberalism) that were known as Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment 
Policies (SAPs)' (Berg, 1994; Walton and Seddon, 1994). As Robertson et al. 
(2007: 37) introduced, 
These policies included a range of measures related to fiscal austerity, 
deregulating the economy and opening it up to international competition 
that later became known as the Washington Consensus. 
John Williamson, an economist from the Institute for International Economics, 
first presented the concept of a `Washington Consensus' in 1989, listing ten broad 
sets of recommendations for aid, including financial liberalization, trade 
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liberalization, and privatisation to globally promote a market-based economy. 16 
The key points are liberalization, privatization and marketisation, which are come 
from the Western liberalism tradition (Williamson, 2004: 3). 
Compared with modernisation theory, a theory based on the economic 
development of nation states and state intervention which was a form of 
protection against the workings of the market, neo-liberalism arose within the 
contemporary economic globalisation context based upon the philosophy of free 
capital market, and thus having `a strong preference for markets as the mechanism 
through which production, distribution and consumption within an international 
economy should be efficiency managed' (Robertson et al., 2007: 13). As King and 
McGrath (2004: 18) described it, the neo-liberal account highlights `the effects 
that globalisation has on the relative roles of market and state, confirming the 
ascendancy of the market and the inevitable demise of the nation state'. 
Washington Consensus set the rules by which low-income countries could catch 
up with their developed donors, and simultaneously involve these countries in the 
global neo-liberal market. Robertson et al. (2007: 37) drew particular attention to 
the significance of the Washington Consensus in relation to aid. It was the time 
when `conditionality' which required a `radical form' (Woods, 2008; 1216) of 
economic adjustment to recipients started to be a core idea of international aid, 
and when some low-income countries were left with little choice but to accept 
SAPs. '7 
The policy measures were linked, through conditionalitiy clause with 
low-income debtor nations, to loan agreements issued by the IMF in 
agreement with the World Bank. Conditionality clause thus became the 
key mechanism through which neo-liberal economic policies became 
16 The ten recommendations are as follows: fiscal policy discipline; Redirection of public spending from 
indiscriminate (and often regressive) subsidies towards broad-based provision of key pro-growth, pro-poor 
services like primary education, primary health care and infrastructure investment; Tax reform; Interest rates 
that are market determined and positive (but moderate) in real terms; Competitive exchange rates; Trade 
liberalization - liberalization of imports, with particular emphasis on elimination of quantitative restrictions; 
Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment; Privatization of state enterprises; Deregulation; Legal 
security for property rights. (Williamson, 1989) 
"` Conditionality' will be talked about more in the following sections on `international aid in the new 
century'. 
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globalised (Robertson et al., 2007: 37). 
Between 1980 and 1998, the World Bank and IMF made 958 adjustment loans 
across the world with the attached strings of their economic policies, but 
performances have been `disappointing' in terms of economic growth (Easterly, 
2001: 3; Kimber, 2005; Sindzingre, 2008). Krugman (1995: 41) noted that `the 
real economic performance of countries that had recently adopted Washington 
consensus policies... was distinctly disappointing. ' In the 1980s, those Latin 
American and African countries which had begun SAPs were hit by the worst 
economic recessions since the 1930s (Cheru, 1989; Green, 1995). The Latin 
American failure sug gested the West a re flection of their `aid' attached with 
neo-liberal policy conditions, while some South countries were trying to develop 
by alternative choices. As Robertson et al. (2007: 39) indicated: 
... the two continents most affected 
by the debt crisis and who had 
subsequently entered into SAPs programmes also suffered the most 
during the 1980s and 1990s. 18 Meanwhile there were alternative policies 
being followed by countries in South and East Asia- Tiger Economies - 
(including China and India particularly in the 1980s). 19 ... a number of 
these Tigers pursued a more strategic approach towards its role in the 
development project, retaining a strong role for the state (Wade, 1990; 
Harvey, 2005). 
The strong, even authoritarian, governments of the `Tiger economies' obviously 
impressed, and even frightened, developed Western countries and the rule of 
Washington Consensus. According to Krugman (1994: 62), although those 
economies were still poorer and smaller than those of the West, `the speed with 
which they had transformed themselves from peasant societies into industrial 
powerhouses, their continuing ability to achieve growth rates several times higher 
18 Th e two continents refer to Latin America and Africa. 
19 The re are Four East Asian Tigers (Four Tigers), Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore. `Asian 
Tigers' also includes the southeast Asian countries of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. These economies are 
known for their phenomenal growth between the early 1960s and 1990s, and are of interest to developmental 
economies because they were able to move from third world status to first world status in a few decades and 
moreover, were able to progress past other developing areas such as Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, the image of the Asian Tigers was heavily diminished by the Asian Economic Crisis, which 
affected each Tiger to varying degrees. 
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than the advanced nations, and their increasing ability to challenge or even 
surpass American and European technology in certain areas seemed to call into 
question the dominance not only of Western power but of Western ideology'. 
1.4 Post Washington Consensus: PRSPs replacing SAPs mechanisms 
With growing criticisms of the Washington Consensus reforms and its SAPs 
(Cornia et al., 1987; Walton and Seddon, 1994), the World Bank and other 
international financial institutions came under pressure to make changes to their 
existing methods aimed at the developing world. At this time the agenda of `good 
governance' emerged, an agenda firstly used by World Bank in a report on Africa 
in 1989 (World Bank, 1989). The failure of previous SAPs and some other aid 
projects were regarded as a consequence of `poor governance' by the report. 
The idea of `good governance', according to Robertson et al. (2007: 55), 
embraced the notion of `an efficient public service; respect for human rights; an 
independent judiciary and legal framework; economic liberalism; protection of 
private property; political pluralism; participation, administrative accountability; 
transparency and respect for the law' (Leftwich, 1993: 610; Osborne, 1993: 67). 
However as Roberston et al. (2007: 57) went on to argue, the concept of `good 
governance' did not actually completely break from the Washington Consensus, as 
it still emphasised a minimal state role and market liberalisation, though it 
acknowledged the non-economic factors for economic success. Thus the overall 
logic of SAPs remained largely unchanged within this `good governance' agenda, 
as macroeconomic policies such as market liberalization, export-oriented free 
markets, the removal of trade barriers and tariffs all remained paramount. 
SAPs were not replaced until the emergence of the Post-Washington Consensus 
(Stiglitz, 1998; 2002) which sought an alternative strategy `in which state 
intervention is greater in depth and breadth' (Fine, 2001: 139) yet still able to work 
with the market. It was seeking to `establish the appropriate role of state in view 
of market imperfections', and `potentially correcting, market imperfections - 
rather than simply creating them as for the Washington Consensus for which the 
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world would be a better place if it were made more and more, if not completely, 
like the market' (ibid). 
According to Robertson et al. (2007: 59), if the 1980s represented a period 
wherein the dominant logic of development focused upon markets, and the early 
1990s focused upon both markets and states, then the late 1990s can be seen as `a 
re/turn to the social but always with a focus on the primacy of markets'. At this 
time the concept of social capital (Fine, 2001) was increasingly seen as `one of the 
key non-market externalities that could promote growth through social cohesion' 
(Robertson et al., 2007: 19). Such ideas were also reflected in the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Programmes (PRSPs) developed in 1999 by the IMF/World 
Bank, instead of the previously favoured SAPs. According to the World Bank: 
Social capital refers to the internal social and cultural coherence of 
society, the norms and values that govern interactions among people and 
the institutions in which they are embedded. Social capital is the glue that 
holds societies together and without which there can be no economic 
growth or human well-being. Without social capital, society at large will 
collapse, and today's world represents some very sad examples of this 
(Fine, 2001: 158). 
In terms of PRSPs, the transformation represented a shift in donor logic to a 
greater consideration of the recipients and the aid relationship: 
According to the IMF (2005) PRSPs were `country-driven' and thus 
would promote strong national ownership of development strategies 
including broad and active involvement of civil society. They were also 
`result orientated' with a clear focus on benefiting the poor, 
`comprehensive' in their understanding of the multidimensional nature of 
poverty, `partnership oriented' involving careful coordination between all 
the different stakeholders and donors and `long term' with a view to 
addressing poverty reduction (Robertson et al., 2007: 60). 
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Despite criticisms and sceptical views, certain ideas relating to social capital (i. e. 
benefiting the poor, searching for a more participatory, bottom-up model of 
development, as well as the equity issues from the Post-Washington Consensus 
`paradigm') had important effects on the strategy of aid and the goals for 
educational development globally. Th e poverty agenda had taken centre stage. 
In September 2000, building upon a decade of major United Nations conferences 
and summits, world leaders gathered in New York to adopt the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration, `committing their nations to a new global partnership to 
reduce extreme poverty and setting out a series of time-bound targets - with a 
deadline of 2015 - that have become known as the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs)' (United Nations website). 20 The goals are eight international 
development goals that all 192 United Nations member states and at least 23 
international organisations have agreed to achieve by the year 2015, including the 
focus on poverty reduction and universal primary education (UPE). 21 
Summary 
According to the time line we tracked back historically, the key features of 
international aid are summarised in the table below. Aid, is not a single 
homogeneous category, but can be broken down into these four areas (shown 
horizontally). 
We divide the stages of international aid into three periods: the decolonisation 
period, the Cold War and Washington Consensus period and the post-Washington 
Consensus period. We can see that, in accordance with these changing 
international situations, discourse, mechanisms and the logic of intervention also 
changed. 
20 See http: //www. un. org/millenniumgoals/bkgd. shtml. 
21 These eight goals of MDGs are: 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 2. Achieve universal primary 
education; 3. Promote gender equality and empower women; 4. Reduce child mortality; 5. Improve maternal 
health; 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; 7. Ensure environmental sustainability; 8. Develop 
a Global Partnership for Development. (see The World Bank website, http: //go. worldbank. org/9NL8YAYOEO) 
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Table 2.1 Western aid: changing international situations, aid discourses, 
mechanisms and logic of intervention 
International Discourse Aid Logic of 
situation Mechanism intervention 
1950s - Decolonisation Decolonisation, Imitating the Help low-income 
1960s and the modernisation, West countries to catch 
beginning of aid stages of up to developed 
economic growth ones and to be 
and economic `modern' 
taking-off 
1970s - two superpowers Globalisation, Conditionality From support for 
1990s and their client neo-liberal market, clauses, client states to 
states in the Cold Washington SAPs, top-down the consideration 
War time, world Consensus, human model for international 
economic crisis capital, Good security and 




2000- Non-economic post-Washington PRSPs, Participatory 
factors and consensus, market bottom-up model intervention, aid 
development, imperfection, role on policy reform 
diverse of state, social 
cooperation in capital 
North and South 
In the first instance, from this summary it is necessary to emphasise that the 
development of foreign aid during the past decades has been related to the 
intervention of dominant Western countries into the developing world. To 
elaborate, following the Second World War there were two significant events 
which dictated the intervention into the developing South by `powerful states 
from the North and their allies': decolonisation and the Cold War (Blakeley, 2009: 
80). In other words, aid was tied to changing international situations among 
different powers. Earlier colonial relations were replaced by donor-recipient 
relationships with the aim being to help former colonies catch up with the West. 
Cold War era assistance for client states was replaced by a neoliberal global 
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market, thus continuing and solidifying Western models. Secondly from the 
donors' perspective, the mechanisms of aid transformed from setting the Western 
models to reforming the Western models. To elaborate, upon realizing the 
unsatisfactory performance of the Washington Consensus, donors fashioned a 
more diverse and harmonious way to consider the role of states in the market, the 
role of recipient governments in aid relations, and the role donors play in creating 
a more participatory donor group to give aid. 
After historically talking about the international background of aid, the next 
section, is mainly about aid in the current globalisation era, namely, the period in 
the last row of the above table and especially the situation in the new century. 
2. Conceptualising the global context and contemporary aid 
2.1 Globalisation 
According to the table we summarised in section one, we notice that the donors' 
logic has been moving from setting an aim (or a modelt giving prescription) of 
modernisation, to a participatory (collaborative) intervention; and this intervention 
is more on policy reform rather than on the projects investment. We now move 
to talk about `aid' mainly under the contemporary global political economy. 
To explore this, it is necessary to know `globalisation', a general background 
setting which is normally introduced in contemporary studies of international aid, 
including studies of educational aid. As mentioned in the introduction, although 
the term `globalisation' became popular after `aid' policy began, we cannot deny 
that this global era, which features knowledge economies, an on-going global 
market, advancing technology and so on, is increasing the forms of `aid'. 
Contemporary roles within the framework of international aid are changing in 
both the global North and South. Thus, when we place international aid to 
education into the context of globalisation, we will obtain a comprehensive 
background to the transformation in the practice of aid. 
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There is a mass of academic literature considering globalisation. As Robertson et 
al. (2007: 2) noted, since the 1980s there has been an explosion of interest in the 
idea of globalisation; the surge in interest has been partly caused by the significant 
progress of technology and communication reform during last three decades, as 
well as the emergence of neo-liberal policies and programmes. A typical definition 
from Giddens (1990) describes globalisation as `a central driving force behind the 
rapid social, political and economic changes that are reshaping modern societies 
and world order' (cited in Held, 1999: 7). The world is in a transformation that 
means there is `no longer a clear distinction between international and domestic, 
external and internal affairs' (Rosenau, 1990, cited in Held, 1999: 7). 
It is worthwhile to summarise Held's (1999) opinion of the transformationists, 
who claim that we are seeking the interaction of powers and their causal 
relationships within a `highly differentiated' transformation. 22 Furthe rmore the 
transformationists believe that globalisation is a historically unprecedented 
process requiring governments and societies to make transformations to cope with 
this new global situation; however we are not sure about the directions and the 
trajectory of this process given that the effects are always uneven and 
contradictory. Therefore the most important point for understanding globalisation 
is to focus on its `multicentric, multiscalar, multitemporal, multiform, and 
multicausal' features (Jessop, 2008: 178). 
Thus it can be seen that with different research implications, there are different 
definitions and focal points. I will seek my topic by considering globalisation 
from a political economic perspective. 
2.1.1 Globalisation as a process of neo-liberalism 
22 Held (1999: 3) introduced three thesis about the globalisation process. The first is the hyperglobalist thesis 
which `privileges an economic logic and, in its neoliberal variant, celebrates the emergence of a single global 
market and principle of global competition as the harbingers of human progress'. Such a position is 
exemplified by Ohmae (1995: 149), believing 'a transnational mode of organisation for managing economic 
affairs'. By comparison the second thesis is the skeptical view, and argues that contemporary globalisation is 
`wholly exaggerated' (Hirst, 1997), and it is actually less integrated than it once was in the classic Gold 
Standard era (1870-1914) (Boyer and Drache, 1996). The third group is for transformationalists such as 
Giddens (1990), Rosenau (1990), Scholte (1993) and Castells (1996), who claim that globalisation is 
historically unprecedented, meaning that governments and societies have to adjust themselves to this new era. 
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McMichael (2004: 152) noted, `development, once a public project, started to 
become redefined as a private, global project'. He also argues that modernity 
under the globalisation project is `less a national property expressed in citizenship 
and more a global property expressed in consumption' (2004: 154). 
The most significant feature of the global era is the neo-liberal global market 
based within the context of economic globalisation. While the economic 
philosophy of neo-liberalism has become widespread during the last 25 years or 
so, with the rapid globalisation of the capitalist economy we are now seeing 
neo-liberalism on a global scale (Martinez and Garcia, 2000). Globalisation is 
increasingly becoming akin to a neo-liberal process. 
Neo-liberal globalisation is presented as the antidote to the problem of poverty. 
Mittelman explained: 
Neo-liberalism provides the rationale for measures that propel 
globalisation, such as structural adjustment policies. From this 
perspective, a commitment to reducing poverty can only be displayed by 
integration into the international capitalist economy (Mittelman, 2000: 
78). 
Within this `international capitalist economy', the neo-liberal ideology, which 
promotes the expansion of the self-regulating markets and is considered as a 
mechanism to realise some social developmental goals, cannot in reality solve 
these problems very well. Critics claim that the Washington Consensus and its 
`structural adjustment policies' are not necessary for the development of the poor 
countries, saying instead that the international economic organisation is setting 
unequal game regulations which `impose some unsuccessful policies to the 
developing countries' who rely on suggestions from these policies (Stiglitz, 2005). 
Scholars such as Mittelman argued that, `there is good reason to feel less than 
confident about neo-liberal models of economic and social development' 
(Robertson et al., 2007: 13); and `the result is new winners and new losers, with 
some segments of the labor force adjusting speedily into poverty' (Mittelman, 
2000: 78). 
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Here, by introducing the concept of the neo-liberal model, I want to establish this 
as the theoretical basis of my future discussion about the Western model of the 
international aid to education. Around the world, neo-liberalism has been 
promoted by powerful financial institutions such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. The 
World Bank is the largest lender of educational aid all over the world, and is thus 
discussed in more detail subsequently. Since economic globalisation is taking the 
form of a `knowledge economy', the function of education is thereby getting more 
attention from those international organisations. 
2.1.2 Globalisation as a politicization process 
In fact, the concept of globalisation cannot be easily divided into economic and 
political realms, as the economy is becoming a `political economy' and politics is 
becoming `economic politics' in this global era. In terms of `political economy', 
O'Neil (2007: 77) explains this as the interactions between political institutions 
and economic institutions and how this relationship shapes the balance of freedom 
and equality. In other words, it is describing how economy cannot be as free and 
equal as people suppose given that economy relies upon an array of institutions 
which are related with certain politics. 
Originally defined as an economic process, globalisation contains increasingly 
complex relationships today, including the use of economic conditions to give 
policy influence among countries, especially from North to South. Here, 
globalisation is going to be considered in its wider political meaning, as 
mentioned by Campbell (1998): 
Most economists argue that globalisation is the outcome of unavoidable 
adjustments to the new rules of international competition and to the laws 
of the market-place which supposedly ensure the optimum distribution of 
resources around the world. But globalisation should be seen more as an 
eminently political process involving negotiations and struggles for 
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influence and power engineered and institutionalized by players such as 
governments, transnational corporations and multilateral financial 
institutions (1998: 25). 
The liberalization underway goes hand-in-hand with a programmed 
withdrawal by the state from certain areas such as planning, production 
and social reform and a re-orientation of its involvement in others, like 
redistribution, regulation and mediation. The aim is to encourage special 
economic growth strategies based on the promotion of private interests 
(1998: 27). 
Looking into globalisation politically can help us capture `the stretching of 
political relations across space and time; the extension of political power and 
political activity across the boundaries of the modern nation-state' (Held, 1999: 
49). Employing the concept `politicization' here refers especially to making the 
economic process political. Economic development is becoming both a pressure 
and a motivation for developing countries. To obtain economic development faster, 
developing countries are receiving support from international or national 
institutions; this receipt of aid is always alongside some compliance of the policy 
adjustment on the part of the recipient. That means the less-developed `partners' 
within the global market will have to accept the rules of this global political 
economy in order to overcome poverty (Mittelman, 2000). 
To introduce the context of the political issues and international relationships as 
well as how this relates with the politicization and conditionality of aid 
approaches is the basis of my research. The international demand for politicization 
has two significant milestones, the Cold War and September 11th, 2001. Aid has 
always been related with the complex international relations and this is increasing. 
This is especially true for when aid is given with political conditions, for example 
within the new strategies to prevent terrorism and improve international security. 
When we talk about the Southern cooperation between China and Africa in the 
following chapters, there will be more logic embedded within a political economic 
picture. 
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To sum up, the introduction on globalisation from both economic and political 
perspectives is the theoretical basis of the relationship between educational aid 
and the totality of international aid, which relates to how donors consider the 
contribution of education to their aid activities. 
2.2 International aid in the new century 
What does international aid look like in this global era? It is firstly necessary to 
introduce the contemporary international aid system. 
According to Tilak (2002: 302-303), the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, amongst 
others, are primarily lending organisations. For these institutions, lending is not an 
instrument of learning; learning cannot be an objective of their lending. On the 
other hand, other organisations are not primarily lending organisations. This latter 
type may provide various types of assistance-monetary or technical, including 
research-to developing countries. For example, UNICEF, UNDP and UNESCO 
are considered to have relatively more interest in learning and building a 
knowledge base. 
The third group of organisations, mostly bilateral and may try to balance their 
interests in aid and learning, depending upon their own requirements. 23 Thu s 
depending on context, they may sometimes take more interest in lending and other 
times more interest in research, development, and thereby, in learning. 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) also constitute an important donor 
group. According to Chege (1999: 6), there has been a shift of donors from 
governments to NGOs in 1990s, meaning that cooperation between governments 
and NGOs is critical for greater effectiveness; interestingly, `some African 
governments remain critical of certain NGOs'. As Chege said, 'NGOs are likely to 
better understand people's needs, but despite what some donors seem to think, 
Z' This include the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the Swiss Development Corporation (SDC), the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Department for International Development (DFID of UK), and Deutsche 
Kultur International (DKI), etc. 
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governments cannot be pushed to the periphery'. On the other hand, in the year of 
the Paris Declaration (31d of February in 2005), 26 NGOs from the North and 
South met to discuss aid effectiveness. 24 In their statement, while they expressed 
a belief that `this declaration is important and much needed', in somewhat 
contradictory fashion they noted that NGOs consider that `a number of important 
issues in the declaration have no indicator to match them and a number of the 
existing indicators are very weak and vague. ' Therefore `the good principles in the 
Paris draft Declaration cannot really be put into practice without a profound 
reform of the aid regime' (UN-NGLS, 2005). 
What, then, is the job and logic of these institutions and organisations, for MDGs, 
for global capitalism, for global democratization, for business, or in the words of 
this research, for what kind of logic? To address this question, this section will 
explore contemporary `aid' according to the aforementioned elements involved in 
discussing `donor logic' - the changes in aid motives, aid relationships, aid 
conditionalities, and aid architectures. 
2.2.1 The development of aid `discourses' 
2.2.1.1 Changing discourse according to changing motives 
Aid discourses are always various with the changing aid motives, so firstly it 
is necessary to trace back again on how aid motives changed since it emerged. 
From George C. Marshall's plan to provide massive aid to European countries 
in order to rebuild their economies after the Second World War, to the US 
oriented aid policy for strengthening national security, and the other Western 
countries' considerations based more upon moral principles and `a kind of 
veneration of their own former colonies' (Degnbol-Martinussen and 
Engberg-Pedersen, 2003: 9), the motives of the donors are changing. 
Generally, the main types relate to `moral and humanitarian principles, 
political and national security considerations, and economic and trade 
24 The NGOs signed on this `NGO statement on aid effectiveness' are including organisations such as 
Afrodad of Zimbabwe, Action Aid International of UK, Cordaid of Netherlands, Oxfam International, World 
Vision of Germany and so on. 
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considerations'. In recent years, donors have also emphasised environmental 
plans and the war on terror (ibid: 9). 
While there are some variances, the core meaning of `aid' is the assistance of 
economic development. As previously stated, from Rostow's stages of 
economic growth (aid for an economic take-off) to the Washington Consensus 
(where aid is attached to conditions relating to neo-liberal globalisation), all 
donors have `emphasised the promotion of spe cific forms of development in 
recipient countries' (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2003: 25). 
To reiterate a pervious point, there are some changes in motivation of donor 
countries after the Cold War and in the beginning of the 90s. The end of the 
Cold War has caused the disappearance of a group of donor countries since 
some Eastern Europe countries transformed into recipient countries at that 
time. This also has reduced the motivation of many DAC countries, especially 
the USA (ibid: 23). Moreover, the end of Cold War has indirectly caused 
more frequent outbreaks of national and ethnic conflicts, thus `national 
security' became one of the more important conditions of foreign aid policies 
since September 11,2001. 
Motives of the recipient countries are generally about promoting their 
economic and social development. Yet we highlight here that this does not 
mean that recipient countries welcome all donor countries' aid plans. 
Especially with the development of the policy-based aid approaches, there are 
an increasing number of Southern countries which have sceptical opinions 
towards to foreign aid (ibid: 21). As mentioned before, some criticisms focus 
on the gap between foreign aid approaches and domestic reform, whereas 
others argue about the conditionality of aid. 
Following the Cold War, with evidence continuing to show the aid reduction 
from the North, a new trend has emerged that `expresses desire to develop 
more symmetrical interrelations or partnerships between the North and the 
South' (King, 1998: 4). As King pointed out, both bilateral and multilateral 
aid relationships have been transformed to `new directions' within the `new 
global context'. In this new context, multilateral agencies and organisations 
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have adopted a partnership discourse, as exemplified by the World Bank's 
`New Directions and New Partnerships' (Wolfensohn, 1995) and DAC's 
`Development Partnership in the New Global Context' (OECD, 1996). 
Bilateral aid, for instance the UK's prospect of a `brave new situation' with 
`genuine' partnerships' and Sweden's `a more equal and respectful 
relationship', have been praised highly on the world stage (King, 1999: 15). 
Therefore the character of foreign aid seems have been changed from 
instructional to collaborative, and the partnership discourse became one of the 
main trends in the late 1990s. Despite how this `partnership' formed (namely, 
who is the senior partner of the partnership, both or one side? ), the appearing 
of many partnerships in policy language is a sign of increasing demanding of 
equal position between donors and recipients. It seems the donors have 
noticed that one of the solutions to make effort on aid, could be a two-side 
way rather than one-side way. Following what King (1999: 16) addressed, in 
the late 1990s there was an emergence of a `New Africa' with `a new 
generation of leaders and policy-makers determined to engage with the world 
on equal terms (Olukoshi, 1997)'. There has been a trend of a `Southern 
insistence on a new relationship' with donor countries. However, King (1999: 
16) argued, `the new partnership paradigm may not remove selectivity or 
indirect conditionality' : 25 
It could merely shift the conditionality from the macro-economic terms 
associated with structural adjustment era to a situation where the North 
chooses partners according to whether they fulfill certain other essential 
criteria (ibid). 
2.2.1.2 EFA, MDGs and Paris Declaration 
All these above various changes came to a head of EFA in 1990 (and the 
Dakar Framework for Action in 2000), MDGs in 2000 (aforementioned in 
this chapter) and Paris Declaration in 2005. Within these series of world 
agendas, an emphasis on partnership and collaboration has been made 
25 There will be more talk about aid con ditionality and selectivity in the following section. 
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frequently. According to Dakar Framework for Action in 2000, ' partner 
members of the international community undertake to work in a consistent, 
co-ordinated and coherent manner', and `each partner will contribute 
according to its comparative advantage in support of the National EFA Plans 
to ensure that resource gaps are filled' (UNESCO, 2000). The eighth goal of 
MDGs called for `a global partnership for development' between developing 
and developed countries, public and private sectors, governments and 
companies, etc., in order to make aid continue to help the least developed 
areas (United Nations, 2007). 
In order to gain a `new' aid discourse and better relations in the new era, the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, endorsed on 2 March 2005, is `an 
international agreement to which over one hundred Ministers, Heads of 
Agencies and other Senior Officials adhered and committed their countries 
and organisations to continue to increase efforts in harmonisation, alignment 
and managing aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and 
indicators'. 26 In addition, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) was drawn up 
in 2008 and builds upon the commitments agreed in the Paris Declaration 
(OECD website). 27 Howe ver, the question remains whether this new agenda 
can make any difference on orthodox aid logic. 
Like many other elements of the new aid architecture, the Paris 
Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) have become part of 
the stock-in-trade of donor discourse. A nod in the direction of the Paris 
Declaration or the AAA has become mandatory, even when some aid 
donors may be continuing business-as-usual. The Paris Declaration has 
become a shorthand term for a whole series of proposed reforms in the 
aid industry, including greater country ownership, aid alignment with 
national policies, and more harmonisation amongst the multitude of 
26 According to Paris Declaration, five principles broken down into specific indicators and targets are to 
guide future aid relationships between donors and recipients: Ownership - donors are to base their overall 
support on partner countries' own national development plans etc; Alignment - partner countries are to 
exercise leadership over their policies and donors are to respect their leadership; Harmonisation - donors are 
to harmonise actions so as to lower transaction costs for the recipients; Managing for results - more 
results oriented decision making etc; Mutual accountability-including promoting transparency and 
participation. (Davies, 2007: 62) 
7 See http: //www. oecd. org/document/18/0,3343, en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00. html 
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`development partners'. This is a particularly critical moment to see 
where the reform of aid has reached. Many traditional donors have a very 
large domestic financial crisis on their hands, whose scale dwarfs the 
sums they have allocated to foreign aid in the past. This global financial 
crisis is also a direct threat to the many promises of rich nations 
dramatically to increase their foreign aid. On the other hand, many 
so-called emerging economies, such as China, India and Brazil, are 
considering the ways they can use their very large foreign exchange 
reserves; and development assistance is one option for the strategic use of 
some of their resources (King ed., 2009: 1). 
Above all, facts show that there has been a series of changing discourses from 
traditional donor groups, and also indicate the emergence of `developing 
economies', and a changing relationship between North and South as well as 
among North or South countries themselves. Aid although within those changes, 
is still predominantly given by orthodox donors. Yet more and more challenges 
from the increasing voices from recipient countries, and even a special case such 
as China, has come to play a double role in the aid practice. 
Within these so-called new aid architectures, what is the role of education, and 
what is the educational aid discourse focusing on? Certainly education is 
linked closely with the poverty reduction agenda and closely with the 
economic growth especially when knowledge economy (KE) has been focused 
on as simultaneously an increasingly common component of the discourses 
around globalisation and education (Dale, 2005: 117). We now move to 
discuss this. 
2.2.1.2 Educational aid in the knowledge economy discourse 
Educational aid is always embedded in a complex historical background and 
involved in the changing `logic of intervention'. It is longitudinally located within 
history from the post-colonial period to the contemporary global era, and 
horizontally correlated with the roles of the developed Western countries and 
43 
international organisations. Thus aid to education is an economic and political 
issue rather than only an educational question. This is well illustrated by Dale: 
Very simply, Education was seen as central to modernisation theory; it 
was a key means through which individuals in developing societies 
would become `modem', i e. like the West, and the logic of intervention 
was to construct programmes of development assistance to education. 
Under the Washington Consensus the assumption was that progress 
would be achieved if all developing countries followed a harsh regime of 
economic orthodoxy, and this was later followed by a rather `softer' 
regime emphasising the need for stakeholder participation (2010: 2). 
Economic globalisation is increasingly linked to education with the term 
`knowledge economy' (KE) - where `knowledge' takes over from `production' as 
the key driver and basis of economic prosperity (Dale, 2005: 146). 
Globalisation enters the education sector on an ideological horse, and its 
effects on education and the production of knowledge are largely a product 
of that financially-driven, free-market ideology, not of a clear conception 
for improving education (Carnoy, 1999: 59). 28 
Tilak (2002: 298) states that by the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s, the 
critical relevance of knowledge - including its production, distribution and 
utilization - in the process of economic growth had been widely acknowledged; 
moreover k nowledge has come to be the most important factor of economic 
growth. Furthermore Tilak (2002: 299) argued that `the nature of the emerging 
knowledge society is also to be understood in the overall international context of 
globalisation, marketisation and technology explosion, e. g. "knowledge society", 
"global(ised) society", and "technology society" or "information technology (IT) 
society" are closely related with implications for each other, and it may not be 
proper to view them as separate systems, though they are also not the same. ' 
28 The similarity is emphasised by Carnoy again in 2002: `Globalisation is a force reorganizing the world's 
economy, and the main resources for that economy are increasingly knowledge and information... . 
To 
complicate the situation further, global economics and ideology are increasingly intertwined in international 
institutions that promulgate particular strategies for educational change'. (Carnoy and Rhoten, 2002: 2) 
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In this context, the proportion of educational aid in the total aid contents is 
increasing. According to the EFA Global Monitoring Report 2005, `in 2002, ODA 
commitments to education exceeded US$4 billion for the first time since 1999 and 
represented about 9% of total commitments. 29 It is expected that further increases 
will follow' (UNESCO, 2005: 18). From this it can be ascertained that educational 
aid will continue to be an important component of the aid system all over the 
world. 
2.2.1.2.1 World Bank: Investing in education for KE 
It is necessary to mention the frequency of aid from the World Bank (the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and its KE discourse. As 
it introduces itself, the Bank has been helping advance learning in developing 
countries since 1963 and today remains the world's single largest provider of 
external funding for education (World Bank, 2007). 30 
The World Bank is argued to be the representative of neo-liberal theories, with 
evidence provided by the Washington consensus (Woods, 2006: 180). 31 Ho wever, 
there have been some new agendas appearing during the post-Washington 
Consensus time (e. g. the `good governance' agenda and the MDGs), which reflect 
`a more consensual and social-market approach that took seriously the inequalities 
produced by the Washington Consensus' (Robertson et al., 2007: 55). With the 
transition towards a post-Washington paradigm, a movement towards a new 
agenda may be seen in the World Bank, as well as in Jomtien conference on EFA 
in 1990 (ibid: 61). In 2000 the Bank moved itself from a financial bank to a 
`knowledge bank'. According to Nath (2000: 9), `by doing so it has ideologically 
29 Each year, the EFA Global Monitoring Report analyses the level and distribution of international aid to 
education, particularly basic education; it draws mostly on the international database of the OECD's 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 
30 The International Development Association (IDA), established in 1960, is the part of the World Bank 
which `helps the world's poorest countries' by `providing interest-free credits and grants for programs that 
boost economic growth, reduce inequalities and improve people's living conditions'. As we mentioned before, 
bilateral aid donors are mostly members of the IDA. 
" According to Woods (2006: 180), one of the World Bank's driving forces is economic ideas, fashions, and 
orthodoxies, as shaped by the needs of each institution. For the World Bank, the Washington consensus on 
adjustment `offered a conditionality-heavy but relatively resource-light way to deal with a large number of 
member countries in crisis' at that time. 
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moved ahead - as knowledge is incubated in all human minds and is a factor of 
growth and development. ' 
This brings us to the field of education, in which the World Bank is promoting its 
approaches in a political economic way, although highly claims the targets such as 
universal human rights and poverty reduction. As Jones and Coleman (2005: 94) 
describes, `although a UN specialized agency, in functional terms the World Bank 
is better understood as a bank, as a borrowing and lending financial institution 
dedicated, above all, to its own survival in the volatile financial world'. 32 Th is 
begs two questions: what is the World Bank's perception of `education'? and, 
what is the role of educational development according to the bank? As one of the 
institutions of the United Nations, the World Bank is supporting the achievement 
of MDGs by putting education into the discourse of Knowledge Economy. As its 
introduction of its central discourse in education., 
The World Bank's strategic thrust is to help countries integrate education 
into national economic strategies and develop holistic education systems 
responsive to national socio economic needs. The World Bank is 
committed to help countries achieve Education for All (EFA) and, 
through Education for the Knowledge Economy (EKE), build dynamic 
knowledge societies (World Bank, n. d. ). 33 
This description begs the question, is it truly as simple as giving more educational 
investment to low-income countries in hopes that the development of education 
will reduce poverty? Obviously there are more complex factors with which people 
should be concerned. Firstly there is still an issue with selectivity. As Jones argues, 
32 Jones (1992)'s earlier work, which talks mainly about the pre-1989's aid system, has systematically 
illustrated the World Bank's financing of education and its 'policy conditionality', and ultimately notes that 
the Bank's view of education has been a `stunted one' in need of additional effort to contribute to the world's 
equity and freedom through education. 
37 See this quotation on World Bank website: http: //go. worldbank. org/A3MWX9WAMO. 
In detailing the EKE approach for educational development, the World Bank describes its job as follows: 
World Bank assistance is aimed at helping developing countries equip themselves with the highly skilled and 
flexible human capital needed to compete effectively in today's dynamic global markets. Such assistance 
recognizes first and foremost that the ability to produce and use knowledge has become a major factor in 
development and is critical to a nation's comparative advantage. It also recognizes that surging demand for 
secondary education in many parts of the world creates an invaluable opportunity to develop a workforce that 
is well-trained and capable of generating knowledge-driven economic growth. (World Bank, 
http: //go. worldbank. org/TJAXOI2A50) 
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in countries where World Bank educational lending is substantial, it must be 
ensured that costs are consistent with the above policy note- and that, at a 
minimum, they are implemented in Bank supported institutions (Jones, 1992: 248). 
Furthermore, in the supporting process, the bank's KE procedure of giving more 
financial aid to education must also be seen as a political process. To elaborate, 
the bank's support is in the form of repayable loans joined with freely given 
technical assistance; Jones and Coleman (2005: 94) argue this to be a `purveyor of 
ideas'. According to Jones and Coleman, the World Bank is consistently 
promoting firm views of how education policy should relate to the fiscal, 
economic and social dimensions of public policy. Seen in this light, the bank is 
both lender and persuader: 
The covenants attached to an educational loan, for example, may well 
have little to do with educational matters directly, but might rather 
address broader questions of governmental economic and social 
policy. . . 
More influential are the covenants that address directly a 
government's fiscal position, its development priorities, and the contents 
of its economic and social policy framework. (Jones and Coleman, 2005: 
104) 
Thus, the two basic purposes of the World Bank's educational policies are, 
according to Jones (2006: 99): as a Bank it needs to set the terms of its own 
lending, specifically the basis and reasons for its financial support; secondly, the 
Bank is keen to influence and shape educational policies worldwide, and expand 
and promote its neo-liberal views of how to achieve economic stability and 
growth. 
With regard to the recent KE discourse, and taking the example of the bank's 
Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM), Robertson (2008: 20) argues that, 
through a tool such as KAM, the interests of developed countries (particular the 
US) are being advanced and reinfor ced at regional, national and institutional 
scales of policymaking and practice. 34 There fore a critical question may be posed 
34 According to Robertson's introduction, KAM is the centerpiece and underpinning architecture of the 
Bank's Knowledge for development (K4D) programme. There are 81 structural and qualitative variables for 
47 
towards to the bank's KE discourse: whose knowledge it is? To elaborate, when 
the bank highlights the importance of knowledge and celebrates its contribution to 
global development, it is potentially embracing a particular bank area, that being a 
`very particular kind of economy- a globally-oriented, market-based economy and 
society' (Robertson, 2008: 11). 
Therefore it can be argued that the World Bank's point of view towards education 
is coming from an economic perspective, seeing `investment in education as the 
basis for growth and for the realization of a so called knowledge-based economy' 
(Robertson and Dale, 2008). Within its `education for KE' slogan, the World Bank 
actually leaves us with some questions, for instance, what kind of knowledge and 
what kind of economy is education contributing towards? Namely, as donors, how 
do they use the relation between knowledge and economy when they are giving 
educational aid? 
For the World Bank, Africa is one of the most urgent areas in need of aid: in 2007 
the bank stated `Africa is a priority for the development community and the World 
Bank' (World Bank, 2007). The World Bank has provided 20-25 percent of 
external aid to Africa (Ridker, 1994), including financial support, and the 
interrelated forum, project and policy discussion (World Bank, 2001: 60). 
According to the 2001 educational report on sub-Saharan Africa, which reviewed 
some past inefficiencies and shortcomings, the bank called upon itself to `do more' 
and that it `must do it better' in Africa during the new century. 
Supporting accelerated education development in Africa is pivotal to the 
World Bank mission of eliminating poverty. The Bank has two 
comparative advantages for education sector development: a strong 
macroeconomic and public expenditure perspective and an unusual depth 
and breadth of international knowledge and expertise. (World Bank, 
2001) 
132 countries to measure their performance on the four KE pillars, including education. The mechanism of 
the program is: the World Bank is using an `emulation' way rather than the earlier `structural adjustment' 
approach to stimulate member countries in the program. 
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Based on the bank's 2001 report, and the review and redefinition of conditionality 
in its 2005 report, the World Bank is trying to make some changes to its the 
educational aid to Africa in accordance with the following points: 
* Expanded lending service, especially more effort on primary education. The 
proportion of lending to primary education is from 29% during 1985-1989 to 46% 
during 1995-1999. (2001: 62) 
* Greater emphasis on nonlending services through seminars and workshops. 
(2001: 64) 
* Promoting partnerships: working together with other donors and governments 
toward common goals, such as the African Development Bank, the European 
Commission, or the European Investment Band (World Bank, 2001,2005) 
From declaring of giving more `nonlending' services and the calling for 
`partnerships', we can see a trend that the bank is making changes on being an 
`assertive' bank (Jones, 2007: 242). However, Easterly (2003: 35-36) listed a 
series of discourses by the World Bank from 1984 to 2002, in the reports about its 
effort on aid, and pointed out (2003: 36), the World Bank's discourse only showed 
an increasing growth of aid disbursements which can only give more comfort, 
rather than showing a excellent performance on aid. Jones (2007: 259) argued that 
the Bank officers may be more interested in the pace of aid disbursement than in 
the quality of projects. 
Above all, we may conclude the bank's logic of aid as below: 
(a) Giving aid is also giving intervention (especially neo-liberal influence) to the 
less developed countries on certain social policies. 
(b) From a lending institution's perspective, aid is never `free', just like you need 
to pay interest when you get loans. Moreover, bank can select to whom they want 
to lend. 
(c) As the relation between education (gaining knowledge) and the economic 
growth is getting increasingly closer, thus investing in education in poor countries 
is an important way to influence their social/governmental structures. 
(d) Practising as a purveyor of ideas, as well as of funds. 
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To conclude, the role of education in the contemporary world gives the bank more 
possibilities to shape the world by its mechanisms (if the bank wants to continue 
to make neo-liberal influence). Therefore, the bank's view/logic towards 
knowledge, maybe can only be interpreted as `the bankable aspects of education, 
given it cannot afford too wide a gap between its policy rhetoric and what it is 
prepared to' (Jones, 2007: 260). Indeed, this gap is a big challenge for the bank, 
just as King and McGrath (2004) pointed out, knowledge clearly is important to 
development, but in a highly complex and contested way. Indeed, perhaps the 
greatest benefit of the `discovery' of knowledge by agencies is its effect of 
opening up their activities to a new form of scrutiny, which challenges them to 
follow the fuller logic of what they profess to believe in and do as a result of their 
belief in knowledge for development (King and McGrath, 2004: 52-53). 
2.2.2 The development of aid 'mechanisms' 
2.2.2.1 Conditionality and changing conditionality 
We have talked about the background of aid conditionality in previous sections, 
yet there are still a lot of discussions which have arisen given the conditionality of 
aid. Conditionality is one of the most distinctive mechanisms of orthodox aid, 
although it has been amended in many ways since the 90s. As Mosley et al. 
(2003: 1) introduce it, the nature of conditionality, particularly as applied by the 
World Bank and the IMF, is changing in response to perceived failings in 
enforcement (World Bank, 2000). Several donor agencies are moving towards a 
model of `new conditionality' in which only a part of the aid programme is 
subjected to conditionality. In this new system, NGOs and the private sector are 
used as alternative agents of programme implementation (Mosley et al., 2004). 
The definition of the conditionality by the World Bank is stated as: 
The Bank makes its resources available if the borrower (a) maintains an 
adequate macroeconomic framework, (b) implements its overall program 
in a manner satisfactory to the Bank, and (c) complies with the policy and 
institutional actions that are deemed critical for the implementation and 
so 
expected results of the supported program. (World Bank, 2005b: 1) 
Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen (2003: 27) summarised the two 
generations of conditionalities based on World Bank's structural adjustment 
programmes. The `Washington Consensus' can be seen as the first generation of 
donor conditionalities, and the second, democratization and good governance, 
came in 1990s. As they observed, during the last fifteen to twenty years these 
conditionalities have become more widespread and far-reaching (2003: 269). 
Whereas earlier conditionalities were limited to demands for a specific economic 
policy, they now include demands for good governance, political-administrative 
reforms, and the division of labour between state and private sector more 
generally. The aim of such a package of conditionalities is to influence the entire 
policy process from structuring decision-making, to policy formulation, to 
implementation (Raffer and Singer, 1996). This is similar to what Mosse (2005a: 
3-4) has mentioned regarding the two trends of aid. First, aid is framed by an 
international commitment to poverty reduction, and in particular, many donors 
have pinned their goals to internationally agreed development targets; this meant 
that during the 1980s, structural adjustment lending was replaced by debt-relief 
initiatives linked to pro-poor policy reform as part of new aid packages resulting 
from Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). The second trend is that reform 
agendas go beyond economic and financial management to `governance' more 
generally, this includes aid packages for public sector management, the support of 
civil society, and the promotion of consultative and participatory mechanisms for 
development planning. 
Conditionality has given rise to numerous critiques and has been the central topic 
of the negative part of the World Bank model of aid. As Dreher (2002: 7) 
summarised, `with the evolution of the IFIs (International financial institutions), 
conditionality gradually increased and became inseparably associated with their 
loans. This evolution was never without critics' (Payer, 1974; Dell, 1983; 
Williamson, 1983; Stiglitz, 1999; etc. ). 35 This model is often perceived as 
75 As Dreher (2002: 7) mentioned, it was argued that the IMF has put too much emphasis on internal 
adjustment and neglects development (Payer, 1974). Its intrusiveness has been criticised (Williamson 1983) 
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excessive or overly intrusive (World Bank, 2005b: 1). Morrisey's (2004: 153) 
discussion about effectiveness of aid demonstrates that if a country is unwilling to 
implement policy reforms, attaching conditions to aid will not ensure sustained 
reform; in this sense conditionality does not work. Therefore there was a 
rethinking of `conditionality' by both multilateral and bilateral donors in recent 
years. 
In 2004 British Department for International Development (DFID) in its report 
`Partnerships for poverty reduction: changing aid "conditionality"', attempted to 
set up a kind of new model of Western bilateral aid approach, focusing more on 
the accountability of both sides. With regards to conditions of aid, it clarifies the 
continuing `process conditions' to improve the quality and effectiveness of aid, 
and offers some new explanations (DFID, 2004). 36 According to the review of its 
conditionality, the World Bank (2005b) emphasised its `evolution of 
conditionality', and called for a decrease in their conditions and an increase of the 
benchmarks; furthermore it called for a shift away from traditional short-term 
macroeconomic adjustment and to remove major economic distortions in favour 
of more support for medium-term institutional changes that are complex and often 
inherently unpredictable (ibid, 2005b: 11). As mentioned previously, along with 
the above changes in aid at this time, the building of a new strategic relationship 
between donors and recipients came to be important, with hopes to work on equal 
terms. The Council of the EU claimed on its meeting on the 15th and 16th 
December in 2005 that they would build a `strategic partnership' with Africa 
based on international law and human rights, equality and mutual accountability, 
with a philosophy of African ownership and responsibility, including working 
through African institutions (Council of the European Union, 2005: 2). 
Yet in following King (1999: 16) aforementioned argument, these changes `may 
not remove selectivity or indirect conditionality', because `aid and adjustment 
lending are only provided to those countries that, on the basis of certain 
as well as its devaluation policy (Dell 1982). Some have claimed that its programs focus too narrowly on 
reducing demand, which jeopardises growth (Allen 1984). With respect to the World Bank, Stiglitz (1999) 
argued that its conditionality has been flawed and may have undermined democracy in recipient countries. 
36 For example, DFID notes that the condition will 'be strongly linked to benchmarks, which both partners 
agree are critical for tracking progress on poverty reduction', and `each will be committed to transparency, 
and will make public their decisions and the evidence on which they are based' 
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characteristics, are more likely to implement policy reforms' (Mosley et al., 
2003: 1). 
Even if these criteria are powerfully shared by the South, there remains a 
danger that the North is seen to be doing the choosing. Graphically 
illustrated in President Clinton's choice of six African countries to visit in 
1998, this tendency could result in a new set of divisions among 
developing countries and their relationships to the North (King, 1999: 
17). 37 
Similarly, Mosse (2005b) also noted that, in some cases, loans and grants are 
`made to states on the basis of demonstrable commitment and past 
performance on the reform agenda- that is "aid selectivity" rather than 
"conditionality"- and outcomes known through state-level poverty 
monitoring' (2005b: 3). 
2.2.2.2 'New architecture' of aid 
From the new century, there has been increased use of the term `new aid 
architecture' (Farrington and Lomax, 2001) which refers primarily to `from 
donorship to ownership', from `SAPS to PRSP', `from project funding to 
Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAPs), and with some focus on `sustainable 
livelihoods approaches' and `right-based approaches' (Farrington, 2001). 38 
Mosse (2005b: 3) notes that the `new architecture of aid' refers to `the focus of aid 
on policy reform rather than conventional investment projects'. This `reform' is 
`neoliberal' in the sense of promoting `economic liberalization, privatization and 
market mechanisms as the instruments of growth and efficiency' (ibid). In practice, 
37 From March 22 to April 2, Clinton visited six African countries, Ghana, Uganda, Rwanda, South Africa, 
Botswana and Senegal. It was the first visit by an American president to Africa in nearly 20 years, and the 
longest ever. Choosing these African countries was linked to Clinton's 'trade not aid' policy. Clinton claimed 
it was the beginning of 'a new African renaissance', and the tour emphasized improved trade and investment 
ties between the US and Africa (Africa Recovery, United nations, 1998: 10). 
38 According to Farrington ed. (October 2001), A SWAp is the process by which funding for a sector - 
whether internal or from donors - supports a single policy and expenditure programme under government 
leadership, and thereafter adopts common approaches across the sector. It is generally accompanied by efforts 
to strengthen government procedures for disbursement and accountability. 'A SWAp should ideally involve 
broad stakeholder consultation in the design of a coherent sector programme at micro, meso and macro levels, 
and strong co-ordination among donors and between donors and government'. 
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instead of funding individual projects, donors start to `collaborate (in principle) to 
make concessional finance available (in the short term through budgetary support) 
to assist governments to develop their own overall strategies for economic growth 
and poverty reduction (through Comprehensive Development Framework, 
sector-wide approaches (SWAPs), and the like) or finance the cost of fiscal, 
governance or pro-poor reforms that would make these strategies sustainable in 
the long run (such as privatizing loss-making public sector operations, cutting 
civil service, decentralization and anti-corruption measures)' (ibid). 39 This can be 
seen as a step followed by the `good governance' agenda in the post-Washington 
Consensus era, which intends to give more concerns on the capacity of 
recipients' governments, rather than giving details on each project. The 
subjectivity of the recipient side is increasingly considered, under the emerging 
`partnership' discourse. This change in aid, just as Eyben (2005) suggests, can be 
regarded as a shift from `gift' to `contract'. 
Mosse concludes that the two characteristics of the new aid framework are 
neoliberalism and institutionalism. `Following the collapse of communism, 
international aid became underpinned conceptually by a neoliberalist confidence 
in market exchange, the doctrine of comparative advantage and the framing of 
development goals not in terms of national economic development (through the 
administered economy) but rather in terms of establishing the conditions for 
successful participation in (production for) world markets' (Mosse, 2005b: 4). It 
seems that aid in the new era, although certainly featuring some new approaches 
and declarations, nonetheless still has some potential problems which existed in 
previous eras, chiefly inequality, which is always a hazard in neo-liberal 
globalisation. As Storm and Rao (2004: 571) note: 
International aid policy frameworks continue to endorse globalisation as 
a process of economic and political freedom (democracy) and poverty 
reduction, despite the fact that free trade seems more clearly linked to 
39 According to Wolfensohn and Fischer (2000), Comprehensive Development Frameworks (CDF) were 
proposed by the World Bank in early 1999 as a means `by which countries can manage knowledge and 
resources to design and implement effective strategies for economic development and poverty reduction'. As 
they claimed, `In order to ensure the most effective use of human and financial resources, the CDF 
emphasizes partnerships between government (at the national, and local levels), civil society, the private 
sector, and external assistance agencies'; PRSP is based on CDF principles. 
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growing inequality than gains in income or welfare for the poor. 
2.2.3 Aid, education and Africa 
African nations constitute a large part of the total recipient members which 
suffered from a lack of international aid following the end of the Cold War. The 
West and East, previously dealing with different ideologies, were no longer 
interested in Africa but instead in Eastern European countries. The nature of the 
donors' political influence has changed, as African countries supported by 
different Western powers are no longer client states aided for their support or 
opposition to one of the dominant ideologies. The new context, that being 
economic globalisation, is now one of the key mechanisms driving aid to Africa. 
However, according to Easterly (2001: 135), developing country growth should 
have increased instead of decreased according to the standard growth regression 
determinants of growth. The stagnation seems to represent a disappointing 
outcome to the movement towards the `Washington Consensus' by developing 
countries. Easterly critiques that Western donors have been promising that better 
times are `just around the corner' for over two decades but the per capita growth 
in Africa has still been showing poor performance (especially compared with an 
increasing of aid as percentage of GDP in Easterly's figure) (2003: 35). In the 
post-Washington Consensus era, the reason for helping African development is 
presented by Western powers as a way `to reach as many of the Millennium 
Development Goals as possible by 2015' (World Bank, 2005a), and by the South 
(i. e. the Chinese) as, a way to foster `mutual beneficial cooperation' (FOCAC, 
2006a) (the southern way will be discussed later in the following chapters). 
According to Wohlgemuth (1999: 153) there have been three eras for Africa. 
Firstly the 1950s to the early 1970s was recognised as an era of optimism wherein 
a number of newly liberated countries in Africa were eagerly targeted for 
development goals; as Tanzania's first President Julius Nyerere said, `we must run, 
while others walk' (ibid). This period ended with the oil shocks in the early and 
mid-1970s, and followed with prolonged crises throughout the 1980s when SAPs 
were established for development. In the 1990s, the history entered into an era of 
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`realism', or `an era of political and economic reforms' in Africa (Wohlgemuth, 
1999: 157). In conjunction, internal reforms and a new century of international 
relations can represent a new opportunity for Africa, in regards to its opening up 
and for a changing situation of being recipient. 
Until now, it may be seen that the complex colonial history and the contemporary 
lower development level of Africa determine that the continent has less autonomy 
of judgement, or at least must still rely heavily on external support. How to 
promote development of Africa and African education more efficiently and 
practically and more properly for its urgent need? How, then, can donors let 
African people have less hierarchical feeling when they receive aid? The global 
political economy has obviously added more complexities to answer how aid 
works (or why aid cannot perform better to help Africa), from which we can see 
`aid' is always related with donors' interventions. 
Conclusion 
This chapter gives an overview historically on the changing aid discourses and 
mechanisms by the Western donors. In the summary of the first section in this 
chapter, a table showed the changing aid discourse and mechanisms, as well as the 
logic of intervention, according to a time line from 1950s to the 21st century with 
the changing international situations. This form gives a background of our further 
exploration on the contemporary Western aid. It shows the logic of aid has been 
moving from a one way intervention (donor setting models- recipient imitating 
models), to a trend toward collaboration with more concern on the interaction 
between donors and recipient governments. 
In the second section, this picture of the Western aid can be seen more clearly in 
the contemporary world, especially under the complexity of globalisation, and 
with the discourses from EFA (Jomtien conference), MDGs and Paris Declaration. 
Despite decades of adjustments to make aid more effective, it nonetheless seems 
that international aid, especially aid from Western donors, has always attached 
political and economic factors to aid. Regardless of the PRSPs (which replaced 
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SAPs), the Western neo-liberal theory and the pursuit of modernisation remains 
the dominant logic of international aid. 
Therefore it can be concluded in three points as below: 
(a) Aid, has never been a neutral concept. In the Western context, aid emerged 
for achieving modernisation, and attached the Western-oriented idea of 
how this world should be. This orthodox aid means the less developed 
countries receive foreign assistance to catch up with their donors. 
(b) The orthodox aid has not been very successful, although with increasing 
disbursement by donors and a series changing international agendas. 
(c) Although it has caused sceptical views by critics, the Western countries 
including diverse types of organisations are still the main donors of the 
foreign aid in the contemporary world (such as the World Bank as the 
biggest donor of educational aid). Their influence to the world especially 
to Africa is significant. 
Within the general aid practice, aid to education is increasingly considered a key 
part given the development of the `knowledge economy' discourse. W hen we 
consider educational aid as a kind of educational practice in the global context, we 
also need to consider it as a part of donor practice with logics not only related 
with transferring knowledge, but also to intervention (or giving influence) 
(Baldwin, 1969) in the global political economy (namely, tied to the changing 
situations issued in the summary table in the first section), 40 Ju st as Dale (2010: 2) 
stated, `the initial logic of intervention involved attempting to implement 
modernisation theory through education', and later, `the logic of educational 
intervention was tied to structural adjustment and good governance agendas, and 
this shaped the aims of and the forms to be taken by "education"'. 
Look at these global `promoters' of education. When educational resources 
flow from a richer area to a poorer area, do they improve education mainly for 
the purpose of enhancing `human dignity' according to the UN policies, and 
40 In Baldwin's paper `foreign aid, intervention, and influence', he argued some advantages of equating 
'intervention' with 'influence' (1969: 426). He uses Robert Dahl's (1963) definition in Modern Political 
Analysis which states that `influence' is `the ability ofA to get B to do something he would not otherwise do'. 
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for reducing poverty, or as Carnoy (1999) mentioned, taking education as 
social investment for economic growth; and as mentioned in terms of the 
World Bank, for shaping the world in a neo-liberal way, or moreover, for 
exchanging for certain types of benefits? We will talk about the last possibility 
in the next chapters. 
In the following chapters, we will see a different perspective from the Western 
logic, China, as an atypical donor, is using `cooperation' instead of `aid' and has 
practised this actively in Africa. Is the Chinese model different in the ways of 
giving assistance from Western countries? Is it creating another way of 
international aid? We will start from seeing how China understands itself and the 
global era. 
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Chapter Three Chinese context of development and education 
Introduction 
In chapter two we discussed the tradition of Western aid from the post-colonial 
period onward. In doing so, we flagged that, with the development of aid 
discourse, donors are proclaiming that aid is critical for reducing poverty in this 
global era. Africa, the world's poorest and most undeveloped continent, has been 
provided diverse forms of aid by both multilateral and bilateral donors, though the 
dominant donors are from Western world. However in recent years, with 
increasing South-South cooperation, developing countries have begun to play a 
role. In this study, we take the China-Africa relationship as a distinctive case 
which appears to be different from the traditional Western-Africa aid relationship; 
following this assumption, we seek to examine if there is another way/model of 
international aid, with particular focus on education. 
Towards this end, chapter three and four discuss China's conception of 
development and education, as well as China's history of cooperation with Africa. 
As a `direct' comparison of the Western model and the China model is not 
possible given the fundamentally different assumptions, it is necessary to first 
look at a bit deeper features of the Chinese model (i. e. theoretical roots, 
development stages and experience, and internal needs). To do so, in these two 
chapters, chapter three provides a conceptual basis of China's understanding of its 
role in the world, how China seeks to develop itself in the world, and a historical 
understanding of China's changing foreign policy, economic development, and the 
impact of `opening-up'. Chapter four offers us understanding of how China deals 
with its relations with African countries and its practice of educational 
cooperation with Africa. Discussion in chapter four will be directly related to the 
empirical work of this study. 
The table framework in the summary of section one in chapter one can be 
borrowed for the following discussion in chapter three and four. We also want to 
seek the changing discourses and mechanisms, as well as the inner logic of China 
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within different historical periods, linked with Western histories of aid. We want 
to look at questions in these blocks shown in table below: 
Table 3.1 A comparison design between the Western and Chinese aid: changing 
international situations and the aid discourses, mechanisms and logic of 
intervention 
Western Similar Discourse Aid Logic of 
periods periods of Mechanism intervention 
(see chapter China 
one) 
1950s - 1960s 1949- early 70s Look at in Look at in Look at in 
(Decolonisation (From the different different different 
and the founding of the historical historical historical period: 
beginning of PRC) period: period: 
aid) China's 
1970s - early 1978-1990s China's China's different ontology of 
1990s (Since the discourse on focus, motives China-Africa 
(Cold War, two opening-up development, and approaches relation, and of 
-superpowers policy) foreign policy, on aid, educational aid 
and their client and especially aid to (what this 
states, world China-Africa Africa relation and 
economic crisis relation; educational aid 
in the 1970s) mean for China, 
Mid 1990s- the 1990s-2000-21s China's according to its 
21 s` century century discourse on own logic) 
(Non-economic (Fast economic educational 
factors and growth and development 
development, stronger links and educational 
diverse with Africa cooperation 
cooperation in particularly with African 
North and since the new countries 
South) century) 
Educational cooperation between China and Africa is, to a certain degree, an issue 
within the field of international relations. Education, within this context, is 
included in the study of international affairs and global political economy given 
that it is considered to be one of the driving forces in the relations between 
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countries. Thus one cannot discuss this educational cooperation without 
knowledge of China's understanding of foreign relations. Understanding of the 
Chinese context is important, moreover, because there is a close relation between 
China's experience of economic development and its view towards to the role of 
education. Therefore, in chapter three, we will explore how China perceives 
education, and in chapter four we will specifically examine how China develops 
educational support for Africa. 
Here then, we begin discussion with the rising up of Southern countries, 
especially China. After providing a conceptual and historical picture, we 
demonstrate that, in this study, China's behaviour features a `Chinese pragmatism' 
for development. Such understanding will help us understand China's logic of aid 
and its educational cooperation with Africa. 
1. South cooperation and the rising role of China 
According to Forster (1999: 37), the perception of the West proposed a 
development model to the rest of the world has profoundly changed from 1970s to 
1990s: 
On the one hand, countries in other areas of the world have established 
their own models which demonstrate an impressive ability to promote 
rapid economic growth... on the other hand, the Western model is 
confronted with a set of very difficult and far-reaching questions and 
challenges (ibid). 
King (1999: 16) also mentioned a partnership discourse from the South itself, and 
argued that this Southern relationship would be very meaningful for the concept 
of development partnership. When human history entered into the new century, it 
is even clearer that developing countries have turned to `aid' each other. 
On the 19th of December 2007 in New York, the 4th United Nations Day for 
South-South Cooperation was celebrated, highlighting the theme of `Innovative 
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Financing for South-South Development Cooperation' (UNDP, 2007). The 
administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, Kemal Dervis, 
called to celebrate `the dramatic economic, social and political energy the South is 
increasingly demonstrating and which is changing the very nature of the 
international community'. As he said, `developing countries are now the largest 
contributors to global growth. In 2006, the GDP of developing countries grew at 
twice the rate of high income countries. The South is capturing ever larger shares 
of global trade and capital flows, becoming not only a destination, but a source of 
global finance, skills, and technology' (Dervis, 19/12/2007). The conference 
actively encouraged Southern countries' independent development and 
South-South cooperation for contribution to global public goods. From this event 
we may see that the conference not only highlights the economic rising of 
Southern countries, but also the increasing internal (own state's) and external 
(global) responsibilities Southern countries should undertake. 
Resonating with what King pointed out on the Paris Declaration in chapter two 
(about `some so-called emerging economies' using their large foreign exchange 
reserves in the practice of international aid), the Chinese government is a 
signatory to the Paris Declaration. Many questions followed from this: is China 
planning to implement the Paris agenda in its capacity as an aid recipient, as an 
aid provider, or both (Wilks, 2007)? Davies (2007: 67) argues that China has 
signed up to the Paris Declaration and thereby committed to follow the 
Declaration's five main principles, including strengthening the ownership of 
recipient countries, aligning aid to their systems and priorities, and cooperating 
with other donors so as to increase the harmonisation of aid. Yet according to 
donors to China, China most likely signed up in its capacity as a recipient rather 
than as a donor country (Davies, 2007: 13). 
As a developing country, China's rise on the world's stage has been discussed in 
both developed and developing countries. Despite the critics (aforementioned in 
chapter one), there has not been adequate attention paid to the Chinese context as 
of yet, and it is especially rare to combine the Chinese historical and 
contemporary perspectives. After 2006's Beijing Summit, cooperation between 
the two sides attracted even more interest, especially the interest on considering 
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China as a distinctive donor. 
Jacques (2009: 100) notes that, East Asian modernity is a unique past, present, and 
future combination of social and economic realities, attitudes and consciousness. 
The contemporary Chinese model has been influenced by both traditional Western 
and Chinese theories. Throughout its thousands of years of civilization, China has 
developed a system of discourse and rules for confronting `modernisation'. Since 
the PRC's founding, China has developed `Chinese style socialism', Marxism, 
and Deng Xiaoping theory (Dengist), all of which followed a series of principles 
by the Communist Party of China (CPC). 4' 
China's foreign policy developed predominantly from the foundation of PRC 
through until today. During this time, the nation's policy was shaped by the 
changing relations between the two super powers before the Cold War, and the 
alignment with the Third World as an essential element for diplomacy. The 
opening-up policy has helped China to gain relationships with the Western world, 
and also helped China join the global market. The aim of modernisation drove 
China to harmonize with partners all over the world, and take education as a key 
factor in development. In a few decades, China's practical policies and flexible 
ideologies have made its behaviour understandable as a kind of pragmatism. 
2. China's conception of development and foreign relation 
At its most basic, China's contemporary theory for directing its intern ational 
relations is still borrowed from Marxism, yet China's clearly has a new version of 
Marxism. This version does not see the world as two opposite parts, socialism and 
capitalism, which characterized classical Marxism. They still believe the two parts 
are those who own the means of production and those who are selling the labour 
to the owners, but they do not think the way to resolve it is the struggling and 
completely revolution. Cooperation, as liberalism always emphasises, has become 
one of the key words in Chinese contemporary policy. 
41 The statement of 'Chinese style socialism' was issued firstly by Deng Xiaoping in 1982, and was 
developed systematically in late 1980s and in 1990s. 
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Describing the background to the Chinese way of dealing with other countries 
during the last century, especially in the last 30 years since the opening-up and 
reform policies of 1978, is essential for this study as it will help us to explore 
China's `donor logic' in their relation with Africa. Our main aim, to see how 
China interprets `aid' and educational aid, requires us firstly to explore how China 
understand the relations with other countries, and how China understands the role 
of education in the world. Thus to explore these areas, we need a historical and 
theoretical review of China's foreign policy. 
2.1 Foreign policy of China: a brief history 
Chinese foreign policy has developed in accordance with the changing of political 
leaders. To complete a picture of China's own development, it is necessary to give 
a brief overview of the China's domestic political evolution and specific 
individuals contributions to the country's development. 
From the time of Mao Zedong through to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao's fourth 
generation of leadership, China has witnessed a series of transformations in its 
theories for development. As Gabriel (2006: 160) summarised, Mao Zedong's 
thought was grounded in class struggle and contradiction, whereas Deng Xiaoping 
theory was grounded in the modernist vision of technologically driven 
transcendence and experimentation. The third generation of leadership, 
characterized by Jiang Zemin's `Three Represents', is a blueprint for 
`modernising' the communist party by combining Deng's pragmatism, Marxism 
theories and the contemporaneous global environment. 42 Under this `blueprint', 
there is also a transformation from the previous focus on political language to 
more pragmatic, cooperative voice in regards to Sino-African relationships. In 
accordance with this evolution, China inevitably becomes interlinked with global 
capitalism and, to some extent, is learning from the experience of developed 
countries. Yet China also doesn't want to lose the `Chinese political characteristics' 
42 The thought of `Three represents' means the party (CPC) must always represent the requirements for the 
development of China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of the development of China's advanced 
culture, and the fundamental interest of the overwhelming majority of people in China. 
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and moreover, seeks to avoid the failure experienced by the other socialist states. 
So under these leading - and evolving - principles, just what is the development 
of China's foreign policy? To describe a complete history is a huge work as one 
can look back to Chairman Mao's time or even to ancient China; such a task is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. To narrow this scope then, this research will talk 
mainly about China in the post Cold War world, with particular focus on the fast 
development and reforms since 1978. 
From the establishment of PRC to the fast economic development since 1978, 
China has experienced a changing foreign policy. Harding (1984: 179) 
summarised four dimensions of China's foreign relations: 
(1) the degree of China's involvement with the rest of the world; (2) the 
extent of China's alignment with either of the two superpowers, the 
United States and the Soviet Union; (3) the economic, military, and 
political resources China brings to the conduct of its foreign policy; and 
(4) China's objectives in international affairs, particularly with regard to 
the preservation or transformation of the prevailing international order. 
In the time of two superpowers, China's experience may be divided into three 
periods: for most of 50s China was allied with the Soviet Union and under threat 
from the United States; from the late 50s until the late 60s China was in dispute 
with the Soviet Union while seeking alignment with the Third World when threat 
from the United States remained; and from the early 70s China was under threat 
from the Soviet Union and in alignment with the United States (Yahuda, 1983: 95). 
Therefore during these years China was trying to find a right place for itself 
internationally. As a socialist country, China did not want to be identical to the 
Soviet Union, but rather a unique country with unique ideology; China did not 
want to be completely at odds with all Western countries. For its own 
development then, China changed its relationship with the superpowers. 
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2.1.1 Opening-up period since 1978 
Since 1978 China found its way of developing economy by the intervention both 
from government and the rules of market: 
During the first three decades of the People's Republic (1949-79), 
China's domestic policy shifted between an ideological emphasis on class 
struggle and a more pragmatic emphasis on constructing an economically 
strong, modem nation. By 1979, the pragmatic forces in the person of 
Deng Xiaoping had won the leadership, and China embarked on a policy 
of shifting the economy gradually toward the market, while trying to 
contain the pressures inherent in openness to foreign investment and 
trade and global markets, and maintaining the Chinese Communist Party 
at the helm of government (Brautigam, 2008: 7). 
After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, an alteration in China's economic system 
was introduced. The decision to begin reform and opening up, which was made at 
the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC in December 
1978, has helped the Chinese people navigate through hard times and toward 
prosperity and rejuvenation in the past three decades; its successes meant that the 
PRC joined the World Trade Organisation in December 2001 (Lee ed., 2008). The 
economic reforms during this time, also called the Chinese economic reform, refer 
primarily to the program of `Socialism with Chinese characteristics'. The 
program was started in 1978 by pragmatists within the CPC and led by Deng 
Xiaoping; they continued through the early 21st century. The goal of Chinese 
economic reforms was to generate sufficient surplus value to finance the 
modernisation of the mainland Chinese economy. Neither the socialist command 
economy, favoured by CPC conservatives, nor the Maoist attempt at a Great Leap 
Forward from socialism to communism in China's agriculture (with the commune 
system), had generated sufficient surplus value for these purposes. 43 Economi c 
opening-up has helped lift millions of people out of poverty. Between 1981 and 
" According to Yang (2008: 2), the Great Leap Forward of the PRC was an economic and social plan used 
from 1958 to 1961 which, based on Mao's decision, aimed to use China's vast population to rapidly transform 
China from a primarily agrarian economy of peasant farmers into a modern communist society through the 
process of agriculturalization and industrialization. It ended in economic failure after weather disaster led to 
widespread famine. 
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2001, the proportion of population living in poverty in China fell from 53% to 8% 
(Ravallion and Chen, 2007: 2). During this period, the spiritual and cultural life of 
the people has been enriched and diversified thinking has been promoted. 
Discussion of such concepts as competition, efficiency, democracy and rule of law 
had not been encouraged before reform and opening up. The PRC began to accept 
Western ideas and opinions more easily than before (Lee ed., 2008). 
Steadfastly opening wider to the outside world and actively participating 
in international economic and technological cooperation and 
competition... As economic globalisation is gathering momentum and 
international competition is becoming increasingly fierce, we can make 
better use of domestic and foreign markets and resources and accelerate 
our development only if we follow the tide of world development and 
open ourselves still wider to the outside world. Despite the grim 
international economic environment, we have created a new situation in 
our opening up by responding positively, striving to seek advantages and 
avoid disadvantages, and turning challenges into opportunities (Zhu, 
Government work report, 21/03/2003). 
While at this time China was aiming for modernisation, it should be clarified that 
China has its own specific aim of modernisation, the ' Four Modernisations'. 
These include the modernisation of agriculture, industry, technology and defence 
(Cannon and Jenkins, 1990: 12). This slogan was first received from a speech by 
Zhou Enlai in 1964. The attitude it embodies was curtailed in the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976) (ibid). After his death and Mao's soon thereafter, Deng 
Xiaoping assumed control of the party in late 1978. In December 1978 at the 
Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping announced the 
official launch of the `Four Modernisations', formally marking the beginning of 
the reform era. The Four Modernisations were designed in hopes of making China 
a great economic power by the early 21st century. These reforms stressed 
economic self-reliance, and that learning and engaging with global trends were 
essential to realizing this. Thus China decided to accelerate the modernisation 
process by stepping up the volume of foreign trade by opening up its markets, 
especially through the purchase of machinery from Japan and the West. By 
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engaging with export-led growth, China was able to speed up its economic 
development through foreign investment, a more open market, access to advanced 
technologies, and management experience (Evans, 1995; Hsu, 2000). 
2.1.2 Foreign policy since opening-up 
With the change from Maoist radicalism to Dengist pragmatic moderation, and the 
corresponding shift from the primacy of politics to that of economics, the mixed 
model economic system required that China (or we can say let China) begin to 
open the door for foreign economic investment, technology transfer, trade, and 
training. China's foreign policy was summed up by twin goals of peace and 
security during this time. For fast development, China needed to foster this type of 
international atmosphere given that the opposite atmosphere, war and threat, 
would destroy China's best chance to catch up with the developed world. 
Learning from the West and gaining access to markets, goods, technology and 
expertise also meant that China needed to take out security insurance in 
Washington against Soviet military threats (Robinson, 1994: 569). 
In addition to dealing its relationships with the US, the Soviet Union, and its 
Asian neighbours, China wished to continue to regard the Third World (countries 
of Asia, Africa, and Latin America) as an essential element of its foreign policy. 44 
While Chinese ideology always believed that the `masses' of the downtrodden 
nations held the key to the future of the international system (Robinson, 1994: 
576), it is apparent why such a sentiment remained. Politically, such countries 
would support China's position in international affairs once friendly cooperation 
was established. Another important reason for sustained interest in the third world 
was economic. Many developing countries represented markets for Chinese goods 
and skills. Deng Xiaoping's noted speech in 1974 stated, `China is a country, and 
a developing country as well. China belongs to the Third World... China is not a 
" The term 'Third World' has a diverse definition, though it normally refers to `less developed countries that 
belonged to neither the advanced industrial capitalist West (First World) nor the Soviet socialist bloc'. Ness 
(1991) questioned if China is a Third World country and if Chinese leaders regard it as a Third World country. 
This research will not discuss much regarding a definition of Third World, but will talk generally about how 
China deals with others, no matter from the so-called First World or Third World; it should be noted that these 
terms show a kind of hierarchical, and also a potential basis, for 'catching up with West by Western help' aid 
logic. 
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superpower, nor will she ever seek to be one... ' (Deng, speech at the UN General 
Assembly, 10/04/1974). 
The opening-up policy and the two items of peace and security have continued 
until today. During the process for modernisation, the Cold War directly affected 
China's foreign policy; Robinson has illustrated five specific aspects (1994: 594). 
First, the Sino-Soviet-American strategic triangle (1960s to 1980s), as the base of 
the global political-military affairs, was replaced with a looser, more informal set 
of arrangements among five power centres: North America, Europe, Russia, China 
and Japan. Therefore China actually had to make decision to transfer its foreign 
policy to a more multi-polar diplomacy Second, the world transitioned into a 
period which strongly valued democratization, marketization and interdependence, 
and thus no nation, including China, could escape this transformation and it was 
pressed into accepting the use of high technology and the knowledge economy. 
Third was the need for a growing number of countries to devote increasing 
resources to solving an array of domestic problems. All of the five power centres 
turned to devote attention to their domestic development and less attention to 
foreign affairs; this also gave influence and space to China. Fourth was the 
tendency towards accelerated technological change which was considered as a 
`driving force' of history. This trend meant that those who did not follow would 
soon fall behind, and therefore China had to become one of the former for both 
domestic and international reasons. Finally, there was the emergence of global 
problem solving, such as environment issues. Within this context, China became 
more engaged in the global society by giving more attention to international 
organisations and trade markets. 
In the 21" century, with the emerging international issues and increasing 
cooperation with developing countries, the Chinese government received 
countless critical comments centred upon its approaches to the contemporary 
world; comments ranged from China as arising developing leader, a rising 
hegemony, a rising competitor for West, and so on (Alden, 2007). The Chinese 
diplomatic strategy in this very recent stage, when facing the international 
spotlights after the Wenchuan earthquake (in May 2008) and the Beijing Olympic 
Games (in August 2008), has called for `media diplomacy (International Herald 
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Leader, 2009). This strategy was employed in order to build a modem Chinese 
image in the global world, instead of a traditional `cultural China', `historical 
China' and `political China' (ibid). 
China attaches its own modernisation closely to the international atmosphere in 
the new century. The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), the country's leading 
academic institution which features a Centre on China's Modernisation Study, 
drafted and published its eighth annual report of modernisation progress in China 
and in it, introduced the concept of the `Peace Dove Strategy' (PDS) in January of 
2008 (He ed., 2008). Before this report, there were yearly Modernisation reports: 
`Districts' Modernisation' in 2004 (He ed., 2004); `Economic Modernisation' in 
2005 (He ed., 2005); `Social Modernisation' in 2006 (He ed., 2006) and 
`Ecological Modernisation' in 2007 (He ed., 2007). The development of 
modernisation reports in China revealed a picture of an increasingly powerful and 
international China, progressing from a low level developing country to having an 
important role in the global village. The country began to consider more and more 
international factors and dimensions in its developmental framework (e. g. 
environmental issues). In the 21S` century, the country's modernisation plan is 
focused more on a systematic work of international strategy, including the fields 
of economy, politics, culture, society andecology. 
China's 2008 report of modernisation is entitled `International Modernisation', 
which means `an interaction between national modernisation and international 
environment, an international interaction during the course of modernisation', and 
includes two stages- `international modernisation at the Industrial Age and the 
international modernisation at the Information/knowledge Age' (He ed., 2008). as 
The Peace Dove Strategy highlights the principle of `Follow the UN Charter and 
Promote World Peace', and calls for building a `favourable international 
environment for China's modernisation'. The strategy is expressed by the 
`s According to Chuanqi He, the head of the CAS's Center on the Study of China's Modernizsation and 
creator of the conceptual framework of `international modernisation', the modernisation process can be 
divided into two stages: 'The First Modernisation is the process and great changes of the transformation from 
Agricultural Society to Industrial Society, Agricultural Economy to Industrial Economy, Agricultural 
Civilization to Industrial Civilization, Agricultural Age to Industrial Age. The Second Modernisation is the 
process and great changes of the transformation from Industrial Society to Knowledge Society, Industrial 
Economy to Knowledge Economy, Industrial Civilization to Knowledge Civilization, Industrial Age to 
Knowledge Age. ' (fie, 1998: 3-4) 
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following graph: 
Table 3.2 The concept framework of the Peace Dove Strategy (PDS) 






Source: He ed. (2008) 
It is interesting to note that, on the above strategy picture, the United Nations is 
drawn as the head of the Dove; Asian nations are the foreside; the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) is the eastern wing and the proposed 
'Asia-Europe Economic Cooperation' (AEEC), which is upgraded from the 
existing Asia-Europe Meeting, is the Western wing; South America, Oceania and 
Africa bring up the rear. The strategy, which centres on Asia and faces the world, 
is underpinned by a basic concept: to comply with the charter and promote 
peace; to be based in Asia yet open to the world; to balance the Western and 
Eastern on cooperation and collaborate with Southern; to be mutually beneficial 
and progressive' (ibid). Chuanqi He noted that `under the strategy, China will 
optimize the structure of its international modernisation strategy, increase its 
national capacity in international modernisation, and improve the international 
environment for the country' (China Daily, 29/01/2008). 
2.2 Education and development 
During last four decades, education has always been a conspicuous part of 
Chinese policy. The strategy of `invigorating the country through science, 
technology and education', was issued in 1977 when Deng Xiaoping stressed that 
progress in science, technology and education is essential to economic 
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development and modernisation. He emphasised the importance of education for 
the aim of catching up with the developed world, and for the aim of `Four 
Modernisations'. 
In 1995, President Jiang Zemin pointed out that progress in science and 
technology was the primary engine for improving the productive work force. He 
said the country should work to boost education and enhance its ability to 
commercialize the fruits of scientific and technological research. Consequently, 
the State has earmarked funding for this strategy ever since it was included in the 
five-year plan for 1996-2000 (Xinhuanet, 02/09/2003). 
Since knowledge economy with high-tech at the core will dominate, the 
comprehensive strength and international competitiveness of the nation 
will increasingly depend on the level of educational development and 
innovation in science and technology and knowledge, and educational 
development will remain a strategic priority. The extensive use of modern 
information technology in education will engender profound changes in 
the educational sector, and lifelong education will be a requisite condition 
for both educational development and social progress, At present, the 
governments of many countries have made educational invigoration one 
of their basic policies towards the 21st century, These trends indicate 
profound changes in the scenario of education in the future. We should 
lose no time in preparing to meet the new challenges. (Ministry of 
Education of the PRC, 24/12/1998) 
In the new century, under one of the aforementioned `Three Represents' by Jiang 
Zemin, the developing orientation of China's advanced culture indicated an 
increasing status of intellects. China called this the `talents work'. In a 2006 
`Report on the Work of the Government', Premier Wen addressed `the strategy of 
reinvigorating China through human resource development': 
We must attach more strategic significance to accelerating scientific and 
technological development. We will fully implement the Outline of the 
National Program for Long- and Medium-Term Scientific and 
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Technological Development to build an innovation-oriented 
country... . We will follow the strategy of reinvigorating the country 
through human resources and intensify development of a well-trained 
workforce. We will increase funding for human resource development 
through various sources, strengthen the role of market forces in allocating 
human resources, and standardize management of the human resource 
market (Wen, 2006). 
Education is an essential factor for Chinese development, both domestically 
and internationally. When we look at the internal and external meaning of 
education in the Chinese context, it can be seen that education is not only 
seen as the key tool for enhancing national productivity and a quality society 
in the age of the knowledge economy, but also as the key tool for the cultural 
exchange, enhancing the Chinese image, and spreading Chinese human 
resources worldwide. China highlighted these points in the 2006 report (ibid): 
We will intensify development of socialist culture. We need to do a good 
job cultivating ideals and ethics, particularly among young people. We 
will carry out extensive public activities to promote cultural and ethical 
progress. We will deepen reform of the cultural system and develop 
cultural undertakings and cultural industries.... We will vigorously 
support folk culture and art and increase cultural exchanges with other 
countries. We will improve management of the culture market and 
steadfastly fight against pornography and illegal publications 
Student exchange is one of the Chinese approaches for modernity. Since the 
founding of PRC in 1949, the 60 years overseas education of China has 
experienced the rush for studying in the Soviet Union, the interruption of studying 
abroad during the cultural revolution, the study-abroad by public expense since 
the opening-up, public overseas education since the late 1980s and returning home 
in the new period (Zhang, 2010). The 18,000 students, technicians and skilled 
workers trained or guided by Russian experts in China during the 1950s have 
played key roles in the operation of the Chinese economy through to the present 
day (Yahuda, 1983: 160). Until 1980s there were a large number of Chinese 
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students studying in America (ibid). 46 It seems then, that student exchange is not 
a new thing for China but rather has an extended history wherein exploring 
culture exchange and gaining new knowledge from other states was the norm. 
During this student exchange development, the China Scholarship Council (CSC) 
is playing a key role for receiving and sending students into and out from China. 
In 1996, on the basis of further development of opening-up policy and with a 
purpose to `promote international exchanges and cooperation in education, culture 
and science and technology', CSC was established by endorsement of Chinese 
government and lead by Ministry of Education, which was described by CSC, `a 
very significant landmark in the administration of Chinese citizens study abroad' 
(CSC, 1999: 4) 47 It is an increasing line during decade's development: in 2000, 
CSC awarded 2,025 international students Chinese Government Scholarship for 
academic year 2000/2001 (CSC, 2000: 12) and in 2009 (according to CSC's latest 
report), the number rose to 8,141 (CSC, 2009: 12). 8 Moreove r, it can be seen 
from the following chart that over half of the recipients in 2009 were studying for 
post-graduate level (including scholar level). 
Table 3.3: Categories of Chinese Government Scholarship recipients in 2009 
46 The 1978 plan (part of the opening-up policy) envisaged sending as many as 20,000 students abroad. But 
this plan was rescinded because of other considerations. By the end of 1981, there were some 7,000 Chinese 
students enrolled in various American universities and colleges, and about half that number in other foreign 
countries. (Yahuda, 1983: 159) 
47 CSC 's predecessor was the Department of Studying Abroad (established in 1989) in Ministry of Education 
of PRC before 1996. Before 1989, in 1978 the Department of Administration of Student Abroad was 
established in State Education Commission (now Ministry of Education); in 1980 this department was merged 
with Department of Foreign Affairs as Foreign Affairs Bureau in Ministry of Education; in 1981 government 
included the self-funding studying abroad into their management. (See REDNET. CN, 2008, 
http: //gaige. rednet. cn/c/2008/01/ 16/1420801. htm) 
Studying abroad by government scholarships was issued by Deng since 1978 opening-up, but was planned 
directly by the political instructions, lacking of professional and effective management (ibid). The Ministry 
then reformed on this and adopted approaches for institutionalization - established the CSC as the 'non-profit 
institution with legal person status affiliated with the Ministry of Education' (CSC, n. d. ). 
(See CSC website, http: //en. csc. edu. cn/About/c309df7fb3fa4Ob3a179a7ad93fl 1988. shtml) 06 8,141 is the number of international students admitted by CSC, but not the whole number enrolled by 
Ministry of Education. However this is the main source of the recipients, compared the total number of 8,413 
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This can be seen as a historical basis for the China-Africa educational cooperation, 
which aims at continuing student exchanges (especially the postgraduate study) 
and teachers dispatch (this will be discussed in detail in the next chapter related to 
China-Africa relations, and will also be examined by field work in Tanzania and 
China- in Part Two).. 
2.3 Chinese discourse on development: pragmatism 
Overall, it may be argued that the new China is using a comprehensive 
understanding of its specific situation and international environment, of its 
development experience and borrowed theories to resolve its international 
relations; more specifically, China is trying to build itself as an independent 
developing country while also being interdependent with other countries through 
the global market. Compared with the development process forwarded by Western 
countries (which is more step by step), it seems that China's process is a 
mixed-stages one. To elaborate, the country is trying to achieve modern domestic 
performance in such a large geographical territory, and in such a relatively short 
time. What is more is that many inequities and imbalances exist in China's various 
social sectors, and this requires a modern international performance facilitated by 
refreshed political manifestoes, economic reforms, high technology and increasing 
intellectuals Given the huge difficulty which faces Chinese attempts to realise 
these goals, one of China's main strategies for economic development is a 
75 
pragmatically based one. We call it `Chinese pragmatism' in this study, and it 
encapsulates the way China is pursuing economic success and international 
integration, or the position China is standing on in this regard. 
Building on this Chinese pragmatism, nowadays China is tending not to place 
much emphasis on specific ideological discourse towards the rest of the world. 
Instead China is focusing on economic development, and therefore gaining as 
many developmental partners as they need for mutual benefits. In this way, China 
gains access to partners and relations who have different religions, languages, 
ideologies, as China points to the prominence of modernisation. This study wants 
to argue that China's theory (or developmental philosophy) is a new type of 
`Chinese pragmatism' which is different from the classical pragmatism, and thus 
suitable for Chinese development demands. Central to this new `Chinese 
pragmatism' is how the Chinese government reshaped the Marxist theory of 
political economy and tied this into its modernisation process. 
One important `distinction should be emphasised is that: some conceptions of the 
Chinese `modernisation' is distinct from the Western one. To elaborate, even 
though Chinese scholars have learnt many theories and discourses from the 
Western modernisation framework, and additionally talked extensively about 
philosophical modernity, Chinese modernisation still maintains its own meaning. 
According to Chinese scholar Chuanqi He (2003: 13), classic Modernisation 
theory mainly refers to catching up to the developed countries in an 
industrialization process which is like Westernization, Europeanisation or 
Americanisation. According to this meaning, developing countries should borrow 
the ideas, theories, knowledge, political patterns and so forth, from the West. Yet 
according to He (ibid: 13), modernisation in the contemporary knowledge society 
is a job for both developed and developing countries, as they should seek new 
ways for synthetic development, Therefore we can see that modernisation in the 
Chinese context, as related to its latest `Peace Dove' strategy and `international 
modernisation' (talked earlier in this chapter), has greater emphasis on the whole 
country's economy and technology development as the means to achieve 
prosperity in an international integration. Importantly, this does not mean the same 
as the West, USA or Europe. Yet another term however, that is `modernity', may 
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be understood and used more similarly by both Western and Chinese on the 
philosophical level. Some terms such as individualization are also talked about by 
Chinese, but less on a governmental strategy range. 
It should be highlighted that China had opposed this type of pragmatism for a long 
period, that being during the early construction of socialism, during which the 
government put more effort into creating a national ideology. Pragmatism has 
been criticised as a sort of capitalist indivi dualism, `just seeing the practical 
results but not the intrinsic essence of the world' (Yang and Wang, 2002: 14). 
Later, especially in the new century, China shifted and started to redefine 
pragmatism as a new philosophy; it was even suggested pragmatism be used as 
some of the principles behind the country's practice. Therefore, with a greater 
understanding of pragmatism in China today, particularly within the academic 
field, people have started to accept pragmatism as a type of Chinese practical 
philosophy (Yang and Wang, 2001). 
Before giving a summary of Chinese pragmatism, we should firstly introduce an 
understanding of the Chinese ideology. If we use ideology to analyse Chinese 
international relations, it is actually quite difficult to give a specific `ideology' for 
Chinese foreign policy. However Levine (1994)'s exploration of the formal and 
informal ideologies probably best provide a view, with a particular emphasis on 
Chinese pragmatism. Levine gives three major sources of the complexities of 
Chinese leaders' thoughts (Levine, 1994: 33): 
First is their socialization into a specific culture at a particular period in 
time; second, their unique experiences as individuals and their shared 
experiences as members of groups; third, their conscious choices as 
thinking political actors from the menu of values, systems of thought, and 
so forth that are available to them. . . Through this creation and 
self-creation, then, foreign policy actors acquire a particular 
weltanschauung or ideologically based world-view. 
Undoubtedly Marxism-Leninism, and its Chinese variant Mao Zedong Thought, is 
the dominant ideology shaping and informing the views, preferences, expectations, 
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and assumptions of Chinese Communists who work in foreign affairs. This is the 
`formal ideology' which Levine referred to. It is an explicit and systematic body 
of thought which gives foundation and a framework for the country's main 
direction (ibid). On the other hand, the `informal ideology' is also a useful tool for 
thinking about foreign policy. It is the complex mix of cultural values, preferences, 
prejudices, predispositions, habits, and unstated but widely shared propositions 
about reality that condition the way in which political actors behave (ibid). He 
mentioned Lucian Pye's (1988: 76) notes on Chinese pragmatism which could 
also be a central term in this research. Pye says it is the `anthropologist's notion of 
culture as ideology, and consider ideology as the thought more from a 
historical-cultural inheritance. Thus, Levine concludes that the informal ideology 
is `implicit, unconscious, or only partly conscious, and intuitive rather than 
cerebral' (Levine, 1994: 34). 
Levine's idea provides a means to answer why China is practising a Chinese style 
Marxism. His two perspectives on China's ideologies can be seen as the difference 
between Chinese pragmatism and the general pragmatic philosophy. That means 
China actually does not give up its formal aim of seeking communism, but rather 
tries different approaches and theories to solve its social, cultural, and 
developmental problems. Those problems are what China prefers to call `highest 
outlines' and `latest outlines, ' which mean the final goal and the current 
demanding respectively, and they are always discussed in a specific historical 
period for development. Keeping the highest outline, which is more like a belief, 
helps the Party lead the huge population as one in attempt to solve current 
developmental problems. If the highest outline was threatened by too many 
branch ideologies, the society, and a large number of Party members, would be 
difficult to be controlled and administrated. With diverse approaches and 
principles, and with the stability of a one-Party system and one formal ideology 
based in the aims of communism, Chinese pragmatism has a large number of 
critics, especially since the new century. Despite this, it is emerged as suitable 
way for China. 
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Overall, the Chinese pragmatism can be summarised as follows: 49 
Firstly, Chinese pragmatism is a dialectic materialism based on Marxism, and this 
is related to the ontology of Chinese pragmatism. The materialism, especially the 
dialectic materialism ontology, h as never been changed for the contemporary 
Chinese ideology. The materialists believe matter precedes thought, just as Marx's 
classical statement `the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by 
the human mind, and translated into forms of thought' (Marx, 1976: 25). With 
dialectic materialism, there are three laws: the law of opposites, the law of 
negation and the law of transformation. The evolution of Chinese theories for 
development has largely absorbed these laws, for instance the idea that 
development is a process whereby insignificant and imperceptible quantitative 
changes lead to fundamental, qualitative changes; just as Marx (Capital, Vol. 1) 
(1976) says, `merely quantitative differences, beyond a certain point, pass into 
qualitative changes'. By keeping this kind of ontology for a nation's development, 
China actually gives itself ideas and methods to deal with the conflicts between 
different ideas, religions, and ideologies. Specifically, when it is not a qualitative 
transformation, the quantitative changes can be allowed to some extent. This helps 
China reflect on some of its previous pitfalls which went to some extreme because 
of their inability to control the quantitative changes and the qualitative points. 
Secondly, Chinese pragmatism does not simply mean `foreign policy is driven by 
core national interests' (Gu et al., 2008 281), though this can be seen as one level 
of meaning. Yet it also has experimental approaches (Zhao, 2009: 25) which helps 
China seek a Chinese model different from any one else in the world. It is as Deng 
said, `the problems in the world cannot be solved by one model, and China has 
Chinese model' (Deng, 1993: 261). The Chinese philosophy based on dialectic 
materialism, Leninism and Maoism teaches people to solve the specific problem 
with specific analysis in accordance with the specific situation (Central 
Compilation and Translation Bureau, 1972: 290 ). Thus when China discovered 
that Russian socialism could not solve the problems of the Chinese circumstance, 
the Chinese changed their policy and reformed in accordance with their realities. 
Thus we can say that China's foreign policy is driven by its national interests, and 
49 To be noticed here, what the paper here concludes, does not mean China has realised or stated they are 
Chinese pragmatism. The term of 'Chinese pragmatism' is produced in this thesis. 
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designed specifically to fit its developmental situation. It is intrinsically about 
China's understanding and the usage of Marxism and dialectic materialism. 
Historically speaking, China revised the way of practicing its 
Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology when the Party prioritized social and economic 
development in the late 1970s. Before the decision was taken, the Party used 
anti-imperialist and anti-Westernism content drawn from the Russian Revolution, 
and thus at that time the conceptual base for China's CPC still remained mostly a 
mystery; Robinson writes `very few Party members could, for instance, tell the 
difference between a force and a relation of production or discuss the linkages 
between economic base and political-social superstructure' (Robinson, 1994: 570). 
Under Deng, the view of Marxism changed. Marx's legacy as a whole was still 
studied but its pragmatic aspect was emphasised, for instance phrases such as 
`seek truth from facts' and `practice is the only criterion of truth' were stressed. 
Marxism was officially `downgraded to only one- albeit still allegedly the most 
important- ideological determinant of modem thought' (which means `Marxism 
cannot resolve all of our problems') (Brugger and Kelly, 1990). 
Thirdly, Chinese pragmatism is growing period by period. This means the 
government does not put emphasis on pragmatism all the time, and moreover 
pragmatic action is not obvious and stable all the time. Indeed, it is only of use 
when the country is on a turning point (or shifting period) and needs some flexible 
approaches rather than the traditional guidelines. At this kind of turning point, or 
during a shifting period, the country usually tries to make its `formal ideology' 
more practical for the particular situation (i. e. to collaborate with `informal 
ideologies'). For example, historically Chinese pragmatism usually has been 
prominent during reflexive thinking periods. At Mao's time, the pro-Soviet system 
failed to promote society development. As such China went into a period of 
reforms, with an amended understanding towards Soviet socialism. This also 
occurred during the opening-up reform period which introduced full 
foreign-owned enterprises into the country and let joint ventures, Chinese 
state-owned enterprises and private firms develop together in the country. This 
also happened during a series of transformations when China entered the new era 
of globalisation in 21St century; specifically the country took pragmatic steps to 
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promote further development, such as building the China-Africa relationship 
devoid of ideological and political strings. Looking back into Chinese history, we 
find that generally a series of conservative guidelines were used to maintain a 
stable and peaceful period of development, yet when internal reforms and new 
external environment necessitate change, a more pragmatic (or we can say more 
creative/experimental) way of dealing with relations between base and 
superstructure would emerge to keep progress. 
Although we define `Chinese pragmatism' in the aforementioned manner in this 
study, a similar idea can be seen in other scholar's works. According to Zhao 
(2009: 25), China's economic progress and modernisation process is not 
motivated by any ideological doctrine, but by pragmatism for economic success. 
China employs the reform approach in certain area and generalizes it in a larger 
range if it proves successful. China is selectively learning Western models, and the 
state understands when and how to use external ideas and strategies to solve their 
problems (2009: 26). 
`Especially when Chinese government has already adopted a lot of 
macro-economic principles from Washington Consensus, the country 
avoided or amended the neoliberal factors which can reduce the role of 
government. For example, although the internal market is opened for 
international competition, the key sectors are still under protection by the 
state' (ibid). 
Zhao also highlighted the limitations of the Chinese model, defined as a 
non-ideological, pragmatic and experimental reform with emphasis on 
economic growth and political stability (2009: 34). The clear pursuit of 
economic and political benefit will lack moral attraction power; in other words, 
it will most likely damage the image of China, with evidence for such a claim 
found in the issue of human rights and environment pollution (2009: 38). 
Therefore in following Zhao (2009: 39), in this study we assume that `Chinese 
pragmatism' will only be a model for transition, and will be replaced by other 
forms for development when the high economic growth can be achieved. 
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3. Summary 
As has been mentioned from the beginning of this chapter, when we are 
discussing the contemporary Chinese approaches to development, it is necessary 
to see how China has formulated and changed its development strategies in 
relation to foreign policy. We now have a brief discussion of the changing focus 
and flexibilities of China's foreign policies, as well as how the country sees 
development and the power of education. Finally we introduced the term `Chinese 
pragmatism' to summarise China's unique understanding and practice of 
development. Let us summarise some points here. 
Firstly since the founding of the PRC, China has always made an effort to 
accelerate domestic economic development and aimed to achieve its `Four 
Modernisations, ' agriculture, industry, technological and defence. One of the 
choices made by the country was `opening wider to the outside world and actively 
participating in the international economic and technological cooperation and 
competition (Zhu, 2003)'. From the development history, especially the last 30 
years, we can see that China has a long history of international relations, whether 
it be seeking political alliance or looking for business partners. This trend has 
become increasingly obvious since the 1978 opening-up policy. In the course of 
this evolution, China has pragmatically chosen a `Chinese style socialism' which 
combines the classical Marxism and Mao-Deng's ideas. Within the anticipated 
means of achieving economic modernisation, the country attaches importance to 
the discourse of the `knowledge economy', and considers education an important 
tool for long term development and as a way to integrate into international 
societies (such as student exchanges). 
Secondly, as China became increasingly closer with the global society, they, on 
the one hand, tried to avoid previous socialist pitfalls based on Soviet experience 
and its own experience. On the other hand, they tried to absorb Western 
experience which was of potential benefit for the Chinese situation, and to also 
integrate the Western ideas and theories into Chinese context, and even develop 
them. In this study this ongoing process is called Chinese pragmatism, as the 
country has managed to control the `quantitative changes' within the certain 
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`qualitative' range, and these `quantitative changes' can help the development but 
won't change the core of its politics. With this principle the CPC has more 
flexibility to make economic development. 
Ultimately, we now have foundational knowledge by which to explore the 
China-Africa relationship, and more specifically, educational cooperation. First of 
all, according to China's foreign policy in this new era (especially the Peace Dove 
Strategy), we can see that one of the next focuses for China is Africa (more 
accurately, China is getting closer relations with Africa). Second, China has been 
developing in a different way from Western countries and is not targeting a 
West-oriented modernisation, but is nonetheless increasingly communicating with 
the West and opening to the world. Thus when we look at Chinese approaches, we 
can both find some traditional Chinese solutions and also some Western-borrowed 
conceptions; in practice this is evident in China calling for both the UN's EFA in 
educational assistance, and a special model not from either SAPs or PRSPs. Third, 
China's Africa policy seems to be different from the West, or we can say, does not 
borrow the entirety of Western rules for foreign aid; Chinese pragmatism usually 
considers its own situation carefully when it collaborates with the external agenda. 
Therefore as being a recipient country and with a lot of needs for national 
development, we assume that China cannot spend much on financial assistance for 
Africa but may approach in another way. 
Based on this, in the next chapter we explore how China develops its relation with 
African countries. It will provide a broad view of how Western and Chinese 
scholars see this relationship. After that, the distinctive Chinese model will 
become even clearer. 
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Chapter Four Chinese context of its cooperation with Africa 
Introduction 
Given our focus on the emerging China-Africa model within the framework of 
contemporary international aid, it is necessary to provide background of the 
China-Africa relationship and its contemporary manifestation. To this point we 
have discussed the traditional model of international aid, namely the Western 
model, as well as the growing trend of South-South cooperation on the global 
stage. We have noted that China, as a developing country, has been rising quickly 
to engage actively and pragmatically in the global political economy. With a 
general background in China's conception of development and its transition of 
foreign policy established in last chapter, this chapter will specifically discuss how 
China deals with its foreign relations with African countries. 
As demonstrated in last chapter, since the 1980s China has focused on building its 
domestic economy and attracting foreign investment, and this trend has been 
strengthened by additional reforms in the new century. According to Brautigam 
(2008: 8), in China's tenth Five Year Plan (2001-2005), these reforms were 
deepened in the strategy of `Going Global'; one feature of this strategy was an 
increase in regional cooperation. This strategy is visualized in the 2008 picture of 
the Peace Dove Strategy. By revisiting the picture, we can see that Africa is part of 
China's international modernisation plan. Indeed China-Africa (Sino-Africa) 
relations are a distinctive example within this changing Chinese foreign relations 
framework. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is a concrete 
example of China's global strategy. 
The China-Africa relationship has a long history beginning with the PRC's 
founding, when relations were shaped by a strong anti-imperialism principle, to 
the more contemporary focus on economic mutual exchange (win-win). Since the 
new century, the relationship has entered a new stage characterized by its Forums 
of China and Africa (FOCAL), which are held every three years and feature, 
within the economic win-win context, diverse cooperation which includes 
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educational support for Africa. 
Educational cooperation within this new framework includes an increase in 
cultural and human resource exchange. In addition Chinese `aid' is focusing more 
on higher education and vocational training. The empirical work of this study will 
examine how this type of `aid' is conducted by the Chinese and perceived in the 
African field. Yet firstly, this chapter discusses how, historically, China increased 
its attention towards educational cooperation with Africa, how China declared 
educational cooperation with Africa in its policies, and how the main approaches 
are described in documents. 
1. Changing discourses and mechanisms of a China-Africa relation 
China and Africa are geographically distant, separated by immense land masses 
with mountains and stretching deserts, as well as by vast oceans. The opinions 
regarding the relations between the two areas have long differed. According to 
Chinese historical records ('Shi Ji'), specifically one written by Si Maqian circa 
100 BC, the Emperor Wuti of the Han Dynasty sent envoys to the far West in 
hopes of making a friendly alliance with tribes there. Among the areas Chinese 
envoys visited was a place called `Likan', which historians argue was most likely 
Egypt (Gao, 1984: 241). 50 As Gao notes, this evidence means that, as early as two 
thousand years ago, Chinese officials visited Africa. Thus beginning in 100 BC, 
Chinese goods reached to the far away continent by sea (ibid). 
During the Tang Dynasty (618-907), the Tang and Arab empires conquered large 
areas of West Asia and North Africa and at that time, established friendly relations 
with many groups. Within about 150 years, the Arab Empire sent envoys to Tang's 
imperial court no less than 36 times. China's knowledge of Africa took a leap 
forward during the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368). In about 1315, a cartographer 
named Ju Siben drew a map with Africa shaped like a triangle pointing southward 
which resembles the actual shape of the continent. Importantly, during the Ming 
50 As Gao noted there was also a different interpretation, for instance the German Sinologist Friedrich Hirth 
that Likan was a part of the Roman Empire. 
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Dynasty (1368-1644), in the 29 years between1405 and 1433, the famous eunuch 
admiral Zheng He made 7 voyages in which he visited Southwest Asia around the 
Indian Ocean. In at least 2 or 3 of his voyages, he and his fleet reached the East 
African coast and visited several areas in contemporary Somalia and Kenya (Gao, 
1984: 242). Zheng He's voyages are still made reference to today, when Chinese 
officials state their long history with Africa. 
Even though Zheng He's voyages were so important for developing relations 
throughout China-African history, relations were cooled down, and nearly came to 
a stop following the invasion of European colonialists in both areas, and the 
subsequent closed-door policy of the Manchu rulers during the Ching Dynasty 
(1644-1912). As Gao stated, `if there were any subsequent contacts worth 
mentioning, these were the Chinese labourers (70,000 to 100,000) or coolies 
recruited by the white colonialists to work in mines in South Africa during the 
early 20th Century (1904-1907)' (1982: 247). The relations were negligible until 
the foundation of the PRC and the emergence of an independent Africa. 
1.1 The time from foundation of PRC 
Beyond the variety of historical relations between China and Africa which took 
place hundreds of years ago, this thesis is talking about the current form of 
China's engagement with Africa, politically and formally, and how it began to 
take shape after the 1949 revolution which brought Mao's Communist Party to 
power (Obiorah, 2007: 35). There have been three stages of relations since the 
foundation of PRC. The first period was the 50s to the 70s. The Bandung 
Conference (also called the Asian-African conference) was held in April 1955 in 
Bandung, Indonesia, and was a milestone conference for Asian and African states. 
The conference's stated aims were to promote Afro-Asian economic and cultural 
cooperation and to oppose colonialism or neocolonialism by the United States, the 
Soviet Union, or any other `imperialistic' nation. Not long after the conference, in 
1956, China set up formal diplomatic relations with Egypt, the first African 
country to engage in such relations. 
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During most of the Maoist period (1949-1976), China's development assistance 
was managed by the Ministry of Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries 
(now the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries within the Ministry of 
Commerce). With the emergence of independent African countries, Premier Zhou 
Enlai visited Africa three times during the 1960s. Between 1963 and 1964, 
Premier Zhou and Vice-Premier Chen Yi toured ten African countries and declared 
`Five principles of China and Africa' in Algeria (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
PRC, 17/11/2000). 51 In Ghana and Mali, the Premier put forward `Eight 
principles of Chinese economic and technological aid' on 15 January 1964 (Yu, 
1988: 853). An outline of the principles are (Chin and Frolic, 2007: 4): 
1. Emphasise equality and mutual benefit 
2. Respect sovereignty and never attach conditions 
3. Provide interest-free or low-interest loans 
4. Help recipient countries develop independence and self-reliance 
5. Build projects that require little investment and can be accomplished 
quickly 
6. Provide quality equipment and material at market prices 
7. Ensure effective technical assistance 
8. Pay experts according to local standards 
The five principles, as developed in the Bandung spirit, include the support for 
anti-imperialism, anti-old and new colonialism and anti-alignment, support for 
African people to achieve `solidarity by their own choice' and a respect for 
African sovereignty. The eight principles of aid, most likely the earliest policy and 
guideline of Chinese aid to Africa, declared that the relationship was `mutual' --- 
thus China has never regarded aid as one-sided, but as being based on equality 
and mutual benefit: 
51 1n brief, the five principles guiding China's relations with the Arab and African countries were as follows: 
a. China supports the Arab and African peoples in their struggle to oppose imperialism and old and new 
colonialism and to win and safeguard national independence. b. It supports the pursuance of a policy of peace, 
neutrality and non-alignment by the Governments of Arab and African countries. c. It supports the desire of 
the Arab and African peoples to achieve unity and solidarity in the manner of their own choice. d. It supports 
the Arab and African countries in their efforts to settle their disputes through peaceful consultations. e. It 
holds that the sovereignty of the Arab and African countries should be respected by all other countries and 
that encroachment and interference from any quarter should be opposed (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
PRC, 17/11/2000). 
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`The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality 
and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards 
such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual'. (The first 
principle of the eight) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17/11/2000) 
Within the eight principles, the chief method of economic aid was offering long 
term, low interest or interest-free loans, technology transformations, and expert 
dispatch, which featured the provision that Chinese technicians should accept the 
same salaries and living standard as their African colleagues (Yahuda, 1978: 160). 
The principles were aimed to assure that African countries were not `relying on 
China', but were being helped to `seek their own way of development and 
economic independence' (China. org. cn, 14/11/2003). 
The Eight Principles obviously stressed China's contributive role to Africa's 
development (Yu, 1988: 853), and what is most distinctive is that this role had a 
different logic from the West at that time. Compared with the Western logic of 
intervention which was more like a prescription or target setting for Africa based 
on the theory of modernisation and Rostovian taking-off model, China's aid 
policy in 1964 focused more on what China could offer, and how this offering 
could be mutually beneficial and related to anti-imperialism. Thus China at this 
time stood like a comrade-in-arms with African countries to work for an 
independent future of the development; it was more like establishing alignment 
rather than forming a donor-recipient relationship. 
As Snow (1994: 288) described it, Maoist China showed the South a lot of what 
the North could not do, so that it became a champion of the Third World and 
ultimately did win African support on a range of collective economic issues. Thus 
by the 1980s 150,000 Chinese aid workers, including skilled engineers and 
doctors, had been sent to Africa. China volunteered to embark on projects such as 
the Tan-zam (TAZARA) railway, which started in 1970 and finished in 1976; it 
was one of the monuments of the period. 52 The building of the railway was both 
52 The TAZARA Railway (also called the Uhuru Railway, from the Swahili word for Freedom, and the 
Tanzara Railway) was built between 1970 and 1976 by the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (abbreviated 
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politically and psychologically important to African governments during difficult 
times, during which more profit-minded donors rejected such projects on 
economic grounds, and Western donors were unwilling to work in inhospitable 
bush or desert postings. Because of this, China then got the mutual support back 
from Africa: `We are aware', said Nyerere who was the Tanzanian president 
during the Tan-Zam railway project, `that this capital is not surplus to your 
requirements, nor are your technicians otherwise unemployed'; President Bongo 
of Gabon called China `the tabernacle of justice' (Snow, 1994: 289). In 1971 at 
the 26th United Nation conference, 26 African countries voted to support China in 
78 total supportive votes; Mao proclaimed `it was our black brothers who lifted us 
into the United Nation' (He, 04/11/2006). African people believed, at least till the 
early 70s, that Chinese assistance was given to them for wholly altruistic reasons 
and no strings whatsoever were attached (Yu, 1974: 86). 
1.2 The 80s to 90s 
The 1980s featured the second aforementioned stage of China-African relations 
which transformed relations from political to economic and commercial. China 
announced the opening-up reform in 1978, and this reform extended Chinese 
foreign relations in the economic field. Plugging into what we talked about in 
chapter three (Chinese pragmatism), the end of the Cultural Revolution marked a 
shift in China's policy toward Africa from one based almost exclusively on 
ideological alliance, to one with a far more pragmatic and diversified approach. In 
1982 the 12th CPC National Assembly officially marked a shift from a policy that 
emphasised `war and revolution' to one that emphasised `peace and development' 
(Li, 2007b: 72). Likewise, China shifted from policies that emphasised `economy 
serves diplomacy' to policies based on `diplomacy serves the economy' (ibid). 
During his visit to eleven African countries between 1982-83, Premier Zhao 
Ziyang called for promoting `south-south cooperation' and announced that China 
was adding a new principle to its foreign aid- `diversity in form' (Brautigam, 2008: 
10). Thereafter China issued `Four Principles on Economic and Technological 
to `TAZARA') to provide landlocked Zambia an alternative rail lines via Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), South 
Africa, and Mozambique. The railroad was a turnkey project financed and executed by PRC. Total costs were 
about US $500 million, making it the largest foreign-aid project ever undertaken by China. This will be 
illustrated in Part two of the thesis. 
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Cooperation with Africa' in 1983, namely, (a) equality and mutual benefit, (b) 
efficiency, (c) diversity and (d) mutual development (People's Daily, 15/01/1983); 
this was announced by Premier Zhao on 13 January 1983 in Tanzania. The new 
four principles marked a significant reform, the impacts of which are still being 
felt today. 
Compared with the Eight Principles of 1964, which governed Chinese foreign aid 
and technical assistance programmes through the early 1980s, Zhao's Four 
Principles of 1983 had a different orientation. The 1964 principles emphasised the 
contributive role of China, a respect for the `sovereignty of the recipient countries, ' 
and no request for the privileges of Chinese aid (Yu, 1988: 857). On the other 
hand the 1983 principles focused firstly on mutual economic benefits rather than 
mutual political support, and also emphasised economic efficiency. Secondly it 
emphasised the actual needs of the two sides in accordance with China's internal 
development situation, which meant China would not over estimate its ability to 
provide aid. Thirdly it shifted focus onto diverse aid forms, including doing 
construction for African countries, and cooperation of labour service and 
investment (Li, 2006a: 6). 
During the same period (1980s to 1990s), the Western agenda was dictated by the 
Washington Consensus. Comparatively then, what China did was not make a 
standard model (such as SAPs) for the development of Africa, but rather made 
cooperation central for mutual economic development. One of the important 
differences is the consideration of the `actual needs' of both sides, and in relation 
to this, the fact that China did not want to make internal changes to African 
countries' political-economic structures. The chief reason for China's position is 
that, when African countries were put under pressure to make structural changes 
oriented by Western donors, China, at the same time, was making changes in its 
own domestic economic structure by seeking an alternative way from Western 
countries' routes (i. e. the opening up policy, Chinese style socialism with a 
socialism market economy, and the other characteristics we talked about last 
chapter). Thus maybe we can say that, during this time, China's aid was focusing 
on how to make a mutually beneficial relation on common aims of development, 
whereas the West was putting much more attention on how to change Africa. 
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The most important progress, and the time during which China got the most 
attention, was the period after the Cold War from 1989. With the disappearance of 
the struggle between two super powers, African geopolitical status changed. As a 
result, Western attention to Africa has been constantly on the decline, while China 
went on to make more reforms of its foreign policy in order to engage more with 
the new global world. Thus, based on the 1980s development of economic 
relations with Africa, China saw great value in fostering an across-the-board 
relationship with Africa by forging closer political, cultural and educational links 
(He, 2008). In 1996, President Jiang Zemin toured Africa and presented a `Five 
Point Proposal' which established the terms of a new China-Africa relationship; 
this relationship emphasised reliable friendship, sovereign equality, 
non-intervention, mutually beneficial development and international cooperation 
(Naidu and Mbazima, 2008: 752) for the 21St century. The proposal has become 
the foundation of China's policy toward Africa. The new Chinese leadership is 
carrying forward the cause of the old leadership, as well as forging ahead into the 
future. In this way they are adhering to and building upon China's established 
policy toward Africa, and paying attention to strengthening unity and cooperation 
between the two (China. org. cn, 2008). If we accept that the 80s principles were a 
series of strategies for Africa, then the 90s was a time for enriching the previous 
plans with more practice. 
Looking back to the Western agenda during the 90s, the Washington Consensus 
was argued that SAPs were undermining the capacity of low-income countries to 
ensure stability and social cohesion, and provide for the most vulnerable sections 
of society (Robertson et al., 2007: 55). It can be seen that, from the 80s through 
the 90s, Western donors were trying to change strategies for low-income countries, 
but in terms of results, not much good was seen in areas such as Africa. The 90s 
`good governance' strategy, though it introduced more non-economic factors into 
economic processes, did not actually represent a complete break from the 
Washington Consensus (ibid, 2007: 57). China on the other hand, made African 
countries see another way towards economic success; this different way was seen 
because China did not minimize African state's roles and ownership, called for no 
attachment, and increased trade agreements and other types of cooperation. Such a 
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model was strengthened by China's experience of opening-up. 
1.3 New century and FOCAC 
`2006 marked the 50th anniversary of the inauguration of diplomatic relations 
between China and African countries. 2006, dubbed by China as its `Year of 
Africa 'P was also a historical year in China Africa relations in terms of political 
achievements (Davies, 2007: 23). 
`The advice that the African leaders received from their Chinese counterparts was 
sound, and much more practical than what they typically get from the World Bank ' 
(Sachs, 2007). 
Since 2000, a new period emerged which may be called the FOCAC (Forum on 
China -Africa Cooperation) years. The first Ministerial Conference of FOCAC 
was in October 2000, where African and Chinese representatives met in Beijing to 
discuss the direction of long term relations between the two (FOCAC, 2000). The 
Forums are held every three years. The latest one, the 4th FOCAC was held in 
Egypt, in November of 2009, and it decided to hold the Fifth Ministerial 
Conference of FOCAC in Beijing in 2012 (Xinhuanet, 09/11/2009d). In June 2003, 
Chinese President Hu Jintao stressed that the Chinese Government would 
endeavour to shape a new Sino-African partnership based on long-term stability, 
equality and mutual benefit. 
The year 2006 was declared `the year of Africa' in Chinese diplomatic history. On 
12 January 2006, the Chinese government released China's African Policy 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2006a) which declared the country's 
future aims and practice plans in Africa, and also made the specific field of 
practice clearer. Before the policy was released, China had been having formal 
diplomatic relations with 47 of the total 53 African countries. To be highlighted 
here, this represented the first time that the Chinese government released its 
policy for Africa (Xinhuanet, 12/01/2006). The policy emphasises mutual 
supportive relations based on the long history between the two continents: 
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China-Africa friendship is embedded in the long history of interchange. 
Sharing similar historical experience, China and Africa have all along 
sympathized with and supported each other in the struggle for national 
liberation and forged a profound friendship.... For over half a century, the 
two sides have enjoyed close political ties and frequent exchanges ... 
Bilateral trade and economic cooperation have grown rapidly; 
cooperation in other fields has yielded good results; and consultation and 
coordination in international affairs have been intensified. China has 
provided assistance to the best of its ability to African countries, while 
African countries have also rendered strong support to China on many 
occasions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2006b: Part II). 
The 2006 Policy is framed by the following points: 
Sincerity, friendship and equality. -- Mutual benefit, reciprocity and 
common prosperity. -- Mutual support and close coordination. -- 
Learning from each other and seeking common development (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2006b: Part III). 
Between the 3`d and 5th of November 2006, the Beijing Summit and the 3`d 
Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC was held in Beijing. The `Declaration of 
the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation' was signed by the 
end of the conference (FOCAC, 2006a). The declaration proclaims establishment 
of `a new type of strategic partnership' between China and Africa, which features 
`political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural 
exchanges', adopted by Chinese leaders and 48 African countries. `The 
China-Africa cooperation on Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009)' was also issued at 
the forum, and offered more details about China-Africa cooperation in the field of 
politics, economics, international affairs, and social development (FOCAC, 
2006b). 
Throughout the declaration, China stands actively in the developing world and 
calls for collaboration among developing countries, for the aim of their common 
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interests, through beneficial exchange and cooperation. Such statements remind us 
that, as both a lender and recipient in the world of aid, `China's goal is not to 
overturn the world order but instead to participate in this order and to reinforce it 
and even to profit from it' (Kirchgaessner, 2006), and in this vein to play a role as 
`a significant player in a liberalising global trading environment based upon 
market principles' (Alden and Davies, 2006: 9). 53 Generally speaking, the 
declaration informs a new pattern of China-Africa cooperation based on the 
principle of economic `win-win'. This new pattern is facilitated by the political 
and economic position of contemporary China. Since then, the `mutual relations' 
emphasised in Chinese policies has been upgraded to a terminology which is more 
market-oriented, and even clearer: `win-win' (Chinese pinyin: shuang ying). 
The Beijing Summit and its Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009) have significant 
changes from the discourses of the previous FOCAC (in 2000 and 2003). 
Compared with the 2000 conference which put a lot of attention on the political 
slogan level (e. g. a common view about UN regulations , 
human rights, and 
anti-terrorism) (FOCAC, 2000), the Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009) has more 
content and more details regarding the practice of the two sides, and particularly 
focuses on economic cooperation. 
Trade between Africa and China has been developing rapidly since the mid-90s. 
Apart from pure trade/business, China also committed itself to a series of 
supporting aims, such as training plans and educational aid. 
On President Hu's 2009 tour to Mali, Senegal, Tanzania, and Mauritius, the 
Chinese Foreign Ministry said that this visiting was not primarily commercial in 
nature, but rather a sign of `good and profound traditional friendship with African 
countries', and gave `fresh impetus to traditional friendship' (Xinhuanet, 
18/02/2009c). The visit aimed to consolidate friendship, deepen cooperation, deal 
with challenges, and seek common development, as Hu said (Xinhuanet, 
12/02/2009a). In an important comment by Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister 
Zhai Jun at a press briefing regarding this visit, he noted that these four countries 
57 Kirchgaessner 's words were from Fu Chuanyu who was CEO of Chinese National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (2003-2010). These words were also cited in Alden and Davies' paper (2006: 1). 
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were actually not rich with natural resources, a point which refuted Western media 
claims that China only cared about energy; Chinese media claimed energy was 
just a part of a more comprehensive cooperation with Africa (Embassy of the PRC 
in the USA, 06/02/2009). 
`The year 2009 is an important year for China-Africa relations to continue to 
move forward and will create new development opportunities for the bilateral ties. 
The Chinese leaders will continue to take the development of relations with Africa 
as a top priority of Chinese diplomacy', Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Yang 
said (Lu and Shi, 14/12/2009). President Hu, from his days of being a 
vice-president through to the president of PRC, has formally visited various 
African countries six times in the past decade, and five of the six visits were the 
first political tour by Hu in each calendar year. It seems China is increasingly 
putting Africa in an important position (Qi, 13/02/2009). 
2. Logic of intervention: Win-win policy based relation 
The contemporary Chinese approach to Africa (always called `cooperation' rather 
than `aid' by the government) is based on their `win-win' policy theory. The 
concept `win-win' is mainly about economic strategy; from the description given 
by the Chinese government: `a new type of strategic partnership with Africa that 
features political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and 
cultural exchange' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 12/01/2006b). 
Therefore, the `win-win' policy is centred upon a mutually beneficial economic 
process. However, since the word `win-win' has been used increasingly in Chinese 
policy discourse recently, the meaning of win-win has been extended to different 
fields. 
We may further illustrate the win-win policy through the discourse of Chinese 
political leaders. President Hu's speech at University of Pretoria, South Africa on 
7 February 2007 highlighted the need to `deepen cooperation and expand 
economic and technological exchanges to achieve mutual benefit and win-win 
progress' (Hu, 07/02 2007). At length, Hu noted: 
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Economic and technological cooperation is an important foundation for 
growing China-Africa relations. ... In addition to trade, we should 
expand our cooperation to other areas, including investment, technology 
and project contracting. Priority should be given to agriculture, 
infrastructure, manufacturing and public welfare projects that are vital to 
people's livelihood. The Chinese Government will fully implement the 
policy steps announced at the Beijing Summit for strengthening 
pragmatic cooperation with Africa and supporting its development to 
help Africa expedite socio-economic development, enhance 
capacity-building and improve people's livelihood, thus bringing real 
benefit to the African people. (ibid) 
The above speech describes that the win-win relation is applicable to many areas 
between China and Africa. Politically it is a sign that the China-Africa 
relationship is moving towards a more diverse and flexible level, that is, from a 
traditional domestic political-based relationship focused on the similarities of the 
political culture and dialogues, towards a multi-fields' performance based upon 
cooperation in economics, political parties, culture, education, medical treatment, 
and more. This multi-layered cooperation includes both the leaders and the public, 
both the national and private companies, both practical and research levels, and 
both political and commercial aims. 
Similarly Yang (2009: 57) talks about the `conditions for sustainable strategic 
partnership' which includes `mutual political trust', `mutual beneficial 
partnership', `interdepartmental coordination' 'mutual understanding of civil 
societies' and `opening to international involvement' (ibid: 62-64). Yang argues 
that, `to realise a win-win outcome, it is necessary to strengthen the dynamic 
framework and mechanism to guide and implement the cooperation programme 
and action plans adjusting to the changing situation with the time' (ibid: 63). 
Contemporary China prefers a `harmonisation' discourse for explaining its 
win-win policy. According to Zhang (2009: 67), China-Africa relations are based 
on building a harmonious world wherein African countries can decide African 
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affairs by themselves, give effective assistance to each other, and establish fair 
and just multilateral trade and financial systems to gear economic globalisation. 
For the Chinese government,, in regards to maintaining a win-win relationship 
with Africa, they firstly `forge friendship, maintain close political dialogue and 
increase mutual trust' (ibid: 68), secondly `deepen cooperation and expand 
economic and technological exchanges to achieve mutual benefit' (ibid: 69), 
thirdly `strengthen exchanges of civilizations', fourthly `strengthen consultation 
and cooperation in security affairs', and finally `uphold each other's legitimate 
rights in the international affairs'. 
Thus China wants to claim that, for the two sides' roles within the win-win 
framework, each will win diverse benefits in a harmonious atmosphere, and work 
for sustainability in the long run. Yet, what is the basis of win-win? And what is 
the logic of win-win? 
This diverse win-win policy is based on a `sharing' platform which could be 
unique to China. Since the 60s through the 70s, the China-Africa political 
relationship has shifted from `striving for political liberation and national 
independence', to `striving for interests of sovereignty, security and development' 
(Wang, 2009: 324) in the 80s and 90s (ibid: 328). Xiao and Zhang (2009: 153) 
also mention `the disadvantages in the same boat'. An (2009: 183-186) compares 
the poverty issues between China and Africa, and notes that they `face different 
situation of poverty issues; however, they have much in common on fighting 
poverty; this makes anti-poverty cooperation possible for China and Africa' (An, 
2009: 186). Possible areas of similarities also include the development of rural 
areas. 
According to Davies (2007: 34), apart from economic cooperation China and 
Africa could also share experiences on common challenges such as rural 
development, labour migration, urbanization and population growth, regional 
imbalances in development, and the development of the domestic market and 
integration with the international market. The two could also learn together to 
safeguard national interest in the face of the globalisation of markets, and could 
together promote the interests of developing countries in world affairs. 
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3. Cooperation in the field of education 
The Chinese win -win policy has opened a window for future cooperation in 
cultural and educational fields. As opposed to short term economic benefits, 
educational aid and cooperation is a method by which development for both sides 
will be achieved in the long run. China has noticed this latter point in the new 
policy, as they increased the expected number of aid students in Africa over the 
coming years. The Chinese also use an ancient saying to describe educational 
assistance to Africa- `give me a fish and I will eat today, while teach me to fish 
and I will eat for a lifetime' (An, 2009: 190). 
As a developing country, China is not able to give a significant amount of 
financial aid. Therefore, based on the win-win theory, the educational aid 
approach from China is to help people to learn rather than give people money to 
go to school. For instance China is active in professional training and the dispatch 
of volunteers, researchers or teachers. Compared with financial aid from the West, 
China has never been a `rich' donor and is thus trying a different way by using its 
human resources to help develop the human capacities in Africa; this is `teaching 
how to fish'. 
In the new century and the global era, educational development is more than a 
process by which to produce skilled personnel, it is a process of learning about 
each other's strengths, to facilitate international understanding, promote cultural 
integration, and even a process to influence each other and promote cooperation in 
other fields. For these reasons, the win-win theory considers the role of education. 
3.1 Increasing attention in educational cooperation 
According to Li Baoping (2007), in the last 50 years China has forged cooperative 
relations in the field of education with 50 African countries. This cooperation has 
expanded from a simple exchange of students initially, to the current multi-level 
educational cooperation which covers various fields and takes many forms. 
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There are three stages of the development in the educational field between China 
and Africa. The first one began from the 1950s. As a new developing country at 
this time, China began to dispatch teachers and students to some African countries 
such as Egypt and Morocco. 54 In the mid-60s, there were 164 students from 14 
African countries who went to China for study, while China kept on dispatching 
teachers to Africa; this process was not carried out during the Cultural Revolution. 
Until the end of the 80s, 43 African countries' sent 2245 students to China. There 
was also some extra development in cooperation among universities (PKUCAS, 
2005: 2-3). 
The second stage was from the 90s. After the Cold War and the resultant 
international changes, cooperation between China and Africa was strengthened. 
Government groups from the Education Ministry of China visited about 20 
African countries and the number of African students coming to China increased; 
within all the educational aid projects, 5660 students from 43 countries, and 238 
teachers were going to over 30 African countries. Moreover at this time, the 
cooperation field was extended to the scholarships for master and doctoral levels. 
It was noticeable that training classes were held by the Chinese ministries in 
Africa from the end of 90s, and covered the fields of educational administration, 
agriculture, computer skills, medical application and more (PKUCAS, 2005: 4). 55 
From 50s to the end of 2005, China offered governmental scholarships to 19,000 
students from 50 African countries, and no less than 530 teachers have been 
dispatched to Africa (King, 2007: 342). The contemporary stage began with the 
FOCAC (as aforementioned). 
While the FOCAC which dictated general cooperation between China and Africa, 
the education ministers from China and 17 African countries actually jointly 
sa The information from this part is drawn mostly from `China Africa Education Cooperation' (2005) (in 
Chinese) which reviews China-Africa cooperation on education, its history, performance, problems and 
prospects. It is edited and written by the Centre for African Studies of Beijing University (PKUCAS), 
entrusted by the Department of International Cooperation and Exchanges, the Ministry of Education of PRC. 
55 In my field work, I interviewed Tanzanians who have attended training in China. I also visited some 
Chinese universities that organised training courses for African countries. There will be discourse analysis on 
short term training course reports by Zhejiang Normal University in the following chapter. 
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signed a Beijing Declaration on 27 November 2005. The Declaration declared that 
the education ministers exchanged views on the current situation and the existing 
problems in educational development. These exchanges were followed by 
in-depth discussions focused upon the formulation and implementation of 
educational strategies for developing countries. The ministers reaffirmed that 
education is the cornerstone of social development, and that promoting the 
development of education is a national priority and a prerequisite for achieving 
national prosperity. Some of the agreements in the declaration are as follows: 
-- Regard free and compulsory primary education as a basic human right; 
-- Prioritizing the development of education, providing sufficient and 
equal opportunities to education and accomplishing lifelong education 
and education for all, are essential elements in formulating national 
development strategies for developing countries. 
-- To improve the equality of education and to offer more opportunities 
for access to education, we will need to facilitate the application of 
information and communication technology in education. 
-- The relevance of education to economic development is more 
significant in the process of pursuing economic development and 
eliminating poverty. 
-- In order to confront the challenges of unemployment, structural 
adjustment of our economies as well as the demands of technology, 
developing countries need to establish prudent vocational education 
policies. 
-- developing higher education, enlarging enrollment and improving 
educational quality and training high-quality talents to meet economic 
development demands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 
29/11/2005). 
`The Sino-African Education Minister's Forum is an important platform for 
exchange and cooperation between China and Africa on the basis of equality and 
mutual benefit, and a significant move for developing countries to seek 
educational development', the declaration said. 
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The ministers held dialogues on the topic of `China-Africa strategy on the 
development of education and international exchanges and cooperation'. It is 
notable that the first consensus of the declaration is very similar to the UN's 
MDGs, which calls for UPE. Moreover the following consensuses about lifelong 
learning and EFA, as well as reducing poverty through education, are using a very 
similar discourse when compared with the UN aims. Furthermore the discourse 
about `the relevance of education to economic development' even seems to absorb 
the World Bank's language. However it seems that some different actions are 
taken despite the similar discourse with the West, specifically with the last two 
consensuses which mentioned vocational and higher education. Those are 
probably China's focus, as compared to its devotion in primary educational range. 
According to King (2007: 343), although this forum was `piggy-backed on the 
High Level Meeting on EFA, it struck out on its own', focusing more on the 
`prudent policies for vocational education and technical education, as well as to 
encourage higher education and cultural diversity'. 
Training and assisting foreign countries is an important component of Chinese aid. 
Until the end of 2006, China held 2500 training classes for 150 countries (African 
countries and other developing countries and areas), and 80,000 people were 
trained in over 150 subjects including economy, management, agriculture, law, 
and education. More than 150 Chinese universities, research centres and 
professional training institutions contributed to the training (Department of Aid 
for Foreign Countries, Ministry of Commerce, 26/07/2007). As a special way of 
educating people in professional fields and in short term fields, training offers 
opportunities for understanding of Chinese culture and learning the Chinese 
developmental experience; this has efficiently promoted good relationships 
between China and other developing countries. 
Some training courses are specially held for African university leaders. On 3 
October 2006, the Sino-African University Presidents Forum, authorized by 
Ministry of Education and Ministry of Commerce, was held at Zhejiang Normal 
University. 30 university presidents and senior educational administrators from 14 
African countries (such as Kenya, Tanzania, and South Africa) met with Chinese 
experts on African research and Chinese university presidents and officials; in 
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total 120 people attended the forum. The main topic of the forum was `reform, 
cooperation and development' in the issues of `capacity building of universities in 
developing countries', `management reforms in the universities', and 
`international partner relationship'. This was the first forum designed for 
university administrators between China and Africa, and demonstrates a trend to 
focus on higher education cooperation in the future (People's Daily, 09/10/2006). 
One month after the university president forum, the largest conference between 
China and Africa, the Beijing Summit as part of the FOCAC series, was held in 
Beijing in November 2006. In the part designed to discuss human development 
between the two sides, the summit declared to expand educational cooperation in 
its Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009). In this plan they increasingly recognize `the 
importance of education as the foundation and key for achieving sustainable 
social and economic development' (in Beijing Action Plan 5.4.1) (FOCAC, 
2006b). This `Education' part of the 2007-2009 Action Plan is built on the 
previous forum for educational ministers in 2005, as the plan indicated: 
Taking note of the success of the China-Africa Forum of Ministers of 
Education last November, the two sides expressed the view that holding 
this Forum on a regular basis will help promote their cooperation and 
dialogue in education (in Beijing Action Plan, 5.4.2) (FOCAC, 2006b). 56 
The two sides resolved to encourage more exchanges and closer 
cooperation between institutions of higher learning of the two sides, take 
steps to ensure the effectiveness of the bilateral student exchange 
programs, and carry out consultation on concluding agreements on 
mutual accreditation of academic degrees (in Beijing Action Plan, 5.4.3) 
(FOCAC, 2006b). 
This plan, passed on the roundtable meeting (on 5 November, 2006) chaired by 
President Hu, aimed that in the subsequent three years, namely, by 2009, it would: 
-Help African countries set up 100 rural schools; 
56 Chi na-Africa Forum of Ministers of Education is the forum we introduced earlier in this section, held in 
November of 2005. 
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-Increase the number of Chinese government scholarships to African students 
from the current 2,000 to 4,000 by 2009; 
-Provide annual training for a number of educational officials as well as heads 
and leading teachers of universities, primary, secondary and vocational schools in 
Africa; 
-Establish Confucius Institutes in African countries to meet their needs in the 
teaching of the Chinese language and encourage the teaching of African languages 
in relevant Chinese universities and colleges (in Beijing Action Plan, 5.4.4) 
(FOCAC, 2006b). 
In this plan, higher education cooperation included scholarships, training and 
Chinese language teaching; in this regard, specific figures were given thus 
indicating a more systematic cooperation between the two sides for future 
evaluations. 
3.2 Main approaches to educational cooperation 
So how is the Chinese educational cooperation with Africa made up? What are 
their distinctive characteristics? Different from the Western donors, China's 
approach to Africa is more about the cultural integration and skill transformation. 
These approaches can be summarised as follows (PKUCAS, 2005: 8-70): 57 
Firstly, there is exchan ge and cooperation between educational and academic 
institutions on both sides, including visits from top-level officials in the education 
sector (PKUCAS, 2005: 8). As Li (2006a: 4) notes, `up to now, China has sent 
more than 100 education delegations to visit Africa while receiving as many 
delegations from African countries... Communications in the education sector 
were carried out not only through irregular mutual contacts, but also through 
mutual and multilateral high level talks and negotiation mechanisms'. 
Secondly, as the data shown in the previous paragraphs indicates, students 
exchanges, which has more than 50 years history, is one of the important aspects 
S' Main c ontents of these approaches are originally from the book: `China Africa education cooperation' 
(2005: 8-70). 
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of this cooperation (PKUCAS, 2005: 13). From 1956 to 2006,18,000 African 
youths received Chinese government sponsorship to study in China. From 1956 to 
the end of 2003, China sent 523 teachers to 35 African countries who gave 
courses in more than 10 subjects and specialized fields, including science, 
engineering, agriculture, arts and physical training, in order to help African 
countries develop the weaker disciplines, train technological talents, and develop 
middle school and university education (Xinhuanet, 04/02/2007). Some of the 
earlier graduates have been given important governmental posts in Africa, 
contributing to and improving Sino-African relations. 
The third way is dispatching teachers to Africa. Dispatched teachers gave courses 
in more than 10 subjects and specialties, including science, engineering, 
agriculture, arts and physical training, in order to assist African countries in 
developing the weak disciplines, train talents in technological fields, develop 
education in middle schools and universities (PKUCAS. 2005: 23). China's 
Zhejiang Agricultural University, which has been merged into Zhejiang University, 
sent 12 teachers to work in Cameroon in eight years since 1991 (Li, 2007a: 5). 
After eight years, an advanced microbiology laboratory was set up in the 
University of Yaounde I, in which China invested 2 million yuan (about 286,000 
US dollars). From 1995 to 2003, China administered 43 sessions of the `Advanced 
Education and Scientific Research Program' in 21 African countries, and under 
the program, 21 comparatively advanced laboratories in biology, micro-biology, 
computer science, physics, analytical chemistry, food refreshment and processing 
were set up in universities in those countries (Xinhuanet, 04/02/2007). 
Another approach is cooperation between universities on research projects in 
order to improve the research quality of African universities; one method was to 
edit a series of research training books by Chinese and African lectures (PKUCAS, 
2005: 27). By the end of 2003, Chinese universities had cooperative agreements 
with 21 African countries on 43 higher educational projects (ibid: 29). The 
agreements included seminars and conferences, research visits, and research 
projects. 
There are also some other aid approaches, such as funding or donating teaching 
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materials to schools directly. From mid-1980s to the end of 2002, China had 
donated teaching and learning tools, computers and lab equipments to 24 African 
countries (PKUCAS, 2005: 41). However, thus far the Chinese aid in Africa is still 
a small proportion of the total international aid in Africa. 
We now have developed a view of Chinese educational practice in Africa. 
Through more than 50 years of development, China has established a series of 
approaches on educational cooperation with Africa, especially on higher level of 
education. Therefore the question must be asked, how does this relatively small 
amount of educational aid by China effect and influence Africa? How is this 
perceived by donors (Chinese officials and people whose jobs are related to 
Chinese aid) and recipients? These are the questions being asked again and again 
in this study. 
4. Summary 
Above all, it is now necessary to grasp some historical features of China-Africa 
relationship and their educational cooperation, related with China's changing 
developmental tasks. The three categories of time '1950s-1960s', '1970s-1990s' 
and `2000-' were divided in chapter two to show the history of Western aid. 
However, considering China experienced a fast economic growth with huge 
changes just in a very short time, we prefer to divide the time line more 
specifically. Thus, four stages of China's African action are shown in the table 
below: 58 
58 Most of the Chinese and English literatures divide this relation into three periods, 1949-1978,80's and 
90's until now. The time from 90s to the 21st century has always been put together. This study made this new 
one and tried to give each of the stage a 'name', in order to show the changes more clearly. 
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Table 4.1: Changing domestic jobs and China-Africa relations 
Year Domestic task Aim of Educational A period of... 
for China-Africa field 
development relation 
1950s-1960s Build a new Ideology Learning Revolution 
China based from each 
systematically solidarity other and 
against cultural 
colonialism exchange, to 
and get friends 
imperialism for the new 
China 
1970s 1970s Develop China Third World Increasing Creation 
economically alliance; A exchanges 
1990s 1980s by Chinese shift from with 
style economy increasing 
pragmatism serves demand of 




1990s Format a Economic More types Diversification 
pluralistic based of 
society in order cooperation cooperation 
to accelerate to adapt emerged 
realizing themselves especially in 
modernisation into the post the field of 
Cold War higher 
time education 
2000- Engage more Strategic and More Consolidation 
into the global more specific 
issue and organised policy details 
figure a win-win confirmed 
modem and relation for Chinese 
democratic aiming for support of 
image of China long-run education 
mutual and human 
development resource to 
in the global Africa 
era 
First was a time of `revolution', as the new country was founded and the new 
China eagerly wanted to have political friends in the Third World and escape its 
`dark' history (being colonised, or being divided by imperialist powers' control). 
During this time China's foreign policy was heavily influenced by ideology, and 
was deeply impacted by the unique international environment of the time (Li, 
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2007a: 70). China placed itself on the front line of the struggle against colonialism, 
imperialism and revisionism in the Third World. Thus, the summary word 
`revolution' means it was the time for China to `stand up'. It was a time when 
China wanted to be independent, a desire shared together with a number of the 
emerging independent African countries, especially the countries with the 
pro-Soviet ideological traditions. At this stage, educational practices between the 
two sides were simple, taking the form of exchange visiting and studying mainly 
for language and literature learning, and aimed to understand and strengthen the 
friendship among the countries. 
Secondly, since the 1970s nation states have involved themselves into the global 
market, and national politics have been interlocked with the market economy. 
Given there is always a tension between the market and political authority for 
territorially-bounded nation states (Strange, 1994), in China's case there was a 
time when politics needed to change to adapt to market rules. As Liu (2008: 82) 
said, at the end of the 70s the `passion' between China and Africa had already 
decreased, and the material foundation which maintained the relations between 
them also got weaker. The relations began when both of the two sides were at a 
low development level, and as the times changed, the two of them were under 
pressure for national development. For these reasons, the importance of national 
emancipation was no longer prioritized instead of the very urgent aim of domestic 
economic development. The 12th CPC National Assembly in 1982 officially 
marked a shift from a policy that emphasised `war and revolution' to one 
emphasizing `peace and development'. Likewise, China shifted from policies that 
emphasised that `economy serves diplomacy' to policies based on `diplomacy 
serves the economy' (Li, 2007a: 72). China began to seek a new way which fitted 
itself better into the world, a new way which would not only use ideological 
standards to decide whether to be closer to, or further from, the African countries. 
China started to use `cooperation' rather than the term `aid' from the 80s, which 
meant that China did away with the ideological eras one-side support, and began 
to develop a kind of two-sides beneficial relations (Liu, 2008: 84). This process, 
which included the development of Chinese pragmatism and a fresh relationship 
with Africa, could be called a sort of `creation' period which was a time of shift 
and also an important time in the history of China and Africa. Education during 
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this time, especially following the opening-up policy, had been improved 
significantly in China, which gave the international cooperation of education 
between China and Africa a better and broader circumstance. Thus we can say, a 
real educational exchange which benefited thousands African students and 
influenced education itself, to a degree, started from this time. 
Thirdly, when China started an `economic cooperation' relationship with Africa, 
the windows opened even more widely than before; during this time the 
estrangement based upon different ideologies was weakened significantly. This 
was the time of diversification. Another obvious reason for this diversification 
was the end of Cold War. During the previous period, China started to make a 
shift from strong declaration on against imperialism to more flexibilities on 
economic cooperation with Africa, and thus from the 90s we can see more specific 
practice between China and Africa in these diverse fields. The diversification 
meant cooperation in the fields of politics, economy and social life, and also 
meant this would happen in different social sectors and at different levels. These 
changes were embodied in the field of education, when the government added 
some new forms of educational cooperation, including extending the academic 
degree levels including not only undergraduate but also postgraduate (master and 
phD level) and increasing research cooperation in higher education. At the same 
time, the recipient countries and the subject of studying and training became more 
diverse as well. 
Fourthly, until the new century China-Africa relations had changed from the 
original ideological relation. The period is named `consolidation' in this study, 
because, based on FOCAC, China consolidated its relations with African countries, 
and provided more details in policy and forum documents. Especially after the 
2006 Beijing Summit, with the 2007-2009 Beijing Action and declaration, it is 
obvious that China is attempting to make this relationship longitudinal, and is also 
trying to strengthen it through closer cooperation. China, as a fast rising state in 
the contemporary world, demonstrates that it is now making a serious effort to 
solidify ties with African countries via economic win-win relations, and by 
keeping relations running regularly and effectively. Educational policy follows the 
same approach as general cooperation, as demonstrated by clearer figures of 
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scholarship, training and school numbers for supporting Africa. Importantly, 
education at this time is becoming increasingly important given the knowledge 
economy atmosphere. Education will help integrate human resource exchange 
between China and Africa in the future. 
In this table, each period of China-Africa relations is actually placed under a 
certain international background, and is also related to the country's own logic of 
intervention. To respond to the questions in the introduction of this chapter, the 
next table offers a glance on the changing ontology of China-Africa educational 
practice, as put into context by the changing international social projects since aid 
started. 
Table 4.2 Chinese aid within changing international situations (Western context) 
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Time in above table is divided according to the different main project of 
international aid, and this division is similar to the period division in the last table. 
The periods are divided into decolonisation, Washington Consensus and 
Post-Washington Consensus. The main difference from the last table is that, in the 
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following one, we combine the time from mid 1970s to 1990 and 1990 to 2000 
into one period given that it was Washington Consensus time, and that the 
Post-Washington Consensus time began in 2000. Borrowed from Dale's table 
(2008) about `Social projects of education, their ontologies and implications for 
education governance, 1945-2008', this table is driven by a desire to understand 
the ontology of educational aid for the China-Africa relation together with the 
economic and political focuses in each period. To be flagged at this point, this is 
ontology of the two sides' relation and not just of China. In the following five 
parts of table content, the first one gives the international background of Western 
projects (namely, main projects from orthodox donors), the middle two parts tells 
us the economic and political background of China, followed with the focus of 
educational practice by China in each period. Finally is the deeper sight of the 
educational aid by China. We may also see that, during the Washington Consensus 
period wherein Western developmental strategies were demonstrating many 
shortcomings, China was focused on internal economic reforms. Through the 
economic transformation and the establishment of a stable political environment, 
China-Africa educational cooperation has begun to play a role as a promoter for 
mutual beneficial development in the long run. 
To conclude, after exploring a set of elements we mentioned in chapter one - aid 
approaches, motives, conditions, modalities, relationships, by looking historically 
at Western and Chinese context of aid, we can see that the Chinese win-win model 
of educational aid to Africa is a new type which adds to the orthodox Western 
model, as represented by the World Bank and some of the ODA countries; this 
new model is probably attractive to some African people. According to King's 
summary, the majority of African presidents are interested in the Chinese 
cooperation and the Beijing Summit because they are actually interested in `trade' 
not `aid' (King, 2007: 346). This conclusion offers a very important clue towards 
telling us the difference, and King elaborates by saying that China never used the 
word `aid' but instead used `cooperation'. Moreover China did not use 
`development cooperation', which is another name for aid, but instead used it 
separately in the title of the Summit, `development and cooperation'. We can see 
the Chinese model from the following points: 
--This position cannot be imitated by the other Western donors, as it is a 
South-South model which is based upon two-sided, mutually beneficial, 
`all-around relations'(He, W., 2009: 110) without political strings attached, and 
based on a history without colonialism but with some common developmental 
goals instead. Moreover, China is not offering approaches which confront the 
Western rules and thus pose little diplomatic risk (Gu et al., 2008: 11). 
--The main approach of educational aid to Africa is not financing but is `soft 
power construction' (He, W., 2009: 110) - human development, especially the 
transformation of the skills such as short-term training in certain subjects urgent 
for development. 
--Contemporary China is influenced by both Western and Chinese theories such as 
the human capital theory and neo-liberalism theory, but is trying to get a unique 
way well settled in its national conditions (Dong, 2009: 124). 
--The Chinese model in the Western viewpoints has several kinds of images: a 
new type of hegemony, or competitor of the West, or partner of Africa and other 
countries (Alden and Davies, 2006). 
However as King (2007: 346) says, there may well be ways in which its aid 
pledges can be implemented based on mutuality and equal benefit and avoid the 
many pitfalls of the traditional donor-recipient relations, if the Chinese 
government continue to conduct their principles based on their policy. King (2006) 
stated, focusing on the cooperation, `China's approach seems to differ 
substantially from many Western donors' preoccupation with poverty reduction, 
and with meeting the MDGs' (2006: 11). It is very clear from the MDGs statement 
that the Western aid to education should help the recipient country overcome 
poverty and realise the goal for UPE. This calls specifically for that `by 2015, 
children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of 
primary schooling' (United Nations, 2000: 5). In a marked difference from the 
Western goals, Chinese policy is not quoting MDGs' statement but is still using its 
terms of `cooperation', emphasizing dialogue between the two continents, 
considering education as one of the promoters of sustainable social and economic 
development. Davies (2007: 34) expressed a similar opinion to King, `China's 
development model offers an alternative to African countries to the structural 
adjustment policies prescribed by the World Bank and the IMF, a view for 
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instance expressed in a speech by the Chinese ambassador to South Africa. China 
has not followed the standardised policy prescription of these institutions. 
Whether the China model will play out differently remains to be seen'. 
Western donors always give us an image that they have responsibilities to help 
Africa. This is a link from the colonial history, despite the fact that the world has 
now entered a new era. Nonetheless a kind of hierarchical relationship between 
them exists and remains from before. China does not have this link with Africa, 
and what is more, they have common goals to pursue with Africa, that being to 
join in the global era. On the contrary, the model from the West, DAC countries, 
and the UN's goals seems like the model of the world, based on the DAC's 
developed economy and preponderant position in the world. They are making 
prescriptions to cure low-income countries' problems, in hope they can catch up 
with the standards of modernisation. With increasing developing countries 
wanting to be independent and developed, this kind of hierarchy perhaps makes 
the recipients feel uncomfortable and feel as though they are losing. At the same 
time, Chinese discourse and approaches satisfied parts of developing countries, 
emphasizing equal status and friendly words. Although with a relatively small 
amount of aid to education, what China doing is to establish very pragmatic aims 
from Africa; perhaps more accurately, China cannot change the whole situation of 
education in Africa, but they are using this as a way of promoting a closer 
relationship with Africa. Thus as King and Davies's previous words predicted, the 
China-Africa model, which is focusing on a different relationship from the `aid 
relationship', may create a new way to think about aid and the relationship to 
Africa. Perhaps this may help Africa up to a new position in the world order. 
113 
Conclusion of Part One 
As stated in the beginning, we divide the thesis into two parts. At their most 
basic, Part One gives us a background and conceptualization of the study, and 
Part Two tells us the empirical work of the study and its result and 
implications. Until now, what we know from Part One is, firstly, the dominant 
position and the changing discourse of Western aid. The Western model of aid 
has experienced a changing history, from a strong intervention of economic 
structures of recipient countries, to more consideration given to governance 
and social capital. However the core of aid has never changed. The core is 
based on the theory of modernisation and for Western donors, international 
aid is for helping low-income countries get rid of poverty and catch up with 
developed countries. 
Given that American global hegemony has held sway for almost a 
lifetime, and that Western supremacy transcends many lifetimes, this is 
not surprising. We are so used to the world being Western, even 
American, that we have little idea what it would be like if it was not. 
The West, moreover, has a strong vested interest in the world being cast 
in its image, because this brings multifarious benefits. 
For reasons of both mindset and interest, therefore, the United States, and 
the West more generally, finds it difficult to visualize, or accept, a world 
that involves a major and continuing diminution in its influence (Jacques, 
2009: 8). 
It can be seen from Jacques' words that the dominant influence from the West is 
decreasing, or at least gaining critics. What is more, we may begin to imagine 
what it would be like when new models emerge, that is those which are different 
or will even replace the orthodox ones on the world stage. In this study we are 
interested in the difference between the orthodox and the new models of 
educational aid to Africa. We are interested in seeing this possibility of these 
differences. Before we make a comparison, we needed to introduce the dominant 
model, that is Western donors and their logic; we also needed to show some 
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evidence (from documents and media) that new donors are rising. We can see the 
traditional aid architectures feature conditionality as well as selectivity. We can 
see a series reforms have been conducted on aid by international donors, but that 
aid is still embedded tightly in this global neoliberal market. We can also see aid 
to education, in this knowledge-based economy, cannot be considered as simply as 
a way of distributing global public goods, but a kind of practice related strongly 
with the global political economy. 
In additional to the traditional donors' logic, some new forms of `aid' which has 
been called such as `mutual exchange', `international cooperation' have been 
emerging in the global era, especially among Southern countries. 
As the largest developing country in the world, China has been considered as a 
new type of `donor', in this sense contrasting with the orthodox donors. This 
inspires us to think about if this can be a new model of aid in the contemporary 
world. The international relations among China and African countries have been 
of increasing interest since the 2006 Beijing Summit. People started to review the 
historical relations between China and Africa, and wonder about the motives 
behind Chinese policies and practice for Africa. The stories can be cast back to the 
relation between ancient China and Africa, but here we focus on the time since the 
foundation of the PRC and especially the time since the 1978 opening-up. This 
time period can show us a political economic picture of how China has developed 
itself, and how it used foreign relations to benefit its self-development (i. e. 
through `win-win'). 
In the field of education, with the increasing voices in the world discussing the 
knowledge economy and the power of technology, developing countries now take 
education as a key tool for rising up. China is increasing its support in diverse 
areas of education in Africa, and in an effort to be different from the Western 
donors, focuses on higher and vocational education as well as teacher dispatch 
and short term training. 
Based on the understanding of the Chinese conception of international relations, 
development and education, we may obtain the Chinese context from a theoretical 
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and historical perspective. China has a different developmental history with 
completely different ideology from the West, thus it is easier to understand why 
the Chinese model is distinctive now. As a developing country without any 
colonial relations with other developing countries and one which pursues a 
self-revised socialism, China has a different foundational basis from the West. To 
organize a vast population and stand steadily in the world, China has to produce 
new ideas which, on one hand can be ideologically supporting of the Chinese 
government and the leading CPC, and on the other hand can be flexibly promoted 
in the globalisation process via socialist China globalisation. 
It will be meaningful to look at whether China brings the world a different model 
of development. In this study, since we assume that countries such as China have 
introduced a new route to achieve `modernity', we want to know if the world can 
feel this difference in our main focus - educational aid. That means, our next 
question is, how do different people perceive it? As scholars talk about it in 
different languages and opinions, how do people involved in the aid practice think 
about it? That is what we want to do in the empirical work in Part Two. 
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Chapter Five Methodology 
Introduction 
In Part one of this study, we looked at the philosophical and political differences 
between the Western and Chinese models of development and international aid. 
Now, we move to look at how these differences are perceived in practice. Part two 
will contain all of the empirical work done in the field. Before this analysis, this 
chapter will clearly address the research questions (especially the questions for 
empirical work) and the process (from the planning to the conducting) of the 
fieldwork and documentary work. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. It is firstly important to let readers know 
the characteristics of this qualitative study; as well as its aims, that is the questions 
and the design of the study. The second part concerns data collection and analysis, 
including the necessities of certain methods which have been chosen, and how 
they relate to this study, as well as the necessities of the fieldwork locations and 
the ethnographic process during the fieldwork. Following this, a critical 
understanding of the methodology will finally come, wherein a discussion of the 
generalisation, reliability and validity, ethics and other potential problems of the 
empirical work will become clear. 
This research is qualitative, based on an in-depth critical understanding of both 
the orthodox and new conception of development and international aid. To seek 
the difference between the traditional Western donors and the rising-up China in 
Africa, particularly in the educational field, this study features fieldwork in 
Tanzania and China; fieldwork mainly features semi-structured interviews aiming 
to hear both donors' and recipients' voices on how aid is practised on the ground. 
Some documentary analysis follows the interview work through Critical 
Discourse Analysis, done specifically on the documents obtained on ground. 
Based on all of the data, the study seeks to find out different donor logic, and how 
China (as an emerging power in the new century) is practising its cooperative 
educational aid to Africa. 
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1. Structure the empirical research 
As mentioned, the research is basically wondering: is educational aid in the global 
era a part of the general strategy to influence developing countries? Is Chinese 
educational aid a threat or a promise for Africa? What are the differences between 
the Chinese and traditional Western models? How is the word `aid' being 
understood? These questions fit into the following five main questions: 
a. Is there a different model from the traditional Western model? (argued `yes' in 
Part one) 
b. If yes, then is there a different logic between them in how they approach and 
deliver educational aid? 
c. How is it perceived by the recipients, and can they recognise any difference 
between Chinese and Western models, and if so, what differences do they see? 
d. How is it presented by the donors (official people from Chinese government, as 
well as people working for aid practice)? 
e. What can we conclude about the different model of educational aid and its 
donor logic? 
In this chapter, we move on to transfer these questions into concrete empirical 
realities, or questions which are accessible and practical for data collection and 
analysis. In terms of Wengraf (2001: 55)'s `Rose-Wengraf model of the research 
process' aforementioned in chapter one, this study, after giving a theoretical 
description which is the first Wengaf's step- `theory' and the second step 
`theoretical propositions' which in this study is our assumption of a different 
model and donor logic of aid (which has been generated from the Part one), we 
are going on to conduct the next three steps: `operationalization/instrumentation' 
(which is based on questions in chapter one and will be talked more in details in 
this chapter), `fieldwork' and `results' (which are in the Part two of this thesis). 
1.1 Research design 
1.1.1 Empirical questions and the research framework 
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The documentary work of the Western and Chinese context (Chapter 2 to 4 set out 
the theoretical basis of understanding the differences between the two models, 
including their main features and mechanisms, as well as the criticisms of them. 
In other words, we have answered some of the questions theoretically. Further 
work is needed, however, to examine these theoretical answers. Therefore, the 
above research questions need to be turned into empirically researchable questions, 
and need to be answered by implementing certain research methods. This is the 
task of a sound research design. 
Thus, the next stage in this thesis consists of empirical studies designed to 
discover the perceptions of those involved in the educational aid practice, and the 
textual meanings of reports related to educational aid practice. The first stage of 
this was conducted through field work to collect information and opinions from 
the people involved in Africa (Tanzania) and China, mainly through 
semi-structured interview and documentary analysis. Throughout the research, we 
want to know if there is a perception of different models of aid and their features. 
That leads us to question (1) shown below- which has been partly addressed in the 
previous chapters by a review of the related literatures, and was again asked and 
examined during the field work and the discourse analysis. Basically, there are 
two ways for us to look at the difference between the models- first is to find out 
what differences people `perceive' or `experience' about them - question (2) and 
(3) - which were addressed by the field work in Tanzania and China, 
supplemented by what is `written' in and about the models - question (4) - which 
is tackled through critical discourse analysis. The specific questions are as 
follows: 
(1) What are the main features of the donors (West and China) by comparing 
different components of `donor logic'? 
(2) How is it perceived by different groups such as people from Chinese embassy, 
different governmental ministries, and scholars? 
(3) How do recipients including individuals and institutions respond? 
(4) How can we see the motives and power relations through the languages used 
in donor's discourse? 
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Specifically, this study locates the empirical work in some cases for analysis: one 
case for field work - Tanzania (which is the largest recipient country from China 
in Africa), and supplemented by a case for discourse analysis - the Zhejiang 
Normal University training reports (the training for African university presidents). 
Through the analysis of interview and documentary data, the study looks at what 
official people, returning students, institutional principals, as well as scholars are 
saying about Chinese assistance and its difference from traditional aid; the study 
also looks at how the Chinese practice and its aims, principles and performance 
are represented in writing. The outcome of the research tries to construct a new 
series of insights (not completely but systematically and logically) about the 
contemporary international aid to education in Africa. The very distinct 
contribution to the theoretical work could be the characterising of, and the 
understanding about, the logic of the new roles- China-Africa cooperation. 
We can see the research framework more clearly in the graph below: 
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Table 5.1 Research framework of the thesis 
Context: Western context about changing logic of intervention 
and the features of aid in the era of globalisation 
International aid to education and 
different donor logic 
PART 1 
(Literature study) PART2 







Field work in 









(being viewed as people wt 
a special model involved i 
by scholars) practice 
Determine whether and how the 
Chinese model is different 
Theories of Chinese model - 
Chinese conception of 
development, foreign 




people who are 










Determine whether and in what 
ways the Chinese practice has 
been perceived by others and 
claimed by itself differently from 
western practice 
Conclusion: 
How can we understand the China's logic of 
educational cooperation with Africa, and its 
distinctiveness? What implication the 
Chinese model gives to the West and the 
world? 
Chinese Tanzania and China by 
model 




1.1.2 Why Tanzania: historical and practical reasons 
One of the key points in this research is the design of field work (which will be 
discussed more in details later in this chapter). Here, first of all, the main area of 
field work was both Tanzania and China. It is understandable that China should be 
part of the researching place, as China is the main actor of this study as a different 
`donor', and not much work has been done on China's practice in the educational 
field. On the other hand, why do we choose Tanzania as a case of the African 
side? 
Tanzania is the first choice in this study, and there are both practical and 
theoretical reasons for this. 
Firstly, Tanzania is China's largest aid recipient in Africa. Since 1964, China has 
provided various types of assistance to Tanzania. The Chinese government 
discusses the relationship as follows: 
China and Tanzania signed the Agreement between the Government of the 
People's Republic of China and the Government of the United Republic of 
Tanzania on Cultural Cooperation in 1962 and 1992 respectively. Since the 
1960s, China has begun to receive Tanzanian students. 59 At present, there are 
80 Tanzanian students studying in China. Since 1964, China has begun 
sending medical teams to Tanzania. In 1967, the two countries signed the 
Agreement on Dispatching Chinese Medical Teams to Tanzania. There are 46 
Chinese medical personnel working in Tanzania. (Ministry of foreign affairs 
of the PRC, 06/02/2009) 
Not only through diplomatic experience beginning in the late 60s, but also 
through a regular systematic process, the educational practice between the two 
countries makes Tanzania a remarkable case of China's engagement in Africa. 
Furthermore, the case is especially representative of China's historical political 
link with Africa with the building of Tazara Railway. 
59 There will be a separate discussion ab out the Cultural Agreement later in this chapter. 
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Educational cooperation is not a new thing for Tanzania and China. As mentioned 
above, the implementation of the Cultural Agreement programme has been signed 
every four years since 1992. It is stated by Chinese government that under the 
agreement: 
... the Chinese side offers Government Full Scholarships to Tanzania each 
year. Meanwhile, the Chinese Government also offers unilateral 
scholarships to Tanzania as a follow-up of the Beijing Summit of the 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Chinese government has set up a 
series of scholarship schemes to sponsor Tanzanian students and scholars 
to undertake studies and research in Chinese institutions of higher 
education, to further strengthen mutual understanding and friendship 
between the Chinese people and Tanzanian people, and to further develop 
cooperation and exchange in fields of education, science, culture, economy 
and trade between China and Tanzania (Embassy of the PRC in the United 
Republic of Tanzania, 12/08/2009a). 
One year after my fieldwork, continuing activities in the educational field between 
the two countries increased the relevance of this fieldwork. In 2009, `fifty-five 
Tanzanians have been awarded Chinese Government Scholarships for the 
academic year of 2009/2010, among them, nine for Doctoral studies, thirty-two 
for Master studies, ten for Undergraduate studies, and four as Scholars' (ibid). 
Also in 2009, in November Ambassador Liu Xinsheng met with Professor 
Mbwette, Vice Chancellor of the Open University of Tanzania. As the embassy 
noted, Ambassador Liu commended the Open University of Tanzania for its 
contributions to Tanzanian education. They both believed that the cooperation 
between China and Tanzania in all areas, including education would continue to 
be strengthened (Embassy of the PRC in the United Republic of Tanzania, 
01/12/2009b). 
There is an impressive historical project of Chinese assistance in Africa in 
Tanzania, the Tanzania-Zambia railway, the biggest Chinese aid project in Africa. 
It has a very important influence for the other cooperation between China and 
Africa. According to King (2007: 340): 
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In a first stage, from 1956, educational cooperation essentially meant 
some exchange of students and of staff between Africa and China. 
Somewhat later, in the era of support for the great TAZARA railway 
project in the late 1960s, aid policy for education could be said to have 
covered a large-scale attempt to transfer skills to thousands of workers 
and supervisors in Zambia and Tanzania. Despite the successful 
completion of the project, there were major concerns about the 
sustainability of the skilled training in this project. 
Secondly there were practical reasons why Tanzania was my first choice for field 
work. The decision to go to Tanzania was confirmed when I was able to make 
contact with Dr. Hillary A. Dachi, the head of the Department of the Educational 
Planning and Administration of the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. He 
was a visiting scholar in Graduate School of Education, University of Bristol and 
was introduced to me by my supervisor. Hillary was in contact with me and told 
me he would give me support for my field work in Tanzania. Finally, with the help 
by Hillary I got the research permit from the Ministry of Education in Tanzania, 
and a reference letter to other educational institutions in Dar es Salaam. Therefore 
there were practical as well as theoretical reasons to choose Tanzania for field 
research. 
Moreover, although specific interviewees were not decided before my travel, 
evidence of other educational researchers (for example, two researchers from my 
department in university: Angeline Barrett (2005) had done research on Tanzanian 
primary education of English and teacher's identity; Jeanette Kuder (2004) had 
been interrogating the formulation of primary education policy in Tanzania under 
the global governance approach of aid) also gave me a range of knowledge about 
the educational situation in Tanzania as well as how Tanzania has been an aid 
recipient for many years by Western donors. 
124 
1.2 A qualitative approach 
The main aim of this study is to analyse the Chinese model of educational aid in 
comparison to the Western model. Thus the study requires a deep insight into the 
issues, the discourse, and the practice, to formulate a system of new knowledge on 
international aid to education, a cross-disciplinary understanding of the 
relationship between development and education, and critical and reflective 
thought on the roles within the aid framework. 
There are some studies which use quantitative methods to examine aid 
effectiveness and aid flows, usually economic. The quantitative studies normally 
employ numerical indicators to ascertain the relative size of a particular 
phenomenon (Matveev, 2002: 59), and involves the counting and measuring of 
events and then performing statistical analysis in a body of numerical data (Smith, 
1988). This is good for a large range test of performance, for example a survey 
by questionnaires. The assumption behind this positivist paradigm is that there is 
an objective truth existing in the world which can be measured and explained 
scientifically (Cassell and Symon, 1994). However, methods such as 
questionnaires are standardised so critics argue it is not possible to explain any 
points in the questions that participants might misinterpret, and respondents may 
answer questions superficially, especially if the questionnaire takes a long time to 
complete. Moreover, a quantitative study may obtain answers to more questions 
and more generalisation, but it will be difficult to get sufficiently detailed 
knowledge and the results will lack depth and variability. In other words, the 
quantitative approaches may be good for a broad overview, but not for the kind of 
enquiry which requires more flexible, interactive and in-depth content. 
The most important reason for choosing and defining the empirical parts of this 
study is still related to what we want and how much we can do practically for the 
study. What we need in this study finally is not some fixed answers, but 
stimulating more in-depth understandings. We cannot use a generalised approach 
to do it, not only because of the focus, but also because of the difficulty for a 
single researcher to cover a continental area. And it is also difficult to put 
something like mechanisms, motives, and logics into statistical methods. 
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Therefore a suitable choice may be talking about key points and cases in depth. In 
terms of the case, given the pragmatic needs for field work such as the need for 
safe living and to contact people, ultimately a single country case study of 
Tanzania has been chosen. This individual country case is not intended to 
represent all the African countries' situation (generalising), but for showing the 
aid practice in this area and stimulating more understanding by the field visits and 
interviews. 
This study chooses a single country rather than a single project or programme, or 
any organisation between China and Africa, because the main relation in 
educational practice between China and African countries is bilateral relations. 
This is under the general framework of China's foreign policy, which means 
everything about educational cooperation between China and an African country 
is firstly a diplomatic issue, and secondly a cultural or educational issue. China is 
not doing too much on educational practice by any single national or private 
organisation, but mainly through the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of 
Education. As King (2007) mentioned, although we always look at China and 
Africa as two terms, actually China is engaged in bilateral practice with each 
African country. Therefore we try to choose a country with both practical and 
historical reasons for field work, to look at how China's action happened and how 
it is perceived on the ground. 
Above all, the research finally was decided to be better done with a qualitative 
approach. Generally, qualitative research can be characterised as the attempt to 
obtain an in-depth understanding of the meanings and 'definitions of the situation' 
presented by informants, rather than the production of a quantitative 
'measurement' of their characteristics or behaviour (Wainwright, 1997). We can 
see some characteristics of qualitative researches as highlighted by Mason (2002: 
3). Qualitative research is always: 
- Grounded in a philosophical position which is broadly `interpretivist' in 
the sense that it is concerned with how the social world is interpreted, 
understood, experienced, produced or constituted; 
- Based on methods of data generation which are both flexible and 
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sensitive to the social context in which data are produced; (rather than 
rigidly standardized) 
- Aims to produce rounded and contextual understandings on the basis of 
rich, nuanced and detailed data. 
Therefore, qualitative research is always considered as a site of multiple 
methodologies and practices, and it does not belong to a single discipline (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 1994: 3). It is many things at the same time, within an 
inter-disciplinary, trans-disciplinary, and sometimes counter-disciplinary field 
(Nelson and Treichler, 1992: 4). 
Within this qualitative work, the research resources come mainly from people's 
viewpoints and official documents. The viewpoints in the field work examine the 
facts in an empirical manner. The interview questions cover topics about the 
governmental officials (both from China and Tanzania), the Tanzanian students' 
experiences and feelings during the aid process, and the government approaches, 
motives and expected aims in the educational field. The policy discourse used in 
Part one offer a general understanding and a wider coverage of the knowledge, 
and the documents processed particularly by the critical documents analysis in 
Part two can be seen as the basis of the fieldwork data. We will talk about these 
more in detail in following section. 
2. Data collection and analysis 
2.1 Qualitative interview data 
As explained above, the research needs different people's voices; thus the method 
of a qualitative interview has been chosen. However in addition to the face-to-face 
interview, questionnaires are also a method for questioning people in research. 
The chief advantage of questionnaires is that they are cheap and 
group-administered (Wilson and Sapsford, 2006: 102). However, quantitative 
methods are not used in my research. It is firstly because questionnaires are often 
used where large numbers of informants are involved (Cuber and Gerberich, 1946) 
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and it is very difficult to identify large groups in this research project; Secondly, 
questionnaires often give highly structured and broad questions to the objects 
(Wilson and Sapsford, 2006: 102), but the information this research wants from 
the informants is quite specific; therefore I need the ability to follow up on 
answers which cannot be done in questionnaires. 
Therefore the qualitative interview, which features a conversational, flexible and 
fluid style, is more suitable for this research. This purpose is realised through 
active engagement by both interviewer and interviewee around relevant issues, 
topics and experiences during the interview. It has roots in the theoretical and 
epistemological traditions which assume or emphasise the centrality of talk and 
text in our ways of knowing about the social world (Mason, 2002: 225). As for the 
open extent of the interview, this research chooses semi-structured interviews. As 
Wilson and Sapsford (2006: 112) explain, `the attempt to study the attitudes, 
beliefs and perceptions of the respondents, using artificial, highly structured 
procedures, is held to entail an unacceptably high degree of reactivity, no matter 
how well it is done'. 
According to Wengraf (2001: 205), the most outstanding distinction of interviews 
was that they involve human experience in their totality. Unlike quantitative 
research, qualitative interviews are not dispassionate, disembodied, or removed 
from the context, nor is the content rated or substituted with score(s). Experiential 
subjectivity and emotion are the hallmarks of qualitative inquiry, and it is because 
of this that the researcher's assessment of risk evolves. Indeed, one of the main 
aims in this study is to listen to different people's voice/experience and obtain a 
changing idea/implications while the interview is going on. How these people 
describe `China's educational aid to Africa' (not only Chinese themselves, but also 
African people), are valuable for this study to examine the theoretical and 
documentary background we have in outlined in Chapters two through four. 
For Wilson and Sapsford (2006: 95), the three dimensions of data collection by 
interviews are procedural, structural, and contextual factors. The first two factors 
are related to the organisation of the interview questions. A strict procedure is 
always used in `the positivist methods of investigation which seek to reproduce 
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the controls over variables that the exact or natural sciences hold to be their 
particular strength'. But less structured methods of data collection are not asking 
questions `in an invariant order and the phasing of each question can be varied 
according to what has gone before'. In this research, we need to make the 
conversation focused on some key points, but can be very flexible when 
conversation happens, thus a semi-structured interview is chosen here because it 
offers interviewees the freedom to talk about `what is of central significance on 
the topic and express their opinions freely' (Bell, 1993: 94). On the other hand, it 
provides interviewers both with the opportunity to `explore in-depth information' 
(Seliger and Shohamy, 1989: 166) and a degree of power and control to ensure 
what should come out of the interview (Nunan, 1992: 149). 
Following the first two factors, the contextual factor in this research is important, 
as Wilson and Sapsford (2006: 96) note `the context of interviewing affects 
response rates greatly', and `the effect of context on response is sometimes a 
critical one' (ibid: 95). The critical characteristic of the research requires me to 
consider the effect of power relationships, the national context, the political and 
cultural influence on the respondents, and the interaction process between the 
respondents and the interviewer. As a Chinese student, I try to not give bias on the 
questions I ask, and encourage the interviewees to answer the question as openly 
as possible. 
2.1.1 The fieldwork plan: who are interviewed and why 
It is important to emphasise the qualitative interview as a key informant interview 
which is seen as a standard anthropological method widely used in inquiry within 
social science. The term `key informant' refers to anyone who can provide 
detailed information and opinion based on his or her knowledge of a particular 
issue. Key informant interviews seek qualitative information that can be narrated 
and cross checked with quantitative data, a method which is `triangulation' 
(Woods, L. N., 2006). It is important that the informant be someone who has 
personal knowledge or experience with a particular problem, or has professional 
training in that area. It also should be sure to have a mix of people -- different 
ages, ethnicity, religious affiliation, educational level, etc. The informant must 
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also be able to express themselves clearly. 
The key empirical work in this study is the field work in Tanzania and China, and 
the important procedure behind this work was to find the right people and talk to 
them properly to obtain answers relevant to the research topic. The research 
questions cover a large range of knowledge, from the official opinion towards 
international aid to the personal experience from local students. Therefore the 
informants should also include a number of people who are fit for the research 
questions, and from different backgrounds. It is not like in a quantitative study in 
which a large number of participants are selected, as the plan is to talk to each 
informant in a personalized way. 
As Hammersley and Atkinson (1983: 20) note, field research can provide a 
broader version of theory than simply a relationship between variables: `a theory 
must include reference to mechanisms or processes by which the relationship 
among the variables identified is generated'. This point relates to Mills'(1953) 
early critique of the atheoretical nature of much quantitative research, or what he 
referred to as `abstracted empiricism'(Silverman, 1993: 27). To get the opinions 
on the front line of educational aid practice, field work is necessary. 
The whole fieldwork of this study includes two periods of work: 28 July to 8 
September 2008 in Tanzania, and 8 October to 31 November 2008 in China. 
Finally through the interview process, mainly face to face and very few by phone, 
I obtained data from different groups of people related with this research topic. 
As we know, the research needs to grasp how people understand and experience 
`educational aid' in Tanzania. What this study want to obtain in Tanzania is 
different people's voices, from a donor's as well as a recipient's perspective. 
These people's voices can also be divided into people working within the aid 
practice, and people who have received some forms of educational aid. Informants 
from only one side cannot provide a comprehensive view. The people working 
within aid practice include Tanzanian officials and Chinese officials, especially 
those from the embassy in Tanzania. The people who have received aid include 
individual students (now back in Tanzania, and especially those in DIT) and 
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institutions. Through this division, we can get information from both donors and 
recipients. 
To see where the informants are from, we can summarise through having a glance 
to the table below: 
Table 5.2 Key informants in groups of the fieldwork 
China (donor side) Tanzania (recipient side) 
Governments Chinese Embassy in Ministry of Education, 
Tanzania; Chinese Ministry of Finance 
Ministry of Education 
Institutions TJNU, ZJNU, TUTE, Benjamin Mkapa High 
BNU60 School, Higher 
institutions (DIT, DUCE) 
Individuals Educational staff, Graduated students 
Scholars now--- 
As teachers (DIT); with 
other jobs 
Group division and rational---- 
*Governmental institutions and departments (Chinese Embassy in Tanzania; 
Department of Aid Coordination of Tanzanian Ministry of Education; Department 
of Higher Education of Tanzanian Ministry of Education; Tanzanian Ministry of 
Finance) 
Reason: Educational practice between the two countries is under an international 
relations framework, which means it is political rather than cultural or economic. 
Therefore, officials from both governments are important for the research. 
Although many official documents are accessible through the web, official people 
can offer the latest information, and more importantly, through face to face 
interview we can get their opinion on those policies. On one hand, their opinions 
can be representative of government's trends or interests, and the other hand, their 
I The full name of these abbreviations are introduced below - `group division and rational'. 
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personal opinions are also typical, as they are directly involved in, or very close to, 
the aid practice. 
*Institutional recipients of China (Mkapa High School; Dar es Salaam Institute of 
Technology; Dar es Salaam University College of Education) 
*Individual recipients (Returning Tanzanian students) 
Reason: Recipients' viewpoints towards to the aid practice- whether they feel like 
it, how they get it, and what kind of experience they have with it - are key to this 
research. As we have already obtained comments on China-Africa relations on 
paper, especially from Western scholars, the opinion on the ground can help test 
those theoretical arguments and hypotheses. 
Mkapa High School has been one of the typical cases of China-Tanzania 
friendship in the educational field. It appeared on a lot on Chinese news media to 
show the cultural exchange between China and Tanzania. 61 So it is meaningful to 
do a `site-visit' the school and its `cultural centre' built by China. 
Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology (DIT) is the only case in Tanzania which 
has its own agreement with the Chinese embassy for student scholarships, which 
is the main method of Chinese educational cooperation with Africa (it means that 
quite a few lecturers in DIT are returning students from China). Dar es Salaam 
University College of Education (DUCE) is planning to establish a Confucius 
Institute with the Chinese government in Dar es Salaam. Both of these higher 
institutes offer very important information regarding Chinese activities in 
Tanzania in the human resource field. 
*Chinese higher institutions (Zhejiang Normal University, Tianjin Normal 
University, Tianjin University of Technology and Education) 
61 For example, Chinaculture website (see 
http: //www. chinaculture. org/gb/cn_world/2005-02/28/content_66474. htm) showed the donation of pianos and 
computers to Mkapa high school; and website of FOCAC (2005) (see 
http: //www. fmprc. gov. cn/zflt/chn/zfyhj/tl97867. htm) reported the establishment of a `Chinese culture centre' 
in Mkapa, the first Chinese culture base for high school students in Tanzania. 
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Reason: They are three of the main education and training bases for African 
students in China. The Ministry of Education in China authorizes these 
universities to perform the educational activities with African countries, such as 
offering student scholarships and short term training, as well as some research 
project cooperation. So beside the opinion from officials, the points from the 
university chancellors and people who are accountable for these activities 
represent the information on the front line. 
* Chinese scholars 
Reason: Standing on a different position, and with more understanding of Chinese 
philosophy and traditional theories, what Chinese scholars understand about 
China-Africa relation is different from Western academics. The lecturers of 
universities' Africa research centres are particularly important to offer comments 
on this topic. 
Within these diverse types of informants, each one gives to this study a `story' 
about their jobs/practice, experience and viewpoints (this will be elaborated in the 
following part about field work stories). Each person's opinion is also important 
and should be asked for as specifically and deep as possible. Finally through these 
`personalized' approaches to my informants, their answers are generated into a 
synthetic analysis to pursue the main aims of this research. 
2.1.2 Pilot interview 
Wengraf (2001: 187) mentions `pilot the design', which means a researcher 
should pilot their `design purpose' and the `fitness of your design for those 
purposes' on somebody, or a couple of somebodies, before you `go for real' on the 
1, the 10, or the 100 people you have as your sample. 
The field work in Tanzania is challenging. As a student researcher who has never 
been to Africa with an educational topic related with the study on international 
relations and policy discourse, I decided to get some advice before the field work 
started. About five months before going to Tanzania, there were small range pilot 
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telephone interviews conducted in China. The aim was to get some advice for this 
study, such as the value of it, and gather some useful opinions and information 
from scholars and officials in order to be more pertinent to the research questions. 
The interview objectives include the informants as follows: 
deputy minister of education (Yuan) 
head of department of society and politics, ministry of education (Gu) 
president of Anhui University (Lu) 
head of institution of higher education, Anhui University (Chen) 
deputy dean of education department, Beijing Normal University (Li) 
The most important reason to select these people for advice is the diverse position 
they have in the educational field in China, and the pragmatic reason was to find 
somebody I could have access to in China. The deputy minister could give me an 
overview of the governmental interest in this field; the scholars in different 
universities could give some suggestion from different perspectives, for example 
as the Chinese approaches focus more on higher education, the suggestion from a 
scholar in this field is useful. They were firstly informed through a brief 
introduction of the research, followed with some questions about their opinions on 
the China-Africa issue, and lastly, their opinions on the research about educational 
`aid' by China especially in Tanzania. 
There are some points I received from these short interviews. Firstly, the research 
about China and Africa cooperation in the educational field generated interest. 
Both officials and scholars showed interest in this topic personally or officially. As 
they said to me, it would be worth going there, and this would be at the forefront 
of this kind of research, especially the empirical study. `It is very new to study 
educational aid when you consider China as a donor'; `It is a hot topic, and your 
field work will be very meaningful'... Secondly, I obtained some brief 
information about the main mechanism of the ministries and sectors in regards to 
this issue. As they suggested, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of 
Commerce are both working for the aid practice to Africa. Thirdly, I got the idea 
that Tanzania would be a good choice as a place to study, as the country had a 
long history with the Chinese government and many Chinese were working there 
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in the past and at present, for either business or aid. Although I didn't get direct 
information about Chinese officials in Tanzania, the information I got from China 
showed that my field work plan seemed to be possible. 
2.1.3 How to access and how to talk 
2.1.3.1 Flexibility and the accesses 
After the plan of informant categories and the related reason, it is also important 
to think about the access to these people. In other words, it is still a question that, 
if it can be conducted as planned? Will it be altered because of the difficulties of 
access and easier ways to other informants who are not in plan? Firstly it is to be 
noticed that, one of the main characteristics of field research is its flexibility 
which is giving more difficulties to the research, but also brings more interesting 
and exciting points. The flexibility of field research `allows theory development to 
be pursued in a highly effective and economical manner' (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1983: 24). Such studies do not `regard theorising as restricted to social 
scientists' (ibid: 20). Unlike other research which usually shares a common model, 
field research depends on a variety of theoretical positions with very different 
implications (Silverman, 1993: 28). The arrangement of the interview has many 
unstable factors actually. It is hard to anticipate whether the next interviewee who 
probably has a high position in the government and is busy with his job, cannot 
attend the interview on time, and it is also hard to anticipate what their open 
answer will focus on. So the result of the research has been open to me, depending 
on whether I can get the access to the informants, and whether the informants like 
to answer my questions. 
Therefore, although the informants groups have been planned before fieldwork, 
the thing that you decide to choose someone is not equal to that you can get the 
access to them. So it is crucial of getting access to the expected place and talk to 
people there. There are people from different offices in Ministry of Education, 
Ministry of Finance as well as some higher institutes in Tanzania, and people from 
government and universities in China. It is always depending on the specific 
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situation of field work, and requires you make changes on your interview 
schedule and content flexibly. A list of the interviewees I finally accessed and the 
key contents of the each interview are attached in Appendix 1. The next two 
sections about detailed `fieldwork stories' in Tanzania and China will tell more 
about each access and the interview process of the informants. 
2.1.3.2 `Tailored' questions with diverse talking forms 
After a successful access, the most important issue is how to talk effectively with 
them. The questions should be `tailored'. Within the interview, it is necessary to 
give different groups of participant different questions, in order to capture diverse 
individual's point of view. For example: the officials in the office of aid 
coordination were asked that if the urgent need of education in Tanzania can be 
helped by external donors, and officials in higher education department were 
asked about the Chinese governmental scholarship for Tanzanian university 
students. Also because of this `tailored questions', it is getting difficult to manage 
large numbers of participants. Sometimes it is necessary to talk with one person 
more than once to get in-depth idea. 
Therefore, question groups can be divided into questions for Tanzanian 
institutions, Chinese universities, Chinese officials, Tanzanian officials, returning 
Tanzanian students. The main areas includes (see detailed questions in Appendix 
2): 
(a) The information they know about what their office/department/institute is 
doing related with the educational cooperation between China and 
Tanzania, especially the latest progress and changes; 
(b) The advantages and disadvantages of the activities they are working for; 
(c) The personal experience involved in the educational cooperation between 
two countries; 
(d) The motives/purpose of the donors and the recipients according to their 
own knowledge and experience, and the difference between Chinese and 
Western aid; 
(e) Suggestion or demands for this cooperation, or comments on this research; 
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(f) Data and other resource including documents and contacts they can 
possibly offer to help my research. 
Every interview was conducted by these steps: (a) when I started to set up the 
interview, I introduced myself and briefly my research, to be sure the informant 
understands the purpose of the study, and what I intend to do with their talk. (b) 
asked them if I could use the recorder. (c) asked questions from general questions 
about their position, to the specific questions related with their roles within the aid 
practice, especially their personal opinions. By the same time I kept track of what 
they told. (d) thanked them for giving time and information, and asked for contact 
information for further questions by email or telephone. 
These steps of asking and answering include different styles of talking. The 
interviews happened in the governmental office, in the restaurant, in the university 
meeting room, in the embassy meeting room (very formal), in the school/college, 
and so on. It is also happened on the way of a journey, during a lunch time, or 
even accidentally. The numbers of people involved into one interview also 
different. This partly depends on the questions and partly depends on how many 
people you can meet at one time. For example, two returning students were 
interviewed in a restaurant by me, because they had similarities on their ages and 
experience, and they knew each other. 
To make the conversation between the interviewees more actively and get more 
reflection and reaction, a focus-group approach can be used when the several 
interviewees can be invited at the same time, as it is an 
opinion-developing-process, during which the individual `listen, reflect on what is 
said, and in the light of this consider their own standpoint further', and then the 
whole discussion `moves to a deeper and more considered level' (Finch and Lewis, 
2003: 171). This helps the interviewees have more `spontaneity' and also helps the 
researcher make the atmosphere more relaxed and get more critical opinions. 
Normally, when we use this method, the data `are generated by interaction 
between group participants' (ibid). During the study in Tanzania, with the help of 
the principal and his assistant, I organised a group meeting at Dar es Salaam 
Institute of Technology (DIT). 4 DIT lecturers attended the meeting, which could 
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be seen as a practice of `focus group'. 62 This helped develop some integrated 
opinions and ideas, and also made the atmosphere more relaxed than one-to-one 
talk. 
The group interview has been criticised sometimes for the disadvantage of being 
less under-control (Babbie, 2008: 339). The interaction among the informants may 
help get to deeper opinions, but it also can lead to some similarities, so that some 
individuals cannot tell their true thinking. Therefore the interview style I chose is 
mainly one-to-one interview, though depends on situation, small group talking 
including 2-4 people can also be conducted. In addition to the meeting in DIT 
which was more formally like a focus group, a meeting in the Chinese embassy, a 
meeting in the aid coordination office of Tanzanian MoE, a meeting with 
returning students as aforementioned, were all conducted with 2 interviewees. 
2.1.4 What happened on the ground: the fieldwork `stories' 
We have now explained the informants chosen for this study, how to meet them, 
what to ask, as well as in what forms. The next task is to talk directly about what 
has happened on the ground. The field work included the work in Tanzania and 
China. The work in Tanzania was quite challenging for me, however the 
performance in Tanzania was better than expected. 
2.1.4.1 Stories in Tanzania 
Totally, the field work in Tanzania had three routes: the Chinese embassy, 
Tanzanian governmental departments, and non-governmental people in Tanzania. 
The work started from the interview in the Chinese embassy in Tanzania. 
Followed by that, after getting research clearance and following the 
recommendation by the Chinese embassy, I got accesses to people in the 
Tanzanian Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Finance. Then, as 
recommended by a former interviewee, I went to the Dar es Salaam Institute of 
62 Details of the focus group in DIT are in the following part of data analysis. 
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Technology (DIT) for further information of their specific cooperation with the 
Chinese government, and Dar es Salaam University College of Education 
(DUCE). During my spare time I visited the Mkapa High School, which received 
donation from the Chinese embassy, following a reference letter from Dr. Dachi. 
*Chinese embassy 
The Chinese embassy played a key role in my data collection, as the people there 
not only accepted my interview request, but also gave me a lot of suggestions and 
recommendations. The interviews in the Chinese Embassy in Tanzania included 
two parts, one with the Secretary of Cultural Counsellor, and the other one with 
the Chinese ambassador in Tanzania. 
The first person I met in the Chinese embassy in Tanzania was the Cultural 
Counsellor, Sun. The location of the embassy, in the city of Dar es Salaam, was 
not difficult to be found, and the people there were friendly with me. I got the 
chance to have an appointment with the Cultural Counsellor and his secretary on 
Tuesday, 5 August 2008. He and his secretary, Chen, received me for my interview. 
Two weeks after that, the ambassador of the Chinese government in Tanzania, Liu, 
asked Chen to arrange a formal meeting with me in the embassy, on Monday 18 
August. 
The two meetings were done separately during my stay in Dar es Salaam. The first 
interview was focusing mainly on the details of educational cooperation between 
the two countries and the contemporary situation, such as the practice procedure 
and the persons involved. The second interview was more like an official meeting 
with the other two participants, Culture Counsellor Sun, and his secretary Chen, 
attending. The interview was more focusing on the ambassador's own 
introduction and personal opinion about the two countries' relationship in the 
global world. Both of the interviews were well done with the participants, friendly 
and easily, with not too much official language but rather more personal 
understanding and interpretation. It was quite meaningful to talk with the 
ambassador for over one hour, who had critical personal viewpoints. 
Through talking with people in the embassy, I got some suggestions and 
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information for Tanzanian officials in the Ministry of Education. Some of the 
information was very similar, or even the same as, the information given from 
Tanzanian ministries later, which could be a kind of double check of `what was 
happening in fact'. The embassy also introduced me to some Chinese individuals 
who are working or staying in Tanzania, for example some people working in 
Chinese companies in Tanzania. Knowing these people was a great help for me to 
find interviews, as well as my staying alone in Dar es Salaam. 
During the stay in Dar es Salaam, I visited the embassy several times; the Cultural 
Counsellor and his wife were always very friendly and helpful for me. Those 
things actually changed my image towards to the official department. I thought it 
could take me a long time to get access to those people, but in fact it was not that 
difficult. 
*Tanzanian ministries and institutions 
We can say all of the access of Tanzanian officials mainly started from the 
research clearance, which can be applied for according to the guidelines found on 
the website of the Tanzanian Commission for Science and Technology 
(COSTECH). 63 W ith this permission, I had the authority to do interviews within 
the Tanzanian government offices. This is a permission which all foreign 
researchers need to apply for if they want to do research in the country. In order to 
save time in the field work and arrange activities efficiently, the application 
documents were mailed to the University of Dar es Salaam before I went to 
Tanzania, and after I arrived, the University proved that I was a doctoral research 
student from abroad and stayed temporarily in the university, and then sent my 
application to the Ministry of Education. It took me around ten days to wait for 
the result of the application, which was a bit time consuming. However, after 
negotiated with the staff about my timeframe in the research office of the ministry, 
I finally got the research permit from the research office which authorized me to 
get my interview data from the office of higher education. After I got the access to 
the ministries for academic research, the officials were all happy to cooperate with 
63 Three research clearance letters by Tanzanian Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (introducing 
me to two key departments in Ministry of Education and to Ministry of Finance), and a letter by University of 
Dar es Salaam (introducing me to DUCE) are attached in Appendix 4. 
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my questions. The interviews were from the Department of higher education and 
the Department of aid coordination in the Ministry of Education, and the 
Department of aid administration in the Ministry of Finance. For some other 
institute or university offices, I also asked for reference letters from the University 
of Dar es Salaam, with the help from Hillary, as my status there was that of 
visiting research student of the University of Dar es Salaam. 
With the introduction of my research, I met the head of the department of higher 
education and received his reference to more departments which were responsible 
for more detail work related to my research. Then, I got the chance to meet the 
officer Kim and her colleagues, who work in the office dealing with student 
scholarships; the meeting was on 19August. Kim, the principal education officer 
of the higher education department, was a very nice lady who knew and worked 
with many Chinese student scholarships, was a very important informant for my 
research because we talked at least three times. She advised me not only as to 
offices, but also individuals, for interview. For example, officer John and the three 
Tanzanian girls all met with me through Kim. 
On the day I had my first meeting with Kim, I was introduced to her colleague 
John, who had a rich experience in China as a Tanzanian student leader. I also had 
a nice talk with John about his study in China. Since John was an older returning 
student, I met with another three young ladies who just graduated from China 
universities in Kim's office, as they were representatives for a new Tanzanian 
generation. Two of them, Kath and Race, then had lunch with me, and we did an 
interview on 4 September, discussing their opinions towards Chinese education 
for African students in the new era. 
Since successfully interviewing Kim, from her I then got information regarding 
the cooperation between DIT and the Chinese embassy. In terms of the 
institutional recipients, the Tanzanian DIT plays an important role between the 
two countries. The reason we choose DIT was originally because the institute is 
mentioned several times by both Chinese and Tanzanian officials, as well as in 
policy and media documents. From another route- the Chinese embassy- I also got 
the same information. The double proof of the value of the DIT case helped me 
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decide to visit the institution as soon as possible. Just after meeting Kim, with a 
guide by the head of the higher education department of the ministry, I then found 
the way to DIT and made an appointment with the vice principal, Dr. Seka. In the 
afternoon of 25 August, I did an interview with him in his office. After the 
interview, he introduced me to some of his staff, and I made a second appointment 
with him and a group discussion with his staff. On 28 August, with the help of the 
principal's assistant Kakana, I organised the group meeting with four lecturers in 
DIT in their meeting room. All the staff studied in China with scholarships, and 
each of them talked of their opinions and experience. Just as in smaller scale focus 
groups, we developed some opinions and discussed together, critically and happily, 
which was valuable. Thus the DIT offered us both institutional and individual 
perspective of recipients. 
Both the head of the higher education department and Kim suggested me to ask 
for information from DUCE as well. I did an interview with DUCE's two 
principals soon after I found the location of this college, on 26 August with the 
vice principal and 5 September with the principal. 
The head of the department of higher education also suggested I meet with the 
office for aid coordination. This was another important route for my interview. 
The head of the office, Maggie, and her colleague Sehe met me on 25 August, and 
we had a very good talk for two hours in her office; discussing everything from 
the current urgent needs of Tanzanian education, to their desire for cooperation 
with different donors and their opinions on aid's advantage and disadvantage. She 
advised me to go to the Ministry of Finance for more information of JAST, since 
both of us thought this document could be important for the general aid situation 
in Tanzania. As she said, JAST is their Bible. The access to the Ministry of 
Finance is not difficult. With the research permit and the note by Maggie, I met a 
lady who is responsible for the management of aid resource in MoF. She arranged 
an interview for me with her colleague, Nancy. From Nancy, I received quite 
helpful documents about JAST and aid flow in Tanzania, as well as the 
opportunity to talk about their job and opinions. 
* Other informants 
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The above is one way of field work data collection, which is similar to snowball 
rolling (snowball sampling), or getting one informant from one already known to 
me. This is the main method of collection for the maximum range of interviewees. 
In addition to that, I was also trying to get interviewees in different institutes 
through different routes. For example, getting interview information from the 
documents I already have, or getting to know people working in Chinese 
companies through the Chinese living or working in Dar es Salaam, or getting to 
know returning Tanzanian students (from China) in the university I stayed at, or 
even getting to know some interviewees on my journey. 
There is a high school which has close relationship with the Chinese embassy in 
Dar es Salaam, and it is also the biggest middle school in Tanzania. After I talked 
with Dr. Hillary in University of Dar es Salaam, he told me that he knew the 
principal of the school. He then drafted me an official reference letter for the 
principal, and gave me the address. The school, called Benjamin Mkapa Middle 
School, has a Chinese Cultural Centre and has received some donations from 
China in recent years. I had an interview with principal Mero and his secretary at 
his office on 8 August. They showed me the centre room with Chinese pictures 
and books, and told me about their situation for external aid. 
During the stay in Dar es Salaam, I sometimes found the informants accidentally. 
During my stay in another city, Arusha, I met a manager in a transformer company 
called Tanelec. The manager, named Moti, did his undergraduate study in China 
during the 1970s. He was another older returning students' representative. He met 
me, very friendly, in his factory and participated in an interview on 29 August. It 
was very interesting that he still kept his Chinese textbooks on the shelf in his 
office from when he did his study in China. 
There were some other individuals I heard or met in Tanzania. For example, I met 
a man called Robert on the trip to Zanzibar, and I found he could speak Chinese. 
He had been studying in China with a Chinese scholarship during the 1960s. As 
Shipman working at the dock, he talked happily about his experience in China on 
the ship to Zanzibar. 
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The individual recipients varied in age. So this study tried to select graduates from 
different age groups. Those individuals have different jobs, from the low levels of 
the society such as a worker at the dock, to officers in government, and also some 
working in private or national companies. The age and job variance is very useful 
to get quite different opinions. 
2.1.4.2 Stories in China 
The field work in China was conducted during October and November 2008, and 
focused more in higher education institutions rather than in official departments. 
The access to government was much more complex than getting a permit into 
governmental departments in Tanzania. Just as one of the interviewees in the 
Department of Education, Beijing Normal University, professor Zeng explained 
when I asked about the problems of access, `it is a huge system which has a 
complexity of administration, so it is not easy to get access to the governmental 
people, and they normally not offering this service for students'. Since there is 
nothing like a research clearance in China, I made some phone calls to officials. 
But not much information was obtained in talking. The better thing is, however, 
that Chinese cooperation with Africa in the educational field is focusing on higher 
education, and it is much easier to get access to university staff. Therefore, 
administrators and lecturers were interviewed in two universities in Beijing, two 
universities in Tianjin, as well as one university in Zhejiang province. The 
universities which are doing a job for the Ministry of Education and the Ministry 
of Commerce gave me quite good ground information regarding their practice. 
The scholars in the universities for African studies also offered a number of 
viewpoints on related issues. They were much more likely to talk than 
governmental people, and liked to share personal opinions. It could be meaningful 
to hear their voice, as they are the people carrying out what the policy says about 
educational aid in Africa. 
I visited Tianjing Normal University and Tianjin University of Technology and 
Education on 19 of October. Yan, the deputy director and vice dean of the office 
of international programmes in the college of international education and 
144 
exchange, Tianjing Normal University, interviewed with me in her office. After 
that I interviewed Wang, a lecturer in the international exchange office, centre for 
African vocational education studies, Tianjing University of Technology and 
Education. Both of the universities are located in the city of Tianjing, and both of 
the interviewees were friendly and talked with me about their duties and the 
practise of educational cooperation with African countries, especially the 
establishment of Confucius Institute. 
Another important place is the Zhejiang Normal University in Jinhua city, 
Zhejiang province. There is a centre for African research in the university, called 
the Institute of African Studies, which does work such as African studies, short 
term trainings and workshops for African universities, as well as national or 
international conferences about China-Africa relations. The notable thing is the 
short term training held by ZJNU, where they collaborate with the Ministry of 
Education and the Ministry of Commerce. So ZJNU could be seen as an important 
practice base for Chinese governmental cooperation with Africa in the field of 
higher education. I interviewed the dean, professor Liu, the vice dean, professor 
Jian, as well as lecturer Zhou and lecturer Chang, in their institute offices, on 22 
and 23 November. They gave me very valuable documents about their institute 
and about a series of conferences they held, and also some literature about 
China-Africa educational cooperation. Especially recently, they still keep in 
contact with me, and sent me helpful literature about Chinese scholars' comments 
on China-Africa relations, all of which could be useful for my research. 
There were three interviews I conducted in Beijing Normal University. One of 
them whom I mentioned before was Professor Zeng. She had collaboration work 
with the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Commerce. Another professor 
I talked with was Hong, in the Department of Educational Administration. Both of 
these professors gave me a general idea of the situation, and provided comments 
on Chinese educational aid. Professor Hong suggested me to go to ZJNU for more 
investigation, and also helped me contact official people in the Department of 
International Cooperation and Exchanges, in the Ministry of Education. The third 
person I interviewed was a staff member in the office of international 
communication and cooperation, named Wang. As a staff member mainly dealing 
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with the affairs of foreign students, Wang answered my questions very carefully 
and told me she would also like to write a paper about educational cooperation 
between China and Africa, focusing on her years of work experience dealing with 
international students, especially African. 
A general feeling from the fieldwork in China was that university scholars were 
very friendly and talked to me more openly than officials in ministries. After 
knowing more about them, their studies and their work which related to Chinese 
educational assistant to Africa, I felt an increasing value of my research because 
more and more Chinese institutes and academics have gotten involved in this 
topic, and even involved with the cooperation with the government in order to 
promote the assistant practice more efficiently and scientifically. 
2.1.4.3 Critical ethnographic work 
The ethnographer's concern to avoid imposing a theoretical framework of 
meanings and definitions perhaps originates from the anthropological study of low 
technology tribal cultures in the third world, where the intention was mainly to 
describe cross-cultural variations in social behaviour and beliefs before they 
disappeared. Methodologically this entailed detailed observation and interaction 
by the researcher, in order to see the world 'through the eyes' of the people being 
studied (Wainwright, 1997). 
The interviews are conducted in a period of field work in my research, so it has 
some relation with ethnographical work. I define it as an ethnographic interview, 
which firstly implies a meaning that the research questions are developing on the 
ground. In fieldwork, sometimes the next moment of data-collection is informed 
by the information and patterns discovered from preceding sources, and `the 
original problems are transformed or even completely abandoned in favor of 
others' (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 33). 
Not only an ethnographic, but a critical ethnographic attitude, was useful to link 
the field work data to the theoretical background of my research. Although not a 
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systematical ethnographic work, I only stayed in Africa for around one and half 
months and another one month in China to gather the opinions from different 
people, this is not a long term investigation into the area. However, the critical 
ethnographic perspective stimulated the fieldwork. What ethnography can do is 
reveal discursive worlds and try to make links with the non-discursive world on 
the basis of theory, which is consequently elaborated and refined in engagement 
with the concrete empirical world (Burawoy, 1998). 
In this research, the interviews in Africa and China are attempting to reveal 
people's perception, which will be part of the data, and this will motivate more 
critical thinking; this is combined with documentary data which seeks to extend 
the knowledge about the Chinese model. Moreover, it is not about thinking 
whether one is biased, but rather, whose interests are served by one's work (Simon 
and Dippo, 1986: 196). That means we do not want to find out who is intervening 
more, the West or China, but we want to find out some of the mechanisms, 
motives, or logics behind the discourse and practice. The study needs to be critical 
of itself during the fieldwork, knowing how much my role will influence the 
conversation. 
2.1.5 Analysing the interview data 
The analysis of the interview data are conducted through transcription to coding, 
and then the interpretation. The coding process is significant before the final 
interpretation. It can be thought about in terms of data simplification or reduction, 
as well as conceptualized as data complication, which opens up more diverse 
analytical possibilities (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996: 28). In my research, the 
coding procedure will be conducted as a mixture of the data reduction and 
complication, and as Seidel and Kelle (1995: 58) mentioned, this has a heuristic 
function for the other parts of data understanding and interpretation. 
Interpreting the interview data is a process by which we deal with the relation 
between interviewee's accounts and the world they describe (Silverman, 1993: 90). 
Silverman sets two different ways of viewing the interview data: by a positivist 
view, considering interview data giving access to `facts' about the world, 
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generating data which is valid and reliable, independently of the research setting. 
Positivists are normally using a random selection of the interview sample, and 
using the administration of standardised questions with multiple-choice answers 
which can be readily tabulated. On the other hand is interactionism. Interviewees 
are viewed as experiencing subjects who actively construct their social worlds; the 
primary issue is to generate data which give an authentic insight into people's 
experiences; the main ways to achieve this are unstructured, open-ended 
interviews (ibid: 90-91). Interactionism seems fit for our study. Even the former 
one informs us that the standard information will be considered by the different 
informants, which means the same things/facts can be different when they are 
talked about by different people. It is important to know: when we talk with 
someone else about the world, we take into account who the other is, what that 
other person could be presumed to know, `where' that other is in relation to 
ourselves and the world we talk about (Baker, 1982: 109). 
Wengraf (2001: 208) tells us that the analytic process of the interview data is a 
process of indexing-copying-transcribing. The system of `indexing' can help the 
researcher find the original talk again, by labelling the tapes according to time, 
date, place and informant. Here, a list of the interviewees and brief contents are 
attached in the appendix. Another important preparation is a copy of the interview 
tape, even two copies, in order to keep safe of what we record. Wengraf (2001: 209) 
suggests: do not think that, if you first transcribe your interview tape into written 
form and then you start to think about it. What we shall do is to transcribe directly 
what the informants said, and then review it, making notes and select the 
important information. It is a process from raw materials to processed data (ibid: 
232). 
2.2 Documentary data: a critical perspective 
2.2.1 Collection of documents: gaining `grey literature' from fieldwork 
Compared with observation, interview, and narrative methods which are becoming 
more and more attractive today, documentary analysis is a basic qualitative 
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method which catches less attention, but offers the researchers insight into lots of 
information through `reading'. It is `the study of existing documents, either to 
understand their substantive content or to illuminate deeper meanings which may 
be revealed by their style and coverage' (Ritchie, 2003: 35). 
The documents can be text-based or non-text-based, including public documents 
like media reports or government papers, procedural documents like minutes of 
meetings or financial accounts, or personal documents like diaries (ibid: 35). The 
majority of these documents are text-based, including `written text' as well as 
`electronic text'. The non-text-based documents have attracted the researchers' 
attention in recent years, such as photography, video, film, and television, and 
these are regarded as `visual data'. In this research, the documentary data is 
mainly textual data, including `written text' as well as `electronic text'. This 
textual data contains the policies from the government, ministries and 
international organisations, also the news from website or newspapers, and the 
papers and reports of the aid projects or programmes. 
To collect the documentary data, selection, classification and evaluation are the 
key steps for it. Firstly, the documents can be sorted based on Scott's 
two-dimension-classification. It divides the documents into four categories 
according to their `access': closed, restricted, open-archival and open-published; 
and on another dimension, there are personal documents and official documents, 
both of which can be divided into the four categories mentioned. Moreover, 
official documents include private and state spheres (Scott, 1990: 13-18). 
In my case, apart from the conversation we can obtain from the field work 
interviews, some documents also can be given by the interviewees. These papers 
may support the field interview by giving fuller picture about the context, or 
describing specific practice by donors. 
As the topic is closely related to official policies, those documents are more 
flexible and more difficult to be accessed by normal articles in journals. Those 
documents also are called `grey' literatures. The `grey' literature refers to the 
documents which are produced on all levels of government, academics, business 
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and industry in print and electronic formats, but which is not controlled by 
commercial publishers (Burnard, 2004: 177). The U. S. Interagency Gray literature 
Working Group, `Gray Information Functional Plan', defines gray literature (US 
English, the same as `grey literature') as `foreign or domestic open source 
material that usually is available through specialized channels and may not enter 
normal channels or systems of publication, distribution, bibliographic control, or 
acquisition by booksellers or subscription agents' (Interagency Gray Literature 
Working Group, 18/01/1995 cited in Soule and Ryan, 1999: 1). It includes the 
documents from governments, conference proceedings, and even lunch menus and 
handwritten notes (Siegel, 2004). Generally, grey literature lacks strict 
bibliographic control, meaning that basic information such as author, publication 
date or publishing body may not be easily discerned. Similarly, non-professional 
layouts and formats and low print runs of grey literature make the organised 
collection of such publications challenging compared to more traditionally 
published media, such as journals and books (Auger, 1989: 3). 
Therefore in my study, there are a number of `grey literatures' used from 
government or governmental institutions, and from conference and institutional 
reports. For example, I obtained documents about aid management and 
coordination from two Tanzanian officials (their personal reports and official 
reports), and also university reports on training for African university presidents 
from Chinese university administrators. 
Moreover, in this research the flexibility of the documentary data analysis also 
means that the documents are not `stable' materials. The documents may have 
already been there, or may be accessed by asking `people or bodies you are 
researching to generate them for or with you' through the research process (Mason, 
2002: 102), especially while doing field work. So we may find more data and 
change our knowledge about the existing material when we are developing 
analysis of the documents. 
2.2.2 Analysis of documents: Critical discourse analysis 
The use of document analysis not only has a long story, but is also flexible and has 
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been used in historical researches. From Marx, to Durkheim, to the Chicago 
school sociology, documents were used to gain insight into social reality by 
employing statistical data or exploring the meaning of written work (Scott, 1990: 
1). Documentary analysis can be a single method in research, and also can help 
the main method in the research as a supplement. In many social science research 
projects, a mix of research methods is applied. In that case, documentary analysis 
serves as a good assistant to the research process and to the final report. 
The `analysis' of documents can mean content analysis or discourse analysis. The 
difference can be seen as the `subject' of the document itself or the idea behind the 
resources; or we can say, we are going to use documents `as resource or as topics' 
(Scott, 1990: 36). With more complex roles emerging in the global network, the 
relations and interactions within the texts become more attractive than the texts 
themselves. The trend was lead by scholars such as Norman Fairclough, Ruth 
Wodak, and Teun van Dijk (Blommaert, 2005: 21), with a critical perspective for 
discourse analysis, or Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). According to 
Fairclough (1992: 12), the approaches of discourse analysis can be divided into 
two groups according to the nature of their social orientation to discourse, 
distinguishing `non-critical' and `critical' approaches. 64 Critical approaches differ 
from non-critical approaches not just in describing discursive practice, but also in 
`showing how discourse is shaped by relations of power and ideologies, and the 
constructive effects discourse has upon social identities, social relations and 
systems of knowledge and belief, neither of which is normally apparent to 
discourse participants'. Also addressed by Van Dijk (2001: 354), `a central notion 
in most critical work on discourse is that of power, and more specifically the 
social power of groups or institutions. ' Therefore CDA is considered as an 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of discourse, which `views language as a 
form of social practice and focuses on the ways social and political domination is 
reproduced by text and talk' (Fairclough, 1995). 
64 As Faiclough (1992: 12) designated, the 'non-critical' approach to be t he framework for describing 
classroom discourse in Sinclair and Coulthard (1975); ethnomethodological work in `Conversation analysis'; 
the model for therapeutic discourse in Labov and Fanshel (1977); and the approach developed by social 
psychologists Potter and Wetherell (1987). The critical approaches Fairclough has included are: the `critical 
linguistics' of Fowler et at. (1979), and the French approach to discourse analysis developed on the basis of 
Althusser's theory of ideology by Pecheux (1982). 
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In terms of the method of CDA, Fairclough (1995: 98) illustrated this very well in 
his diagrammatic representation as follows: 
Table 5.3 CDA diagrammatic representation 
Process of production 
Text 
Process of Interpretation 
Discourse practice 
Sociocultural practice 
(Situational; Institutional; societal) 
Dimensions of discourse 
Source: Fairclough (1995: 98) 
Description (text analysis) 
Interpretation (processing analysis) 
Explanation (social analysis) 
Dimensions of discourse analysis 
He explains the above graph for CDA in three points (ibid: 97-98): 
(1) Texts with heterogeneous and contradictory features; 
(2) A complex relationship between discourse practice (text production) and 
discourse conventions; one could show a similarly complex relationship 
between text interpretation and conventions, but I shall not do so here; 
(3) A relationship between such heterogeneous textual features and such 
complexity of discourse processes, and processes of sociocultural changes. 
Thus, to do CDA, we need firstly look at the text, including the vocabulary, 
grammar, cohesion, and text structure (Fairclough, 1992: 75-78); and then think 
about the discursive practice of the discourse, including the processes of text 
production, distribution, and consumption, and notice that the nature of these 
processes varies between different types of discourse according to social factors. 
Then, finally, we go to a more abstract level to explore how social structures 
determine properties of discourse, and how discourse in turn determines social 
structures. During this process, we always need to pay attention to the 
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`background knowledge', `speaker-goal' or `the neglect power' (ibid: 27). To be 
highlighted, regarding the step of analysing discursive practice, Fairclough quotes 
Goffman (1981: 144) who suggests a distinction between `animator', the person 
who actually makes the sounds, or the maker on paper, `author', the one who puts 
the words together and is responsible for the wording, and `principal', the one 
whose position is represented by the words. 
Using CDA for the analysis of both published and unpublished texts in this 
research can stimulate more understanding of the language used by specific 
institutions and their power relationships. It is a method suitable for this research, 
as there are many organisational and governmental reports to be analysed, and not 
only their contents, but also the language they used. This is especially true with 
the policy documents, since they `do not have a single authoritative meaning' 
(Codd, 1988: 244). Thus, CDA appears most useful for policy text (including 
newspaper articles) analysis, as it emphasises the relationship between discourses, 
ideology and power. 
Despite some mixed analysis of interview data and documents data in Part two of 
this study, there is a case study conducted through CDA. It is about the short term 
trainings by China. The analysis documents are the training reports from 
2004-2006 by Zhejiang Normal University (ZJNU), based on their training 
courses/workshops for African university leaders. Different from the listing of 
some policy items and reports content in Part one, the CDA in the next chapters 
focuses particularly on the language/texts reports are using, and the potential 
voice or power relations within and behind them. The analysis of the training 
reports aims for details on the specific practice by China; what China claims; the 
responsibilities of different roles involved, and their motives. These analyses are 
integrated into the whole framework of Part Two in order to make the main aim 
more clear, rather than let CDA be a separated part. 
Finally, there is an additional question for this research: can we use CDA for 
Chinese texts and Chinese language? With increasing literature talking about CDA 
in China, and since some Chinese studies have been done by using Fairclough's 
theories, it is possible and suitable to use CDA approaches to explore Chinese 
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documents. There are many interests addressing media discourse in China using 
CDA, for example Ji (2001: 153) mentioned a comparison between some news 
agencies in Hong Kong and Mainland China on a report of Clinton's statements. 
However Chinese literature is still focusing on the introduction of CDA, rather 
than empirically using CDA. Therefore it remains a challenge for me to analyse 
Chinese texts, and even compare them with English policies. As the ZJNU's 
training reports are in Chinese, therefore the words and sentences shown in this 
thesis are translated into English, but the analysis will be based on the original 
Chinese words when written styles and genres needed to be considered. 
3. Critical review 
3.1 Validity and reliability 
Reliability refers to the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to 
the same category by different observers or by the same observer on different 
occasions (Hammersley, 1992: 67). Validity refers to the truth interpreted, as the 
extent to which an account accurately represents the social phenomena to which it 
refers (Hammersley, 1990: 57). 
Reliability can mean `sustainable' and validity can mean `well grounded' in 
qualitative research (Lewis and Ritchie, 2003: 270). In terms of the reliability, 
since it is not easy to make replicability, my aim is to make the fieldwork 
consistent, allowing the respondents sufficient opportunities to talk about their 
experience, to allow the analysis to be carried out systematically and 
comprehensively, and to make interpretation well supported by the evidence (ibid: 
272). 
As Silverman (1993: 156) suggests, two forms of validation can be used for the 
logic of qualitative research. Firstly, comparing different kinds of data (e. g. 
quantitative and qualitative) and different methods (e. g. observation and 
interviews) to see whether they corroborate one another, called triangulation, 
derives from navigation, where different bearings give the correct position of an 
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object. Secondly, one can take findings back to the subjects being studied. Here, to 
ensure the research is more valid, a triangulation of the diverse methods and data 
types is important. According to Yeung (1997: 65), `the practical adequacy of 
causal mechanisms is likely to be better established through triangulation if the 
methods used are all consistent with realist ontology and epistemology. What is 
necessary in the process of triangulation is to compare and contrast different 
sources of findings if they are addressing the same phenomenon. ' As I mentioned 
before, the methods included both document analysis as well as fieldwork data by 
semi-structured interview. On the other hand, triangulation may also bring the 
contradiction between the different sources. But these contradictions can offer 
some reflective thinking of what we have examined. 
Humanistic approaches favour `depth interviews' in which interviewee and 
interviewer become `peers' or even `companions' (Reason and Rowan, 1981: 205) 
In this humanistic version of the interview, both the type of knowledge gained and 
the validity of the analysis are based on `deep' understanding. This is because the 
`humanistic framework' supports `meaningful understanding of the person. . . and 
wholeness in human inquiry' (Silverman, 1993: 206). 
It is important to mention `triangulation' here in this qualitative and comparative 
study, as triangulation is seen as a strategy for corroborating findings and as a test 
for the validity of the research (Mathison, 1988: 13). Moreover according to Olsen 
(2004), it is not aimed merely at validation, but at deepening and widening one's 
understanding. So it is important to use triangulation in this study to avoid 
limitations by field work in one African country (Tanzania in this case), and to 
avoid the limitation by people's bias in the interview. 
Denzin (1978: 294-307) identifies four types of triangulation: data, investigator, 
theory and methodological. In the following Part two, all of the knowledge 
obtained through the methods mentioned in this chapter will be triangulated 
critically to address our main problem; data triangulation and methods 
triangulation will especially be used. This means the interview and textual data 
which are collected in different ways (for the same main questions) will be used in 
a combined way to capture the social reality and allow me interpret it. The 
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interview data source can be obtained from different groups of people, both 
donors and recipients, and the documentary data can include various types of 
paper work, from governmental policies to institutional reports. Therefore we will 
obtain the findings and conclusions from both field work and paper work, from 
the voices of diverse people (donor side and recipient side, individually and 
institutionally, officially and privately), and from at least two analytical methods 
(interview analysis and critical discourse analysis), all to show how China is using 
its own way to support African educational development. 
3.2 Ethics 
The research was conducted according to the Ethical Guidelines of the British 
Educational Research Association (BERA) (BERA, 2004): 
`conducted within an ethic of respect for persons, respect for knowledge, respect 
for democratic values and respect for the quality of educational research' as well 
as with appropriate sensitivity towards `cultural, religious, gendered and other 
significant differences within the research population'. 
In order to operate within an ethic of respect for every participant involved 
directly or indirectly in my research, the consent forms (attached in Appendix 3) 
were delivered before the research study began. The informants were told about 
the aim and brief content of the study, asked if they would agree to be involved in 
the research, and if they feel alright with a recorder. If the informants refused to be 
recorded, the interview was recorded just by notes. 
To respect the informants' will, it was very important to not put personal bias and 
pressure on them, especially when the interviewer, me, is a Chinese doing a 
China-Africa study. Thus I tried to encourage them to say something critical or to 
tell two sides (disadvantage and advantage) to me in order to make the asking and 
talking based on a neutral perspective. Since the questions seldom related with 
very intimate problems, the informants were willing to tell their experience. It is 
also important to create a tolerant and relaxed atmosphere, to let the informants 
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feel at ease. 
Moreover, pseudonymous names are used in final data analysis, to fully respect 
informants' privacy, especially for people who are working in the government. 
3.3 Potential problems 
The first problem is the difference between the theoretical plan and the practice. It 
is a research project developing with every step. This ethnographic character let 
me face some challenges, and make some improvements, depending on the 
situation and practicalities. For instance, how could I get access to the 
governmental office of the aid program in another country? How could I resolve 
the culture conflicts friendly? How could I communicate well with the official 
people and get trust from African people? Those all have to be considered. There 
also needs to be some flexibility during the data collection and analysis practice. 
In Tanzania, the process was more successful than we had hoped. The Chinese 
and Tanzanian officials were kind to accept interviews. But the access was 
sometime time consuming. Quite a few informants were developed during the 
field work process by introducing from one to another, for example the DIT focus 
group and the visit to Mkapa High School, and those interviews were even more 
interesting and important than what was planned. On the other hand it was very 
challenging. You should prepare different questions for every emerging situation, 
and catch every opportunity to extend the key informants list, as well as think 
about the changes in the whole idea and theoretical framework. 
Moreover, as already mentioned, the African continent has a number of diverse 
countries, which cannot be covered in entirety in the research. The research can, 
however, focus on general information from academic and official documents, 
gain perceptions from the diverse people working for or receiving aid, and carry 
out fieldwork focusing on one country in Africa. 
Another problem is the value of the research. If this research cannot be repeated 
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easily or cannot represent a large number of people who are involved in the aid 
program in Africa, then what is the value of this qualitative research? The most 
important meaning for qualitative research is not just to extend the result to a 
larger sample, or even the whole population, but `its ability to explore issues in 
depth and from the perspective of different participants, with concepts, meanings 
and explanations developed inductively from the data' (Lewis and Ritchie, 2003: 
267). It is a critical understanding of some mechanisms behind the phenomena, 
rather than being concerned will applying the results into a further setting. 
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Introduction to Part Two 
Part One (Chapters 2-5) of this study looked at both orthodox and emerging 
donors, especially through the comparison of donors' intervention in the global 
political economy and the concept of development. The next step is to examine 
donors' action empirically. Part One addressed the following question: is there any 
difference in the logic of intervention between China (as an emerging donor) and 
the orthodox/dominant Western donors, and if so, what are these differences? 
Theoretically we explored the changing motives and discourses of international 
aid. The conclusion reached from Part One was that there are some differences in 
conceptions of development, historical relations, discourses, motives, approaches 
as well as aid amount between the Chinese and Western model of educational aid; 
in different conceptions we highlighted the importance of aid to Africa. Yet these 
answers are literature based and need to be examined empirically. Therefore, in 
Chapter Five - the methodology of the study - we addressed the specific research 
questions and research design, highlighting that we will explore these questions 
through a qualitative approach using field interviews and discourse analysis. 
Building on these foundations, Part Two, or the next three chapters, tries to 
understand donor's logic of educational aid in practice (i. e. how China as a donor, 
or as a partner, describes itself and how the recipients describe the aid practice). 
Based on the theories from Part One, Part Two mainly focuses on two questions: 
(1) given that we theoretically perceive some difference between the Western and 
Chinese aid, is there any difference in practice, and are they recognised as such 
(e. g. can people, either in donor or recipient groups, distinguish it)? (2) How do 
Tanzanian people view China-Africa relations, and how do Tanzanian people 
perceive China's help from an individual perspective? 
The fieldwork in Tanzania and China, conducted mainly by semi-structured 
interview, will tell us how people belonging to different groups view Chinese 
action in Africa. Assuming that the theoretical difference can be reflected in some 
particularities by China, Part Two includes two sections: Chapter 6 is talking 
mainly about the historical particularities of China-Tanzania, from the previous 
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`brothers' relation' to the current partnership under a `cultural agreement'; Chapter 
7 and 8 discuss about the particularities of China's current practice which focuses 
mainly on higher education, vocational education and short-term training. Chapter 
8 also reveals that China's conception of educational aid includes not only formal 
education, but also other types for transforming practical skills and cultural 
influence. The focus in Chapter 6 is on the bilateral relationship and related 
policies between China and Tanzania, and how people see this relationship; 
however focus on the latter two chapters are more on specific types of practice. 
In terms of people's perception on these particularities/differences, Chapter 6 
seeks to understand how these special links between the two countries are 
recognised, which includes (a) my personal changing perception during the field 
study; (b) Chinese and Tanzanian officials' knowledge and 
understanding/interpretation of this bilateral relation; (c) Officials' viewpoints of 
different donors in the new era. 
Based on the knowledge obtained in fieldwork, Chapters 7 and 8 look at people's 
understanding of, and comments on, China's current action more specifically; 
these `recognitions' are both from field interview talks or papers obtained from 
fieldwork. Some special cases are included in these two chapters, including: 
Tanzania's Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology (DIT) and its agreement with 
China on teachers training through Chinese scholarships; China's short term 
training yearly reports from Zhejiang Normal University (ZJNU); and a `Chinese 
Culture Centre' built in Mkapa High School in Dar es Salaam by China. DIT is a 
representative of China's support of student scholarship, especially on 
postgraduate study; ZJNU is a successful example for offering short-term training 
to African university leaders in China; and Mkapa's Chinese Culture Centre 
unique in that it is a small work which has a big name in the Chinese media. This 
research raises the question, how do people see these practice in/or for Africa? 
Chapter Eight explores this question by looking at people's perception from the two 
sides, Tanzanian institutional principal and returning students. Chapter 8 explores 
the discourse and perceptions from fieldwork from the perspective of Tanzanian 
school/institution and Chinese universities. 
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From the field study, it is found that, in a similar vein to the principles advocated in 
Chinese policies, rather than making an effort towards UPE (as stressed by the 
Western practice), Chinese educational aid is directed mainly towards higher 
education, vocational education, and short-term training, giving support to human 
resource development in Africa. In terms of people who have jobs related with the 
aid practice, Tanzanian and Chinese official people seem to be doing well on 
translating the policies into practice; Chinese universities, authorized by the 
Chinese Ministry of Education, are actively making their influence/reputation in 
training African participants, either for long-term or short-term studies. The 
Tanzanian institutional principals are delivering the information from national 
ministries to their campuses, and trying to build capacity from diverse foreign aid. 
In terms of the recipients, Tanzania, as a national recipient, needs help from both 
Western donors and China's practical experience; DIT, Mkapa High School and 
DUCE (Dar es Salaam University College of Education was also visited during 
fieldwork), as institutional recipients, need any donor who can solve their problems, 
whether it be a construction need, or a teaching resource need; returning students, 
as individual recipients, care about the performance of the practice (i. e. to what 
extent can they solve their urgent problems) rather than talking about the 
differences between the donors. 
To conclude this introduction, it is important to highlight the standpoint of the 
analysis which will take place in the next chapters. This standpoint is 
demonstrated in the following words: 
Africa's civil society, however, needs to examine how best to react to the 
challenges presented by China's engagement in Africa and find a 
tolerable median between uncritical acceptance and knee-jerk 
rejectionism (Obiorah, 2007: 53). 
China wants to pursue policies that are in its best interests and what we 
have to do in Africa is also to trade and pursue policies that are in our 
own interests. It's as simple as that - all states do that.... It is futile for 
Africans to be pointing fingers whether at the West or at China. Africans 
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have to organise their side of the story as best as they can in their own 
interests (Prah, 14/12/2006). 
In the long run as Africans transform their societies it will be their task to 
ensure that the relations between Africa and China do not repeat the 
centuries of underdevelopment and exploitation... . to ensure the old 
competition of capitalism does not lead to another global war (Campbell, 
2008: 104). 
The above words are from African perspectives, and while they cannot be 
generalised, there are nonetheless some key points held in them. We put this in the 
front of this chapter to show that the key point of this study is not to offer a 
judgment on who is a better donor, but whether there are differences between 
different aid models. We are interested in the features, motives and logics each 
donor has, but we are not interested in `pointing fingers' at any side. This is the 
basic rule of my study. This rule was conveyed to my interviewees so the 
discussion could be more free and easy. 
Thus, from the above words, we arrive at this idea: African people care more 
about what kind of action Africa itself can have, as a response to global 
competition and global neo-liberal market economy. For African people, they 
want to find a route without any, either Western or Eastern, exploitation. 
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Chapter Six Exploring in Tanzania: history and voices ---- 
From `socialist brothers' to `market and mutual benefit'? 
Introduction 
As indicated in the methodology chapter, this study seeks to explore different 
voices and attitudes towards China's action in Africa. To examine this as closely 
as possible during field work interviews with officials, educators, students and 
other relevant people in the aid practice, we ask what they perceive about Chinese 
educational aid. Tanzania ultimately proved to be an appropriate choice for both 
theoretical and practical reasons. Therefore, this chapter begins to explore the 
picture of China-Tanzania relations, how Tanzania has a special historical 
relationship with China, and how people in Tanzania, as well as myself, perceive 
China-Tanzania relations. 
There are five parts in this chapter. 
Firstly, I include my own perception of my fieldwork, as the changing opinions 
and experience I had during my time in Tanzania helps explain how China and 
Chinese people are integrated into a local African area. Thus the chapter will start 
with my own experience during fieldwork. My changing perceptions resulted 
from informal talk, daily life, and observation in the field. This helped me build 
my own understanding of China's practice, and set a basis for my further analysis. 
Based on this, the chapter focuses on the special China-Tanzania relationship 
(which is different from West-Tanzania historically and politically) and how this 
relationship is being discussed by people, and how it relates with aid practices. 
The second part is a review of history through current people's comments. As 
introduced, Tanzania is one of the largest recipient countries of foreign aid in 
Sub-Sahara Africa, receiving help from both developed and developing 
countries. 65 The donor-recipient relationship is also changing in accordance with 
the global changes in the aid agenda. Since the independence of the country, 
65 see the website of the Development Partners Group in Tanzania (DPG): 
http: //www. tzdpg. or. tzlextemaVdpg-tanzania/overview-of-aid-in-tanzania. html 
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Tanzania featured an aid seeking attitude by joining the World Bank Group. 
Tanzania had some economic growth but it was not very efficient until the aid 
framework was reformed. Under the wave of aiming for poverty reduction in the 
post-Washington Consensus era, Tanzania goals for long-term development 
(national vision 2025 and Zanzibar vision 2020) were linked closely with MDGs. 
Collaborating with their development partners (DPs), one of Tanzania's key 
papers is the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST), considered their Bible, 
for constructing a relationship between Tanzanian ministries and an alignment of 
DPs; it is hoped to help offer more ownership for the recipient country. 
The education development in Tanzania has also experienced changes under the 
general aid situation. From the colonial education system to the low development 
of education after independence, the country has been looking for a solution with 
their donors to promote better management of funding and educational resources, 
and thus put education at the central position of MKUKUTA. The Western aid in 
Tanzania is moving from the project aid to the budget support, although within 
this process there are diversities - some of them did `pool funding' to primary 
education, while some of them directly financed national budget. In a process of 
aid harmonisation and with the country's urgent needs, Tanzanian officials in the 
Ministry of Education indicated that they would like to hear any suggestions for 
educational development, including advice from both developed and developing 
countries, and specifically their invitation to China. 
The third and fourth parts of this chapter review China-Tanzania stories. In this 
sense, the history between the two countries is reviewed firstly, and then some key 
issues in the relationship are explored. China is not a new actor in Tanzania and 
has stayed in the country for a long time; having said that its aid practice in 
Tanzania is unique. The China-Tanzania relationship is a representative one within 
the larger context of China-Africa history. The historical link between the two 
countries, which made China unique when compared to Western donors, can be 
traced back to their socialism brothers' time. The Nyerere-Mao time built the 
friendship among older generations of Tanzanian and Chinese. The TAZARA 
railway is a monument for the two countries. The Cultural Agreement from 90s 
builds upon this history to establish a systematic framework of cultural exchange 
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and educational cooperation between them. 
How are these facts and relationships recognised in the field? The fifth part of the 
chapter examines people's perception of the China-Tanzania relationship and the 
changes from the past to this new global era. The history is well known to officials 
and even for some local people, especially the older generations. For Tanzanian 
officials, the previous friendship between the two sides may help promote the 
current work (for getting aid from China); for Chinese officials, the government 
has noticed their changing donor-recipient relationship (as a special and 
impressive donor to a donor with business rather than political issues, and one 
offering a small amount of aid when compared to the West). Both of the sides 
seem to recognise the changing global environment and want to build their aid 
relationship based on the historical link, while still recognizing the new 
atmosphere (for example not only concentrating on construction, but also human 
resource support). Although historically different, China and other Western donors 
are encouraged by the Tanzanian officials at `one table' for discussing issues 
collaboratively. It seems they are going to be considered as one group, in the 
contemporary era of economic globalisation. 
1. Before and within the field work: a personal `ethnographic' perception 
As field work can offer us a `broad version of theory' which is more than `a 
relationship between variables' (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 20), this section 
will explain what I have seen and felt on ground, rather than simply offering my 
interview data. 
In Chapter Five we mentioned that the field interview would be conducted in a 
critical ethnographic way, meaning that the task was not only about collecting 
interview data, but also about the entire circumstance which I found myself in. 
According to (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 96), from an ethnographic view 
`one form of the data is researchers' descriptions of people's behaviour, of what 
they do and say in various circumstances, and of their own experience of 
participation in settings'; equally important `are the accounts that people in the 
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setting provide, while being observed or in interviews. ' Although not 
systematically an ethnographic work, here we tried a thinking `style' of critical 
ethnography (ibid: 96). 
1.1 Before and after arrival- from imagination to the reality 
There are some rules I gave myself before and during the fieldwork; the first 
being to adopt a neutral attitude, despite the fact that social science is always 
characterized by a degree of personal value. Moreover, as I was afraid that people 
would be reluctant to criticize the Chinese approach when they replied to a 
Chinese researcher, a second rule was required, that is, be reflective and critical all 
the time. Thirdly, my rule was to encourage interviewees and other people, to join 
in the discussion freely and openly. I hoped that interviewees could provide some 
critiques on aid practice. Aid itself is `help', which means it should be a positive 
thing, but we want to know how it is that it cannot be equal and free in a political 
economic process. Therefore I prefer to hear complaints rather than praises, and 
sought to create rules to facilitate this. 
Another consideration for me was how to deal with a situation when interviewees 
are difficult to be accessed. Before I went to Tanzania, I could not get any 
information directly from Tanzanian officials and Chinese officials in Dar es 
Salaam. What I could do was complete the application for a research permit from 
Tanzanian ministries, yet only the first half of the application could be done 
before my arrival. That meant that with only some `psychological' preparation and 
the application form for a research permit I sent technically and with nearly `zero' 
interviewee information, I went to Tanzania alone and started my work as soon as 
I arrived. 
From the time of my arrival my worries about looking for interviewees began to 
be released. With the help of many people, I finally obtained access to both 
Tanzanian and Chinese people. Most of the access were admission to official 
departments, in the first two weeks. Many of my concerns of interviewees' 
attitudes solved well, as they went better than expected. The talks with Tanzanians 
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were free and open, and deepened some key points which followed my research 
questions. People there were happy to share their personal and/or official 
information with me, even when I went back to them again for further questions. 
The meetings with Chinese officials (for which I was worried they may not want 
to meet me, or could not talk with me in a critical way, but rather in official 
language echoing the Chinese media resource) were also easier than I imagined. 
There was a good deal of officials' reflexive thinking about personal opinions and 
reviews of official practice. Helpfully, every interviewee also gave me information 
for my next interview, in this way resembling a snow-ball sampling process as 
participants in the study were recommended one by one. Generally the interview 
was held in a friendly and peaceful atmosphere, and I did try to encourage people 
to make more reflexive and critical comments on my questions. With these results, 
I felt more and more confident and active while the fieldwork proceeded. My 
changing perception may also be valuable for a support of the later analysis of 
interview data. 
During the stay I had the opportunities to visit two cities of Tanzania- Dar es 
Salaam and Arusha, with most of time being spent in Dar es Salaam. 66 As a 
capital city, Dar es Salaam is quite big, with a remarkable amount of construction 
going on in the city, especially the main roads and the beautiful seashore scenery 
along the Indian Ocean. As the Chinese ambassador said to me: `you could see the 
country is growing up, and maybe in ten years you may see a totally different and 
new capital city of Tanzania'. I also had a strong feeling while visiting the city, 
namely that the country wanted to make changes for itself urgently. There was a 
road outside of the university campus under construction by a Chinese project and 
other roads were also built by China the more places I visited; I saw construction 
projects such as national stadium, hospital, and I also saw the train station which 
was the eastern starting point of TAZARA rail way which was built between 
1970-1975, the largest foreign-aid project ever undertaken by China (this will be 
talked later in this chapter). It seemed that the city had many connections with 
China, historically and contemporaneously. 
There w as only one interview did in Arusha, introduced by a Chinese engineer working in Dar es Salaam. 
The interviewee in Arusha is working in a transformer company. He did his undergraduate study in China. 
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From only imaging to travelling, visiting and viewing the reality of this Eastern 
African country, I felt it was a good choice for fieldwork. The reasons were 
simple: only seeing the reality allowed me to see the difference between words on 
paper and actives in life, and also to recognize the difference between how the 
West and local people view China. Without talking to the recipients themselves, I 
would never know what they care and think about. 
1.2 Talking and living with local people 
Mainly in English and sometimes with a little Swahili, I tried to talk with local 
people and get some images of China from them. This included talking to 
interviewees I had planned or found in the process of `snowball sampling', and 
also, talking to people living or working around me or those I met occasionally. 
I was living in a lecturer's house in the University of Dar es Salaam. I still 
remembered my landlord, Frida, a lecturer in Department of Education, told me 
her opinion about `choosing friends'. She told me, everybody has the right to 
choose friend, and also as a country, you can choose which partner you want, no 
matter a Western country, or China. That means that an aid partner is a decision 
for an African country itself, which cannot be imposed by any others. My landlord 
told me this on just the second day after my arrival, and the comment stimulated 
me to begin to enquiry about more issues related the authority of recipient 
countries and how important the recipients see their rights or ownerships in the 
aid practice. 
The attitudes from Tanzanians towards Chinese people and China were more 
positive than I supposed. However there is always a difference for me between 
viewpoints towards Chinese people and towards the Chinese government, 
anywhere in the world. China for Tanzania was not a new thing, and people would 
say `China, China' (pronounced in Swahili) on the way when they met you. They 
basically were happy with the Chinese aid, as the officer Maggie in the Ministry 
of Education said, `we welcome help from different donors, for supporting our 
urgent needs'. People also talked about the disadvantage of Chinese aid, such as 
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the limited donation (by the Mkapa School principal), the cheap price but poor 
quality of fake mobile phones made in China (although this has little link with 
educational aid, it was mentioned at least twice by interviewees), the degree 
length and money amount of the Chinese scholarship, and so on. However most of 
them gave me a feeling that they wanted to learn something from China and/or 
Chinese people, and/or wanted to work in China or a Chinese company; it seemed 
that Chinese hard-working characteristics were rooted in Tanzania. After spending 
a while in Tanzania, my perception was changed in some way from the images I 
got in UK. The negative words from Africans were not as copious as in Western 
papers. 
Actually, the most distinctive difference between how Western discourse 
discussing China and the recipients' words was not about negatives or positives, 
but was talking about the same thing from different perspectives and subjects. For 
some Tanzanian people, the donors are not different too much from each other, 
and for some others, the West reminds them of colonial history. 
Living with local people, I found they were very easy-going. You can easily talk, 
dance, or sing with them. The institutional principals were well educated, and 
spoke English well. The governmental officials were also easily accessed with the 
research permit I applied, however sometimes the efficiency was a problem. You 
could feel the governmental function still needed to be improved. 
I also felt a large gap between educated and un-educated people, rich people and 
poor people. Most of my Tanzanian friends who at least had university degrees in 
the country and stable jobs (such as a lecturer) had a house and car, as well as air 
conditioners which were quite useful in the hot weather in the offices. Some of my 
Tanzanian and Chinese friends in Dar es Salaam even had their own security 
guard, family servant and catering people. However beside the university campus 
and ministry buildings, or a little off the main roads in the city, you would see 
many poor houses with much lower living conditions. 
This inspired me to do some critical thinking: as most of the interviewees in my 
study were educated well with good positions in the country, there was in fact a 
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question which arose: can China really benefit the local poor people? (Or only 
people with a good network, a richer background, or a good education? ) As I was 
told during the interviews, some of the official people have their children studying 
in China with the scholarships. It may not because they use their position to help 
-their children, but these children certainly have better primary and high school 
education. One of the Tanzanian official's daughter was going to study in China at 
that time, had already got her undergraduate degree in US. In the next chapter, 
people in Chinese embassy and Tanzanian ministry will tell us how they select the 
applicants to try to make it equal. 
1.3 Chinese people in Dar es Salaam 
A section of this thesis dealing with the Chinese in Dar es Salaam is necessary, 
firstly because I was helped a lot by some Chinese engineers in Tanzania without 
which I could not have gotten access to both official and local people; and 
secondly the Chinese I met, with different jobs in Dar es Salaam, gave me a lot of 
useful clues and knowledge about China-Africa relations. 
The most `useful' Chinese people I met were two engineers from China National 
Electric Wire and Cable Import/Export Corporation. My meeting them was by 
accident when I was searching a blog about Chinese in Africa, and after my arrival, 
they drove me to the Chinese embassy and various ministers for my first few days; 
this saved me a lot of time. From talking with them, I also got to know the 
Chinese working life in Africa. As they told, some of their projects won the 
bidding even against famous world companies because of the hard-working 
Chinese ethic and the more efficient output with less budget. I have seen some of 
their engineers working on the project site, and most of them already recovered 
from malaria once or twice. The working conditions were not good, but they were 
cooking and having lunch together happily. One of them had just got married in 
China, and another had a one-year-old baby in China. Both of them obviously 
were missing family a lot, but tried to seek work and to earn more with these 
`China trends' in Africa. 
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Chinese officials in the embassy gave me a good impression, which was actually 
much better than I supposed. Because I could not get in contact with the embassy 
by email before I arrived, the interview for Chinese embassy in Tanzania was an 
aspect of the fieldwork which was full of suspense. In China, high level officials 
gave an image that they could be difficult to be accessed. Therefore when I first 
entered into the embassy yard and then talked with the secretary of the Cultural 
Counsellor, I felt very lucky. After that I went to embassy several times, and 
managed to meet and talk, even have dinner with, the Cultural Counsellor Sun and 
his wife Zhang. They acted very friendly and kindly to me, a student they never 
known before. One day I was informed through a phone call that the ambassador 
wanted to arrange a meeting with me. The talk with the ambassador Liu, 
accompanied by Cultural Counsellor and his secretary, was successful; it 
resembled a lecture by Chinese officials who had considerable African 
information and experience, as opposed to a governmental-trained speech. 
Through my Chinese engineer friends I also got to know some Chinese with other 
job including a 28 year old man, a restaurant manager who followed his parents to 
settle down in Dar es Salaam and operates Beijing style restaurant. There were 
also some elder restaurant managers, with decades of experience in Tanzania who 
spoke fluent Swahili and had a broad network which included Chinese and local 
officials. While these business people were not direct interviewees, knowing them 
helped me understand real Chinese people's lives in Africa. 
Based upon these on-the-ground experiences, I got closer to Tanzania and its 
people. Without so many small stories in the `discursive world' (Burawoy, 1998), 
I was not able to `extract' the non-discursive logics and theories for an academic 
study. Thus the following parts will talk about Tanzania and its relation with 
China in a more `non-discursive' way, one based on my empirical work. 
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2. Different donor, one meeting table 
2.1 Tanzania: a recipient country in new era 
2.1.1 Highly aid-dependent country: a historical development with foreign 
aid 
Tanzania is one of the largest recipient's countries of foreign aid in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The country has a population of about 43 million in 2009 (World Bank, 
2011). Aid contributes a significant share of the national budget by 
complementing domestic resource mobilization and capacity development in 
Tanzania. Approximately 35% of government spending is dependent on foreign 
aid (Fiscal Year 2008/2009). For fiscal year (FY) 2007/2008, total ODA to 
Tanzania, provided by 40 Development Partners, amounted to approximately 2 
billion USD. This includes assistance in the form of grants, concessional loans 
and debt relief. Aid management in Tanzania is guided by the Joint Assistance 
Strategy (JAST) jointly developed by the government and development partners 
in order to enhance aid effectiveness at country level (DPG Tanzania). 67 
Tanzania became independent in 1961 and was led by Julius Nyerere. Nyerere 
believed that Western-style economic policies were unsuited for Tanzania. He 
drew from the ancient African tradition of sharing in an effort to create what he 
saw as a special African socialism, and he wanted to develop Tanzania without 
depending heavily on Western assistance (Ungar, 1986). From the 60s to 70s, 
Tanzania experienced a period of socialist development. Throughout the 1970s 
and early 1980s, external events, including oil price shocks, the collapse of the 
East African Community in 1977, a war with Uganda, and drought aggravated 
domestic economic problems caused by inefficient domestic economic policies 
(Bureau of Public Affairs of Tanzania, 1992). 
67 See website of De velopment Partners Group (DPG) in Tanzania, 
http: //www. tzdpg. or. tz/external/dpg-tanzania/overview-of-aid-in-tanzania. html. There will be more talk on 
DPG later in this chapter. This website gives information on Tanzania's aid relation with its multilateral and 
bilateral donors (development partners, DPs) including the engagement with China. The general situation 
about aid flow to Tanzania and aid management was also informed by my interviewee Nancy, who was 
working at the office for aid management in the Tanzanian Ministry of Finance. LAST will be introduced in 
details later in the next two sections. 
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Despite its record of political stability, Tanzania did not get much attention from 
foreign investment. So the country itself had to turn to seek foreign aid. During 
the early years of independence, Tanzania established contact with a great number 
of states, including the Nordic countries, so as to ensure external funding. As 
some of the earliest donors to Tanzania, Norway and Sweden, reported their first 
aid disbursements in 1962; they were followed by Denmark in 1965 and Finland 
in 1971. Since then, Tanzania become one of the, if not the greatest beneficiary, of 
Nordic aid (Selbervik, 2006). In the early 1970s however, China was the largest 
single aid donor to Tanzania. Most of China's 400 million USD aid was dedicated 
to building and equipping the TAZARA Railroad between Dar es Salaam and 
Zambia's copper belt. The other donors included the World Bank, the United 
Kingdom, and Germany. 
In 1986, the government announced a recovery program which stressed food, 
shelter, drinking water, education, and health care at the village level. This 
produced significant increases in agricultural production and financial support 
from bilateral donors. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have 
provided funds to rehabilitate the basic economic infrastructure of the country 
(Bureau of Public Affairs of Tanzania, 1992). 
As a recipient country, Tanzania joined the World Bank Group in 1962. Beginning 
with a credit from the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) 
for education in 1963, over 5.8 billion USD in credits and 274 million USD in 
grants have been approved so far to Tanzania (World Bank, 2009). 
In Helleiner's Independent Commission Report (1994), the government and its 
development partners (DPs) agreed to reform Tanzania's aid management 
framework. By placing national ownership and government leadership at the 
forefront of the development process, they fostered transparency and 
accountability in external resource management. The economic growth between 
2002 and 2006 showed the positive effect of this reform, and government-donor 
confidence also remained `historically high'. Howeve r, the government still 68 
68 As introduced by Tanzanian MoF data (offered by interviewee Nancy), the real economy has grown an 
average of 6% between 2002 and 2006, compared to less than 4% in the early 90s. Inflation has sharply fallen 
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notices that almost 50% of the population living below the national basic needs 
poverty line. Therefore, more effort is needed to transform the economic gains 
into wellbeing for millions people, which also requires the government to keep 
suitable relations with development partners, as well as to encourage collaborative 
relations among donor countries. 
2.1.2 Reformed aid relations between Tanzania and the DPs 
After years of changes, the Western donors are transforming their functions from 
working separately on many single projects and programmes to working together 
as partners with Tanzania's national development agenda. 69 Essentiall y there are 
three modalities used to provide assistance to Tanzania: General Budget support 
(GBS), Basket Funds (BFs) and direct project funds; GBS is tending to be the 
preferred mode, since it is consistent with the government's legal framework and 
processes. In the fiscal year (FY) 2007/8, GBS amounted to 673 million USD 
compared to 277 million USD in FY 2002/03. Despite GBS being the preferred 
mode, a large proportion of aid assistance to Tanzania continues to be delivered 
through project modality which, in many instances, remains off-budget and 
outside the government system. Through the JAST framework, the country 
encourages more donors to shift away from the individual programmes and areas, 
and towards projects which are programme-based and to GBS (DPG Tanzania). 70 
Under JAST framework, there are planned supports to Tanzania from the 35 
members of the Tanzania Development Partners Group (DPG, formerly the 
Tanzania Development Assistance Committee), comprising of 17 bilateral and 5 
multilateral agencies working with the government and other domestic 
to an average of 5% since 2000, compared to more than 30% in the mid 90s. 
69 Through past my intervie ws, there were still some projects and programmes going on in Tanzania. 
According to the booklet given by Ministry of Education of Tanzania, named 'Education Projects and 
Programmes' (Ministry of Education and Vocational Training of Tanzania, 2007), there were nine projects and 
programmes ongoing during 2006 and 2007, funded by different donors or groups of donors. For example, 
the big project - Secon dary Education Development Programme (SEDP) - had been financed by the 
government, communities and the soft loan from the World Bank through IDA (2007: 49); and Primary 
Education Development Programme (PEDP) was funded by GoT, GPs and communities through direct cash 
and labour contributions (2007: 23); School Health Programme was funded by some NGOs and UN 
organisations; Prevention and Awareness in School of HIV and Aids (PASHA Project) was funded by German 
Ministry of Cooperation through German technical cooperation and implemented by the Swiss Tropical 
Institute, etc. 
70 See D PG Tanzania website, http: //www. tzdpg. or. tz/externaVdpg-tanzania/overview-of-aid-in-tanzania. html 
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stakeholders to strengthen development partnerships and the effectiveness of 
development cooperation (ibid). 71 To be noted, China, although not listed as a 
member of DPG, was mentioned on the DPG website to have `participated in 
some of the DPG meetings and seminars over the past years' (ibid). 
What, then, kind of national developmental framework are the Tanzanian 
government and DPs working for? The country's long-term development goals for 
Tanzania are laid out in the Nation Vision 2025 and Zanzibar Vision 2020. The 
medium-term objectives are MKUKUTA and MKUZA. MKUKUTA is the 
Kiswahili acronym for the Nation Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty 
(NSGRP), and MKUZA is for the Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of 
Poverty (ZSGRP). 
These strategies, which are very Western donor oriented, are `fully linked' with 
MDGs and thus call for results-based management, good governance and expect 
the contributions of all sectors; they examine cross-cutting issues including 
HIVIAIDS, gender, environment and employment, and growth and poverty 
reduction. The DPs support MKUKUTA and MKUZA through the national budget 
which translates their strategies into fundable and implementable activities 
72 (ibid). 
To this point of the thesis, there have been several mentions of `JAST'. It seems 
contemporary practice, which has been reformed or renewed by Tanzania with its 
donors, is actively part of JAST content. Indeed, I was also told about JAST when 
I interviewed aid coordination officials and aid management officials in the 
Tanzanian Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Finance. They all 
emphasised the key role JAST is playing for their renewed ownership in aid 
practice. Therefore in the following section we specifically discuss JAST and the 
Tanzanian officials' comments on it. 
'' The 17 bilateral members of DPG are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (German 
Embassy, KfW and GtZ), Ireland, Italy, Japan (Embassy of Japan and JICA), Korea (KOICA and 
EDCF/Korea Exim Bank), Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK (DFID), USA (USAID and 
MCC). See DPG Tanzania's website http: //www. tzdpg. or. tz/. 
72 This information is also provided by documents from my interviewee Nancy who is working in Ministry 
of Finance of Tanzania. 
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2.2 JAST - `It is our Bible' 
As noted in chapter two, with the development of aid discourse and practice the 
logic of aid in the new century is turning to a `new architecture of aid, ' referring to 
a transformation of aid on conventional investment projects to aid on policy 
reform (Morse, 2005a: 3). The Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST) is 
one of the examples within this transformation, as it aims to change the old 
structure of the aid coordination model. 
I was informed about JAST on my first interview with the aid coordination office 
in the Tanzanian Ministry of Education. Thereafter, I received the governmental 
documents from Maggie (Ministry of Education) and Nancy (Ministry of Finance) 
which detailed JAST. JAST includes the developmental cooperation between 
donors and recipients, and the cooperation among donors themselves. In terms of 
the first relationship, when I asked about the progress of the donor-recipient 
relationship, and how to promote the aid practice more effectively, Maggie and 
Sehe in the office of aid coordination (Ministry of Education) mentioned, 
We are dealing with our development partners by the latest JAST which 
is Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania, a policy framework helping us 
get more ownership than before... It is our Bible. 
Dependence! Dependence! That is the most disadvantage [of the aid 
relationship]... If we are dealing aid as before by different small projects, 
it is easily to be helped by conditionalities, but it is changing now. When 
donors signed our JAST, the conditionalities will no longer be there. Last 
year there were 14 development partners signed on this. 
JAST, in Swahili `Mkakati wa Pamoja wa Misaada Tanzania' (MPAMITA), is a 
national medium-term framework for managing development co-operation 
between the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania (Government) and 
its Development Partners, with the aim to achieve national development and 
poverty reduction goals. However, it also outlines the role of non-state actors to 
the extent that they contribute to the successful implementation of the Strategy 
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(JAST, 2006). 
JAST has been formulated in the spirit of national and international commitments 
and initiatives on aid effectiveness - most notably the Tanzania Assistance 
Strategy (2002), the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development (2002), 
the Rome Declaration on Aid Harmonisation (2003), the Marrakech Memorandum 
on Managing for Results (2004) and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
(2005) (JAST, 2006: 1). It spans a renewable cycle of five years and outlines the 
main objectives, principles and broad arrangements of Tanzania's development 
partnership. It is complemented by an Action Plan which specifies concrete 
activities and timeframes for implementing JAST, and a monitoring framework 
with indicators to measure Government and Development Partner performance 
(JAST, 2006: 1; JAST Action Plan, 2007). 
The background of JAST was a journey of the nation and its DPs' negotiating for 
better coordination. One major outcome of the process was the establishment of 
the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS), launched in 2002, which aimed to 
strengthen aid coordination, harmonisation and alignment, as well as national 
ownership and Government leadership in the development process. 73 A ithough 
the national leadership has been enhanced with this, the aid power has still not 
been centralized very well. As stated in JAST 2006 documents, the widespread 
provision of off-budget financing, most notably for projects, has impeded strategic 
resource allocation in the national budget process as well as transparency and 
domestic accountability in the utilisation and performance of external resources. 
Thus, the nation aimed for a more comprehensive plan, the JAST. 
The objectives of JAST are as follows: 
Strengthening national ownership and Government leadership of the 
development process; 
Aligning DP support to Government priorities, systems, structures and 
73 A TAS Action Plan, developed during FY 2002/03, set out practical steps for implementing TAS. Actions 
were grouped in four priority areas, namely (1) increasing the predictability of aid flows, (2) integrating 
external resources into the Government budget and Exchequer system, (3) harmonising and rationalising 




Harmonising Government and DP process; 
Managing resource for achieving development results, in particular 
MKUKUTA/MKUZA; 
Strengthening domestic and mutual accountability (JAST Action Plan, 
2007: 1). 
JAST seeks to bring a refreshed aid relationship to Tanzania. The following figure 
shows clearly this change JAST hopes to achieve. As the figure indicates, this 
strategy is moving from `each development partner with own priorities, 
requirements, practices, systems, procedures and process' to `alignment of 
Development Partners' assistance with national development goals and processes' 
(JAST, 2006). 
Table 6.1 Alignment of Development Partners' assistance with national 
development goals under JAST in Tanzania 
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Figure 1: Alignment of Development Partners' assistance with national development 
goals under the JAST 
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coordinates dialogue with Development Partners and non-state actors at the 
respective levels and, moreover, accounts for its decisions and actions, including 
the use of public funds, the provision of public services, the attainment of 
development results and outcomes upon implementing JAST to domestic 
stakeholders. Development Partners will support government efforts to develop 
sustainable capacity in both the public sector and across society, and will do so by 
responding to national capacity needs with financial and technical assistance. 
In terms of interviewees' (official people) responses, it appeared that they were 
happy with this new mechanism, and had a good amount of hope in it. The new 
strategy helped them feel they could develop the country in a more cooperative 
way (i. e. by recipient-donor and donor cooperation), rather than in accordance 
with a template (i. e. by each donors' design). Officer Sehe, in Ministry of 
Education, noted: 
`Every organisation has its way of reporting, its reporting format, 
sometime they give templates... When they come and support you, ok, 
you should report to them in some kind of format... Sometimes they force, 
they choose where to go.. They give you conditions. The priority of the 
country, the urgent need cannot be considered very well because of the 
conditions. They (donors) want to decide more and more. ' 
The government had very positive claims about JAST: 
As more development partners continue to show interest in the joint 
development approach, the impact of this cooperation has been felt 
across key sectors such as health and education, indicating the significant 
leverage that a well guided aid management system can have (Ministry of 
Finance of Tanzania). 74 
It has meant to bring together all Development Partners under a single 
strategic framework that guides their development assistance in line with 
74 Fieldwork data from Ministry of Finance of Tanzania. 
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the cluster-based and outcome-oriented NSGRP (or MKUKUTA in 
Kiswahili) and ZSGRP (or MKUZA in Kiswahili). It has also aimed to 
fully take into account the international aid effectiveness commitments 
made in Monterrey, Rome, Marrakech and Paris and to adopt them to the 
Tanzanian context. (JAST, 2006) 
The government needs help, of course, but there is the continuous problem of 
dealing with ownership and external aid. Under JAST, participants find a solution 
which can be also agreed by many donors (at least temporarily). JAST actually is 
making reforms on two relationships therefore: between donor and recipient, and 
between donors. The role of the recipient country is moving (at least ideally) from 
being aided, to organizing and cooperating the aid activities. It is as Maggie said, 
, they [DPs] are complementing the government's effort'. It also can be seen from 
this agreement, between some of the DPs and Tanzania government, that some 
DPs want to make changes to their previous management of aid flows and also 
reform the previous low effectiveness of aid, so as to not only give more 
ownership (or subjectivities) to recipient countries, but to cooperate as well. 
As Secretary Chen in the Chinese Embassy mentioned, sometimes the donors 
have competition among themselves. `For example, people from the Japanese 
embassy would like to know privately that how many scholarships we offered last 
year... ' Thus an agreement among the donors is also necessary to keep an open 
and harmonious aid situation. 
To create more dialogue, donors within DPG have monthly meetings to address 
policy issues with `more technical dialogue at sector and thematic areas with 
relevant sector ministries'. Consistent with the principle of government leadership, 
and in light of the proposed domestic dialogue structure, the DPG endeavours to 
align its own structure (i. e. sector or thematic sub-groups) to a corresponding 
government-led dialogue structure within the cluster structure of the MKUKUTA 
and MKUZA (JAST Action Plan, 2007). 
The practice of JAST on aid can be seen as one of the national strategies in the 
PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) era, which transferred from the 
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previous SAPs era. It is said that the donors are recognizing the importance of the 
ownership with the principles such as `country-driven', `result-oriented', and 
`partnership-oriented' (IMF, 2007). 
However, the implementation of JAST also brings some risks, including the 
political risk, fiduciary risk, as well as institutional and operational risk (JAST, 
2006). Therefore, whether the strategy can be maintained in a long run and can be 
realised fully with its aims, and especially avoid the pitfalls brought by SAPs, 
some still have their doubts. As critically indicated by Zack-Williams and Mohan 
(2005: 501): 
The essence of PRSPs is to give African Governments a say in the choice 
of policies and a move away from what has been described as the 
one-size-fits-all approach of SAPs. PRSPs are supposed to facilitate the 
engagement of civil society... It is increasingly doubtful if PRSPs carry the 
democratic mantle their proponents claim, since the neo-liberal rejection of 
any notion of a developmental state has left a political and economic 
vacuum, which can be filled only by Northern dominated NGOs, donors 
and the International Financial Institutions (IFI). 
2.3 JAST's implication for China: opportunity or obstruction? 
As introduced above, although not formally a member in the DPG, China is 
regularly a development partner providing support for development in Tanzania. 
We can see China in the following table which lists the Tanzanian government's 
aid predictability gaps. Although this is referring to the management of aid flows 
of Tanzania, we can extract from the table that they take China officially as a 
development partner, and estimate and manage Chinese aid. 
Table 6.2 Trends of projections and actual disbursement by countries for FY 
2002/03-2006/07 
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Source: External Finance Department of Tanzania (2008)75 
Therefore, what does JAST mean for China? Can China join together with other 
donors to fulfil the aims of JAST? 
Firstly as the table shown above shows, China's data is sufficient, and the data in 
2003/2004 is showing a large gap (also possible a typing mistake? ) between 
expectation and actual disbursement. However, given the unclear data, we can still 
see an increasing amount of budget from China. So within the framework of JAST, 
it is perhaps an opportunity for Tanzania to get an easier calculation of China's aid, 
within a simplified framework of donor-recipient relations. 
Secondly, under the JAST framework, there may be some possibilities for China 
increase collaboration with Western donors in accordance with the JAST aim: 
being harmonized with other development partners. As we know, the current 
situation does not show much cooperation between China and Western countries 
(although official people from Tanzanian ministry of education indicated in my 
interview that they were going to invite China to join their annual meeting with 
Western partners for education development, this hasn't happened yet), the future 
framework ma y improve a network among these donors which benefits both 
developing and developed countries. 
Thirdly, it may be helpful to China as a sort of building new aid architecture in the 
recipient country. Since China engaged actively from 2000 in Africa and practised 
differently from previous China-Africa socialistic relation, China may now play 
an impressive role and have more influence in the process of building a new aid 
reality. 
However, opportunities always have their obstructions. China's aid reality itself 
still has significant problems and ambiguities which are not shown clearly in the 
field work and literatures, and limited to Chinese publications. So China is also 
under more strict and systematic evaluation mechanism when it is entering the 
73 The data is from my interviewee Nancy in Tanzanian Ministry of Finance. 
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world of a group of donors. When China is showing its practical method of aid, it 
also under the examination from others: whether China is making aid actions 
more accurate and equal to the public and recipients. 
2.4 Educational sector of Tanzania 
Education is an important part of Tanzania's urgent needs and as this thesis is 
mainly concerned with aid practice in educational field. This section will briefly 
introduce the educational development with foreign aid in Tanzania. 
2.4.1 A brief history 
With Tanzania's national development at a low level, the education system is also 
struggling (Kuder, 2004: 31). The colonial history during which Tanzania was 
occupied by Germany and Britain brought colonial educational development. 
After World War I, Tanganyika was mandated to be a British protectorate, and the 
British government deliberately focussed educational provision at the primary 
level, aiming at mass education for rural development (Cameron and Dodd, 1970). 
The purpose was to impart literacy skills so that Africans could read bibles and 
hymnals. Once educated, Africans could then receive theological training so that 
they could take on the important work of conversion (ibid). `From a mission point 
of view, however, the most important function of the `school station' was to create 
an isolated haven of security that demonstrated and offered a complete, modern, 
Western way of life as a civilized Christian alternative to African ways' (Kuder, 
2004: 36). For example, once a German administration had been established in 
Tanganyika, missionaries actively worked to strengthen the `national colonial 
programme' and `to establish German culture and German thought in the colonies' 
(Mbilinyi, 1979: 77). 
According to Wedgwood (2005: 7), in the years immediately following 
independence in 1961, secondary education expansion continued to be prioritized. 
As she stated (ibid), 
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The new government desperately needed educated Tanzanians to take up 
jobs previously filled by Europeans. Education was seen as an instrument 
for modernisation, by providing high level manpower that would drive 
top-down development. With the support of the World Bank, Tanzania 
focused its resources on expanding both secondary and higher education, 
consciously eschewing the resolutions of the UNESCO conferences of 
Karachi (1960) and Addis Ababa (1961) which set a target for achieving 
UPE by 1980 (Samoff and Carrol, 2003: 9). In 1967 President Julius 
Nyerere made mass primary education a priority again through his 
version of socialism, as outlined in the Arusha Declaration. 76 
After 1967, guided by Nyerere's `Education for Self Reliance' (Nyerere, 1967a), 
Tanzania had a strong focus on primary education. At that time education was 
intended to equip Tanzanians with self reliance rather than as a preparation for 
further academic aims. This led to a weak post-primary education in the country, 
with some of the lowest secondary enrolment ratios in the world (Wedgwood, 
2005: 8). Post-primary education was intended to produce only enough graduates 
to supply the projected skilled manpower needs of the country. 
After the achievements in primary education during the 1970s to early 1980s, the 
situation in the education sector in Tanzania constantly declined both in terms of 
quality and enrolment. " In the mid-nineties, the condition of education was in a 
deep crisis. In 1995 the government of Tanzania decided to develop a new 
Education and Training Policy (ETP), in which the urgent need to improve the 
quality of, and to ensure access to, education was recognised. Following the ETP, 
the Education and Training Sector Development Programme (ESDP) as a strategy 
towards a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) to education development was initiated 
in 1997 and revised in 2001 (Basic Education Development Committee, 2006: 
4). 78 ESDP focused on basic education, was developed by the Ministry of 
76 The Arusha Declaration was made by Julius Nyerere on 5 February 1967, outlining the principles of 
Ujamaa (Nyerere's vision of socialism) to develop the nation's economy. The declaration called for an 
overhaul of the economic system, through African socialism and self-reliance in locally administered villages 
through a villagization program. 
" As shown by Wedgwood (2005: 7), 'the statistics for primary enrolment and adult literacy in the early 
eighties are very impressive; the gross enrolment ratio (GER) for 1980 was 98% and compared well with 
those of other Sub-Saharan countries'. 
78 Th e SWAp was mentioned in Chapter two. 
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Education and Culture together with other Ministries and institutions involved in 
education, as well as the bilateral and multilateral donors. 79 
In terms of the development of higher education, it can be seen from Wedgwood 
(2005: 8) the University of Dar es Slaam played an important role within this 
process. As she said, `higher education in Tanzania during the last century was 
predominantly provided by the University of Dar es Salaam. This was established 
as a college of the University of London in 1961, and it later became a part of the 
University of East Africa'. The development also slowed down since 1980s. `The 
80s and early 90s were a period of decline for the university with enrolments 
stagnating and spending per student falling dramatically' (ibid). 
Thus, within this educational development process, how did Tanzania deal with 
the external donors? And how did Tanzania develop education in the 21St century 
within the agenda by MDGs? The next section will explore issues of Western aid 
and the related projects. 
2.4.2 Western educational aid to Tanzania 
Development of Tanzania has often taken the form of joint intervention of the 
state and the external donors, particularly since 1970s. The total external 
assistance to Tanzania increased from 51 million USD in 1970 to around 700 
million USD in 1981. Within this amount Nordic countries provided an important 
share (Havnevik, 1993: 21). The bilateral co-operation in the educational field for 
Tanzania began in the early 1970s with a wide range of projects, such as Folk 
Development Colleges, Vocational Training Centres, volunteers, teacher training, 
and the importation of printers and paper for production of schoolbooks (Embassy 
of Sweden in Dar es Salaam, n. d. ). In 1970 under the national self-reliance policy 
context, Tanzania/ UNICEF/ UNESCO/ Primary Education Reform Project 
(Mpango wa Tanzania/ UNICEF/ UNESCO (MTUU)) was launched in order to 
reform primary education in accordance with the newly stipulated national 
79 See website of E mbassy of Sweden in Dar es Salaam, 
http: //www. swedenabroad. com/Page 10788. aspx 
The information in this paragraph was also offered by my interviewee Nancy in Tanzanian Ministry of 
Finance. 
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policies. The reform project was executed by the Tanzania government and 
combined the expertise of UNESCO with the financial, technical, professional and 
other assistance of UNICEF. MTUU and its pilot project `Kwamsisi' aimed at 
building schools in communities and an integration of school education and 
community life (Buchert, 1994: 130). However the community school 
experiments died out after 1975 due to `the lack of cooperative spirit in the village' 
(ibid: 131). In the 1980s educational development in Tanzania was influenced by 
the SAPs. Also according to Buchert (1994: 144), while there were some positive 
indications with respect to economic recovery during the 1980s, the impact of the 
recession and the SAPs on the social sectors and social equality, including equity 
in education, was negative. In the early 1990s, the aid programmes were narrowed 
down to focus on basic education in the areas of education materials, pre-service 
and in-service training of teachers, and training of tutors (Embassy of Sweden in 
Dar es Salaam, n. d. ). 
Today, when the latest EFA global monitoring report indicates that `donors are not 
on track to meet aid commitments for 2010' (UNESCO, 2011: 107), the aid 
situation in Tanzania is also not very optimistic. The table below is from the 
OECD International Development Statistics (IDS) databases which record 
information provided annually by all member countries of DAC, showing the 
ODA to Tanzania from 2007 to 2009 and the top ten donors of gross ODA in 
2008-2009. Another chart is the bilateral ODA by sector in the year 2008-2009 
and from the chart we can see the first one (the black one) is the sector of 
education which occupies about 5% of ODA. 
Table 6.3: Aid at a glance chart - Tanzania 
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Tanzania 
Receipts 2007 2008 2009 
Net ODA (USD million) 2 222 2 "1 2 -- 
Bilateral share (gross ODA) "'ý 
Net ODA ' GNI 1f S`ý 1t 2% 13. £% 
Net Private flows (USD million) - --- 122 1 SC 
For reference 2007 2008 2009 
Population (million) - 
Gtll per capita (Atlas USD) =1ý - 
Top Ten Donors of gross 
ODA (2008-09 average) (USD M) 
1 Ic A 
2 United States ý_. 
? United Kingdom 2M 
fDF 159 
EU Instduticrs 1E2 
16IF iS4F. ESA. F. PRGF 1E? 
7 Global Fund 1? 9 
8 Nor;. ay 122 
9 Genmark 11? 
1C S:. e. len I11 
IIIII 
i':.. 
Y ý_ý"" 3'J ::: _ 1 :"0: 7- : -: 3 Sil: 7]3 
0:: 7'" : -3tr. "_ 
O: __ ý_... __: _3":? 0ý'::: - i- 37 : ': _': ' 
Source: OECD, n. d. 
More details in the educational field can be seen from EFA global monitoring 
report 2011 (UNESCO, 2011: 358). According to the report these data are derived 
from Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of OECD's IDS. The CRS's aid activity 
data come from donors including the 22 member countries of the OECD's 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the European Commission and other 
international organisations (OECD, n. d. ). The table shows a declining trend of aid 
to education as well as aid to basic education in Tanzania. 
Table 6.4: Aid to education and aid to basic education in Tanzania 
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UNITED Total aid to Total aid to Direct aid to Direct aid to 
REPUBLIC education basic education basic 
OF education education80 
TANZANIA Constant 2008 US$ millions 
2002-2003 277 216 215 176 
annual 
average 
2007 259 121 146 61 
2008 204 93 110 34 
Source: UNESCO, 2011: 358 
After showing this overall picture of Western aid to education in Tanzania, it is 
necessary to look at the development of Western aid since 1990s more specifically, 
in order to see how donors changed their aid forms and mechanisms in Tanzania 
to improve aid performance and how Tanzania itself collaborated with it, and from 
which we may summarise some changing modalities and features of the Western 
aid. 
2.4.2.1 SWAp in Tanzania and PEDP 
In terms of SWAp, it emerged as a new modality of Western aid in 1995 when the 
traditional aid approach, in the form of self-contained projects by each donor, was 
being criticised for its donor driven nature and its consequences of fragmentation 
and duplication, and is now being developed in different sectors, including the 
educational sector. The aim of a SWAp is that donors within the same sector form 
a group and work together in the support of policies, strategies and plans for each 
sub-sector of a Ministry. This is instead of supporting isolated projects bilaterally, 
in order to make the donors promote greater local involvement, accountability and 
capacity in partner countries (DFID, 2006a). 8' Donors such as the World Bank, 
Canadian International Development Agency, Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency, British DFID, Danish DANIDA, Ireland Aid, and the 
8° As explained by the report, direct aid to education is the total of four subcategories: aid to basic, secondary 
and postsecondary education and `level unspecified'. Total aid to education = direct aid to education + 20% of 
general budget support. Total aid to basic education = direct aid to basic education + 10% of general budget 
support + 50% of `level unspecified' aid to education (UNESCO, 2011: 347). 
S' The information of SWAp is also offered by interviewee Nancy in Tanzanian Ministry of Finance. 
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Netherlands have all joined to integrate education support into the SWAp (Kuder, 
2004: 56). It was claimed that this produced a well functioning donor 
co-ordination based on the DAC principles for harmonization of procedures 
(Kuder, 2007: 39). The modality of having a SWAp, where GoT cooperates with a 
donor group instead of individual donors, was intended, in the long run, to 
considerably reduce transaction costs on both sides. As the World Health 
Organization states, `a SWAp calls for a partnership in which government and 
development agencies change their relationships (to clearer government 
leadership); They interact more together in the formulation of policy, and less on 
the details of its implementation'. 82 Howeve r, can SWAp turn the donor- recipient 
relationship towards a kind of `interaction' or `cooperation' within a 
`harmonisation'? Does this plan give the recipient country more ownership and 
more equalities within the aid relationship? Although it was said that 'SWAps 
typically have a joint review mechanism and performance monitoring system 
relying on the government's own performance assessment framework' (DFID, 
2006a), such a shift of donors' attention and influence on recipient countries' 
national policy formulation still have shortcomings from the recipients' 
perspectives, as Kuder (2004: 56) argued, 
It appears as though donors are replicating the state's central co-ordinating 
role, but on a global level, co-ordinating a global policy network across a 
range of developing countries. ... they 
[donors] are now limiting their 
influence to `getting the policy right' and withdrawing from 
implementation phases, delegating or contracting those responsibilities to 
sub-national actors... There are two problems with this approach. First, it 
automatically conflates donors with national governments in the central 
policy-coordination role - within country... Second, it overlooks the 
well-known capacity issues that prevail in developing countries whenever 
policy reaches the stages of implementation (Brinkerhoff, 1999). 
With SWAp in educational sector, one of the earliest achievements within the 
ESDP, was the Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP). Based on the EFA 
82 See World Health Organization website, http: //www. who. int/tradelglossary/story081/en/ 
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and MDGs' idea, to promote the access to quality education for all children, 
Tanzania in July 2001, launched the PEDP, which was financed jointly by the 
Government of Tanzania (GoT), the World Bank and other DPs. The Plan started 
in January 2002, was a five year plan, with the goals of `improving education 
quality at school level; improving retention and completion of the seven years of 
primary education cycle for all children; providing equitable access to all children, 
and building capacity at school, community, district and central government levels' 
(World Bank, n. d. ). 83 
However, `the process was delayed because the basket donors were not fully 
prepared to harmonise. Instead most of their conditions and monitoring 
instruments were added to each other, which would have increased rather than 
reduced the transaction costs for all' (Oden and Tinnes, 2003: 20). To consider a 
`harmonised' aid with less transaction costs, DPs and the government of Tanzania 
agreed on a mechanism for financial resource allocation, for the management of 
funds, and for the implementation of PEDP, which is detailed in a Memorandum 
of Understanding concerning `the Pooled Funding of PEDP' (as a Basket fund) in 
2003. International donors joining in the PEDP `pooled fund' included eight 
bilateral donors - Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the 
Netherlands, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Ireland, Finland, 
Belgium, France, and the European Union. By contrast, the British DFID is using 
another modality - `by providing direct budget support to the Ministry of Finance, 
it supports PRSP priority areas including basic education' (Yamada, 2005: 3)"84 
The pooled fund mechanism was aligned with the principles of JAST. Within this 
collaboration on PEDP, the World Bank's domination both in the formation of the 
PEDP and the SWAp generated critique among other aid agencies (Oden and 
Tinnes, 2003: 20). Another important contradiction is, while the Ministry of 
Finance strongly argues for budget support, the line ministries are more interested 
in sector basket funding and even project support (ibid: 18). 
83 See World Bank website, http: //go. worldbank. org/UIQOBYXKWO 84 In 2009-2010, UK bilateral aid spending in Tanzania was 143.6 million GBP, in which 18% was funded on 
education sector (DFID, 2010). 
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The `main harmonised aid arrangements' including SWAp for PEDP are 
summarised by Oden and Tinnes (2003: 19) in the table as below. 
Table 6.5 Main harmonised aid arrangements in Tanzania 
Arrangement Sector Participating donors 
Budget Support National (PRBS): Canada, Denmark, EU, 
budget Finland, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, UK, Switzerland. 
Co-ordination with World Bank 
PRSC. 
SWAp Health Denmark, Germany, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, World 
Bank (Norway until 2002). 
SWAp Primary (Pooled fund): Belgium, Canada, EU 
Education Commission, Ireland, Netherlands, 
(PEDP) Norway, Sweden. 
(Direct budget support), World Bank 
SWAp Local Denmark, EU, Finland, Ireland, 
Government Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Reform, UNDP, UK 
LGRP 
Emerging SWAp Agriculture Japan (lead), Denmark, EU, Ireland, 
World Bank. 
Sector working group exists. 
Programme draft being appraised. 
Earmarking or basket not yet decided. 
Sector Dev. Tax Admin. World Bank (lead), Denmark, EU, 
Programmes Programme Finland, GTZ, Sweden, UNDP, UK, 
USA. 
Sub-sector pools Public Updating in progress based on CFAA. 
between donors Finance World Bank, EU, UK, Sweden, 
Management Switzerland, Norway. 
Reform 
Legal Sector Canada (lead), Denmark, Finland, 
Quick Start Netherlands, Norway, Sweden 
Programme 
PER Basket Denmark, Norway, Sweden, UNDP, 
UNICEF 
Poverty Denmark, DFID, Japan, Norway, 
Monitoring Switzerland, UNDP, UNICEF, USAID 
System 
Independent UNDP (lead), UNICEF, Denmark, 
Monitoring Ireland, Finland, Germany, 
Group Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, 
Sweden, USA 
Diagnostic Work in Zanzibar UNDP (lead), World Bank. ADF, 
DFID, Sweden. 
Implementation Canada, Denmark, EU Commission, 
of Mwafaka agreement Finland Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, UK, UNDP. 
Source: Oden and Tinnes (2003: 19) 
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Under PEDP, Tanzania achieved positive progress in primary education: The GER 
and NER improved from 84% and 65.5% in 2001 to 112.7% and 96.1% in 2006 
respectively; the number of primary schools increased from 11,873 in 2001 to 
14,700 in 2006; the transition rate from primary to secondary school increased 
from 22.4% in 2001 to 49.3% in 2005, etc. (Basic Education Development 
Committee of Tanzania, 2006). 
2.4.2.2 PEDP 11 and the trend for GBS 
Following this, another five-year extension, PEDP II (2007-2011), continued to 
take primary education as its priorities, and aimed to strengthen linkages within 
basic education and the education sector in general (ibid, 2006: 1-2). It also 
focuses on enrolment, quality, capacities, as well as three extra focuses: 
cross-cutting issues (such as HIV and AIDS, environmental education and gender 
equality), educational research, educational monitoring and evaluation (Ministry 
of Education and Vocational Training of Tanzania, 2008: 5). The whole 
commitment is still around EFA, MDGs and UPE. The important transformation 
of PEDP II is a move of the funding modalities from Basket towards General 
Budget Support (GBS) which is what the State prefers. According to the 
government report, `contrary to PEDP I which was funded through a basket fund 
mechanism which came to an end in June 2006, PEDP II will be mainly funded 
through the National Budget' (ibid, 2006: 39). 
Donors work on GBS through the Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS), 
coordinated with the World Bank's Poverty Reduction Support Credits 
(PRSC). 85 The donors with PRBS can be seen in the above table by Oden 
and Tinnes (2003: 19), including Canada, Denmark, EU, Finland, Ireland, 
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK, and Switzerland. PRBS is a 
platform, in which 11 donors provide grant money and other support, such 
as policy suggestions. 
85 PRSC is a loan scheme of the World Bank, which is, in Tanzania, co-financed by Germany and African 
Development Bank (AfDB) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2006: 9). 
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Today, with these changes and reforms of donor activities and the improvements 
of their effectiveness, Tanzania itself is also increasingly putting education in an 
important position. Pursuing the MDGs within the PRSP agenda, Tanzania is one 
of the African countries making effort to fulfil the UN's aim of `poverty reduction' 
and UPE. As the World Bank shows, Tanzania has put education at the centre of 
its National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, known as MKUKUTA 
(2005-2010), with the aim of ensuring equitable access to quality primary and 
secondary education for boys and girls, universal literacy among women and men, 
and the expansion of higher, technical and vocation education (World Bank, 
n. d. ). 86 
As the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) reported: 87 
Tanzania is clearly on track to achieving the MDGs related to primary 
education, child mortality, gender equality, and access to improved sanitation, 
but is lagging behind in other MDGs (UNDP Tanzania, n. d. ). 
It is important to recognise that, Tanzania also had national strategies for 
secondary and adult education. These included according to Yamada (2005: 3), 
`another sub-sector program - the Secondary Education Development Program 
(SEDP) (2004-2009)'. The World Bank has been supported SEDP with US$124 
million credit and an IDA grant of US$24 million to support in 2004 (World Bank, 
2010: 4). The 2009 government report on SEDP still showed some positive 
progress in educational access, equity, quality, sex parity in secondary education 
in Tanzania (Ministry of Education and Vocational Training of Tanzania, 2010: 6). 
Followed the first phase, SEDP II (2010-2015) is the natural continuation of the 
previous one (ibid: 14). No clear donor list is contained in the SEDP II 
(2010-2015) report by the Tanzanian government, but just a short description of 
DPs' responsibilities (ibid: 50). Compared with the `satisfactory' evaluation to 
PEDP (World Bank, 2010: 29), the outcome of SEDP overall was rated as 
`moderately unsatisfactory' by the World Bank (ibid: 32). According to the 
government, `the secondary education has been able to triple enrolments in a span 
16 See htt p: //go. worldbank. org/U1QOBYXKWO 
87 See UNDP website, http: //www. tz. undp. org/mdgsý_progress. html 
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of four years, from 432,599 in 2004 to 1,466,402 in 2009', and `the number of 
secondary schools (both Government and Non Government) has also increased 
from 1,291 in 2004 to 4,102 in 2009' (Ministry of Education and Vocational 
Training of Tanzania, 2010: 17); however these increasing numbers also created 
`bigger constraint' on the quality of education (ibid: 18). 
Finally some key points can be summarised from above reviews, as follows: 
Firstly, while Tanzania has historically placed a greater emphasis on its primary 
education and got positive progress, the country also made efforts on secondary 
and higher education. However, the post-primary education still has much lower 
enrolment compared with primary sector: transition rate from primary to 
secondary education improved from 36.1% in 2004 to 51.6% in 2009 and the 
government set a target of 50% by 2010 (ibid, 2010: 7). 
Secondly, the efforts for educational achievements were made by both national 
ministries and international (bilateral and multilateral aid) partners/donors. Within 
a process of seeking aid harmonisation (among donors and between donors and 
GoT) and reduction of the transaction costs (increasing aid effectiveness) and 
replication of policies, the aid modalities of Western donors have been moving 
from project funding to basket funding, and more recently, towards the direct 
budget support. This is also under the principles of JAST. 
Thirdly, there are diverse donors in Tanzania, and they are mainly Western 
bilateral and multilateral donors. Although there are common trends in their aid 
modalities on general budget support, each donor has their own plans on aid 
strategy (for instance, when pooled fund was established, DFID had already 
started general budget). There is diversity even within the same modality in terms 
of the details of the conditionality and accountability (Ohno and Niiya, 2004: 4). 
Therefore, a harmonised commitment among donors with budget support is an 
important issue which potentially needs continuing progress (Oden and Tinnes, 
2003: 27). The dominant role of the World Bank also caused some critique in the 
donor group, however, the coordination between PRBS and PPSC perhaps can be 
a good example of harmonising of these instruments (Oden and Tinnes, 2003: 27; 
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DFID, 2006b). 
2.4.3 Contemporary need in education and an invitation for China 
With the country's effort and the external aid, progress is still necessary for 
reaching a quality education level for the whole nation. The country still faces 
difficulties in contemporary educational practice. What are the urgent needs of the 
country in the educational field, then? I asked the educational officials in the 
Tanzanian Ministry of education. At the moment, as Maggie and Sehe (Office of 
aid coordination, Ministry of Education) said, the urgent needs for education in 
Tanzania can be summarised in four points: 
`There are four priorities: First is the construction of teachers' 
houses/accommodations especially the rural areas. The houses are for 
both primary and secondary education. The second one is teaching 
materials especially the science and math and language books, for all 
levels. We also have to train science and language teachers (means 
teaching English). And the fourth is the scholarship for the students from 
poor families and those who have special needs. These scholarships are 
for both higher education and secondary education. ' 
The country is dealing with the external aid through both Ministry of Finance, 
which is accountable for financial issues and managing the money flow, and the 
Ministry of Education, which is coordinating with donors, discussing educational 
difficulties and situations, and looking for solutions. During the interview with 
Maggie and Sehe, they confirmed the jobs of the two ministries, and said that they 
were holding an `education review meeting' every year, with invited donors: 
`We have meetings with donors. All of the donors including NGOs are 
sitting together with us, then we talk about the educational development 
in Tanzania. But we are not dealing with financial things which are 
solved by the other sectors such as Ministry of Finance. So we never 
touch the money. We have the education sector review. The supporters 
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come and see what we are doing, and discuss and give suggestions to our 
performance in a year. It is open for them. ' 
`It is an open discussion. Sometimes professors from University of Dar es 
Salaam come and present to them. For example, this year we have two 
presentations on the meeting. The one is financing of education in 
Tanzania, related with foreign aid, and the other one is about quality of 
education, about how we achieving the MDGs. Professors from 
department of education, University of Dar es Salaam, will come and 
give the performance report. ' 
They mentioned both developed and developing countries as their donors. China 
is also invited to attend the yearly review meeting. 
`This review is held every year, with different partners. We wish Asian 
countries can come, such as Japan, China and India. We welcome them to 
come. They are supporting us a lot.... China is also one the supporters of 
the review. But they could not come last year, which made us very 
disappointed. So we will invite China again this year, and hope that they 
can come. Normally they come.... We do appreciate the support from 
other countries, and we really want to learn some experience in China. ' 
The comments by two official people in the Ministry of Education gives an idea 
that, firstly, they are dealing with donors worldwide in both the North and South; 
and secondly, they need help from the rising Asian countries including China, 
even if the main donors are still Western countries. They showed their sincerity by 
inviting countries such as China because these developing countries probably can 
give more practical developing experience. `We are sitting by one table... 
discussing our problems, and giving suggestions... ', as they said. So it is possible 
to predict, if actively present, that China could quickly become to be one of the 
members on this table and give advice and support to Tanzanian education 
development. However, on the other side, it is still a question as to whether China 
can sit and talk with other Western donors together on one table. `Probably 
because of the critics from West, China was afraid to come.. . Last year they 
did 
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not come, but this year we wish they can'... Even though Maggie made this like a 
joke, we still can read into some disharmony between the West and China on 
African issues. 
Overall, the history that Tanzania developed is also a history of changing relation 
between Tanzania and its external donors. The Western strategy of international 
aid to Tanzania is part of the global agenda of aid (as mentioned in Part One, from 
the time from Washington Consensus to the Post Washington Consensus and the 
PRSP) -a reflection of the traditional model of Western donor and recipient logic, 
to a reformed relationship with increased focus on the outcome and 
recipient-driven mechanism. For Tanzania, the current solution for overcoming 
previous foreign aid problems is their beloved JAST. However how many donors 
will go on to sign on JAST, and how will it affect the future, we still don't know 
the answer. On the other hand, China's influence on a table for donors is being felt. 
From the interview information we know that, from the Tanzanian government's 
perspective, China's experience of development and support on educational 
development are welcomed. It is also in Tanzania's interest that China can join in 
Tanzania education review meeting in the ministry, together with Western donors, 
to discuss foreign aid. However, we don't know if Chinese embassy will 
dispatch someone to attend. 
It can be seen that an overall trend that Tanzania is in reform on aid relation in this 
post- Washington Consensus era. At this time, can China bring a new atmosphere 
to Tanzania? A historical fact is that Chinese have been in Africa for many years, 
but how do Africans see China as donor? Although Chinese people are not new to 
Tanzania, and currently China is attractive for Tanzania, China is no longer in 
their previous socialism era with Tanzania. Let's firstly have a review of the 
China-Tanzania relation, and see a series of stories which may be different from 
the West-Tanzania relationships from past through to today. 
3. A distinctive historical link between China and Tanzania 
What we want to discuss next is the special relationship between China and 
Tanzania. Although Tanzania is only one case in a wide range of African countries, 
199 
the distinctive history between the two countries, and the influence of this 
historical tie, has given the contemporary China-Tanzania relationship a different 
view from the West. 
China began its relationship with Tanzania from 1961. China established 
diplomatic relations with Tanganyika and Zanzibar on December 9,1961 and 
December 11,1963 respectively; Tanganyika and Zanzibar were united and 
became Tanzania on April 26,1964, and China took the Union day as the date of 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United Republic 
of Tanzania (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 12/08/2010). We can see the 
relationship developed in the field of politics, economy and culture and education; 
the table below demonstrates that the political and economic relationship was far 
earlier than the educational link. 
Table 6.6 A brief historical review of political, economic and cultural/educational 
relation between China and Tanzania 
Political Economic Cultural and 
Educational 
1961- China established diplomatic Agreement of 
1963 relations with Tanganyika Cultural 
(09/12/1961) and Zanzibar Cooperation signed 
(11/12/1963) respectively between China and 
Tanganyika in 1962 
1964 China took the union day as Various assistance started China started to 
the date of the establishment from China to Tanzania gradually accept 
of diplomatic relations (railway, factories, etc. ); Tanzanian students 
between China and the China-Tanzanian joint in 60s 
United Republic of Tanzania; venture cooperation 
26/04/1964 started in the 1960s 
1964- Nyerere visited China five 
1985 times as President 
1964- A series of bilateral 
agreement were signed88 
88 According to the website of the embassy of China in Tanzania, from 1964, for example, the Agreement on 
Economic and Technical Cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the United Republic of 
Tanzania (June 1964); The Trade Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the United Republic 
of Tanzania (February 1965); The Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and 
the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Government of Republic of Zambia on the 
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1970- TAZARA railway 
1976 construction 
1971 At the 26th General 
Assembly of the UN, 
Tanzania was among the 
sponsoring countries of the 
resolution supporting the 
restoration of all China's 





1985- President All Hassan Mwinyi 
1995 continued to pursue a 
friendly policy towards 
China and visited China 
twice 
30/04/ Cultural Agreement 
1992 signed between the 
two Governments in 
Dodoma 
1995- President Benjamin William China Investment and 
2005 Mkapa visited China twice Trade Promotion Center 
and spoken highly of China's was established in 
assistance and its Tanzania in 1997 
independent foreign policy 
of peace and its experience 
on the reform and 
opening-up policy89 
2000- First FOCAC in October of Agreement on 
2003 
Construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (September 1967); The Barter Trade Protocol between the 
People's Republic of China and the United Republic of Tanzania (March 1984); The Agreement between the 
Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania on 
the Establishment of a Joint Economic and Trade Commission (August 1985); The Framework Agreement 
between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United Republic of 
Tanzania for the Provision of an Interest-Subsidized Preferential Credit by China to Tanzania (1996 and 1997) 
(Embassy of the PRC in the United Republic of Tanzania, 04/04/2008a). 
S9 In January 1998, China and Tanzania signed the Agreement between the Government of the PRC and the 
Government of the United Republic of Tanzania on the Establishment of Honorary Consulate by the United 
Republic of Tanzania in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China. 
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2000 and the second one was 
in December of 2003; 90 
the dialogue grows 
developing the 
cooperative project 
of higher education 
between two 
ministries of 
education in June 
2005- Chinese side offered 
2007 one hundred 
government full 
scholarships to 
Tanzania each year, 
while Tanzanian side 
offered China five 
government 
scholarships in 
2006, and four 
government 
scholarships in 2007 
As shown in the table, strengthened educational relationship between China and 
Tanzania started in the 90s and was built on the history of political and economic 
connections between the two countries. It is claimed by Chinese government that 
cultural and educational cooperation is key for strengthening the friendly bilateral 
relation between the two countries, and for making diverse forms of relations. 
What is making this relationship special, and what are the key factors during the 
history? Beside the South-South cooperation, which is different from the West 
(the Northern aid), we cannot avoid talking about a person, a railway, and an 
agreement in the following section. 
90 In October 2000, President Benjamin William Mkapa led a government delegation to participate in the 
2000 ministerial meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing, and made a speech at the 
opening ceremony. 
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4. Different from the West: from socialism friendship to agreement in the 
global era 
4.1 Nyerere's time and influence 
During interview work in Dar es Salaam, I always heard people mention the first 
president of the country, Julius Nyerere. Sometimes I could also see his picture in 
the city. We cannot say Nyerere made the country develop very well in the right 
direction, but we can feel that his idea of development and his personality 
influenced the country significantly. Mentioning him here is necessary because 
this president set a friendly relationship with China in Tanzanian history, and his 
influence contributed to the country's development. 
As the first President of Tanzania and previously Tanganyika, from the country's 
founding in 1964 until his retirement in 1985, Nyerere introduced a policy known 
as Ujamaa (meaning `familyhood'), and community-based farming collectives. 
BBC (14/10/1999) said: Ten years later, taking stock, President Nyerere issued a 
remarkably honest booklet which gave as much prominence to the failures as well 
as the successes (BBC news, 14/10/1999). 
As an `African Socialist', he established close relations with China. During his 
time as president he visited China five times, and another eight times from 
1987-1990 when he was the chairman of South Commission. 91 
During 1960s there was a rapid growth of the Tanzania-China relations, partly due 
to Nyerere's wish to reduce his country's dependence on British power and to 
adopt a more non-aligned position in world affairs. A brief review follows (Bailey, 
1975: 40-41): 
1962 Cultural agreement signed between China and Tanganyika; 
9' The South Commission was established in 1987. At the Non Aligned Summit Meeting held in Harare in 
September 1986, Dr. Mahatir Bin Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia, announced the intention to 
establish the Commission and also made known that Julius Nyerere, had accepted the invitation to be its 
Chairman. It is an intergovernmental organisation of developing countries established by an 
Intergovernmental Agreement which came into force on 31 July 1995 with its headquarters in Geneva. Until 
15 February, 2008, there were 50 developing countries which signed , ratified, or acceded to the Intergovernmental Agreement. The centre is working for promoting South solidarity, South-South cooperation 
and other mutual understandings (see South Centre website, 
http: //www. southcentre. org/index. php? option=com content&task=view&id=635&Itemid=80). 
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1964 Tanzanian Vice-President Kawawa and Babu visited Beijing, signed an 
agreement for 320 million Shs, of development aid; Tanzanian embassy was 
opened in Beijing in October; 
1965 Nyerere's first visit to China in February and impressed with the 
achievements the new China made; 
1966 A Chinese Economic and Commercial Mission opened in Dar es Salaam, as 
an evidence of the growing functional ties between the two countries; 
1967 Tanzania, Zambia and China signed in September on a tripartite agreement 
under which the Chinese undertook to finance and build the Tanzam Railway 
(TAZARA Railway), Chinese largest aid project in the Third World; 
1968 Nyerere's second visit to Beijing in June. 
This relation continued to grow during the 1970s, when Nyerere went to visit 
China and received a warm welcome in Beijing. Nyerere showed a keen interest 
in China's example, which offered an important alternative model of development 
to that which Africa inherited from the period of European colonialism. Therefore 
Tanzania learnt from China how to build a socialist society, especially with the 
focus on self-reliance and development of rural area (ibid: 41). 
On April 26,1965, Nyerere addressed Tanzanians on frugality. He said (Ndaskoi, 
2004): 
I learned one very important thing. China is a huge country, with a 
population of more than six hundred million people. And the Chinese 
Government is one of those which is making money and technicians 
available to Tanzania to help us with our addressed the nation in the 
Development Plan. But they are able to do this only because they are a 
frugal people; they husband their resources very carefully indeed, and 
only spend money on things which are absolutely essential. This is true 
both of individuals and of the Government. There are hardly any private 
cars in China; people go to work by bus or on bicycles. The Government 
officials too, use cars only when it is really necessary for their job-and 
then the cars are small and cheap ones. 
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It is always said in Chinese history that Nyerere and Chairman Mao had a good 
friendship as they were doing similar reforms in their countries, aimed at trying to 
speed up the social development in a socialism system. We can obtain some idea 
about how Nyerere considered China's power, and how Mao considered China's 
support to Tanzania, from the following dialogue between the two: (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 25/03/1974) 
Nyerere: If the Third World does not have China, they (the two super powers) 
will not be afraid of us. 
Mao: They will also be afraid. 
Nyerere: The Third world without China will be a `paper tiger'. 
Mao: We cannot say this. The solidarity of the Third World will let Japan, 
Europe and the two super powers pay more attention. 
Nyerere: China did a lot to help Africa. 
Mao: No, the help is very little.... What we should do, actually is to teach... 
to teach your doctors, and also to teach you how to build the railway and road, 
to do the construction... Thus when we leave, you can manage it by 
yourselves. If not, then our help is not good. 
Mao: I heard that some of my people did something wrong there? If you find 
any problem, please tell our ambassador. That is because we did not educate 
them very well when people getting more there. 
Nyerere: They did not complain with very poor working and living condition. 
It is a brief but rational talk between the two presidents. Although both of them 
did not succeeded in their social reforms, the talk about the South, about aid, and 
about China's role was understandable and meaningful. Mao did not show a 
powerful China, but emphasised the powerful South. He did not show a very 
`right' Chinese aid, but mentioned their fault during the aid practice. We also 
found that Mao knew that continuing development did not require Chinese 
assistant workers in Tanzania, but teaching, which meant providing education to 
help Tanzanians master the skills, and learn how to develop. 
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4.2 The TAZARA railway 
In Tanzania there are currently 40 Chinese companies carrying out labour contract 
businesses. According to figures released by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, 
in 2007 bilateral trade volume reached 794 million U. S. dollars, up 48.4% 
compared with 2006. Goods exported from China to Tanzania include food, 
vehicles, textiles, light industrial products, chemical products, goods China 
imported to Tanzania include dried seafood, raw leather, wood, and wood crafts, 
and blister copper (Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, 2008b). Within all of the 
Chinese projects in Tanzania, and even those in Africa more generally, the 
TAZARA railway is probably the most impressive until now. 
On the website of `A 30-Year History: Exhibition on China's Opening Up' 
(Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, 2008a), China reviewed the important 
progress in the past 30 years. When the web mentions the China-Tanzania 
relationship, the Tanzania-Zambia Railway is called `the China-Africa monument' 
(Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, 2008b), which shows an idea that the railway 
is not just represents the relations between the two countries, but China and the 
continent of Africa. 92 When the ambassador Liu met me in the Chinese embassy 
in Dar es Salaam, he firstly mentioned the railway: 
China has a good relation with Tanzania in history, as we know. Tanzania 
is the biggest recipient country in Africa from China. The TAZARA 
railway project probably will be the biggest one in the past and the future. 
In China-Africa history, China is not a new county for Tanzania. It started to 
provide Tanzania with aid projects in 1964, including the TAZARA Railway, 
Friendship Textile Factory, Mubuhrally Farm, Kivienay Coal Mine, Mahongda 
Sugar-refinery, iz Water-supply Project, and National Stadium (ibid). 
`TAZARA', the 1,860-kilometer-long Tanzania-Zambia Railway and known as 
`Freedom Railway' amongst local people, runs east from Dar es Salaam through 
92 The document is fro m the official website of `A 30-Year History: Exhibition on China's Opening Up'. This 
is an exhibition on China's opening up performance in the last 30 years, with thousands pictures, historic 
artefacts, and models. The content of the exhibition is shown on the website. 
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to New Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia. The Chinese government has provided tens of 
millions Yuan in an interest-free loan, and nearly 1 million tons of equipment and 
materials for building the railway. Large numbers of human resources also were 
dispatched for the railway construction. About 50,000 engineers and technicians 
were sent to Dar es Salaam, and 64 Chinese people lost their lives during their 
work in Tanzania (Embassy of the PRC in the United Republic of Tanzania, 
27/10/2009c). In Dar es Salaam, there is still a gravestone commemorating 69 
Chinese experts and workers who died in China's aid projects for Tanzanian 
national constructions. The youngest was only 24 years old when he died 
(Xinhuanet, 16/02/2009b). As the Chinese official documents said, the railway, as 
a milestone in the history of Sino-African relations, serves not only as an 
economic tie between Tanzania and Zambia, but also enhanced and enhances the 
friendship between China and Africa. 
However it was not a one-way contribution, as China eagerly needed support from 
developing countries at that time (also mentioned in Chapter four about China's 
changing relation with Africa). The railway was important for Tanzania and 
Zambia. According to Premier Zhou, `for Tanzania and Zambia, the railway is not 
just meaningful in economic development, but also in the field of politics and 
military. It should be built, by us, or by others' (He, Y., 2009). China took on the 
project, which was rejected by the Western donors such as the World Bank. On the 
other hand, Tanzania supported China on the international stage through China's 
`one China' issue. At the 26th General Assembly of the UN in 1971, Tanzania was 
among the sponsoring countries of the resolution supporting the restoration of all 
China's legitimate rights in the world body. This stands as a good example of 
China's win-win theory, as the railway was built to benefit the local development 
of the recipient country, and China got benefit in the long run- a good relationship, 
political support, and economic cooperation. 
Today, TAZARA is still mentioned frequently by the government in the media or 
during official speeches, and referred to as an impressive example of 
China-African friendship. As said by Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, 
when paying his tribute to the cemetery during a 1999 trip to the country: `The 
friendship between the two countries, fostered by the late Chinese leaders Mao 
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Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the late Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, and of 
course the railway workers, is indeed cemented with blood' (People's Daily, 
11/10/2000). 
4.3 The Cultural Agreement 
In terms of education, it is necessary to say something about the Cultural 
Agreement between the two countries. Many years ago an agreement, the 
Agreement of Cultural Cooperation, was reached between the Government of the 
Republic of Tanganyika and the Government of the People's Republic of China, 
and signed on December 13 in 1962 (Government of the Republic of Tanganyika 
and the Government of the PRC, 1992). But the increasing series of cooperation 
between the two countries has heightened during the last two decades. 
As the website of Chinese embassy in Tanzania introduces (and this was also 
confirmed by Secretary Chen when I did interview in the Embassy), the two 
countries, with a view to further promote the friendly relations and strengthening 
of exchanges and cooperation in the field of culture, and in accordance with the 
Cultural Agreement signed between the two Governments on April 30,1992 in 
Dodoma, have agreed on an implementing program (Embassy of the PRC in the 
United Republic of Tanzania, 04/07/2008b). Based on the agreement, a 
cooperative project on higher education between the Ministry of Education of 
PRC and the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education of Tanzania 
was signed in June of 2000. The Chinese side provided the Dar es Salaam Institute 
of Technology (DIT) with two micro-computer teachers and helped DIT to 
develop teaching and research in the field of micro-computers, and also trained 
lecturers and students on micro-computer knowledge so as to develop technology 
in Tanzania. During the years 2005 to 2007, the Chinese side offered one hundred 
full government scholarships to Tanzania each year. Tanzania offered China five 
government scholarships in 2006, and four government scholarships in 2007. The 
permanent secretary of Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology 
visited China in September 2007. Qingdao arts group attended the 10th Zanzibar 
International Film Festival (ZIFF) in June 2007, and a Tanzanian arts group 
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attended the 7th China International Folk Arts Festival in September (ibid). 
Bearing in mind the purpose and provisions of the 1962 agreement, the 1992 
Cultural Agreement has made an effort towards cultural cooperation between the 
two countries, this includes educational cooperation. The agreement declares, `the 
two Contracting Parties (PRC and the United Republic of Tanzania) agree, in 
accordance with the principles of equality and mutual benefit, to promote 
exchanges and cooperation between the two countries in the fields of culture, 
education, science, health, sports, publication, the press and broadcasting'. The 
agreement has set several articles to detail the cooperation in the different fields. 
For example, in the cultural field, there are some artists and writers exchanges 
between the two sides; in the sport field, there are some athletes, coaches and 
sports teams dispatches; in the field of science, there are some exchanges of visits 
and lectures tours by social scientists and relevant materials; and in the field of 
media, there are also cooperation in forms of the press, broadcasting, television, 
the cinema. Another part features important details. It is the Article 3 as follows: 
The two Contracting Parties agree to undertake the following program of 
exchange and cooperation in the field of education: 
(a) Exchange of visits and study and lecture tours by teachers, scholars 
and specialists; 
(b) Grant scholarship to each other's students according to needs and 
possibilities; 
(c) Facilitate the establishment of direct contacts and cooperation 
between institutions of higher learning of the two countries; 
(d) Encourage the exchanges of textbooks and other materials between 
the educational institutions of the two countries; 
(e) Encourage and facilitate the attendance by scholars or specialists of 
each other's country at international academic meetings held in the other 
country; 
(fl Encourage training of technicians (Government of the Republic of 
Tanganyika and the Government of the PRC, 1992). 
The Cultural Agreement is a key point here as the main approaches, such as 
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Chinese governmental scholarships for Tanzanian students and short term training, 
are all issued in this agreement. Secretary Chen in the Chinese embassy (the 
Cultural and educational counsellor) introduced more details under the Cultural 
Agreement, those of which will be introduced in the next chapter which discusses 
Chinese scholarships. As Chen said, the Cultural Agreement was for the two 
counties' cooperation and exchange in the cultural and educational field. For 
example, official scholarships were offered by the two sides to each other, 
although the numbers were unbalanced, given that the populations were not 
equal. 93 There were also some one-way extra scholarships for Tanzania after the 
2006 Beijing Summit, but Chen emphasised this was not included in the 100 
scholarships signed on Cultural Agreement. 
Named as an agreement, the most important thing is the form rather than the 
content it shows: a mutual engaging activity, an interaction between these two 
countries, rather than a donor-recipient relationship. China may want to express 
that an `agreement' means both parties have the possibility and ability to talk 
about deals and cooperative action. This can be felt in the confidence of Tanzanian 
officials when they discussed this. 
4.4 New world, new era 
With the history now past, can these people from both donor and recipient 
counties realise a difference between the past and the present? We notice that, it is 
different usage of the word `aid' on Chinese official websites. On the website of 
the embassy, they still use the word `assistance', but on the latest very big web 
exhibition of China's progress of 30 years since opening-up, the word `aid' has 
been used. Understanding this as a native Chinese, I think the word `aid' has more 
economic meaning, but `assistance' has more moral feeling of humanistic care, 
although they are the same words in Chinese: Yuan Zhu. Does this show us a sign 
that China is going to make a systematical change in its discourse and conceptions 
of foreign relations and in donor-recipient relations, a shift from the traditional 
political `brothers' logic replaced by the economic `win-win' logic? 
93 Scho larships will be talked in next chapter. 
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During the field work, when being asked about the relationship between the two 
countries, both the people giving aid or receiving aid all knew the history of the 
railway and about Nyerere's friendly attitude towards China. It was not just 
known by the donor side. However, people also knew that the time is changing 
and we are not stopping on the TAZARA time. 
During the interview in the Chinese embassy, ambassador Liu talked a lot about 
the historical transformation of China and Tanzania. What is interesting to me was 
not telling about the contributions China made for Tanzania or the deep friendship 
between them, but rather about the change, the difference (from the West) and the 
impact upon the two-sides (advantage and disadvantages). As the ambassador 
said: 
Tanzania is one of the early independent countries in Africa. It was close 
to China and Russia during the socialism period. At that time the country 
was against the West. With the end of Cold War and the wave of 
promoting democracy by the West, African countries actually got a lot of 
pressure at that time. Many African countries started to do reforms, 
including Tanzania. We cannot say it is good or bad. But from the 
position of Tanzanian people, they got more chances of foreign aid. There 
are more donors and financial support to them. 
He mentioned the situation of changing donors in Tanzania: 
China has a good relation with Tanzania in history, as we know. Tanzania 
is the biggest recipient country in Africa from China. The TAZARA 
railway project probably will be the biggest one in the past and the future. 
With the time going on, there are more and more bilateral aid to Tanzania. 
China has been their socialism brothers, their biggest supporter, but now 
it is not the only donor country, and far behind the Western countries. We 
give them aid worth 0.1 billion RMB every year. However, Bush came 
this February and gave 0.697 billion USD just by once. You can see the 
difference between us. 
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When asked about personal perception, Liu talked about his changing opinion 
towards Chinese aid and Western aid: 
Previously I thought the Western aid is not very good, because I thought 
Chinese aid is unconditional and self-giving. But my opinion is changing. 
For our aid project, the advantage is, we can control the whole process, 
such as building the national sport stadium or the hospital or the schools. 
Tanzanian does not have to control the money so we can use the budget 
very efficiently. We say we devote 0.1 billion, but the money is in 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce. We have our own construction team and 
we give Tanzanian the finished product. Normally our speed is incredible 
for Tanzanian. And on the other hand, compared with Western team, we 
have less labour cost. ... But we have some other problems. In very 
few 
cases, we built the things they did not need, and another problem is, how 
to maintain the product. For example, if we build a hospital for them, 
then do we also need to offer them the medical materials and even 
doctors? We then may be involved into more and more issues. So the 
Western donors may have realised the problem during the recent years, 
and started to give direct financial support. But China will still maintain 
this approach at the moment, and see if we can make it more scientific. 
The old `brothers' relation' will be instead by a new relation with more 
consideration of the market and mutual benefit. 
As Liu said, it is a new century and the Western countries have already been the 
main donors for Tanzania. It is perhaps good for the recipient country, as there 
more opportunities. And the Western countries have different approaches from 
China. The West changed their aid approach with more direct financial support to 
Tanzania, to let the country itself manage the money for their urgent needs, no 
matter if that money is spent on AIDS or primary education. All of these changes 
are giving Tanzania a new atmosphere and a global donor group. Liu said in the 
meeting with me that: 
Africa is developing in the new century and is attractive for the world. 
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China is also facing a time of `going out', and Africa obviously is a good 
choice. Beijing Summit has very good strategic plans in Africa.... Africa 
also need development, thus it is a win-win process. Win-win, actually it 
is a kind of mutual need under the new situation. ... After 2006, both 
Europe and America also put more interest on Africa. Europe even 
advised to build a triangle relation including Africa, China and Europe, 
seems excluding USA. It means all of us is getting more and more to 
view Africa as a hope. Some people say that the 21st century is Asian 
people's century, but I think it may also an African century. 
That is why China held the new FOCAC in the new century, setting new policy 
languages and adding new principles to Africa to make a transformation from a 
political friendship to a win-win one based on economic cooperation. It is a kind 
of integration into the global market by the two sides. When Africa can manage its 
development better, the mutual relationship can have more bidirectional flows and 
more production on both the spiritual (knowledge) and material level. 
5. Perceptions of China's motive/logic 
What, then, can we learn about China's changing motives in Tanzania from our 
field work? Firstly, although written in 1970s, some of the words of Bailey (1975: 
50) are still meaningful today, especially his quote of Nyerere's `unequal equals': 
Chinese aid, far from reducing the freedom of Tanzanian decision-makers 
to pursue their own foreign policy, has in fact increased their scope for 
manoeuvre in the international arena. Chinese material backing, both for 
aid projects and the armed forces, has provided the necessary support 
over issues such as the Southern African liberation struggle, and the most 
important example of this aid is the Tanzara Railway which plays a vital 
role in Africa's search for political and economic independence. The 
growing relationship between Tanzania and China is, as Nyerere once 
explained, a `friendship between most unequal equals'. 
We can see that, the relationship between China and Tanzania appeared to be very 
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one-sided. Even today, the cooperation in education is mainly China offering 
scholarships to Tanzania, while much less are offered from Tanzania to China. 
What are the motives behind China's active support of Tanzania while they are 
insisting on a win-win relation? 
In fact, except for the official people, most of the other interviewees are not 
interested in discussing this. For them it is politics, and some student recipients 
simply told me they did not understand these things. Some of the institutional 
leaders showed me that they would care about the real practice- i. e. how much 
support the donors can give- rather than what they are really thinking about. The 
ones who discussed this more or less expressed the similar idea that the 
China-Africa relationship is about what you give and I give. We will have more 
discussion in the next chapter when talk about the historical influence. 
Here, it is prudent to look at Ambassador Liu's words, when he talked about the 
reason of giving aid to Tanzania. Liu mentioned the importance of the country: 
Tanzania has relatively stable society and abundant natural resource. 
The country has never had a very big civil war or social movement. Dar 
es Salaam is an important port. The country has a good investment 
environment in Africa. The geographical condition and the political 
condition are all good for invest. So it is attractive for us. And the 
country can use the aid resource properly, compared with other 
countries. It is developing, and we can see some hope of it, just like 
China's situation during 70s to 80s. If they can maintain this level of 
development, it may take ten years to get to a better condition. 
Tanzanian officials in the Ministry of Education were more likely to tell me what 
they need, rather than what they think China wants. When asked about the 
motives of China, one of the officials responded that it was just about doing 
practical things for Tanzanians. She said: 
I will say that it is based on the friendship. Because looking into history, 
the number is increasing. It is looking what Tanzania needs at present. 
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From last year, we got postgraduate scholarships from China... It is 
unlike three years ago when we only mainly had undergraduate 
scholarships from China. Many students can study in China when we 
have very limited postgraduate students. It can solve very practical 
problem in Tanzania, what we need. (Kim) 
It is interesting that one of the returning students, now as an official working at 
the technical office in the Ministry of Education, noted his opinion towards this 
`politics': 
Those are politics. It is cooperation... I get something from you, and you 
get some from me... (Win-win) Yes win-win. (John)94 
Of course, in quite different vein from the positive words towards China found in 
Tanzanian fieldwork, in the academic world there are quite a few African 
perspectives which worry about what China will bring, for instance the 
environmental problem (Lemos and Ribeiro, 2007: 63), and whether the relation 
really will be a win-win one (Karumbidza, 2007: 87). However, we noticed that 
most of the opinions, both in the field and on paper, were aware that China was 
opening a new page and would bring new atmosphere into Africa. 
Conclusion 
Above all, from my perception to interviewees' recognition, from historical 
introduction to field study of current viewpoints, we had an exploration into 
Tanzania. As we mentioned already, this is China's biggest recipient country in 
Africa, and we chose it for both historical and practical reasons. In this chapter, 
we were trying to see the distinctive China-Tanzania relation and its contemporary 
situation. 
Some points can be summarised: 
(1) The Western aid, including educational aid, has been in Tanzania since the end 
94 Some of his understandings about the West will be shown in the next chapter, when we discuss the 
historical roots of these returning students' perceptions. 
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of colonial times. However, within the changing global discourse and agendas on 
international aid (as shown in Chapter Two), the aid performance didn't bring an 
optimistic situation for Tanzanian education. Efforts were made by donors and the 
Tanzanian government to make reforms on the framework of the aid 
administration: from previous separate donor-recipient relations, to a donor group- 
recipient relation. It is claimed to be the beginning for more Tanzanian ownership 
and better management of aid resources. 
(2) As a non-colonising nation, China has a different history with Tanzania from 
the West. Although time has passed, the Nyerere-Mao friendship is still 
recognised by many Tanzanians, especially the elders. The TAZARA railway is 
still used and well talked about by local people, and is known as the biggest 
project China had in Africa. The workers who died in the construction for 
Tanzanian national development are buried in Tanzania and still honoured by 
Chinese officials. It can be seen that these memories can help China and Chinese 
keep a good image in and a close feeling to, Tanzania. 
(3) However, today China is no longer a big donor in Tanzania. How does China 
stay in Africa together with (or even cooperate with) the Western donors, and how 
is China perceived in the new era? China nowadays is engaging in Africa with its 
new version of aid and cooperation (as introduced in Chapter 4), including 
practice in Tanzania (with China's Cultural Agreement). The Chinese officials also 
showed their recognition of the changing time - the situation of staying in 
Tanzania with many big Western donors with more consideration on economic 
growth. On another hand Tanzania, as a recipient country, realises ownership's 
importance and is willing to make an effort on solving its urgent needs by itself 
and with the support from a group of donors, no matter if those countries are 
developing or developed. 
(4) Tanzanian stories may not represent the whole situation of China's action and 
logic in Africa. But the Tanzanian case can represent that this is an era with 
critical thinking and reformed ideas regarding the orthodox West-oriented aid. On 
this point China, with its win-win logic, can easily be seen as one of the 
alternative solutions for the low performance of Western aid. Meanwhile, China is 
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clear with its new position in Africa and recognises the competition and 
cooperation with the Western donors. 
Finally, we may not say we have examined the `real world' as an ethnographer. 
The people we interviewed were mainly officials and Tanzanians who had proper 
education and jobs. So we did not grasp whether the poorer Tanzanians could take 
advantage of these aid opportunities. Thus, in the following chapters we plan to 
explore the main practice of China in more detail, and find out how people talk 
about, i. e. mainly on the higher and vocational education level. 
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Chapter Seven Donor logic in action: a focus on higher 
education ---- Translating policy words into practice 
Introduction 
There are two levels of recognition of donor logic in this study: the 
theoretical/historical recognition, and the practice recognition. The latter one we 
examine from the field work in Tanzania and China. Yet sometimes the practice 
may not be recognised very well as it is stated in theory, and sometimes the 
practice can be recognised as the policy through someone's translation. Here, 
`donor logic in action' means, in the following two chapters, that we are 
examining the donors' practice on the ground, and analysing the inner logic 
behind these actions we have directly heard and seen, and finally, seeing whether 
the logic in these theories can be recognised in action. 
In chapters 2-5, we reviewed the changing discourse, aid mechanisms and 
dynamics of the West and China. We also compared the discourse of policies as 
well as the related different aims and social relations between the West and China. 
We reviewed how China changed its policy in Africa, and how it engaged in 
Africa in the new century since the FOCAC. All of the conclusions and theories 
found in these chapters are donor logic in words, or on paper. So in the field work, 
we plan to see how it is practised and perceived (e. g. as donors claimed? as 
recipients expected? as different as we supposed? etc. ). 
In the last chapter, after looking at China-Tanzania relations and their historical 
links, we saw historical differences between the West and China. These 
differences, and the contemporary situation, were recognised by Chinese officials, 
and the Chinese historical link also recognised by Tanzanian people. Now we 
want to know more about China's general educational practice in Africa today. So 
the next two chapters are about the main action China is performing for African 
countries to give them educational support. As the study could only take one 
African country for fieldwork, the next chapters include the analysis results of 
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fieldwork conducted in three cities in China, especially in Chinese universities 
Through the field interviews, we get more confirmation that the main support 
approach from China to Tanzania is at the higher educational level, mainly taking 
the form of scholarships, short term training and culture exchange. There are also 
some other forms, such as teacher and volunteer dispatch, which also feature 
`Chinese characters'. China does not give much direct financial support, just some 
donations of teaching materials. This chapter anal yses the empirical work on 
student scholarships based on a series of field work conducted in Tanzania. It 
comprises three parts. 
The first part is an overview of China's current educational aid to Tanzania related 
to FOCAC pledges. This is mainly presented in a table, in order to give an idea of 
the total aid approaches FOCAC promised, and within these aid practice how 
much we could find in Tanzania, and how much I discovered in the fieldwork. 
Following the overview framework we start to look at the general mechanism of 
the most important Chinese aid approach - government scholarship. The data here 
are mainly obtained from interviews with Chinese and Tanzanian officials. The 
interview results show how the Chinese secretary in the embassy is translating 
policy words into practice. Without this translation, action carried out by the 
Chinese government may not be recognised as such by me (and by other people). 
The Chinese embassy and a department in the Tanzanian Ministry of Education 
which is working for student scholarships work closely to implement China's 
action of scholarship offered to Tanzania. It can be seen that training students with 
university degrees in China (rather than teaching in Africa) is the most important 
route taken by China. Particularly, the Chinese government tries to demonstrate 
two-way cooperation through a `student exchange' agreement, broadly located 
under their Cultural Agreement. 
The third part is a case study at the Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology (DIT). 
Through a review of DIT's establishment and history, we can trace the close 
historical relationship between this institute and China. Under the agreement 
between the Chinese embassy and DIT, China currently dispatches teachers 
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regularly to DIT and also trains DIT lecturers in China with Chinese governmental 
scholarships. Compared with only two Chinese computer teachers in DIT, the 
scholarships seem to have more influence. A number of returning students are 
teaching in DIT with their masters and PhD degrees obtained in China. The 
interview with the DIT principal shows his positive attitude towards China's 
support, but also his scepticism about real `win-win' situation, as well as his 
concerns about a continuing human capacity growth in DIT, even in Tanzania. 
In the fourth part, we look at the perception of study in China from returning 
students who are now working in the DIT, in government, and in companies in 
Tanzania. These returning students, in a group interview, revealed their experience 
in China and issued some critical points regarding Chinese higher education for 
foreign students. There are some main conclusions to be drawn from their opinion: 
the double-edged feeling about degree length, funding amount, teaching quality 
and communication; the difference in the responses of younger generations and 
the older ones, on their feelings towards China; and the historical influence on the 
understanding of East and West. Although these ideas may not be generalised 
given the small sample, the words from these returning students shows us the gap 
between the past and present, the gap between what China wants to offer and what 
students want to have, and the gap between what individuals feel and what the 
researchers describe. 
In this structure, we can see both what official people propose and discuss, and 
also how people who benefited from this feel and perceive it. We also can see how 
an institutional leader understands this approach (the interview with DIT 
principal). From diverse perspectives, we will have an understanding about how 
and why this approach is acceptable, what advantages or disadvantages it has, as 
well as how people perceive it compared to the Western way. 
1. Overview of China-Tanzania educational practice under the FOCAC 
pledges 
The table below shows the general situation of China-Africa educational 
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cooperation and the overall practice or plan in Tanzania, as well as the practice 
particularly investigated in my fieldwork. The general aid approaches by China in 
Africa, as summarised from both documentary resources and my fieldwork data, 
include (1) government scholarship, (2) short-term training, (3) cultural exchanges, 
(4) Confucius Institute, (5) school building and donation, (6) teacher secondment, 
and (7) university cooperation. 
Chinese government does not provide details of the financial commitment or 
amounts it promised to African countries on each of these approaches. This 
unclarity may be for three reasons. Firstly, as we will show below, China's aid 
does not come in the form of cash, or cost calculable projects. The dominant aid 
modality is scholarships and no figures are available on the cost of each 
scholarship, for instance, university income for overseas scholars. In effect, only 
the cost of building is easily obtainable, and this is shown in the table below. The 
second reason is the more general one that Chinese aid delivery channels are 
fragmented across several government ministries or institutions. The main 
authority is the Ministry of Commerce, but various other governmental bodies 
such as the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of 
National Defence, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Chinese 
Embassies, and the State Council are involved in the decision making process 
(Pehnelt, 2007: 2; Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, 2009: 19). Thirdly, 
according to Pehnelt (2007: 2), as well as the problem of fragmentation, analyzing 
the size and quality of China's aid program is not a trivial task because of a 
fundamental lack of transparency. 
In the educational field, aid and cooperation plans are always carried out by 
Ministry of Education and Ministry of Commerce, in accordance with Chinese 
Embassies and authorised Chinese universities. The amount budgeted for 
China-Africa cooperation on higher education and research programmes since 
1995, is 10 million RMB (about 1.53 million USD) budget, within which 
60%-70% is for staff and 30%-40% for teaching facilities (PKUCAS, 2005: 28). 
The FOCAC pledges showed the numbers of the commitments, for instance, 
scholarships and schools that China promises (which can be seen in the following 
table) but not the financial statistics. In terms of scholarships, figures recently 
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published by the China Daily show that China increased the total finance of 
government scholarships to 6.5 billion RMB in 2010 (about 0.99 billion USD) 
which includes the finance for African students (China Daily, 01/02/2010). 
Summing the living cost component (the only cash delivered to students) of each 
scholarship enables us to make a rough calculation of the level of investment 
involved. The allocations are 1,400 RMB for undergraduate students monthly, 
1,700 RMB for master students monthly, and 2,000 RMB for PhD students 
monthly (ibid). This adds up to about 72,000 RMB (about 11,076 USD) for the 
living cost of a PhD study and 61,200 RMB (about 9,415 USD) for a Master study 
(both are 36 months) in China. 95 More specifically, as we see in the Table below, 
China planned to allocate 72 scholarships to Tanzanian students in 2011. If we 
assume that the average cost of these may be close to the cost of the Masters 
support, 1,700 RMB monthly, that adds up to a total of around 1,468,800 RMB 
(about 225,969 USD) per year for scholarship support to Tanzania. 
During my fieldwork, Tanzanian officials showed their increasing interest in 
Chinese government scholarships, although as I discovered, the Chinese Embassy 
also made some donation to Mkapa School, and the principal of DUCE also 
joined into short-term training. Apart from the scholarships offered by diverse 
Chinese universities, one-to-one university cooperation plays an important part in 
enlarging China-Tanzania cooperation, and Tanzanian DIT has a long history with 
Xi'an Jiao Tong University. The practice that happened after my fieldwork also 
shows a trend of strengthened university cooperation between China and Africa, 
especially with the involvement of top Chinese university ECNU (collaborating 
with University of Dar es Salaam, under the 20+20 Plan). 
Table 7.1 China's current educational aid to Tanzania related to FOCAC pledges 
Aid General situation Tanzanian situation My fieldwork 
approaches (FOCAC pledges) 
Government Achieved 4,000 by 2009 Main approach, keep In Tanzania, 
scholarship (doubling the number of 100 Tanzanian students officials from both 
2006) and aim to 5,500 in China every year of Chinese 
95 T he tuition fee, accommodation fee and some travel grants are paid by Chinese government. The cash in 
the above calculation are given to students for living and study. 
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by 2012 (FOCAC, 2009c) 
to African countries; The 
number of scholarship 
recipients increased by 
700 year-on-year both in 
2007 and 2008 and by 
600 in 2009 (ibid) 
Short-term 
training 
Annual training for 
educational officials as 
well as heads and leading 
teachers of universities, 
primary, secondary and 
vocational schools in 
Africa (FOCAC, 2006b)96 
under `Cultural 
Agreement' and some 
extra numbers as a 
`follow up of FOCAC 
2006'(Embassy of the 
PRC in the United 
republic of Tanzania, 
2009a); Chinese 
universities and colleges 
will enrol 72 Tanzanian 
students for bachelor, 
master and doctor 
degrees in 2011 
(Xinhuanet, 2011) 
Not showed specifically 












and its procedure 








experience in a 
workshop in 
China; In China, 
ZJNU lecturers 







The FOCAC pledges 
included `to promote 
cultural exchanges' 
(FOCAC, 2006b; 2009b); 
and planned to hold the 
FOCAC Culture Forum in 
Cultural Agreement 
between China and 
Tanzania (the 
implementation 
programme has been 
signed every four years; 
The principal and 
secretary of 
Mkapa School 
showed me the 
room and donated 
books of Chinese 
96 It was added in the 2009 Action Plan that, there would be 200 middle and high level African administrative 
personnel on MPA programs in China in three years; China would help African countries train teachers for 
primary, secondary and vocational schools and train 1,500 school headmasters and teachers over the next 
three years (FOCAC, 2009b). 
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future in 2009 Action 
Plan 
latest one is for 
2009-2012); Mkapa 
Cultural Centre has been 
reported frequently on 
Chinese media 
Culture Centre 
Confucius Increase the number of Planned but not yet built In DUCE, it was 
Institute scholarships offered to in Tanzania; Nanjing confirmed by the 
Chinese language University of principal that a CI 
teachers to help them Information Science & plan was in the 
study in China, and Technology (2009) draft stage 
double efforts to raise indicated the prospect of between DUCE 
capacity of local African establishing Cl in and Chinese 
teachers to teach the University of Dar es Embassy but not 
Chinese language Salaam in 2009" established yet98 
(FOCAC, 2009b); Up to 
October 2010, there were 
21 CIs in 16 African 
countries, and 5 
Confucius Classrooms in 
5 African countries 
(Hanban, 2010b) 
School Already set up 96 rural Mkapa High School- The principal of 
building and schools by 2009 computers, piano and Mkapa School 
donation (FOCAC, 2009c); 99 aim books donated by talked about 
to build 50 China-Africa China; Msoga Primary donation from 
friendship schools by School - the first China 
2012 (FOCAC, 2009b) China-aided primary 
school hailed in 
Tanzania in January 
2011 with total cost of 
5 million RMB (about 
97 According to Nanjing University of Information & Technology (31/12/2009), the Secretary of the 
university signed the Memorandum of Understanding with vice-chancellor of University of Dar es Salaam, 
Mukandala, on 14`s December of 2009. The two sides showed the interest on building Cl. Chinese 
ambassador Liu Xinsheng also encouraged the university to enter into Tanzania and establish Cl. 9' This Cl should be as same as the one mentioned by Nanjing University of Information & Technology 
(ibid). DUCE is a constituent college of the University of Dar es Salaam. 
99 The aim was to build 100 rural schools in Africa (Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009) (FOCAC, 2006b)). Up 
to November 2009, according to FOCAC's (2009c) `Implementation of the Follow-up Actions of the Beijing 
Summit', the teaching equipment for the 30 schools have been delivered and the construction of 91 out of the 
96 schools has started, of which 66 have been completed. Construction of the remaining five will start by the 






Mentioned in the book of 
China-Africa Educational 
Cooperation but not as a 
main approach in FOCAC 
policies 
The `20+20 Cooperation 
Plan for Chinese and 
African Institutions of 
Higher Education' to 




between 20 Chinese 
universities (or vocational 
colleges) and 20 African 
universities (or vocational 
colleges) (FOCAC, 
2009b); '°' 
Two MPA (master of 
public administration) 
programs for developing 




Chinese side provides 
DIT with two 
micro-computer 
teachers (Embassy of 
the PRC in United 
Republic of Tanzania, 
2008a) 
Agreement on the 
cooperative project of 
higher education 
between the Ministry of 
Education of PRC and 
the Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Higher 
Education of Tanzania 
was signed in June, 
2000. (Embassy of the 
PRC in the United 
Republic of Tanzania, 
2008b); University of 
Dar es Salaam signed 




The principal of 
DIT talked about 4 
previous Chinese 
experts dispatched 
to DIT, and 2 
current Chinese 
teachers teaching 
in the institute (but 





spoke about the 
collaborative 
project with Xi'an 
Jiao Tong 





10° According to Xinhuanet (18/01/2011), the school was constructed by the Beijing Construction 
Engineering Group Co. Ltd. Msoga Primary School is one of the three primary schools China promised to 
build in Tanzania under the action plan of the Beijing Summit. 
101 It was also emphasised in 2009 Action Plan that `the two sides proposed to implement a China-Africa 
joint research and exchange plan to strengthen cooperation and exchanges between scholars and think tanks 
of the two sides through a variety of ways, such as seminars, mutual academic visits, and joint research 
projects. ' (FOCAC, 2009b) 
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University and Tsinghua December 2009; East 
University with the China Normal 
participation of 42 University (ECNU) 
students from 16 African signed cooperation 
countries in 2009 MoU with 3 Tanzanian 
universities: Nelson 





Research Institute and 
University of Dar es 
Salaam in March 2010 
(ECNU, 05/03/2010); 
ECNU and University 
of Dar es Salaam built 
one-to-one cooperation 
under 20+20 plan 
(Xinhuanet, 28/06/2010) 
It can be seen from the above table that, China is trying to achieve its declared 
aims on FOCAC in Tanzania. However, what about Tanzanian people's perception 
of these in practice, and how do official people in Chinese Embassy talk about 
them? Therefore, this and the next chapter will explore those `Chinese actions' in 
Tanzania, mainly based on my fieldwork data. The Chinese government 
scholarship, as introduced in Part One, has a long history in the educational 
cooperation between China and Africa. Also as shown in the table, this approach 
has been promised by China in FOCAC with increasing numbers, and the 2006 
Beijing Summit promise also was achieved by 2009. The scholarship approach 
was mentioned often by my interviewees in Tanzania. It is an important modality 
of Chinese educational aid, perhaps the most important one. The exploration of 
the situation of Chinese government scholarship in Tanzania starts from enquiries 
at the Chinese embassy, as the embassies play a key role in China's foreign aid 
policy. They are the main channel of providing aid - embassy staffs negotiate with 
recipient governments, define the specific requirements, and frequently implement 
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the projects (Pehnelt, 2007: 2). It is meaningful to look at what people in embassy 
say and what practice they are planning in the recipient country. 
2. General situation of Chinese government scholarship: A translation of 
rhetoric into practice 
Just as the beginning of this chapter's introduction, sometimes the practice may be 
recognised as the policy through someone's translation. Can these rhetoric of 
policy, or of theory, be put into practice (i. e. from policy discourse to reality), and 
can Tanzanian people recognize those Chinese aid theories/logics? The job the 
Chinese embassy is doing, with the collaboration of the Tanzanian Ministry of 
Education, is about translating the rhetoric into practice. In this part, we can listen 
to what they claim and explain about China's `win-win' theory in the educational 
(especially higher educational) field, taking the form of student scholarship. 
Both of the officials from the Chinese embassy and Tanzanian ministry discussed 
the general situation of the two sides' policy and practice. Both of them talked 
about student scholarships and gave a similar illustration. It seems official people 
from the two sides have made a clear agreement about educational cooperation. 
According to the information both from Secretary Chen of Chinese embassy in 
Tanzania and the documents, in a difference from the Western countries' focus 
mainly on primary education, China is giving its support to the higher education 
level. I asked Chen the reason and the advantage of this HE focus. He said, 
Indeed we did much less on the level of primary education, but mainly on 
higher education. This can be seen as a kind of the Chinese 
distinctiveness. It is practical and pragmatic for both of us. We are 
approaching this way also because we are good at this. We want to use 
our strong points. For Tanzania, they also need development on higher 
education, and need human resource with high skills and management 
abilities. Tanzania is starting to devote more and more on education and 
the human recourse with higher quality. 
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I got an idea from the interview with Chinese embassy officials that the 
scholarship mechanism contains two parts: one is `under' the Cultural Agreement 
between Tanzania and China, which, as the policy says, is a two way student 
exchange with 100 Chinese governmental scholarship and a small number 
Tanzanian governmental scholarships every year; and another part, added after the 
Beijing Summit, which is more flexible and `outside' of the Cultural Agreement, 
promising that China can give extra scholarship opportunities. We can see this in 
the following talk by Secretary Chen. 
In the Chinese embassy, I was told that the situation of bilateral cooperation in the 
field of education is changing year by year, and especially after the Beijing 
Summit, during which the relationship got closer. Therefore Secretary Chen 
answered questions about the latest progress and the latest agreement: 
China at the moment thinks a lot about the educational 
intercommunication. For example in Tanzania, in the field of Chinese 
educational aid, China and Tanzania have a Cultural Agreement which is 
a main framework. Under this framework, the two countries sign details 
every three years and carry out the plans, for instance, from 2005 to 2007, 
and from 2008 to 2010. With the development of the world's and two 
countries' situation, the two countries can enrich the agreement gradually. 
Under the agreement, we give `100' scholarships to Tanzania every year. 
However it means, if we offer 100, then next year there are 60 graduated 
from Chinese universities, thus we will add 60 more into Chinese 
universities. So we maintain 100 students studying in China every year. 
The Chinese government will pay their tuition fee, living fee and 
accommodation fee, as well as the ticket back to Tanzania. 
There are over 200 universities accepting African students with this 
Chinese government scholarship. These universities are in the different 
cities, for instance, Shandong University, Zhongnan University, 
University of International Business and Economics, China University of 
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Geosciences, Wuhan University of Technology. The subjects include 
agriculture, information industry, electronic communication, computer 
science, management, economic, environment, geology, animal, life 
science and so on, within a large range. 
Similarly, Kim, from Tanzanian Ministry of Education said: 
That is in the Cultural Agreement between two countries. In that 
agreement, China will train 100 students a year, normally in the science 
fields. We are given the number. The subjects are given by the country's 
need. Engineering, agriculture, medicine, management, business, and a 
few social science are provided. Sometimes there are workshops and 
seminars in China, maybe traditional medicine, ICT, educational 
administrate, agriculture, for 3-4 weeks. It is a long history. I cannot 
remember when it started. Just after independence there were already 
some students went to China for medicine, I think. 
Chen mentioned especially that the educational aid from China is focusing on the 
higher level of university education: 
Those scholarships include undergraduate students, master and Ph. D 
students, in different levels. That is the character of Chinese educational 
support. Chinese government always insists to train more students in the 
higher education field, especially the post-graduate students. 
Besides the 100 student scholarships under the Culture Agreement, there are also 
some other chances for Tanzanian students, as Chen introduced: 
The other part of the scholarship has been decided after Beijing Summit. 
It is called Chinese one-side scholarship. This scholarship is more 
flexible in the number, and it is only one way. The Cultural Agreement 
emphasises the exchange, so under the agreement we offer 100 and 
Tanzania also offer 5 student scholarship every year. There are 30 
one-side scholarships this year, and this is unconditional by Chinese 
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government. The content of the scholarship is as same as the scholarship 
under Culture Agreement, also including undergraduate, master and 
doctoral levels. It is issued because of the enlarge aid to Africa since 
Beijing Summit. 
Highlighting the procedure of selecting students is important to show the equity in 
the process. There are few documentary introductions to the process of student 
selection, so Chen was asked to give me some more details. He introduced: '02 
The scholarships under Cultural Agreement will be firstly informed to 
Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Then the Ministry of Education 
will be informed. You know, the two countries' issues always go through 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but carried out by Ministry of Education. 
The details of the scholarships, including the numbers and majors, will be 
advertised on the local newspaper, both Swahili and English newspaper. 
Both of the newspapers have the most circulation in Tanzania. The 
English one is Daily News, and the other one is in Swahili. The 
universities are also informed by the scholarship information, and they 
can organise and recommend some excellent students to apply for the 
scholarship. So there are individual applications, and universities 
organised application. For example, University of Dar es Salaam selects 
and recommends students to us every year. 
Kim also explained her job during the process of scholarship selection: 
My job is the communication of the scholarship: Embassy of China sends 
the letter to our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and they hand it to Ministry 
of Education, after that the information will be public published. 
Sometimes we deal with it to fast track it and coordinate to the office 
from the Embassy of China. We want to make it fair so we advertise it on 
newspaper or website then they can apply. Then there is a committee to 
select - it is called sub-advisory committee for higher education and 
102 The selection of the st udents has been confirmed again by Kim, and also by some individual interviewees. 
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training. The chairmanship is in this ministry, but we have members from 
Zanzibar and in other ministries such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Zanzibar coordinating office, civil service department and director of 
higher education (of Zanzibar). So this committee will sit down and 
discuss the scholarships. 
Chen added some more points about how they tried to make this scholarship 
procedure more equal and efficient: 
In terms of one-side scholarship, we need to discuss with Tanzanian side, 
considering more aspects. For example, the scholarship information is 
easily to be spread in Tanzania but not in Zanzibar. So when the Ministry 
of Education can not send the information to Zanzibar on time, we will 
help to give some additional scholarship to Zanzibar by the one-side 
scholarship. We also give this scholarship to some students who cannot 
get the opportunities from the Agreement scholarship. This year there is a 
student who is the daughter of the general secretary of Tanzanian 
Olympic Games committee. She is also an excellent student, and just 
finished her study in USA. But she needs the same procedure as the 
others. We also checked her study performance and interviewed her. 
It is also interesting for us to know if the Tanzanian side wishes to have the 
Chinese offer, even though the offer is not large. As Chen felt, the Tanzanian 
government feels very happy to have this kind of Chinese support. They feel 
happy to communicate with Chinese officials, as the negotiation is always in a 
harmonious atmosphere. Chen said, although China is not giving a lot of financial 
aid compared with the much bigger Western donors, Tanzanian people still take 
the Chinese support. This attitude also proved by Kim and her colleagues. 
Why not give higher education funding directly to the Tanzanian government? 
Different from Western reformed strategies which are now focused on direct 
financing, China's support is still at the project level. When considering aid via 
project or direct financial funding, both Chen and Ambassador Liu showed their 
worries of how Tanzania can manage money if giving direct financial support. 
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Chen said, 
They may not manage the money very well. How to deal with the money 
in the real practice is a problem. Therefore if we aid in the project, it will 
be direct and easy to conduct for us. 
As Chen felt, the main problem is the efficiency of the Tanzanian government as 
the procedure of selection is slow. 
2.1 Summary 
It is getting clearer how the practice is on the ground, as it is described by officials. 
Despite the rhetoric they want to emphasise, some facts we get from these 
interviews can be interpreted in the following points: 
(1) The most notable characteristic of Chinese educational support for Tanzania, 
as is claimed by both officials, is aid in higher education. The main approach 
for Tanzanian higher education is not dispatching teachers or giving 
equipment (although these have been done in a small amount), but training 
African students in China with Chinese governmental scholarships. Students 
get degrees, especially higher degrees in China, and then go back to their 
home countries. 
(2) In terms of these scholarship policies, China is trying to making a two-way 
atmosphere by showing exchange. Chinese policies emphasise how much 
benefits the two sides give each other. In fact it is hard to be called `aid' 
because China likes to call it `student exchanges' (Li, 2008: 28) rather than 
`offering' or `giving' scholarships. 
(3) It is claimed that the selection of the student scholarship is made as equal as 
possible, and the Chinese embassy tries to make the information delivered fast 
to further areas in Tanzania. However, the extra number of scholarships which 
is `outside' the Cultural Agreement is much more flexible, so we are not sure 
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if this is also processed in the same way as the one `inside' the Cultural 
Agreement. 
Overall, it can be seen that, giving governmental scholarships is both China's 
preference and what Tanzanians need. Moreover, based on an increasing number 
of African students in China, documents, and information provided by 
interviewees, this will probably be a long run project for China. 
Specifically, in the fieldwork in Tanzania, I had the chance (also introduced by 
officials in the Tanzanian MoE) to visit the Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology 
(DIT) several times. This is an example of the scholarship agreement between 
China and Tanzania. Therefore, after we get the general image of the scholarship 
approach, the following part will conduct a study of the DIT and its leader, as well 
as lecturers, in order to see how they understand China's support. 
3. The case of DIT 
Located in the Dar es Salaam city centre, the Dar es Salaam Institute of 
Technology (DIT) is an accredited institution by the National Council for 
Technical Education (NACTE). It was established in 1997, and now offers 
full-time, part-time and professional engineering qualifications and courses. The 
institutional history dates back to 1957 when its predecessor, the Dar es Salaam 
Technical Institute, was established with the main aim of providing vocational 
training. The Institute later expanded to offer technical secondary school courses 
and training for Technical Assistants; it was upgraded in 1962 to become the Dar 
es Salaam Technical College (DTC), the first formal technical training institution 
in the country. The position of DTC in the area of higher technical education was 
consolidated in 1991, when the Advanced Diploma in Engineering (ADE) 
programmes replaced the Diploma in Engineering (DE) courses. With the 
increasing competition in new technology, and the supply of quality products such 
as technical education and services, the position of DTC was changed as the DIT 
was established in 1997. The new institution not only provided quality technical 
training, but also applied research and expertise services to the community (DIT, 
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n. d. ), 103 
The cooperation between the institute and Chinese embassy started from 1990s. 
Under the agreement between the PRC and the United Republic of Tanzania in 
1991, a collaborative project between Xian Highway University (Xi'an Jiao Tong 
University, China) and Dar es Salaam Technical College (currently DIT) was set 
up to develop a Highway and Transportation Engineering Laboratory. In 1993, the 
laboratory was established through `generous assistance' from China. 104 The mai n 
objective of this project was to strengthen the DIT's highway section by providing 
equipment, experts and training staff in the field of Highway and Transportation 
Engineering. Four experts from China were dispatched to DIT to assist their 
counterparts in technology transfer. tos The experts helped manage to install 
equipment in the lab and to teach in the highway engineering field. 
Also under the China-Tanzania agreement of 1991, there were opportunities for 
human resource development through which some personnel from the former 
DTC were trained in various fields in China. Most of them were trained in Xian 
Highway University (e. g. Dr. Urio Erick S, Dr. Simon Simeon J. B., as shown on 
the document). It is noteworthy that they obtained a high degree in China- mainly 
PhDs. They went back to DIT after graduation and now teach and research at DIT. 
Over years, the institute has been able to build its human resource capacity. 
However, even though China has donated some equipment to the DIT, the institute 
still `has not been successful in acquiring more facilities to supplement, 
complement or replace those donated by Chinese government'. 106 
This support (e. g. labs, equipment, experts and training) is continuing in other 
fields at the DIT by the Chinese government. Besides the cooperation the field of 
Highway engineering, the Chinese government began to target the computer 
science department in the DIT. In June 2000, China entered an agreement to 
103 See DIT 's website, http: //www. dit. ac. tz/about. php 
104 This historical information is from the document given to me by the vice principal of DIT. The 
document's title is Support to DIT extended by the Peoples Republic of China to DIT since 2002'. 
105 The four Chi nese experts were Yang, Han, Qin, and Lei. 
106 This is from interview with the DIT principal. 
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develop a Computer Laboratory at DIT. Under the agreement, the Chinese 
government provided the necessary teaching facilities to set up a laboratory with 
fifty micro-computers, provided experts to train in computer applications, and 
offered opportunities to train in China. The project lasted for two years, from 
December 2001. 
Following successes in implementing the project, it was extended for another two 
more years following the signing of a memorandum of understanding on 11th 
December 2003. During 2004-2005, China offered 12 short and long term 
scholarships; currently, there are 3 DIT staff studying at master's level in 
Computer related subjects in China. Also, the DIT has received three Chinese 
experts, two of them are still at the institute at the time my interview was 
conducted, supporting teaching and research. '07 
3.1 Interview with vice principal of DIT 
The interview with the vice principal of the DIT, professor Seka (who has been 
the vice principal since mid-2000), showed a two-sided opinion regarding the 
Chinese support. 
In his opinion, China provides a good example which can help Tanzania catch up 
with the world speed. When asked if Chinese support to the DIT is helpful, he 
conveyed his positive opinion of learning in China, and the importance of 
educational practice (aid): 
Yes of course it is helpful. It is simple and can solve our problems. Not 
long ago, China was not that much developed, but now it is developing 
very fast. But Africa is walking backwards. I think we have to reverse it 
and try to develop. China has invested a lot in education. For those 
reasons and also for China has managed a lot of technologies, we think 
that this way is proper. 
107 The jr names are Mr. Liu Yong, Mr. Song Jinpang, and Mr. Du Xiaocheng. 
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... we are catching up... so why not going there to study ... then we can 
jump. 
Not only in the field of technical science, in other fields, we are also 
trying to learn from abroad... Especially the area of research... We are 
not producing, but we are consuming. If we can not buy, we can not 
consume. We have to produce something, and we need the ability of 
producing. A good quality education is needed, and more opening up for 
education is needed. The best investment is educating people. 
However, the principal seems have more expectation for the Chinese support. Just 
as the officials hoped in the Ministry of Education, the professor also expected 
more support from China. He particularly stressed wanting `more senior people' 
from China: 
It is good opportunity for learning capacity and some training for our 
people. But I know it is not easy. It is also good to have more experience 
from Chinese working here. But we need more good professors here from 
China. I hope they maybe can stay here working 1-2 years, which is 
better than we have our teachers study in China. All of our departments 
will be benefit from those professors. I mean they are senior academic 
people, and now we don't get the senior ones, because they want to go to 
UK or America. 
Then Dr. Seka discussed more forms of collaboration between potential 
companies and the institute: 
I hope some Chinese company would like to work with us. Such as 
Huawei, they only choose some graduates but not collaborate with us. 
They are not cooperating with us at all. ' 08 We hope we can work together. 
We can do some research or even invest money together. If we just 
108 Huawei is one of the biggest Chinese telecom companies. Their products and solutions have been 
deployed in over 100 countries all over the world. Huawei entered African market in 1997 (HUAWEI. 
27/10/2009). 
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receive 50 computers, it is good but it is not sustainable. The capacity is 
most important. 
But he also realised that cooperation should be built on an equal basis, and this 
kind of relationship between Chinese and Tanzanians is within a process of 
learning, not cooperating. When I asked about China's `win-win', he responded 
that, if we call the Chinese support a kind of `win-win cooperation', then a key 
point is how to be a proper partner. 
It can be mutual beneficial if Tanzania has capacity to be partner. When 
we have this opportunity- one thing, we also need capacity- it is another 
thing. That is the question. When you have equal capacity then you can 
have equal cooperation and partners, but at the moment we cannot be 
equal partners. 
The principal is generally satisfied with his teachers who studied in China, but 
was also is a bit sceptical towards some Chinese universities. 
Some of the teachers working very well and most of them contributed a 
lot to our teaching and research, but some Chinese universities are not 
very good. As I know some of the Chinese universities are very high in 
their quality but not all of them. I think some of them do not have 
experience with foreigners. 
Yet what about Chinese teachers in DIT, and their difference from the teachers 
from other countries? Seka, in his interview with me, praised the performance of 
Chinese teachers and showed his wishes for more communication with them. He 
said: 
The Chinese teachers are teaching in English language, and the students 
are from whole country and few foreigners. We also have some Swedish, 
Japanese, and now we have some Korean teachers. The difference among 
teachers is not depending on the country, but the university, and also the 
people themselves. But I have seen some engineer who has studied in 
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China and is really good! You cannot believe it! For example this 
excellent Chinese man was in China for master study, and now is doing 
quite good in Tanzania as an engineer. 
Chinese teachers cooperate with institute very well. Most of them are 
very serious but there are cultural problems. Sometimes I want to talk to 
them and share some experience with them but they don't feel very 
comfortable. Sometimes I want to talk to them directly, not through the 
head of the department. But they prefer to talk to the head. They should 
be more open. (Are they young? ) Some came firstly were very young but 
now, they are middle age. They are doing their teaching well and they do 
not complain. (DIT, Seka) 
It seems, then, that the situation is firstly that China wants to say it is mutual 
beneficial in a long run, but in fact, at the moment it is only one-way support from 
China to this institute. There is no academic flow to China from the DIT. 
Secondly, even though there are two types of help, Chinese teachers dispatched in 
the DIT and scholarships for the DIT staff, it is more about training staff in China 
than training students locally. The staff members returning from China are 
working as main powers in the DIT, and they are not in small number. On another 
hand, only 1-2 Chinese lectures work at the DIT every year, although teaching is 
no problem and welcomed, the problem of communication with administrators 
appears to some extent. 
From recipients' perception, it seems the support is welcomed and they are trying 
to be cordial on the basis of friendship. However the recipients have more 
expectations, such as higher quality capacity building, as they are eager to develop 
and catch up. Another potential point is that when the recipients demand better 
support, they should also develop themselves efficiently and independently. The 
principal realised this when he talked how to be mutual beneficial partner, and he 
worried about the slow development of Tanzania and about the complexity in the 
DIT. Those things made him feel anxious for the continued development of his 
institution in the future. 
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4. Students feeling 
With the rising of China, Chinese student scholarships have become very popular 
in Tanzania, just as the deputy principal of the Dar es Salaam University College 
of Education (DUCE) said, `I will say that the relationship is growing, I mean, 
more Tanzanians are going to China. The image of Chinese university is changing. 
Because at some point people think going to China is very different from to 
Western countries, but now is also good. ' Thus, the students' perceptions should 
be representative and be meaningful to listen to. 
As stated in the methodology chapter, this research tried to gather opinions from 
different types of people who studied in China with Chinese scholarships. They 
are now working as government officials, teachers, or in national companies. 
After listened to their feelings and conversing face to face or in groups' discussion, 
some key points can be highlighted as follows. 
Obviously, the logic of donors and recipients are quite different. Especially for the 
individual recipients, as they seem to not care about the politics of aid at all. Some 
of the young students do not understand the so called `win-win', however, when 
talking about China and the West, they would respond `oh that is the politics'. 
What they care about is their real life in China, about if they can get enough 
funding, about if they can get a good opportunity for themselves, and about if they 
can get a nice job after they abroad study. Let us dig deeper into their perception 
and their direct feeling towards Chinese higher education. 
4.1 An ambivalent feeling about the degree length, funding amount, teaching 
quality and communication 
When talking about the advantages and disadvantages of the study in China, 
former students showed their happiness about their opportunity to go to China, 
and expressed that they are willing of going again for higher degree such as PhD; 
they would even send their children in future. When asked about the importance 
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of this degree in China, they all gave positive answers. 
TOGETHER (answered by DIT staff members): Yes. Definitely. 
Sanga: You can see we are here now. So you can know the importance. 
We are doing our job here, trying to contribute to our institute, so it is 
very important. 
Georgia: We learnt a lot in China and from China, now it is very 
important that we using what we learnt to teach and research. 
Yes we always ask, why China can do successfully in this era, so it is 
important to study in China. Tanzania is learning China that how to 
develop the country, and Chinese are hardworking people. 
Amble: You see, many Chinese companies are now in this country. Most 
of them are engineering companies. The parliament building is built by 
Chinese company. So maybe for us it is good chance to study there and 
the government opens a lot of business and receives things such as this 
scholarship agreement from China. Now we have relations in many 
fields. 
But this does not mean study in China has no problems. What they are not so 
satisfied with always covered degree length, the funding amount, teaching quality 
and communication. Firstly, three years master degrees (even though a small 
number of universities started two year programs) made them feel a kind of 
contradiction- a good chance for more research, but too long for a masters. 
Sanga: For the advantages and disadvantages, I would like to say yes and 
no. The disadvantage is, the master in China is too long. You know 
masters in UK only take you one year. But in China some of us even need 
to take one year to study Chinese, and 3 years for a master degree. It 
together will take 3-4 years for us. 
Simon: Yes, it is good to study one year master, however, three years is 
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too long but one year is too short. In the Western countries they cover a 
lot in undergraduate so they have only one year master. That means if you 
go to the West for one year master, it is better to study there for 
undergraduate. I think 2 years is acceptable. But for three years the ad is 
you will have more time to do your own research. You have time to 
explore your subject more. 
Amble: Yes it is true for doing research. Research takes some time. In the 
Western countries they just choose a topic and write your master thesis. 
But in China you must do something such as publications. It is good 
because then you know how to publish articles. You have much more 
experience than study for one year.... Some universities changed their 
length of degree when I was leaving Wuhan. They changed it into two 
years degree. That is good. 
The language seems to be the second problem. Compared with the Western 
education, lectures are not good at speaking English, and the communication with 
other Chinese in the university is also a problem. One of the results is that the 
Tanzanian students wanted to learn more, but the university sometimes treated 
them as foreigners and required less from them. When asked about the difference 
between the West and the East, Georgia raised the language problem, and the three 
other DIT staff members noted: 
Georgia: Actually for me the same level degrees from the West and the 
East are just the same, but the problem is language. The teaching and 
study is ok, but the only problem is language. When you have difficulties 
or problems you do not understand, and you come to someone work with 
you, but he or she can not explain it to you very well. 
Sanga: According to my experience, language has caused some problems. 
When the teachers are going to teach the foreign students, they are a kind 
of shy, with not very much confidence. They know very much how to 
teach.... The evaluation is also different. Because you are a foreigner, 
they will just say, ok. But when you are a Chinese, the teacher will be 
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stricter. They will say, it doesn't matter he is a foreigner. Then the 
Chinese students can get more knowledge from the teachers because the 
teachers know what they are planning and doing and the problems. That 
is much easier to them. 
Amble: They will think you are a foreigner so you do not need to know 
this. So we can not get the knowledge at the same level as Chinese 
students. 
The two young ladies, Kath and Race, in another interview also raised similar 
points about language and communication: 
I think it is because of the language. Many books are in Chinese.. 
sometimes you can not go deep. Things from class is not enough. There 
are a lot of self study. 
(Do you have communication with your Chinese friends in your daily 
life? ) Yes of course. (Are you living with them? ) No just foreign students. 
But usually we have some Chinese friends. You have to learn some 
Chinese. Some of them they can speak English but they are shy. 
To be treated as a foreigner seems brings both advantages and disadvantages. As I 
mentioned, the universities have festivals for foreign students and let them show 
their diverse culture through traditional dressing and food. But in daily life and 
study, they want to be integrated into normal campus life. 
In terms of funding amount, the two young girls who do not have their own family 
(children and husband) did not see this as a problem, but the DIT members did: 
Amble: They fund us, but not enough. DIT pays part, such as the flight 
for going. We should come back after study. I think that is how the two 
sides agree. Even though I wish I can bring my family. 
Georgia: For example in our university even you have husband but you 
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have to pay for his accommodation, even he stay in your room. 
4.2 A different feeling between older and younger graduates 
It is quite interesting that after meeting some of the older Tanzanian graduates, we 
found they seldom complained of any disadvantage of their experience in China. 
They did not feel unsatisfied with the money, with the language, and with the 
lecturers. They conveyed more positive feeling when they talked about their life in 
China. 
In a bit different fashion from the younger interviewees, those graduates did not 
feel language was a problem, and they were integrated more with the Chinese 
students. Older Tanzanians had to study Chinese when they were studying in 
China, but when more and more foreign students began to attended Chinese 
universities, the Chinese government began to let universities teach foreign 
students in English. However, the English level of Chinese lectures has not been 
improved enough, and the English teaching led some students to feel study 
difficulties. For older graduates - John who studied in the 90s (he is now in MoE), 
Robert who studied in the 60's (now a dock worker), Moti who studied in the 70s 
(now a manager in the transformer factory) - they seem to feel good with their 
communication in China, and with Chinese. 
Robert: Probably I was in the earliest group to study in China, and we 
learnt Chinese very well. At least I learnt very good Chinese, but that was 
long time ago. 
Moti: I got a scholarship in 1977 when I finished my high school in 
Tanzania, and I was chosen by MoE to go to China. I went to Beijing and 
studied Chinese for one year, until 1978. After one year, I was chosen to 
go to Shanghai, studying electrical engineering in Shanghai GongYe 
Daxue. I studied there for undergraduate, 5 years together, then I came 
back .... Yes the university was all in Chinese. It is difficult but we had 
language course in language school. Then in the university we also had a 
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little bit language study in the first year. And, we had room-mate who 
was also Chinese. So it was like one foreigner, one Chinese, one 
foreigner, one Chinese... So you could get help.... For us it was so 
integrated. It was not difficult because we were living together. In 
classroom, maybe we had 24 Chinese students, and 1-2 foreign students. 
Moti: For me it was a good opportunity to see. I was able to go to China, 
and was able to learn its culture, was able to know a lot of things about 
China. During holiday the university would arrange trips. We went to 
Dalian.. The university paid about 80%, and we just paid a little, all 
foreign students. We paid very small amount of money but we visited a 
lot of place. The scholarship paid everything. It was enough for us. I 
think we were total 30 students, 10 of us and some went to there before 
us. ... I was very happy with my study in China. I didn't see any 
disadvantage there. 
John studied in China for his masters degree in a top Chinese university (Qinghua 
University) from 1996 to 1999, and now is an official working in the Ministry of 
Communication, Science and Technology. He was very excited when talking 
about his experience in China: 
John: I had very good experience there, fascinating!... (He talked in both 
English and Chinese) Initially we studied with foreign students only 
Ghana, Nigeria, Mexico, Kenya and many other countries in the 
world... but in the second year we were put together. So we can work 
with Chinese students together. We studied and even lived together. The 
dormitories are separate but we have meals together. They are very 
friendly, very friendly.. And foreign students also had to behave to show 
an image of their country. So no fighting no contradiction.., no drink too 
much ... The social life there was very good. You can have Chinese friend. 
I went to Chinese home! 
However, age alone is not sufficient for saying the previous was better. Although 
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the number of people in the interview is not enough to make any generalisations, 
the information they gave reflected some realities: there were a smaller number of 
African students in China and they studied Chinese; and it seems that they have 
more affection towards China than the young Tanzanians. This means the younger 
generation, which grew up in this economically globalised world and seeing how 
many Chinese companies are in Africa doing business, cannot recognize a 
passionate link between the two countries in the same degree their elders did. For 
China, it could be a danger that if more African students come into Chinese 
universities while they want to make the training/teaching more globalised (i. e. in 
English, not in Chinese so as to make teaching to foreign students easier), more 
foreign students cannot find the inclusive feeling they should. 
4.3 A historical influence on the understanding about East and West 
Although the Western donors have been changing their image in African people's 
eyes by changing the conditionalities and making aid harmonization, the history 
still seems to be influencing Tanzanian perception, especially when we talked 
about `motives' of donors. They prefer to use the word `take' when describing the 
Western donors. They also expressed their opinion of win-win. 
John: Those are politics. It is cooperation.. I get something from you, and 
you get some from me... Yes it is win-win. Colonial time, they (the West) 
come and take a lot of materials and resource. They were not helping us. 
But China wants to help you. They are not capitalism previously, but 
socialism. That policy is still there until today. They want to help Africa. 
They gave us technology and skill, of course they can also take some 
resources minerals, mine... which is for exchange. That is win-win, and it 
is ok! But in the colonial times, they used to take everything. It was not 
equal. When they came and invested, they made agreement to take more, 
and they gave a little. They made you not independent. They made you 
become more and more depend on them. It is not good. They give you 
some conditions, conditionalities... So I am not happy with that. 
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Sanga: I have been in Sweden for months, I could see the way Western 
people see us. They won't stay in Africa. Even they come, they are 
coming to take something and leave. The media things do not tell people 
the truth. They will say in Africa there are a lot of wars and a lot of 
hunger, even in China people said `but we hear that in Africa there are a 
lot of wars'. It is something implanted. That is Western countries think 
what Africa is, but when Chinese stay here and go back they tell others it 
is not really like what we have been hearing. 
Tanzanian is maybe the most diplomatic people in this planet... because 
we are mixed up by different cultures. It is always that poor people speak 
the truth, but the rich ones like to create some things. There are a lot of 
politics..... 
When you are poor, you need to receive donations and help, and also 
need to accept some conditions, but now China is getting up, becoming 
independent, saying to the world it is China. So why not love your 
country! 
Georgia: We are getting something from China, and China is also getting 
something from me. 
Another thing is, there are two kinds of history here, West and Africa, and 
China and Africa. West colonised the continent so they know Africa 
much more than Chinese. China knows us because of friendship, or we 
can say international policy, so it is different from Western countries. 
Now they come and help, and also they get something from us because 
we have a lot of natural resource. 
Oh that is the politics. I am not politician but they know what they are 
saying, when you see your neighbor is becoming better and better than 
you and with less assistant from you. For example I don't believe my 
country is poor, and it is just said by those things imposed to the 
continent. 
The relation Africa has with West, is different from the relation Africa has 
with east, because of the colonial time. Without us the West cannot 
survive. (Amble: They took a lot. ) Even now. China does not have 
colonial relationship with us. We are getting a win-win situation. So that 
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is why Chinese are more welcomed. 
Amble: For the West, they are also doing donations, but the point is, they 
take more than what they give. Our president Nyerere was a very good 
friend with Chairman Mao. When president have meeting in USA, 
American wanted to donate to Tanzania and saying because you are poor 
and something like that, he said, you were not donating, you just want to 
continuing to take things from us. 
I never heard complains about Chinese company and Chinese 
government that they are taking something for granted. But we always 
heard the Western countries taking minerals. It is the Western countries. 
China takes a lot of contracts of constructions. 
The colonial time affected the Tanzanians generation through gen eration. For 
them, the biggest difference between China and West is colonial history. They do 
not take China as some great donor who gives them help for nothing. They are 
clear about exchange, about win-win, even though they did not talk about it in an 
academic way. For them the relation between Africa and the West is always 
unequal, for example their sceptical opinion about the percentage the West paid 
for their natural resource. Although they did not suffer anything from the West and 
even wanted to have a scholarship in the Western countries, they cannot forget the 
history. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has mainly been about China's action in higher educational support 
for Africa, and the form of giving governmental scholarships. From the interview 
with both Chinese and Tanzanian officials, we obtained information about the 
practice of Chinese governmental scholarships, which was increasingly become 
the most important way of Chinese educational aid. The information about the 
scholarship types-- `under' or `outside' of the Cultural Agreement, the number of 
scholarships, the main subjects and degree levels, the advertisement approaches, 
as well as the student selection methods -- showed us that: Chinese officials are 
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trying to make the practice reflect its policy texts; the government wants to make 
it look like a cooperation or an exchange, rather than a type of aid; meanwhile, 
Tanzanian officials also cooperate and gave confirmation of what was said by 
Chinese officials, this indicated a growingly closer relationship between the two 
sides. 
The Tanzanian DIT, as a impressive case of China's educational aid in our field 
study, has its own agreement with the Chinese government, including Chinese 
governmental scholarships and Chinese teacher dispatched. Two interviews were 
made with the principal of the DIT, who expressed his opinion towards China's 
help and China's rising-up. He talked about their motives of learning from China, 
the benefits of learning from China, and his feeling of satisfaction with Chinese 
teachers who were working in the DIT. He also gave his suggestion for future 
cooperation with China, especially the local Chinese companies. It was evident 
that the principal had a great hope on the DIT and even his country, and learning 
the Chinese experience of development was a possible way for strengthening 
Tanzania. Therefore, training DIT's teachers in China would be an ideal way for 
him, as capacity building can be a long-run beneficial project for his institute and 
his country. 
Not only were DIT's teachers who were returning students from China in our 
interviews, but there were also other individual Tanzanians who studied in China 
with the scholarships. So in the last part of this chapter, we summarised their 
opinions and experience, including detailed things such as the degree length, 
lecturer's language, living costs, university activities, and more. It is interesting 
that elder returning students seems more satisfied and to have more passion than 
the younger ones, perhaps based on a fact that China has increased the number of 
scholarships and tried to make a more globalised teaching and learning form; 
evidently some of the improvements did not work well. It is also noticeable that 
the historical impact of colonialism still has roots in African's hearts, however the 
young people seems to be uninterested in talking politics (i. e. the difference 
between donors' action and logic). One of the biggest differences of aid from 
China and from the West, for them, is the colonial past which has instilled a 
hierarchical feeling in them. 
248 
Above all it can be argued that in terms of China's action in the field of higher 
education in Tanzania, it is recognised as either positive or negative by both 
officials and individual recipients, and as an important way for the development of 
human resources in Tanzania. From their recognition, we can see how the logic in 
theories and Chinese policy texts translated, and how China's logic is 
implemented; we can also see how the logic of China is understood by recipients. 
We can see in this chapter that different people present information in different 
ways. Secretary Chen is translating policy words into practice - negotiating with 
the Tanzanian side and answering questions from outside, my interviews for 
instance. On the other hand, returning Tanzanian students and educational staff 
present in a different way - more like telling stories--- and show us vividly about 
Chinese scholarships. Both of their words show some effect and the increasing 
influence China has had on Tanzania and Tanzanians. It can be predicted that this 
approach will go on for the long run, to help China build an image for training 
Tanzania's future human resource, and to help Tanzania have quicker growth of 
central capacities, which are the key for developing stably in this `knowledge 
economy' age. 
Following this main approach of supporting higher education support, the next 
chapter will talk about more types of China-Africa educational cooperation. We 
will focus on short term training by China to Africa, and the related Chinese 
universities. Some conclusions will be drawn regarding the `culture route' by 
China, such as building cultural centres in African schools or establishing 
Confucius Institutes. 
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Chapter Eight Donor logic in action: transforming experience 
and cultural heritage 
Introduction 
As stated in the last chapter, aid for higher education with scholarship projects is the 
main approach by China. Beside the scholarship approach, there are other types of 
practice by China in Africa. As human resources are becoming increasingly 
important in this era of a knowledge economy, transforming skills and experience 
by either long term study for degrees or a short-term workshop are both practical 
and important for African people. As mentioned in Part One, short term training is 
another part of China's educational cooperation with Africa. Every year China's 
Ministry of Education and Ministry of Commerce launch courses and training for 
African teachers, university administrators, engineers, and other professionals. 
There are also some other approaches China has developed, including the 
Confucius Institute and the Chinese Cultural Centre. 
In China, the Ministry of Education usually authorizes tasks to the local 
universities and allows these institutions to organise and arrange the specific 
practice with African participants. Thus the notice of training is delivered to the 
African side in a diplomatic way (as Secretary Chen said, it was affair between 
two countries), then the training activities are conducted by the universities. In 
terms of educational cooperation with Africa, these universities also have the 
chance to educate African students who received Chinese scholarships, and to 
establish Confucius Institutes in African countries, though this depends on the 
main subjects of the university and its reputation and performance. Universities 
such as Jilin University, China Agriculture University, Zhejiang Normal 
University, Tianjin University of Technology and Education (which, although not 
the best universities in China, still have good prestige) are designated by 
ministries to do the workshops and seminars for Africa. In 2005, during which the 
Educational minister forum (mentioned in Part One) was held, there were eleven 
universities entrusted by the Ministry of Education to run 12 courses and seminars 
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on higher education management, long-distance education, and vocational 
technical education; these were mainly for African peoples (Li, 2006b). 
The Confucius Institute (CI) is another way to cooperate with African countries in 
China's broad `cultural and human resource' field, although CI itself is not 
specially designed for Africa. However through a cultural and language bridge, 
both the Chinese universities and African higher institutions seek to find a 
beneficial way for themselves. 
Thus, in order to show China's logic of having universities expand influence on 
transferring Chinese experience to Africa, and the universities' perspective of 
`win-win', three Chinese universities are introduced firstly in the beginning in this 
chapter. Field interviews have been done with university staff who led or work 
within the job for holding courses or building CI in certain African countries. 
Through talking with them, we seek to obtain more information about these 
approaches and the motives of the universities. 
Following the three university cases, there will be a part talking specific about 
short-term training, which will also provide some Tanzanian voices from higher 
institutional leaders. We are especially interested to find out the deeper `logic' 
behind the training performance- based upon a CDA study on ZJNU's training 
reports from 2004 to 2006. By looking at the university's official discourses, we 
may reveal what kind of practice they are aiming for, what they want to claim, 
who the participants and leaders of the practice are, and what social relations and 
beneficial sides these words reflect. 
Finally there will be a shorter part about a `cultural route' from China to Africa. It 
is principally about my visit to Mkapa High School in Dar es Salaam. The 
Chinese culture centre in their school will be an interesting example of this 
politics through culture. After that, there will be a discussion on the CI and 
Tanzanian's plan regarding the CI, as we got information in the field study that 
Tanzania DUCE would like to establish a CI together with a Chinese university. 
Although it was in the planning stage, we saw the active motives of African 
higher educational leaders. 
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While training people, teaching language and making a cultural influence are also 
normal for the West in Africa, the biggest difference is that China and Africa are 
more related and in pursuit of common aims. The ambition for an economic rise 
ties them together, and the African people, including university leaders, want to 
learn and understand why China can develop so quickly through a different route 
and ideology from the Western strategy, as Africans have used this approach for 
many years but it has performed not very well. The short-term training has this 
attractiveness, as well as the Confucius Institute. They all offer an opportunity for 
African people to learn from China, not with degree knowledge, but with basic 
and practical skills and experience. 
In a word, this chapter is about how China transfers its experience, skills and 
cultural heritages to Africa; it is also about the voice from Chinese and Tanzanian 
institutions. It can be argued that the Chinese conception of educational assistance 
is broader than `the education system' which is the normal target for Western aid. 
In this Chapter, analysis of Chinese short term training and language study is about 
these extended conceptions of China's educational aid. With these diverse types of 
higher and vocational education with different length of study, Chinese universities 
also get an opportunity to show their capacities internationally. However, it is 
always an issue to make sure what kind of aid Africans need urgently. 
1. Three cases of Chinese higher institutions affording educational support 
to Africa 
The three universities introduced in this section, are all authorized universities by 
Ministry of Education of PRC to offer higher education for African students with 
Chinese governmental scholarships, or establishing Cl in Africa, or doing research 
on African vocational education, or holding trainings for African university 
leaders, and so on. They are not the only universities authorized by Ministry of 
Education, but each of them is famous for and outstanding in doing certain 
educational activities for China-Africa educational cooperation. They got some 
`first's in the area of China-Africa educational relationships, for example: Tianjin 
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Normal University established the first CI in Africa; Zhejiang Normal University 
build the first Centre for African Education Studies in China; and Tianjin 
University of Technology and Education was the first educational foreign aid base 
of Ministry of Education. 109 As universities which have less prestige in China 
than the top universities such as Beijing University and Tsinghua University 
which are more comprehensive and have already established some international 
reputation, these universities aim to build their specialities in enrolling 
international students, in Africa study, in Cl, or in training for African 
administrators. Thus on one hand these universities became to be the key bases for 
educational cooperation by Chinese government, and on another hand the 
activities helped them build an increasing influence in both domestic and 
international wide. 
There were also practical reasons for choosing these universities for my fieldwork 
places. I got some contact information when I attended the conference on 
comparative education in Beijing Normal University in 2008. Some lecturers who 
were from these universities also contacted me after the conference. With their 
help, I got the opportunities to do interviews in these three universities in Tianjin 
and Zhejiang. 
1.1 Tianjin Normal University 
First founded in 1958, Tianjin Normal University (TJNU), the Key Research Base 
for Humanities Studies funded by the Ministry of Education, is one of the sixteen 
universities hosting the HSK (Chinese Proficiency Test) in China, and has set up 
two CI in Kenya (at Nairobi University) and in Thailand (at Bansomdejchaopraya 
Rajabhat University). There are more than 1700 foreign students studying in the 
university now. 110 
109 According to the website of Ministry of Education of the PRC, since 2000 Ministry of Education has 
established 10 bases for educational aid to foreign countries. These 10 bases are all universities, and they are 
Tianjin University of Technology and Education, Zhejiang Normal University, Jilin University, Northeast 
Normal University, Nanjing Agricultural University, Tianjin University of Traditional Chinese Medicine, 
Southern Medical University, Guizhou University, Qiongzhou University, and Yunnan University. The task of 
these bases are: foreign aid trainings, African study programmes, and teacher secondment for foreign aid 
(Ministry of Education of the PRC, n. d. ). (See 
http: //202.205.177.9/edoas/websitel 8/53/info1243992823587253. htm) 
10 Beside the i nformation accessed on the university website, some supplement documents were given by 
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The agreement of establishing the Confucius Institute at University of Nairobi 
was signed by Zhou Ji, the Minister of the Ministry of Education in China, and 
George Saitoti, the Minister of Education, Science and Technology of Kenya. It 
was approved by the Office of Chinese Language Council International, the 
`first-ever' Confucius Institute in Africa was set up by Tianjin Normal University 
(TJNU) and University of Nairobi on 19 December 2005. As TJNU introduced the 
phenomenon `its birth is hailed as a milestone of education cooperation between 
China and Kenya'. The previous president of TJNU, Runcheng Jin said in an 
interview in 2005 that, `culture and education is the "soft power" of a country, so 
it is meaningful to strengthen the Chinese language education abroad; Nairobi is a 
better developed place in Africa, and our Cl is the first one in Africa, so we can 
say we are going to "occupy" the "commanding height" for Chinese language 
teaching in Africa' (China Education and Research Network, 28/07/2005). 
When I interviewed Yan, the director of the international cooperation office at 
TJNU, she introduced the general situation behind their work on CI, and their 
international programmes. At the moment, TJNU have three types of African 
students: firstly, the students with Chinese government scholarships; secondly, 
students with Huawei scholarship; and thirdly, African self funding individuals. III 
She emphasised that the establishment of Cl in Nairobi, and in other developing 
countries such as Thailand, all have good reputations and that this is very good for 
TJNU's future development. As they have already devoted significant resources to 
CI projects, they would like to have long term cooperation with those partner 
universities. She hopes in the future the CI in Africa can train local teachers. 
1.2 Zhejiang Normal University 
Zhejiang Normal University (ZJNU) is one of the Chinese universities which 
started cooperation with African countries in the 90s, specifically from 1996. At 
the president of TJNU. 
111 Scho larships established by Huawei, to `motivate outstanding engineering students to further their college 
studies' (Huawei, 27/10/2009). 
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that time, the university set up the Chinese Language Training Center in 
Cameroon to teach Chinese language and culture to students in Central and 
Western Africa. After the first team of teachers fulfilled their mission, the second 
and third were sent in 1998 and 2001 respectively, and the fourth has taken over 
the job recently. The Cameroon centre has trained over 380 masters and diplomats 
in more than 10 African countries, as well as more than 400 Chinese learners. 
From 2002, under the framework of the China-Africa Forum- FOCAC, ZJNU 
began to take human resource projects by the Ministry of Education and the 
Ministry of Commerce, and invited African educational administrators and 
universities chancellors to come to China for training. In 2004, ZJNU became one 
of the four educational assistance bases to Africa in China. Most of those African 
administrators are high level officials. 
To promote educational cooperation and exchange, the Center for African 
Education Studies (CAES), which is the first of its kind in China, was founded at 
ZJNU on April 7,2003. What is more, in 2006 the university held the first `Sino - 
Africa University President Forum' authorized by the Ministry of Education and 
the Ministry of Commerce. Thirty university presidents from 14 African countries, 
and tens of university presidents in China, attended the forum. 
According to the analysis by professor Gu, the vice dean of CAES in ZJNU, there 
are three key points regarding the educational cooperation with Africa: 
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Firstly, ZJNU is located in the Western area of Zhejiang province, a small city 
called Jinhua. Compared with the top university, such as Zhejiang University in 
the provincial capital city (and also international tourism city) Hangzhou, ZJNU 
does not have any advantage on location nor the reputation. But as a university 
focusing on educational subjects and especially educational administration and 
teacher education, the university can have the strength to develop a route for 
educational assistance to Africa. Moreover, the university also has advantages in 
language teaching. So this is the basis for developing Chinese centres in Africa, 
by sending staff and facilities from ZJNU. 
"Z The following points are summarized from the interview with Gu. 
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Secondly, for the university educational aid is firstly a political issue, with the aim 
of strengthening cooperation and exchange between China and Africa. All of the 
university activities for Africa will be based on this central political point. The 
training and other activities they hold are under the close charge by the Ministry 
of Education and the Ministry of Commerce. This political emphasis is very 
different from the Western educational aid practice. 
Thirdly, the training for high level officials from Africa is also an opportunity for 
the university to learn from others. Some of the African administrators have 
studied well in Western countries, and they also can discuss with Chinese 
university or school leaders about their development goals on education. It is a 
process of exchanging ideas, rather than just training African people. During the 
training, over 20 universities signed universities agreements with ZJNU for more 
educational and cultural cooperation in the future. 
1.3 Tianjin University of Technology and Education 
Tianjin University of Technology and Education (TUTE) is the 98th Chinese 
university that receives foreign students with Chinese government scholarship, 
from countries such as Ukraine, Mongolia, Ethiopia, Zambia, and Vietnam. As the 
first educational foreign aid base of China's Ministry of Education, it has actively 
launched teaching staff training for 87 education officials of developing countries, 
including Mr. Jamah A. Barco, the Assistant of the education minister of Liberia. It 
has trained two hundred and fifty-one vocational teaching staff for thirty-four 
developing countries in Africa, South-Asia, East-Europe, and appointed 
eighty-nine teachers to Ethiopia and Yemen to train more than 8000 students. 
TUTE also established the first research center of African Vocational Education in 
China to carry out the systematic study of the African Vocational Education. 
Mr. Mulatu Teshome, Speaker of the House of Federation of Ethiopia, and 
Mr. Wondwosen Kiflu, the State Minister were appointed as specially hired 
professors in the research center of African Vocational Education of the university 
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(TUTE, n. d. ). 113 
The university offers undergraduate and master degrees with an emphasis on 
engineering and education, and combining science, liberal arts, economics, and 
management. It provides support for Africa through vocational education. The 
university has dispatched 104 lectures to African countries such as Tanzania, 
Egypt and Ethiopia. In 2008, according to the agreement by the Ministries of 
Education of China and Ethiopia, the first Confucius Institute in Ethiopia was 
established. 
Wang and Xie, who I interviewed in TUTE, talked about their jobs, which are 
similar to TJNU, and inculde teacher dispatch and short term training. Xie is the 
director of their office for international exchange which has ten staff working 
there. Wang is one of them and is responsible for organizing training, including 
solving accommodation and language issues for African participants. She 
confirmed the cooperation between the university and some African countries 
since FOCAC was held, and highlighted the close link with Ethiopia. The 
Educational minister of Ethiopia is an honorary professor in TUTE. The notable 
opinion from Wang is that she thought Africa should get more support from China, 
rather than from developed countries. 
As I know there are 17 German universities have educational aid to 
Ethiopia, and there are some British and international organisations 
giving educational aid to the country. However I think Ethiopia may 
prefer China's support, as China has more similar experience. They can 
share these experience..... On the other hand, Chinese people are well 
known of their hard-working, even within the adverse circumstance. This 
is also what African people can learn from us. 
Wang organised several training programmes for African administrators, and she 
said that two to three weeks is a short time, and maybe African administrators 
cannot learn deeply during the training. However, she said their progress can be 
113 S ee university website, http: //www. tute. edu. cn/english/linshi/About-Tute. html 
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seen, even in the small things such as their daily life. Now she herself begins to 
understand more about Africa, beyond the ideas of disease, poverty and war. After 
all, she thought it could be very valuable to hold this short training between China 
and Africa. 
Above all, two interesting points of contrast from my interviews in these 
universities showing that, firstly, in the West, universities are `driven' to 
international initiatives because their government have taken funding from them, 
whereas in China they do it because their government gives them funding to do so. 
Although the universities also devoted much staff and finance into their `Africa 
action', the arrangement and authorization by the government are powerful to 
promote all those activities, especially let those activities be part of a country's 
action; secondly, it is also interesting that, cooperation with/ involvement in Africa 
is good for universities' reputation rather than income. 
2. Practical idea: Short term training 
2.1 General situation 
When asked about the other types of cooperation between the two countries, 
secretary Chen in Chinese embassy in Tanzania talked about training and teacher 
dispatch. 
In terms of teacher dispatch, Chen told me that in the Dar es Salaam Institute of 
Technology, there are 2 Chinese teachers teaching computer science every year. 
The tenure of the teachers is normally two years, and afterwards new teachers 
were dispatched from China. Unfortunately the two teachers were back in China 
during my staying in Tanzania. However, according to embassy staff information 
and some investigation at the DIT, it was found that there were very few Chinese 
teachers in Tanzania. The job of Chinese teachers is teaching and directing, but as 
communication is difficult with local staff and institute heads the influence of 
them is very limited. It is still difficult to move human resources into Africa. 
Instead, another way perhaps is to do training in China. 
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As Chen said, the Ministry of Education in China is planning to hold training 
every year in Chinese cities for African people. China pays for -the entire process 
of journey and training, including the ticket and accommodation, as well as setting 
up the staff and the lectures. The fields of training cover computer science, 
agriculture, medicine, and educational management. The term of the training 
normally is two weeks. The Chinese embassy will inform the Tanzanian 
government about the training information, and then the Tanzanian government 
will recommend the group of people to the Chinese embassy. The embassy then 
checks the materials of the training objects and sends formal offers. In the field of 
educational training, the Ministry of Education organizes most of the activities. 
Yet there are also other training plans conducted by the Ministry of Commerce. 
In a two to three weeks' workshop, the African school or university administrators 
have an opportunity to get some experience of how China developed their 
education system. The principal of DUCE, Misa, talked about her three week 
experience in China during training in Zhejiang, 
I visited China last year. It was an invitation to our Ministry of Education, 
about some workshop in China. Zhejiang Normal University organised 
everything. MoE in China contacted our MoE. Then our MoE sent 
invitations to us. There were people from different African countries in 
the training. We visited 3-4 universities. It was in August. I spent 3 weeks 
there. We got to know more about educational development in China. 
Generally we were informed educational systems, the changes taken 
place in China and other information about the educational development 
of China, such as how the enrollment has been increasing. .. I got some 
information from that visit in China, and some cooperation. I also got 
information that China is offering student scholarship to Tanzania. One of 
our staff went to China last year, for phD with the scholarship. 
This is a process of viewing and learning from successful experience directly. For 
African people, th ey all know the quality educational system in the Western 
countries, but they want to know more about how a developing country develops 
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its educational system. The Chinese experience for them is more pragmatic, 
andthey may find out some similarities. As Misa told, 
Yes it is useful. It is good to know what others are doing. We learn from 
others, sharing opinions. It is helpful for you to shift your own programs. 
For example we learnt some foreign language programs which I was also 
thinking to do. It is about introducing some second foreign language 
programs. I can also introduce that to our college. So we need 
cooperation with Chinese universities, and we need to learn from them. 
From the TUTE interview we received some course names from the lecturer Wang: 
they have been offering training course in vocational education to African 
institutional administrators. The seminar topics of the training include the 
following: `curriculum and teaching reforms of vocational education: based on a 
direction of employment', `vocational education in developing countries: a 
comparative view', `Educational development in China', `vocational skill 
certification in China', `administration models of vocational institutions in China', 
and `developing vocational education in China'. In addition, there are some 
visiting activities to historical places and to primary/secondary/vocational schools 
in China. 
It is revealed to us that China is `sharing experience to let you learn', a method 
which is significantly different from the Western way of `giving direction to let 
you catch up'. China does not criticize or comment as to how African people 
have done, but rather shares opinions and experience with them on the basis of 
South-South cooperation and within a field of the developing world. Western 
donors do not have this basis because they have developed much faster than 
Africa and even colonised them, thus psychologically they cannot sit on the same 
level. 
2.2 The case of ZJNU's short term training 
Before starting discussion of the ZJNU case on short term training, we may look 
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at some points Chinese and African university chancellors issued during the 1st 
China-Africa university president forum, held at ZJNU in October 2006: 1 is 
The developing countries which have less developed higher education 
should get more cooperation in this field, promoting national higher 
education quality, and more competitive human resource internationally'. 
---The chancellor of Nanjing University which is one of the top 
universities in China, Yongzhong Song 
International cooperation could be one of the key points for the capacity 
building and reforms of higher education in developing countries. ---Vice 
chancellor of Western University College of Science and Technology 
(WEUCO) in Kenya 
The cooperation between Chinese and African universities is based on equity, 
friendship, mutual respect, mutual needs and mutual benefits, which is 
different from the higher education relationship between Africa and their 
Western colonists. ---Chancellor of University of Namibia (UNAM) 
Zhejiang Normal University will make a special funding for inviting African 
scholars coming to China for lecturing, visiting and other academic work. 
---Chancellor of ZJNU, Xinlin Mei 
We wish the cooperation in the fields of technology research, adult education, 
teacher education, postgraduate education, scholarships exchange and degree 
certification. ---Dean of the Open University of Tanzania 
The words show the willingness for cooperation by African and Chinese 
educational administrators; for what reason do they have passion towards, and feel 
more equal with, China, rather than the Western donors? And how do Chinese 
university organize and declare these activities? The President Forum followed the 
third year's training for African university chancellors by ZJNU. A series of short 
114 These viewpoints are from the training reports by ZJNU, which were offered to me by the dean of the 
African centre while I was doing my interview there. 
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term training sessions by ZJNU have already transferred a broad range of basic 
knowledge about China and the Chinese educational situation to African trainees, 
and also created a harmonized relationship between Chinese and African 
educational leaders. Let's examine some details of this training, and have some 
critical analysis on how the organizers describe the training. 
The trainings held in ZJNU have been formed regularly and systematically. The 
information of three training sessions held in ZJNU in recent years can be seen in 
the following table, and highlights that the university is accelerating on this kind 
of cooperation with Africa and building stable relationship with Africa through 
this channel. ' 15 
Table 8.1 Three training sessions held in ZJNU in 2004-2006 
Year 2004 2005 2006 
Participants 19 participants from 11 participants from 7 20 participants 
fromAfrica 13 African countries African countries including chancellors, 
including university including university vice chancellors and 
chancellor and vide chancellors, deans, deans 
chancellors officials from MoE 
Participants 
from China 
ZJNU chancellor and lecturers, scholars from top Chinese universities, 
officials in educational sections 
Schedule 12/08-14/08 Shanghai, 01/12-08/12 ZJNU, 15/09-25/09 ZJNU, 
arriving; seminars, workshops, seminars, workshops, 
15/08-19/08 ZJNU in visiting and culture visiting and culture 
Jinhua, seminars and saloon; saloon; 
workshops; 09/12-15/12 in Wuhu and 26/09-01/10 in 
20/08-22/08 Hangzhou, Anhui Normal Shaoxing and 
Hangzhou, seminars University etc. and other Hangzhou, seminars 
from officials and colleges for professional and visiting in 4 
scholar outside of education, seminars and institutes in two cities; 
ZJNU; visiting in 5 institutes in 02/10-05/10 Forum of 
23/08-26/08 Beijing, two cities; China-Africa 
visiting Beijing 16/12-19/12 finishing university Presidents; 
University and 06/10-08/10 finishing 
Tsinghua University 
115 The training documents were obtained from my field interview at ZJNU. 
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performance A good connection Three modules training: Based on the previous 
between practice and background module, experience, more 
theories; promoting professional module and diverse activities and 
long term cooperation; expansion module; 116 higher quality of 
enhancing the image Very good interaction lecturers team; 
of China. between participants, The 1" China-African 
managers and lecturers; University President 
'Cooperation Forum. 
Memorandums' signed. "7 
It may be concluded that the case of short term training held by ZJNU showed 
some progress and provided good experience for this approach by the Chinese 
government. It is a practical idea that the Ministry of Education and the Ministry 
of Commerce authorize universities to do the training, as it is easier to organise 
teaching team and space, and also a provides a good opportunity to advertise these 
universities internationally. Some of the universities began to build regular 
cooperation with African universities. Within several years of the development of 
the training, it is more synthetic in content and there are more universities and 
colleges joining the training. Universities work collaboratively with the hosting 
university to hold seminars and workshops, as well as to show their research 
performance, such as some Africa research centres. 
3. CDA of four pieces of `Work summary of training for university presidents' 
by ZJNU: a statement rather than technical report 
In this section, we use CDA to look at the words and language used in discussing 
educational cooperation between China and Africa. The typical case, short term 
training, which is featured as `practical' and a `connection between theory and 
educational reality' for African higher educators, can be set as the analysis basis. 
116 The background module includes an introduction of the educational development situation in China and 
education in Zhejiang province, where ZJNU is. The professional module includes topics of higher education 
in China, such as the system, the policies, teaching and curriculum, enrolment, postgraduate education, 
logistics socialization, etc. The expansion module is about the prospects of the internationalization of higher 
education. 
"' The `Cooperation Memorandums' is for more cooperation and exchange between Chinese and African 
universities in the future. It includes collaborated research, academic meetings and conferences, cooperated 
education, academic resource exchange, short term training, teacher and student exchange, short term course, 
etc. There were seven chancellors signed the memorandum with ZJNU by the end of the training 2005. 
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Following Fairclough (1989; 1992: 73; 1995: 98) there are three dimensions of 
critical discourse analysis - description (text analysis), interpretation (processing 
analysis) and explanation (social analysis). In this analysis, there will be three 
parts which are `the text of the summary', `the roles in the summary', and `the 
social relation within the summary'. Through this analysis on text, we can see that, 
while the texts may be not too different from how Western courses might describe 
their activities and their performance, CDA enables us to see `behind' the words, 
into a bigger context of broader social/power relations of the Chinese aid practice, 
and through this to demonstrate a different logic behind the courses in China. 
3.1 Text (style, genre) 
The four pieces of work summarised include three pieces from `Training for 
university presidents in African English speaking countries' and one summary of 
`Training for university presidents in African French speaking countries'. There is 
not much difference between the two types of training, except for the different 
groups of African countries. The schedules and lecturers are similar. So we will 
not discuss them separately. Three training sessions from 2004 to 2006 for African 
English speaking countries were summarised in the table above. Every summary 
includes the following parts: (a) basic information about the number of 
participants and their nationalities, as well as the schedule of the training (i. e. 
stages in different cities and activities); (b) the performance of the training; (c) the 
experience and implications. 
The language used in the summary moves between formal and informal. As a 
formal report of the schedule and activities, the summaries state the schedule of 
each time of training in a neutral way, noting the date and the content of the 
training (such as the titles of the seminars and the place names they visited). These 
features have been listed in the above table. However, in terms of some specific 
places and activities, a few descriptive words which expressed some `feeling' 
about the training were used: 
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Pleasant and exciting description--- 
'In the evening, the participants visited the beautiful night view of The Bund 
(Waitan) in Shanghai. ' (2004 summary) 
`The participants are keeping great interest consistently towards to the visiting and 
seminars. ' (2004 summary) 
`The beautiful West Lake in Hangzhou' (in every summary) 
`The local place with very rich local characters' (in every summary) 
Describing the practice they joined- 
`During the intense study we arranged the visiting to the beautiful West Lake' 
`A fully reinforced teaching team with educational experts in and out ZJNU' 
(similar words in every summary) 
`At the moment our chancellor exchanging gifts with African participants, the 
prolonged applause foreshowing the-long vitality of the China and Africa 
educational cooperation' (Nov. 2005 summary) 
`The participants visited Qinghua University, and received kindly by the vice 
chancellor' (2004 summary) 
`The seminar proceeded in a very warm atmosphere... they discussed the 
experience and methods as well as the difficulties very deeply' (2004 summary) 
, The study and visiting in China let them keenly aware of China as the rising 
eastern big country and its full power and grandeur... ' 
An African participant's words has been quoted- 
'A participant from Morocco sent email to us after he went back, saying, China is 
the real friendly country for Africa. They are warm-hearted and hospitable. The 
staffs from Ministry of Commerce and ZJNU are so friendly and served us well. 
They have given us the best arrangement, which let us feel like at home! We want 
to thank you very much again! ' (2005 summary) 
Some specific examples added- 
'A lady from Republic of Djibouti got sick in the night. The Chinese staff sent her 
to the hospital as soon as possible during the night and watched her until the next 
day. Then the staff started to watch her by turn until she got well and left hospital. 
During the visit in Jiangxi province, in order to look after her well, there was a 
female staff joining temporarily in the trip. After that, the lady has being getting 
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better and better. ' 
`During the daily life in China, in order to respect fully everyone's religion, the 
university emphasised again and again at the scheduled dining places about what 
kind of food they can supply, and checked the menu carefully. There were two 
participants from Morocco in the Ramadan time which means they can only eat in 
the very early morning. So the organizer served them separately of their meals. ' 
All of the discourse about the trainings emphasised: the well-organised 
arrangement, the strong lecturing team, the diverse activities and the good 
feedback, this shows a feeling of friendliness and cooperation between African 
participants and Chinese organisers. Not only were the diverse activities and 
seminars in a wide range of topics which they enjoyed, but they also were very 
well looked after during daily life in China. This is what the summaries have 
described to us. 
Another feeling expressed by the texts is `win-win'. It is not discussing about how 
China is giving a beneficial opportunity to African universities, but highlights a 
sharing opportunity for both sides. The texts use words which are not like voice 
from a higher level to a lower level. The terms `discussion', `communication', 
`international exchange' are used frequently. 
`The two-sides discussed deeply according to each side's experience, methods and 
difficulties of administration. ' (2004 summary) 
`This has promoted the future cooperation in the educational field for China and 
Africa two sides. ' (2004 summary) 
`Our university exchanged the educational documents with the African 
participants during the training. ' (2005 summary) 
`We discussed the higher education issues together. ' 
`We combine the seminar, visiting, exchange activities together to achieve a best 
effect of the training. ' (2006 summary) 
`We arranged the face-to-face communication between our university students and 
the African participants- the Cultural Saloon which let the participants be 
integrated into the atmosphere of Chinese university culture... is getting to be a 
bridge for China and African young people's life. ' (2006 summary) 
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This shows the Chinese style of talking about the relationship between them and 
their developing partners. It is in the context of equals, exchange, communication 
and friendship. This is found from the political discourse in speeches by the 
president to the small summaries for practice, and thus we can see this style in 
many situations. 
Most of the texts are positive, and seldom are critical and reflective thinking to be 
found. However, the language being used is changing through time. Note that 
although the frameworks look similar for all of the summaries (i. e. with a kind of 
fixed outline), the language used and the expression have some changes. There are 
more specific examples, and fewer high-sounding words used in the latter 
summaries. It seems the summary writers have also begun paying attention to the 
style, so as to make the summaries more technical and less emotional. In the last 
summary, an additional suggestion part with some specific future plans on the 
training was added. 
3.2 Roles- discursive practice of discourse 
The summaries are made by the Foreign Affairs Division of ZJNU. As discussed 
above, the writers are responsible for the summaries to three level bodies, the 
university, the local educational departments and the Ministries. 
According to the paragraphs talking specifically about the `support of ministry', 
we can firstly interpret from the text the important role of the Ministry of 
Education and the Ministry of Commerce, as well as Education Department in 
Zhejiang Province. 
`The training is highly valued by the leadership of International Department, 
Ministry of Education, and supported a lot by the departments in charge. All of 
these are the preconditions and important guarantee of the training. -During the 
training time, the Education Department of Zhejiang province has been supporting 
a lot to us, especially the session in Hangzhou. We can not separate our success 
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from their help. ' (2004 summary) 
`Ministry of Education highly valued the training and held the Forum of 
China-African University Presidents, concerning and directing us a lot in many 
aspects. The vice-department chief of International Cooperation and Exchanges, 
Baoli Liu not only directed us very carefully in the first-phase preparation of the 
training and the forum, but also gave a lot of constructive suggestions and 
attended all of the sessions of the forum. ' (2006 summary) 
`Executive Bureau of International Economic Cooperation of Ministry of 
Commerce highly valued assisting Africa by this kind of training, and concerned a 
lot in many aspects. The executive bureau did a lot of efforts on the enrolment of 
the training, and devoted a lot on the training contents and schedules, issued very 
clear requirements. The bureau concerned the participants' arrival information all 
the time before the training, and always inquired about the situation on the phone. 
All of these are strong guarantee of our success. ' (2005 summary- French 
speaking African country training) 
The text actually shows a political system among the host university (ZJNU), the 
local educational department and the central ministries. All of the educational 
cooperation practices are directed by the central government, which indicate that 
the practice is educational as well as political. The power relations among these 
institutions have an influence on the language of the summaries. 
It can be seen from the content that both ministries have been mentioned 
frequently in the texts, which in turn means the leadership of the ministries. The 
two ministries, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Commerce, are the 
driver of the practice and also the audience of these summaries. 
Another role is ZJNU itself, as the producer of the summaries and the organiser of 
the training. The summaries are all showing us that the university, in this practice, 
has done a good job and devoted human and material resources to it. Thus the 
objectivities could be a consideration when people are reading these words, as it 
actually showing ZJNU's capacity. 
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So it can be seen that the reports are also intended to be an advertisement for 
ZJNU. The description about the well organised training and the quotes featuring 
good feedback are very persuasive and show the ability and performance of this 
university. The implications and future suggestions indicate that the university is 
thinking to improve this practice. That is why some interviewees told me that it 
has been a good chance to advertise universities' (especially these `second line 
universities') special characters (such as African study centre), as well as promote 
themselves internationally. 
Under the big picture of the China-Africa relationship, which seems to be getting 
closer, it is obviously a good idea to develop educational practice in Africa, 
especially one authorized by the central government. For ZJNU, the benefits are 
multidimensional: helping the win-win China and Africa relationship, helping 
higher education cooperation between itself and other national and international 
universities, and helping its own research development. 
Therefore, from the texts of these training summaries/ reports, we can get an idea 
that, the texts tend: To show how successful the training is, which has taken the 
forms of the visiting, seminars, workshops and cultural saloons, and how welcome 
the training is by African participants; 
To show a special kind of cooperation between Chinese and African universities, 
as well as a cooperation among the Chinese educational institutions and 
educational administrative organisations; 
With the performance described in the texts, from the political perspective we can 
see the goals the texts producer wants: 
To get a positive evaluation from the higher educational departments (which is 
good for the university in the long run); 
To create a positive image of the university itself (to let the wider audience, other 
universities in Africa and even all over the world, know about its success). 
269 
3.3 Social relations 
Fairclough (1995: 38) says, a social institution is (amongst other things) an 
apparatus of verbal interaction, or an `order of discourse'; thus an institution can 
be regarded as a sort of `speech community' with its own particular repertoire of 
speech events, its own differentiated settings and scenes, its cast of participants, 
and its own norms for their combination. The institution provides these with a 
frame for action, without which they cannot act; it thereby constrains them to act 
within that frame, however. 
Here the discourse of the summaries is under two types of institutional 
frameworks: one is the administration within university, which means the 
summaries are reports of work for university level eyes to see whether the staff 
organise the activities successfully; another is the administration within the 
educational system, from local to central government, which means the 
summaries are reports for higher educational managers to evaluate their practice, 
especially for the manager who gives the funding- the ministry. Thus the 
summaries should be like working reports, yet within a more political atmosphere. 
This is why the summaries are not technical but instead show a `colourful picture' 
of Chinese and African educational cooperation. 
This picture is a representation of the distinctive style of China-Africa cooperation 
in the field of higher education. It shows how China wants its educational 
assistance to be understood and presented. 
It could be argued that the summaries are not just summaries, meaning that the 
summaries are more than technical reports which describe the process, progress, 
and results of technical or scientific research, or the state of a technical or 
scientific research problem (Online Technical Writing, n. d. ). ll' It is not just 
talking about the aims, content and main performance of the training in a technical 
way. The content listed in the table above cannot cover all the meaning in the 
whole discourse. For instance those `exciting' words have been used to imply a 
"a See explanation of a `technical report' on the website of 'Online Technical Writing', 
http: //www. io. com/-hcexres/textbook/techreps. htmi. 
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very important and meaningful intention. 
It is more than a report, it can be seen more as a statement. In logic a statement is 
a declarative sentence. These summaries are statements about China, about 
Chinese intentions towards Africa, and about Chinese equal relations with Africa. 
They are not only talking about how the training is going, but also about how the 
organisers have not wasted the time, resources and the government funding - an 
effective work, about how the training has been successful for both sides -a 
win-win process, about how this kind of Chinese educational aid has formed an 
impressive approach of aid which is welcomed by African people. The statement 
actually is that by short term training, China is successfully exchanged the higher 
education knowledge, experience, and resources with African universities in a 
friendly, practical and efficient manner. 
4. Cultural route: culture centre and Confucius Institute 
Beside the aid approaches in higher and vocational education, China has other 
types of action in Africa. However these activities were not recognised as main 
approaches in my field work, and some of these activities seemed to be unpopular 
for Tanzanians. As the ambassador told, sometimes what we gave was not what 
they wanted. Here, the Cultural Centre in Mkapa High School in Dar es Salaam 
could be an example which shows a gap between the donor's aim and the 
recipient's urgent needs. The idea of the centre sounds a good idea to build a 
cultural `bridge' between middle school students in China and Tanzania, however 
it is better known to China's media, but not outside. 
As we indicated in the introduction, China had an extension on the conception of 
education. Training seems like an acceptable way, both practically and politically, 
to build the China-Africa relationship, and to transfer Chinese developmental 
experience to Africa, and also to establish a reputation for Chinese universities. 
Not only this, but in Chinese discourse the term `education' is always associated 
with the term `culture' (as in Tanzania all of the cooperation is mainly in the 
Cultural Agreement), this therefore transforms Chinese culture through education 
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while it is also claimed by China as a way to support African education. It is a 
cultural route for promoting a political relationship and a friendly atmosphere. 
Thus, how about the field scene and the school/institutional leaders' feelings? 
4.1 Chinese Cultural Centre in Mkapa High School: a small place with a big 
name 
Benjamin Mkapa High School, which honours Tanzanian's third president 
Benjamin William Mkapa, was introduced by the school principal and his 
secretary as the biggest one in the country with more than three thousand students. 
If you check the information on Chinese news website, you can read news about a 
Chinese Cultural Centre in this school, which was built by the Chinese 
government in 2005. On 27 May 2005, the opening ceremony of this centre was 
held in the school with the two sides' officials in attendance. As Chinese- news 
introduced: 
This is the first Chinese cultural-educational base for Tanzanian high 
school students. Chinese government donated more than 400 books and 
CDs about China (in English language), TV and DVD, 20 computers 
which are value to 20,000 USD to Mkapa School. Therefore the school 
established an exhibition room for `Chinese Cultural Centre', and let the 
2000 students get to know the Chinese history and current situation as 
well as cultures and arts at any time. (FOCAC, 31/05/2005) 
The Chinese news motivated me to arrange a visit to the school when I arrived in 
Dar es Salaam. I was lucky to meet the school principal, Mero, as soon as I 
reached the school. Mero and his secretary accepted my interview request and 
introduced me to the school: 
I am not very precise but I think we were looking for various 
organisations and assistance for our school, Japan, China.. . and 
fortunately we got Japanese embassy to help to do some constructions, 
building these rooms, and the teaching materials were mainly from 
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Chinese embassy, in terms of computers... and to make sure this 
friendship goes on, they use one of the rooms for the cultural centre. The 
materials there can be read by both of teachers and students. They helped 
build some sort of library, basically some educational materials, 
newspapers and so on. (Principal, Mero) 
The basic fact seemed to be the same as what the Chinese media described. As the 
secretary said: 
Sometimes Chinese come and visit the school. They came twice. They 
firstly donated some computers and piano, and some sort of materials 
such as books and pictures, posters. (Secretary of the principal) 
When asked about what they thought about the motives of these donations, the 
principal said: 
Well.. . Chinese and Tanzanian, 
diverse cultures, relationships... because 
of that... There are some Chinese pictures, including Chinese and 
Tanzanian presidents Mao and Nyerere... (Mero) 
It is obvious that the donation and the Cultural Centre are all for building a 
relationship between China and Tanzania. The principal talked about the Cultural 
Centre: 
It is open. And some teachers they can seek materials for teaching. But it 
is not directly related with the teaching, and some of them are in 
Chinese... Anyway it is helping us, and you can see our students are 
happy with that when they use the TV which is available there.. . And the 
cultural centre, because of that, we feel our friendship is still growing. 
After that, we had a look at the Chinese cultural centre in the school. On the way 
to the Cultural Centre I could see part of the school was still under construction. 
Actually the construction was suspended because of a lack of money, as the 
principal told me. Thus I felt that it is good to let students know more about 
273 
another continent, however the urgent needs of students must not be Chinese 
culture. 
The information, when compared to pictures I got from Chinese media, is not too 
different from the reality. However, the media likes to use some `big words' to 
describe the project. Does this centre represent such a big value as the media 
expressed, one for `bridging two countries friendship' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of PRC; Ministry of Culture of PRC, 2005)? In fact when I reached the centre, it 
seemed to represent a kind of loneliness. It was also possible that students were in 
class, so not many people were there. The centre was just a room, not big, but full 
of books and pictures. Some of the books were very good for learning Chinese 
history and geography, and there were posters showing typical Chinese scenes. 
The room was decorated with Chinese red lanterns, on each of the lanterns there 
were Chinese characters. It could be attractive for students, but I was not sure how 
big an influence it could make. 
On the other hand, as Mkapa School is quite well known in the country, I 
sometimes talked about this with local students. A Tanzanian PhD student, who 
was also working on aid research and did fieldwork in Mkapa School, told me that 
the school's management capacity was a problem. As she said, `the school is just a 
normal school, but so many political things are related with it because of the 
school's name. If the school gets several small amount donations from diverse 
donors, then they should collect them together and organize them well in use' 
(reference). It seems that from a Tanzanian researcher's perspective, not only the 
donor, but also the school leaders, should work better and be responsible for the 
school's future. 
4.2 Confucius Institute (CI) 
If we say in most of the areas the so called `cooperation' between China and 
Tanzania is more like one-way assistance (i. e. offering teaching materials, teacher 
dispatch or student scholarships), then the development of a Confucius Institute 
(CI), claimed as a non-profit education organisation promoting Chinese language 
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and culture in the world, could be one of the educational and cultural 
`co-operations' between China and Africa in the new era. 
It is important to mention Hanban (the Confucius Institute Headquarters), which is 
`the executive body of the Chinese Language Council International, a 
non-governmental and non-profit organisation affiliated to the Ministry of 
Education of China'. Hanban is the body governing the CIs, leading and 
supervising all of the CIs around the world. 
The number of the CIs and the Confucius Classrooms is increasing, according 
to Hanban's data: 
In the period up to October 2009, a total of 523 Confucius Institutes and 
Confucius Classrooms have been established in 87 countries and regions 
over the world; among which 282 are Confucius Institutes in 84 
countries..... 21 in 15 African countries, 94 in 29 European countries... 
(Hanban, 2009)119 
By the end of 2010, there have been 322 Confucius Institutes and 369 
Confucius Classrooms (total number 691) established in 96 countries. In 
addition, some 250 institutions from over 50 countries have expressed 
requirements for establishing Confucius Institutes/Classrooms, amongst 
them some of the world's top universities (Hanban, 2010a). 
Among these 322 CIs in 91 countries, according to data by October 2010, there 
are 81 CIs in 30 Asian countries, 21 CIs in 16 African countries, 105 CIs in 31 
European countries, 103 CIs in 12 American countries, and 12 CIs in 2 Oceania 
countries (Hanban, 2010b). 
The aim of CI, as stated in Hanban's `Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius 
Institutes', is very inspiring: 
119 See from H anban's website, http: //english. hanban. org/. This was expired when new data came out in 
2010. 
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Confucius Institutes devote themselves to satisfying the demands of 
people from different countries and regions in the world who learn the 
Chinese language, to enhancing understanding of the Chinese language 
and culture by these peoples, to strengthening educational and cultural 
exchange and cooperation between China and other countries, to 
deepening friendly relationships with other nations, to promoting the 
development of multi-culturalism, and to construct a harmonious world 
(Hanban, n. d. ). 
Also stated in the by-law, the services provided by the Confucius Institute include: 
Chinese language teaching; training Chinese language instructors and providing 
Chinese language teaching resources; holding the HSK examination (Chinese 
Proficiency Test) and tests for the Certification of the Chinese Language Teachers; 
providing information and consultative services concerning China's education, 
culture, and so forth; and conducting language and cultural exchange activities 
between China and other countries (Hanban, n. d. ). 120 
Yet there hasn't been much separate introduction about Confucius Classrooms on 
Hanban's website, however, there are separate procedures for applying CIs and 
Confucius Classrooms, based on the same by-laws (Hanban, n. d. ). 12' 
The principal of DUCE also was asked to talk about the aim of CI. She said: 
Spreading Chinese language, Chinese culture in the world... It is more 
about learning Chinese and culture, not for business profit. Chinese 
language also comes international. That is possible. One of the criteria for 
setting CI is the demanding for Chinese language and culture. When we 
sign the agreement of establishment, as they say, we need to coorperate 
the Chinese language education and promote culture exchange, and 
increase mutual understanding between two countries. I think these are 
the major objectives. (Mica) 
120 See http: //english. hanban. org/node_7880. htm 
21 See http: //english. hanban. org/node_7879. htm 
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It should be additionally noted that the CI is claimed to be a type of cultural and 
educational cooperation between China and Africa (and with other continents), 
and that this `cooperation' and `exchange' means that the Africa side also needs to 
contribute. We noticed that in the Funding Chapter of the `Constitution and 
By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes', both sides have to provide funds to 
maintain the CI. 
A newly established Confucius Institute will receive aid to its initial 
operation in the form of a set amount of funds provided by the Chinese 
Parties. The funds for its annual projects shall be raised by individual 
Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Parties together in a ratio of 
approximately 1: 1 commitment in general. (Chapter 5: Funds) 
From this aspect we cannot say it is just `aid', and as CIs are built all over the 
world, African people feel that they are joining a global project and probably, that 
they need Chinese language more than people in other countries. Thus they would 
like to apply for this project, as a type of university cooperation with China. 
Perhaps the CI will remind people of the British Council. Both of the CIs (by 
Hanban) and British Council, as government's international cultural relation body, 
show people the soft power and the importance of `culture'. Comparatively, the 
British Council has more diverse activities in more areas in the world, and is more 
mature. Besides the funding from the government, British Council earns more 
income from its `commercial businesses', while Chinese Hanban still define CIs 
as 'non-profit'. 122 Howeve r in this study, we focus on the CI's meaning for China 
in Africa, and it may be explained as follows: 
Firstly, CIs in the Western countries service Chinese lovers more than Chinese 
`demanders', but in Africa with more and more Chinese business and Chinese 
scholarship opportunities, there are increasing number of peoples need who need 
"'British Council expresses their funding system in three parts: government grants, further sources and 
financial memorandum; the 'further sources' refers to their commercial businesses, principally `teaching 
English, administering examinations and managing international contracts on behalf of clients. ' As they say, 
`for every £1 of government grant we receive, we earn £2.50 from other sources' (British Council, 2010). 
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the CI as a kind of instrument for life. For example, five of the students in the 
Nairobi CI have been employed by Chinese invested cooperation in Kenya. Just 
as the principal of DUCE said: 
We wish to teach Chinese here, because there are quite a number of 
people I am sure who have an interest to learn Chinese here. Then when 
they go to China to do business or whatever, they can communicate with 
Chinese well.... It is just about teaching Chinese. I believe more and 
more people want to learn it and I have introduced it to my students 
already. Our students are interested in that. They want to learn a second 
foreign language. (Misa) 
Secondly, it is a cultural route for developing a China-Africa relationship through 
cooperation in the educational field. Through learning about Chinese Wushu 
(martial art), calligraphy, paper-cuts, and ancient poems, the students have become 
more and more interested in Chinese culture. Yet it is for more than education and 
learning Chinese, it is for political and business aims as well. As TJNU introduced, 
there are a series of officials visiting the CI in Kenya, even President Hu. The 
speeches discuss the `memorable meeting with President Hu', `the first lecture by 
the Chinese ambassador', and the `2008 Beijing Olympics'. They started to be 
friendlier to the Chinese officials and moreover, the students with good 
performance in their Chinese learning have the opportunity to work in Chinese 
institutes or companies. So the CIs produce students who are close to China and 
even work for Chinese businesses in Africa. 
Thirdly, while the CI cannot bring much business for the Chinese university which 
operates it, it can bring reputation. As Yan (TJNU) said, `it is also a good practice 
for advising our universities. We are not the most famous university in China but 
we can develop our institution by some creation and some contribution to the field 
such as educational cooperation with developing countries and spreading Chinese 
learning in the world, in order to be more competitive'. On the other hand, there is 
the same effect on African universities which have CIs. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter featured analysis and findings regarding China's training and cultural 
approaches on educational aid. In addition to formal higher education by which 
the Chinese government cooperates with Africa there are other forms. This is what 
we talked about in this chapter, specifically short term training or Confucius 
Institute. We also did discourse analysis on the training reports in order to see the 
motives and the social relations of the Chinese institutions and ministries. 
Within this chapter, the introduction and visits to three Chinese universities gave 
some information about individual universities' jobs and roles in the action for 
Africa. These universities are the main power of human resource support to 
African countries, and these practice, such as training African students, officials or 
administrators, also help the universities have higher international prestige and 
more funding from the Chinese government; a type of `win-win'. 
In terms of the short term training, we reviewed ZJNU's three years' reports on 
training for university presidents in Africa. The texts in the reports revealed that 
the organizer- Chinese ministries and the university- both wanted to emphasise 
their positive performance as recognised by African participants, which were 
presented through a series of words and sentences, as well as through specific 
examples. Thus we prefer to call it a statement rather than a report, as the texts 
produced a vivid picture of China and Chinese universities' interest and intention 
towards Africa. 
Moreover, China has an extension of the conception of education so that Chinese 
texts include both formal education and short term training as `educational 
cooperation'. In addition to this, the cultural route is also conducted by 
contemporary China. The Confucius Institute has trained more and more foreign 
people who like Chinese language. One of the big differences between the CI in 
developed countries and in Africa is that the CI in Africa can help a number of 
African applicants obtain jobs in Chinese companies. Another case was the 
Cultural Centre in Mkapa School, which was successfully in its political aims 
rather than solving urgent educational needs in the school. The Centre was also 
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a Chinese style of logic in practice - focusing more on an image it can build. 
In terms of the difference between these Chinese approaches and the Western 
approaches (i. e. a comparison with British Council), we actually cannot 
distinguish them too much at the mechanism level - on strengthening a country's 
`soft power' by doing cultural activities and language education (though with 
longer history, British Council is more comprehensive and systematical than 
Hanban). However, the most important characteristic China has, which is also 
recognised by the participants/recipients, is that there are more common goals 
between Africa and China. This is China's active strategy at the moment. There 
are advantages of doing this: China's experience and culture, quite different from 
the Western developmental history, are attractive to African people. The 
experience is pragmatic for African people, as they can learn how a developing 
country achieves fast economic growth. Learning Chinese culture and language 
will be interesting and helpful for African people, as more and more Chinese 
economic powers will engage with Africa. Educational institutes, in this process, 
are the provider and organizer for delivering knowledge and directing people 
towards knowledge in an efficient way. 
This logic of `sharing experience' within developing countries is increasingly 
recognised by not only African people but also Western donors. The World Bank 
has noticed `Africa seeks to replicate China's success' (Kleine and Xie, 2008), and 
according to president of the World Bank Group, 
`... new partners are contributing not only aid, but more importantly are 
becoming major trading partners and sources of investment and 
know-how.... This is particularly true in the case of China's engagement 
with Africa. African countries want to learn about China's development 
experience, particularly about overcoming poverty and sustaining 
economic growth.... Development is no longer a North-South transfer. It 
is South-South, even South-North, with lessons for all with open minds. ' 
(Zoellick, 2010). 
We can see a trend: China is establishing its image in Africa, including a Chinese 
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style of development, and how it has changed. This forms a comparison with the 
image of `the West'. The Cold War gave the world an impression of `the West' as 
a distinct entity (Vlahos, 1991: 60), and politically, the socialist side, including 
China, represented an opposite meaning and style. However with the 
disappearance of the two super powers and with economic globalisation, we are 
wondering whether there will be a `Southern picture', or an Orientalism, which is 
not Western oriented. China is doing, in transforming its own style through formal 
higher education, short term training, school exhibition, or language study, 
expanding an influence different from the classical Western model. 
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Conclusion of Part Two 
1. Summary 
In Part One, we have already discussed the logic that all countries could become 
`modern' and `catch up' with the West if they followed the same stages as the 
West did; this was seen as both a theory and a prescription (Dale, 1982) and set 
the basis for the Western model of development. Rather than giving a standard 
prescription or defining conditions to the recipients, China claims a `win-win' 
(mutually beneficial) route (FOCAC, 2006a). Different from the Western logic of 
building a framework for modernisation or promoting an economic/political 
adjustment, China is working for building bilateral relations rather than framing a 
global structure (although the influence seems to be increasingly global). 
According to `win-win' rules, China is gaining broader political and economic 
relations through this human resource transformation. 
Therefore, Part Two examined these features on the texts/ in the discourse, looked 
at whether there were differences and whether people recognised these differences. 
Through field work in Tanzania and China in different social departments and 
with diverse people, Part Two found more details of the Chinese aid and more of 
voice about China's practice. By visiting Tanzanian ministries, institutions, high 
schools and individuals, we arrived at some answers regarding the distinctiveness 
of Chinese aid: 
Firstly, China is very clear about providing educational aid through offering 
human resource - with the main way of training African people in China being 
long term for degrees or short term for skills and experience. For example, China 
does not finance the Tanzanian Ministry of Education or give big amount money 
to the schools directly. This is very different from the Western way -a turning 
from project supported to budget support- as China does not like `cash aid'. This 
is also indicated by Brautigam (2009: 124): 
... a growing trend 
in the West, where donors have begun to believe that 
a relatively well-governed country should be able to make its own 
282 
decisions about how to use foreign assistance. Although the Chinese are 
aware of this trend, they are not following it. They rarely give cash aid in 
any significant amount. 
And as she says, don't mistake the cash aid to be a donation. China also likes 
donating some goods to schools (such as they did to Mkapa School with the 
computers and books, etc. ). According to Brautigam (2009: 125), the difference is 
a normal grant-in-kind with a value in Chinese currency, while a cash grant will 
normally be announced with a value in US dollars. Moreover, donations also 
make for good pictures in the media, which build a nice image of China in Africa 
(just as the Cultural Centre and the donated pictures and books do). 
So when China is not planning to provide a big amount of money, one of the best 
choices for China is educational aid andoffering human resource support. 
Providing assistance in higher education for Africa's urgent needs, and carrying 
out technological training, may be seen as one way of saving African people from 
the low effectiveness of some foreign aid. The Chinese media likes to use a 
proverb from Lao-Tzu to describe China's logic of educational assistance for 
Africa: `Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach him how to fish and 
you feed him for a lifetime'. Moreover, when both parties depend on the fish, the 
`teaching' approach seems more meaningful. 
Secondly, the help for human resource development in Africa is recognised as an 
important approach by our interviewees. We can see the Chinese scholarships are 
acceptable, and we also can see a number of returning students who obtained 
degrees in China now working at a good job in Tanzania. We can see the 
Tanzanian principals are applying to build a Confucius Institute, which proves to 
us the need (maybe rather the desire) for Chinese language learning in local areas. 
However, there are both positive and negative opinions on the details of the 
practice, which shows that China still needs to improve its practice. Instead of 
building a friendly image for African people, it is better to work on their urgent 
needs in education, either the needs for school teaching or construction, or the 
needs for more communication and strict evaluation in higher education from the 
African students in China. 
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A final point is the recognition of the difference between China and the West. It 
can be seen that the Chinese officials translate their policy claims into practice, 
and the Chinese can also point to their good performance in the training of African 
University administrators. Both of these show China providing unconditional and 
equal support for African countries. However, while the older generation seems to 
have more passion in their Chinese friendships through the historical link, the 
younger generation may not be interested in any political comparison of different 
donors. Even some current institutional leaders also noted that they would accept 
any donation from any type of donor, when the resource could be of help. So it 
can be argued that the difference of donor logic is not recognised very clearly 
among the recipients, as most of the interviewees are not keen on talking about 
politics even though they know why they choose to study in China or why they 
want to learn Chinese, or why they feel happy with the workshops taken in China. 
The answer is they feel related with Chinese - within the activities organised by 
China, they can get what they are interested in, but maybe cannot easily obtain 
these things from the West: (a) some feeling of sharing experience and ideas for 
development; (b) some activities which are more like exchange rather than help; 
(c) some practical skills which are related to, and helpful for, their future careers. 
2. An important part of 'donor logic': understanding modality 
differences 
We pointed out in the Introduction that one of the main elements of `donor 
logic', is what was referred to as the `aid modality' the means and mechanisms by 
which aid is provided, and how funds and knowledge are transmitted to recipient 
countries (Ohno and Niiya, 2004: 3). Having described the detail of Chinese aid in 
Part Two, it is appropriate to return to this broader question now. 
In terms of the Western context, according to Ohno and Niiya (2004: 7), there 
have been three shifts towards to a new aid modality. The first shift is from 
'stand-alone' projects to project `clustering', often in the form of pooling funds. 
The second shift is from structural adjustment operations to GBS under the PRSP 
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agenda. Third, some donors, particularly DFID, have moved from SWAp to GBS, 
based on the view that GBS is a `preferred' or more `progressive' aid modality. It 
is interesting to summarise China's position and aid modality features within the 
process of these shifts. 
The exploration of the fieldwork data helped us find out more about how aid has 
been and is provided by Western and Chinese donors. The main differentiating 
characteristics of China's aid modality are as follows: 
1. China does not `do' `professional aid'. As mentioned in the Introduction, China 
does not distribute aid through bureaucratised specialists or agencies, as China is 
not keen on direct finance and hence not so concerned with evaluating how 
recipient countries manage the money. Therefore there is no `accounting' of the 
money and much less accountabilities of recipients. There is no central foreign-aid 
agency (an institute such as DFID), although there is a Department of Aid to 
Foreign Countries under Ministry of Commerce of the PRC. Beijing often 
designates different ministries (or, in some instances, provinces) to tackle different 
projects in different countries (Davis and Woetzel, 2010). 
2. There is not yet any evidence of China joining in the trend of moving to `new 
aid modalities' such as GBS with the Western donors. In the primary educational 
field, despite some donation of teaching facilities we examined in Tanzania, it 
seems China still focuses on building schools - from rural schools to friendship 
schools, which it also constructs itself; in the higher educational field, China 
focuses on government scholarship and university cooperation. Again it gives the 
completed project, not `money' and `assistance'. The government is not interested 
in becoming involved in managing aid flows, but in building a good image of 
China and a long term relationship with Africa through human resource 
development support. 
3. One feature of Chinese aid modality is a trend towards building one-to-one 
relationships between universities, either by organising short-term training, or 
by establishing CIs. The 20+20 Plan in 2009 FOCAC documents particularly 
emphasised this again. King (2010) exactly pointed out this distinctive 
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modality: 
A further distinguishing modality of the Confucius Institute and 
Classroom is that each of these bodies overseas is formally linked to an 
appropriate university or secondary school in China. This partnership 
then provides the source of the Chinese co-director of the Confucius 
Institutes in Africa as well as of the regular and volunteer teachers of 
Chinese to go to the African university. The Chinese partner can also 
become the host for the different scholarship and other language visitors 
to China (King, 2010: 82). 
4. While building schools and offering scholarships are not in themselves special 
forms of aid approaches (they also can be seen in Western aid), in terms of 
Chinese aid, these forms are related not with accountabilities but with 
reciprocities. It is hard to define Chinese schools or scholarships as a kind of 
project aid, as in the Western idea of project aid, in the sense that `the project 
approach is based on the identification of a specific area of intervention for donor 
involvement, and the targeted use of funds for specific activities for which the 
objectives, outputs and inputs required to achieve them have been defined' (Ohno 
and Niiya, 2004: 3). China carries out the education and training but does not 
intervene to evaluate how well they have been implemented. Individual recipients 
are evaluated by the university educational system when they are in China, but are 
not required to show they have used scholarships properly to any aid agency in 
China. The point/motive of China is creating a basis for long term trade and other 
exchanges. 
5. Finally, although on the basis of the main arguments of this study, we have been 
able to show that China's aid modality may have some differences from the 
Western aid, this conclusion is reached on the basis of an assumption of the 
`normality' of the Western framework/logic of aid. It is very hard to frame China 
into any Western modality type, as Chinese aid is not about doing stand-alone 
projects or directly financing in order to reduce transaction costs, nor about giving 
more or less ownership to recipient countries, or whether they should intervene 
into African countries' governance issues. It is even not just about promoting 
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educational development. As King (2010: 86) concluded, `ultimately all the many 
elements of China's cooperation with Africa are inseparable from the political, 
economic and trade engagements with Africa'. This may remind us that it may not 
be appropriate to put China into any category of `aid modality', because it is not 
like Western `aid' from the beginning. This blended model of aid, investment, 
trade, and technology as levers for development, while less common in Western 
approaches, embeds education into the wider and more complex political 
economic context. 
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Chapter Nine Conclusion 
This study draws on a theoretical and empirical exploration of different `donor 
logics' by examining two sets of essential elements of aid practices and policies 
between Western aid and Chinese aid to Africa - what is given/ aid approaches; 
why aid/ aid motives; any condition attached (economic or political); how aid/ 
Logic of intervention/ aid modalities/ aid paradigms; technocratic frame of aid 
practice; and aid relationships (donor and recipient). Bringing together these 
elements, enabled the work of seeking differences of `donor logics' to be 
researchable and structured. It was realised through the following process: 
--The Western context of aid, including the history of changing forms of donor 
logic, key mechanisms and logic of intervention, as well as the dominant aid 
features in the current global political economy (in Part one); 
--The Chinese conception of development, international relations and educational 
development; the Chinese logic of intervention and donor logic in its relation with 
Africa, especially its strategies from politically based to economically based, as 
well as the Chinese model in different eyes- international and national (in Part 
one); 
--Empirical studies, mainly conducted through the field interview in Tanzania and 
China, supplemented with critical discourse analysis of Chinese training reports in 
order to test how Tanzanian people perceive Chinese aid and if the Chinese model 
and logic is recognised differently (in Part two). 
In this concluding chapter, we want to review the theoretical arguments, and 
empirical findings, in order to assess the contribution and limitations of the study. 
1. A summary of the findings 
Firstly, let us examine briefly some arguments that can be drawn theoretically 
from Part one of the thesis. These can be summarised in the following points: 
(a) Under Western context, `aid' has not been a neutral term since it emerged in 
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the last century, because it is fundamentally based on a donor logic of `helping' 
developing countries achieve economic growth through entry into the world of 
capitalist economic system, so that they may someday `catch up' with 
developed countries. The specific motives of foreign aid also depend on 
different international relations and situations. Aid was a weapon during the 
Cold War; aid can help security in the post-September 11`h period; and aid is 
aiming at `poverty reduction' at the moment. 
(b) `Educational aid', under the rules of general `aid', is first and foremost about 
developing human capital in order to promote faster economic growth to 
achieve modernisation. It is an era of `education for the knowledge economy' 
(EKE). This is very much dominated by the Western donors (e. g. the biggest 
donor, the World Bank). Current donor logics of educational aid are largely 
related to the global political economy. 
(c) `Aid' has not been very successful via the logics of intervention used by the 
Western donors (e. g. in Africa), especially compared with the amount of 
money the donors contributed. From Washington Consensus to 
Post-Washington Consensus, from SAPs to PRSPs, although more 
consideration on governance and more effective approaches and 
measurements have been introduced into aid practices, the performance of aid 
has not shown much improvement. The problem lies not with one side or the 
other, but in the problematic aid relationship itself, and further, within the 
particular aid logic. 
(d) Most of the aid money ultimately comes from Western taxpayers, and to a 
certain extent NGOs and private foundations, though this is changing as 
countries such as China get involved (Roughneen, 27/04/2010). 
(e) The difference China brings is not just its role as a developing country, but a 
different development theory and a different `donor logic'. . This 
is based on a 
different historical link, and China's `pragmatism'. China's increasingly `hot' 
relations with African countries stimulate us to examine how this can be 
realised on the ground. 
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Therefore, secondly, let us look back again at what we learned from the ground, 
namely, the empirical studies: 
(a) According to the investigation in Tanzania, we can see that, firstly, Chinese 
educational practice, from donation to schools, to governmental scholarships, 
has its own impact on the local people, especially the higher educational 
groups. But compared to traditional Western donors, Chinese approaches still 
comprise only a small part of total `aid' to Tanzania. Secondly, although there 
were some complaints in specific areas, the general attitudes towards the 
Chinese contribution are positive. The government has realised the importance 
of its ownership within the aid practice, and this may give China a good 
opportunity to show its different relations to Africa. Individual students have 
an interest in studying in China, since China is offering more and more 
opportunities, and also because of Chinese economic development. 
(b) According to the investigation in China, it can be seen that higher education 
and cultural dissemination are the main routes for Chinese educational 
practice in Africa, in the forms of student scholarships and short term training, 
as well as the CIs. The short term training and the establishment of CIs are 
conducted and arranged by a few Chinese universities authorised by the 
Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Commerce. Therefore, a kind of 
win-win cooperation may be appearing: African people can get opportunities 
to study or being trained in China, and Chinese higher institutions get more 
famous and more chances to show their educational quality on an international 
platform. 
(c) According to the discourse of one particular aid action (the training reports), 
we can see how Chinese practitioners show and declare their performance 
regarding the educational assistance for Africa. The CDA analysis, enable us 
to look deeper into the broader context behind the Chinese texts -a 
`sharing/exchanging' platform built by China, advertising Chinese experience 
to Africa. On the other hand, this could lead us to think that Chinese discourse, 
although highly self-praising, has not made much impact on Africa. 
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Comparatively, it is noticeable that in talking with Tanzanian officials, they 
use Western discourse to describe their problems and solutions. 
(d) In terms of the `Chinese model' mentioned frequently in this study, from the 
data we collected it is clear that although people are not very interested in 
distinguishing the Chinese and the Western model of aid, the Chinese model is 
recognised from a practical perspective: for individuals Chinese education is 
beneficial for their future career, and for institutions, Chinese assistance can 
give useful and related developmental experience. 
The Chinese model for African education has its own basis. It is based on 
China's own discourse and experience of foreign relations and economic 
development, and also on China's domestic educational development. As 
Professor Liu of the Institute of African Studies at ZJNU said, `China 
developed a lot for its higher education in the recent 20 years, and joined a lot 
into the global trend. The progress of domestic higher education development 
provided China with the basis for supporting Africa. The 30 years of economic 
development since opening-up policy, brought China's achievements to the 
attention of the Western world. The developmental experience is valuable for 
African countries'. 
In addition, although is not among my main empirical findings, from talking with 
some Chinese scholars, I developed the impression that the researchers in the field 
of African studies are forming a rising group in current Chinese society, not only 
in academia, but also in helping to promote the China-Africa business/ trade 
activities. Most of them also agree that the key point of the Chinese model is a 
different aid theory or logic. 
Thus, what we get from this study is: under globalisation, educational 
development is increasingly important to the economic development of every 
country and also strongly influenced by the political economy nationally and 
internationally. International aid to education, as one of the aid forms, is an 
important force for the development of African countries which are still struggling 
with poverty. The Chinese model, which calls for `educational cooperation' and 
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`cultural exchange' rather than `educational aid', is based on a `win-win' and 
`mutual beneficial' logic rather than giving structural/governance consultants to 
achieve certain donor-oriented goals, and is thus gradually and increasingly 
showing a new trend of South-South relations and a new understanding of `aid'; 
to put it another way, a shock to the orthodox conception of `international aid' or 
`international assistance'. 
The empirical work tested China's logic and related action through people's 
perception. We can see that within the process of globalisation with man y things 
stimulating, shocking or motivating us, people's perception of `aid' has already 
been altered or given some new ideas. Through the field work and the 
documentary analysis, I have increasingly begun to feel that multiple changes are 
taking place around the idea of `international aid'. These include: Chinese 
people's understanding about the Western aid and about its own aid to Africa, 
Western people's understanding about the Chinese model, and Tanzanian people's 
perception of China and the West. These complexities might be expected to make 
some impact on the dominant donors, and their logic. 
2. A different logic in a set of dimensions 
`Difference' is one of the main themes of this study, so we need to emphasise 
where we have found the distinctiveness of the Chinese model. From the 
theoretical exploration, we have set six dimensions of `donor logic' and assumed 
that China has different characteristics in these elements. In contrast to the 
Western model which is still the main resource of financial aid, with changing 
forms of conditionality, paternal and hierarchical relations (instructional and 
`top-down' structured), and fundamentally `catching-up' logic based, the Chinese 
model focuses on construction, donation and `teaching people' rather than giving 
direct finance, unconditional, historically fraternal and emphasising equality 
(claiming `cooperation' and `exchange'), and based on a self-help and reciprocal 
logic. Based on this, education is one of the best ways to help `enabling' people in 
a long time, just as Confucius said: `if you plan for a year, plant a seed. If for a 
hundred years, teach the people. When you sow a seed, you will reap a single 
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harvest. When you teach the people, you will reap a hundred harvests' (Brautigam, 
2009: 119). 
By analysing the interviews and reports from the ground, most of the differences 
in these elements became more evident. We can see recipients want to move away 
from the paternal attitude they associate with Western donors; and at this point 
Chinese action has satisfied them- people like Chinese aid because it is based on 
trade, practical and more related to recipients' reality. The criticisms of China 
come more from the Western scholars than from the local people who have 
received help. These distinct Chinese logics of intervention and related 
mechanisms include: 
--A political basis to guide educational practice- educational cooperation is under 
the framework of diplomatic relations and related foreign policies between China 
and African countries; it is mainly a national activity, which means it has very 
clear political goals, and sometimes the political demands are on top of the 
educational demands. 
--An economic orientation in the aid action- although the recipient countries 
have 
been under a series of economic suggestions from the West since `aid' emerged, 
this `economic orientation' of the Chinese model means linking bilateral relations 
through business and trade activities, and setting economic growth as a common 
aim for both recipients and China itself. 
--A practical way of transferring knowledge- such as short term training, which 
is 
very practical for transferring and sharing developmental experience; despite 
some approaches on primary education, such as donating to schools and 
constructing school buildings, it is mainly focusing on a higher level of education, 
including university education and vocational education. 
--A series of discourses about 'equity' and 'cooperation' instead of `giving aid'- 
actually the word `aid' also appears in China's translated official documents, but 
more frequently used are terms which can be interpreted as a two-way action (e. g. 
the FOCAC's slogans frequently use `cooperation' and `win-win'). All of the 
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textual resources gives the world an image of an un-conditional, non-colonial tied, 
friendship based, and mutual beneficial oriented China-Africa relation. 
These differences may offer some new possibilities, or promote more 
consideration into, the traditional aid system built after the Second World War, to 
Western capitalism and its aim of modernisation, as well as to the 
language/discourse system set by the World Bank and other dominant donors. Just 
as King (2007: 346) co ncluded, `this need not take China into a Western or 
Japanese style donor, but if China is to continue to be true to the Eight Principles 
of Foreign Aid, there may well be ways in which its aid pledges can be 
implemented which build upon those foundations of mutuality, equal benefit and 
self-reliant development, and avoid the many pitfalls of traditional donor-recipient 
relations'. 
3. What China is thinking? 
Above all we now may give an extended summary of China's `donor logic', 
especially from thinking about the motives of action in the educational field. The 
fundamental thinking of China is, actually, that it does not regard itself as a donor 
(which does not have the same meaning as it does in the case of the Western 
donors). This logic, partly self-set, partly formulated by history, led to a main rule 
of building non-hierarchical relations with African countries, but based on mutual 
benefits, namely, win-win. This is different from the `catching up' logic and any 
of the related structural adjustment or governance intervention logic. Let's paint 
this logic in more detail from reviewing China's motives: 
(1) The first and the most basic thinking: you are helped not so that you can `catch 
up' with us, but so that we can exchange and share something and develop 
together. 
Ambassador Liu gave an important opinion about how different the Western aid is 
from the Chinese aid. As he explained, there is a basic difference in aid logic. In 
terms of the Western logic of aid, there is an emphasis on planning and evaluating, 
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and they have very clear standards and targets. So, they monitor the flow of the 
money and hold meetings to supervise how it is being used. This kind of aid 
system leads to Tanzanian people feel pressured and uncomfortable. 
China's advantage is its role as a developing country and never having been a 
colonist (not hierarchical). China's disadvantage is also the role as a developing 
country, as it still needs domestic development which restricts China's ability and 
competitiveness of being a donor. Therefore it is better to find another way rather 
than staying in a Western oriented model. This is the `win-win' logic. 
As Liu said, 
China is facing a period of `going out', when Africa is in a continuing 
development and being increasing attractive for the world. We are all 
giving rising investment to Africa. Where should we be going to? Africa 
is an aim, and the Beijing Summit is of very strategic importance. On the 
other hand, Africa also needs opening-up. We are win-win. This win-win 
is a kind of mutual needs under the new situation.... It is not the same 
brother relation as before, but more economic benefits and market plans 
being added. 
For Liu, the old brother relation may have focused more on political support, but 
the new win-win relation put the economic development on the first line. Also for 
Liu, even though China has a different attitude to the Sino-African relationship, 
the traditional emotion is still there: `Chinese leaders can backslap African leaders 
and say we are brothers, which is much less likely to happen with the Western 
people. This is our best advantage, although we also need reflective thinking on 
it'. 
(2) The second thinking: through education, which means not only formal school 
and university study, but also vocational training, we can provide a kind of 
assistance for Africa by transferring our experience; this may be pragmatic for 
both of us, and is an `enabling' way of intervention. 
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It is significant that it is `aid through education' rather than `educational aid'. 
Following on from the first logic, we can see education is an important strategy in 
the larger framework of China-Africa `win-win' cooperation, and it is also good 
for China itself. This means, for China, that doing educational aid is not directly 
aiming to build hegemony, but it is either directly aiming to improve the education 
of people in Africa or gaining closer bilateral, especially trade, relati onships. 
China's logic interprets `education' in a broader range within which China and 
Africa share the developing experience and become closely related with each 
other. 
Compared with direct donation to schools (e. g. to Mkapa High School), China is 
making an increasing effort towards scholarship offerings and short term training. 
We can see that, compared with Mkapa School, DIT is in a much better situation. 
DIT lecturers who have recently returned from China with Master and PhD 
degrees actually become main powers for the institute, and perhaps even in the 
country in the long run. 
(3) The third thinking is: it is practical politically to let Africans who are in 
administration/ institutional leader positions come and learn Chinese experience 
and knowledge, which will effectively help the two areas relations. 
Based on the second thinking, if the point is gaining a beneficial relationship, then 
the objectives of education could be important. Thus in addition to normal 
selection of student scholarships under the Culture Agreement, there are a few 
additional `flexible' scholarships `outside' of the agreement, though nonetheless 
official; there are also trainings/workshops for university presidents. 
(4) The fourth thinking is: although this is different from the Western model, the 
Chinese model is not contradictory to the West's new role in Africa. H owever in 
the new era, China can work together with the West in Africa. 
Premier Wen emphasised history during the recent 4t' China-Africa Ministerial 
Conference in Egypt in 2009: 
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The rapidly growing relations and cooperation between China and Africa 
have attracted the world's attention in recent years. I would like to point 
out that it was not just a few years ago that China suddenly started its 
presence'in Africa or Africa started its support for China. As early as in 
the 1950s and '60s, China and Africa fought shoulder to shoulder in the 
historic struggle against imperialism, colonialism and hegemony and 
worked side by side in the hard endeavour to revive our respective 
national economies.... (Wen, 08/11/2009) 
However when history passed from the post-colonial time and the Cold War into 
the current period, China now does not want to be in opposition to the West: 
Even though we do not have the kind of `brothers" relationship we had 
before and there may be a bit more distance between us, I think we are 
still closer than the West and Africa. Our basis of assistance is not easily 
understood by the Western countries, but I think African countries may 
need diverse help from both of us (Liu, interview in Chinese embassy). 
China welcomes the active involvement of other countries and 
international organisations in Africa's development so that we can jointly 
promote peace, development and progress in Africa (Wen, 08/11/2009). 
Finally, there is also a point that: from a win-win point of view, China invented 
some new meanings for aid logic; however, China cannot avoid some of the 
pitfalls because the logic is still a donor's logic. This means: sometimes, as the 
Ambassador in the interview told me, some aid practice was set up from what the 
donor was willing to offer rather than by carefully thinking about the recipient's 
situation and urgent needs. The Chinese Culture Centre in Mkapa School is a case 
of this. 
4. Contribution and Limitations 
The main job of this study is to introduce and analyse the `Chinese model' and its 
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distinctiveness from a comparative perspective. It is not only introduced as `what 
it looks like' and `how it works', but also explained `why it is like that' and 
explored `how it is recognised'. The comparison is not only about how it works 
differently in the contemporary world, but its theoretical and historical roots. In 
this vein, the most important contribution of this study is the rethinking, from a 
perspective of `logic', of the emerging Chinese action in Africa, especially as it 
compares with the Western `donor logic' and related logic of intervention and aid 
mechanisms. 
Within this study the first and the most challenging job is the empirical work of 
the China-Africa educational cooperation, which was based on a series of field 
work in Tanzania and China by myself. In the Chinese context, there is an absence 
of systematic empirical work on this topic, and only a few papers based on 
literature studies of China-Africa educational cooperation exist. Even in the 
Western academic world, although African study has developed a long history, the 
research on China and Africa in the field of education is still very new, though 
nonetheless attractive. My field interview experience was very valuable for my 
own academic life. The second challenging, but valuable, job in this study is the 
analysis through a combination of languages, particularly the critical discourse 
analysis of Chinese texts. As a Chinese person, I have an advantage in this work, 
and this permitted increased insights into how the Chinese model is described by 
China itself and by Chinese scholars, and commented on by the West and the 
Western scholars. 
However, as the study covers the field work from Tanzania to China, as well as 
the analysis work in UK, the data collection has been a hard job for one person 
who has never been to an African country. If the study could be done by a team of 
researchers, the data collected could be more diverse and more representative. For 
instance, getting opinions from Chinese official departments has been a problem, 
because of the difficulty of access. Even though I made many phone calls, the 
answers were not as helpful as I had hoped. The work in Tanzania also had a time 
limitation, as well as the limits set by living and research expenses. 
Another difficulty of this study is that its `moving' target. At the beginning of this 
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study, it was hard to find articles on the topic of `Chinese aid' or `China as a 
donor', but this has changed greatly during the past four years. The literatures are 
increasing rapidly, much more than I expected. So the study has had to be updated 
all the time. On another hand, the China-Africa relationship has been developing 
across these years (from the 2006 Beijing Summit- the 3rd FOCAC, to the 4th 
FOCAC in 2009), and this `unlimited situation' also requires me to update the 
materials and statements. At the same time, international cooperation on education 
is also changing over time. If there were another chance to research a similar topic 
in the next 3-4 years, a very interesting comparison could be made with this study. 
However, China as a donor in educational practice has not been discussed as much 
as the general aid and trade issues in the academic world. Therefore, it is hoped 
that this study may stimulate some new ideas- as education develops within the 
framework of global political economy, and new models of educational aid are 
emerging, based on a different donor logic from the traditional ones. But in this 
limited study we cannot describe very much in details about what is happening in 
many specific African countries, and we cannot predict very well the direction the 
new model is going to take, and we cannot answer fully how much influence this 
South-South cooperation can make on the Western model. 
It is to be hoped that, in future studies, there could be more field work done in 
different African context to provide a basis for generalisation from this research. 
China is dealing with relationships in many African countries, so it would be 
interesting to see whether there is a different focus of aid in different African 
countries. It would also be better if more Chinese official informants could be 
accessed. The study of Africa is getting more and more attractive in China, so it is 
very likely that in the future increasing numbers of people will involve themselves 
in research related to this topic. Furthermore, there is also some speculation 
about whether this Chinese model can represent any Asian alternative, or even just 
a Chinese one (SSrensen, 2010: 18). We cannot say this Chinese model can be 
generalised as an Asian model, but there will be more possible to find out some 
similarities among China and other developing countries, such as `BRIC' 
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countries. "' 
Ferguson (2005: 176) argues, `location in the hierarchy no longer indexes a stage 
of advancement, but simply a rank in a global political economic order. . . Ranks 
become not stages to be passed through, but nonserialized statuses, separated from 
each other by exclusionary walls, rather than developmental stairways. Modernity 
in this sense comes to appear as a standard of living, a status, not a telos'. This 
gives us an incentive to look at diverse situations in the global era. A Chinese 
model of educational aid not focusing on pursuing Western development goals by 
the Western way, but giving more possibilities of `helping' shows that the Western 
orthodox way is no longer the only way of aid, the West is no longer the only 
donor. On the other hand, China's motives in developing a new model are not 
based on ideology, but on trade, cooperation and mutual benefit. 
Globalisation has brought about significant changes to our perceptions of the 
world, and also brought about the globalisation of knowledge, as well as the close 
combination of knowledge and economy. The dominant elements of economic 
development are more able to dominate the discourse of knowledge. When the 
world experiences unequal economic development, aid can be a way to promote 
global equity and peace, and to help the distribution of the public goods more 
equally. But aid can also easily be used to promote the dominant ideology and be 
used for political aims. It is not easy to justify which approach or strategy is right 
or wrong, but the most important point is to let aid face urgent needs, in other 
words, the aims of aid should not be separated from aid realities. The recipients 
are trying to gain independence and equalities in the aid relationships, which is a 
hard process for themselves, and this also requires their own effort. 
123 BRIC countries, refers to the countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China that are at a similar stage of 
newly advanced economic development and are considered to be the dominant economic power of the world 
by 2050. (Goldman Sachs, 04/12/2009) 
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Appendix 1 Key interviews 
Fieldwork in Tanzania 
1. Chinese embassy: Cultural Counsellor (a brief introduction of their work for the 
cultural and educational cooperation in Tanzania) 
2. Chinese embassy: the secretary of Cultural Counsellor (details about the work 
in the educational field, policies, new trends, practice in China especially the 
cooperation on higher education level/ training/ Chinese teachers in Tanzania, 
the attitude from Tanzanian, difficulties and comparisons) 
3. Vice principal of Benjamin Mkapa High School, Mero, and his two colleagues 
(history of the material support to the school from Chinese government and 
their opinions on this kind of aid, showed me the Chinese Culture Centre in the 
school) 
4. Ambassador of the Chinese embassy (general cooperation between China and 
Tanzania, advantage and disadvantage of the different aid approaches, 
discussion about the contemporary situation of the Chinese support to 
Tanzania) 
5. Kim: principal education officer of higher education department (three times 
talks to her; the scholarship offered by Chinese government and the implement 
of the selection and the students feedback from China) 
6. John: officer of higher education department, experience studying in one of the 
top Chinese university (his experience in China and his work at the moment) 
7. Maggie: head of aid coordinator office in ministry (ministry's function for 
asking for the educational cooperation and aid by the other countries, 
Tanzania's most urgent development goal for education, their hope and 
suggestion to Chinese government, the experience and lessons from the past aid 
practice ) 
8. Seka: vice principal of Dar es Salaam institute of technology (DIT) (three times 
meeting; the practice between the institute and Chinese government and their 
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agreements, and why they choose China, his own opinion on the aid 
cooperation and African development of education) 
9. Focus group in DIT (Tanzanian teachers in DIT who studied in China with the 
scholarship offered by Chinese government, their experience and opinion) 
10. Deputy principal of Dar es salaam university College of education (DUCE) 
(general introduction of the cooperation with different countries/organisations 
by the institute, and the difference and similarities) 
11. Principal of DUCE, Misa (more in details about the institute practice, the plan 
about building Confucius Institute collaboratively, her own experience in China 
for official training) 
12. Nancy: from the department of aid administration, Ministry of Finance 
(introduction of main aid resource to Tanzania and how they manage the 
financial flow; the procedure, and the new policy which is the JAST) 
13. Moti: from Tanelec company in Arusha, studied in China before (his experience 
in China and opinion) 
14. Kath and Race: two Tanzanian girls who have just come back to Tz from China, 
studied in China with the Chinese governmental scholarships (their experience 
and opinion, talking about the advantage and disadvantage of the Chinese aid to 
them) 
15. Robert: a worker at the harbor, studied in China at very early year when the 
official scholarship for Tz just started (experience and opinions) 
16. A lecturer in University of Dar es Salaam, studied in China before (experience 
and opinions) 
Fieldwork in China 
17. Zeng: the deputy dean, department of education, Beijing Normal Univerwsity, 
her husband is working in Ministry of Commerce (introduction about the 
general ministries which are doing the job in China, especially talking about the 
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motives of the international engagement of China and other Asian countries, 
personal opinions on the China's different role and approach) 
18. Zhang: dean of the department of education (general discussion about the 
research and his opinion) 
19. Chen and Wang: administrators from the international cooperation office in 
BNU (University's assistance with Ministry for receiving African students, 
stories and experience, students situation and responds, practice) 
20. Hong: dean of Institute of educational administration, Beijing Normal 
University (general discussion about the China-Africa cooperation 
philosophically, brief introduction about the different ministries function on this 
topic) 
21. Wu: Section chief of Asian and Africa section, International cooperation 
department, Ministry of education (brief introduction about official progress 
Chinese government has made to African areas and roles of different 
sections/departments) 
22. Yan: deputy director and vice dean, office of international programs, Tianjin 
Normal University (the cooperative programs, including Confucius Institute 
between TJNU and African countries, the very outstanding of what TJNU has 
made for the China-Africa educational cooperation, the details of how select 
and dispatch teachers and receive students, the motives of the university for 
these practice, future plan ... ) 
23. Wang: associate professor, International exchange office, Centre for African 
vocational education studies, Tianjin University of Technology and Education 
(personal experience of dealing with African students and training African 
officers and school administrators, the exact relationship between the university 
and Ethiopia, the detailed program of the training courses, the function of the 
centre and some of her own suggestion for the future support to Africa) 
24. Zhou and Chang: lecturers in Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal 
University (discussion about the China-Africa relationship and their work on 
the issue, personal opinion) 
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25. Liu: vice dean of Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University 
(talking about this topic theoretically, historically and philosophically, Chinese 
history of development and the cultural/education engagement in the global 
world, how to explain the particularities of the rising Chinese model, 
importance of understanding the term `exchange and cooperation', the context 
of the global political economy) 
26. Jian: dean of Institute of African Studies, ZJNU, but just has changed his job 
(the characteristics of the Chinese model, the progress China has made since the 
Forum, how the western people look at the Chinese approach, and the 
philosophical and theoretical differences between China and the West, the 
importance of the Conceptualising `aid', the practice of ZJNU since 90's and 
their cooperation with ministry of education and ministry of commerce, and 
other institutions) 
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Appendix 2 Field work interview questions by groups 
I- For institutions 
(1) Have you ever heard about any educational cooperation between China and Tanzania, in 
any educational fields? If yes, what type? 
(2) Does your department (Faculty of education) or university (University of Dar es Salaam) 
have any relationship with some Chinese programs? 
(3) Does your department or university have any information of certain Chinese educational 
programs? For instance any advertisement? 
(4) Are these educational practice from China in Tanzania normally for aid purpose, or for 
business? 
(5) Does your department or university receive any educational aid from the western 
institutions such as the British DFID? Could you give some introduction about it if yes? 
(6) What do you think about the aid programs from western organisations? Is it working well 
as you know? (good performance and disadvantages) 
(7) Compared with the western aid, what do you think about the Chinese approaches as you 
know? As we know it is probably a small part compared with a lot of western agendas, so do 
you think it is useful in Africa area? For what motives? 
2. For Chinese officials 
(1) Does China have a long history with Tanzania in the educational field, in addition to the 
other parts cooperation? 
(2) What did China help Tanzania with their education? Could you give some examples of 
some programs/projects? 
(3) Generally, what kinds of approaches China is giving educational aid to Tanzania, or in 
another word, educational cooperation? 
(4) Does Chinese government have regularly meeting with Tanzania within the education 
cooperation? Official visiting? Scholarship? Training? 
(5) Which ministries in China (Education? Foreign affairs? ) conduct the practice with 
Tanzania and, is it with the ministry of education here? How does Chinese embassy do this 
with Tanzania ministry? 
(6) Currently as you know what projects China is offering to Tanzania? Could you introduce it 
a little more in details? 
(7) What are the procedures of the some specific aid programs, for instance the Chinese 
scholarship? And is it offered annually? How much? and for how many students? 
(8) In terms of some training offered by China in Tanzania as part of the aid, what kinds of 
subjects they cover? How long of the training normally? How often? 
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(9) What is the main practice do you think at the moment? As we know the big donors are all 
from western countries, so what is the distinct characteristic of the Chinese practice? Do you 
think it is opening a different way to help the educational development in Tanzania? 
(10) What are the main problems do you think of the Chinese practice? And what the main 
difficulties it is facing nowadays? 
(11) As you know until now has there any good progress in this educational aid by China in 
Tanzania? 
(12) What is the main aim of the Chinese aid practice? For what purpose? (further cooperation 
in other fields? economic development? ) 
(13) Have you ever met any difficulty/conflict (with African or Western people) during your 
work? or any encouragement from them? 
(14) Does China have any cooperation with the western organisations for offering aid 
collaboratively? 
(15) Any changes during these years, and in the future, any new plan? 
(16) Do you have any contact with the people who has experience studying in China before, 
or people who are now studying in China? Then I can ask them for some more information if 
they would like. 
3. For Tanzanian officials 
(1) Does Tanzania have any cooperation in the educational field with China? Could you give a 
brief introduction of this history? 
(2) Currently how is the cooperation with Chinese government for education development? 
Through Chinese embassy? With which ministries of China? 
(3) What types of the educational help/aid China gives? Mainly on what level? (primary, 
higher? ) 
(4) What is the procedure for the main aid programs from China? Such as scholarship. 
(5) How to select recipients for the study in China or some training in Tanzania? Any 
standard? 
(6) Is there any progress China has been making for educational development in Tanzania? 
Example? 
(7) Does Chinese government claim any conditions for your country's educational practice 
performance when they give help? 
(8) Totally what are the main educational aid projects in Tanzania currently? And are they 
mostly from western donors? Do you think Chinese way is making some efforts/ effects? 
(9) Do you think the educational help from China is different from the western model? 
Explain more please, 
(10) What do you think the motives of both sides within the educational cooperation? 
(11) What kind of influence the donors give to Tanzania? (what did you learn from western 
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educational system? From Chinese skill training? ) What kind of image you have for these 
donors? Any difference? 
(12) Do you have any personal information to give me for further investigation if it is allowed 
and possible? 
4. For returning students 
(1). When did you study in China? Major? Which level (undergraduate or postgraduate) 
(2). Was it through the help of Chinese government? How did you get this opportunity? At 
that time what was your situation? (as a student or having a job) 
(3). Is your study in China important for your work in your country after you came back? 
(4). Was there any other African student go with you at that time? Do you have any contact 
with them now? What are you doing now? 
(5). Was there any requirement from the Chinese government? 
(6). How do think about the reason of giving scholarship to Tanzania from China? And what 
was the motive of you to go to China at that time? 
(7). Was it an important way for African student (going abroad to some developing countries)? 
Is it easier to go to China than to go to some western countries? Is there any other 
opportunities to go to Europe or USA? 
(8). As we know Chinese government is still giving scholarships to Tanzania, do you think it 
is increasingly important to Tanzania, or not as important as before? 
(9). As you know, people from China back to Tanzania or other African countries, are they all 
doing some very professional jobs such as professors, lectures or working in government? Do 
they contribute to the relationship between the two countries? 
(10). What do you think about the advantages and the disadvantages of the Chinese help to 
Tanzania by this way (some trainings and offering scholarships)? Is it an effective way for the 
improvement of Tanzanian educational development? Other suggestions for the Chinese 
cooperation/support? 
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Appendix 3 Consent letter 
Dear sir or madam, 
Thank you for taking time to read this letter. It sets out the nature of my research 
and seeks your consent to participate in an interview for about an hour. In some 
cases I might requests a further interview. 
I am a PhD student at Graduate School of Education in University of Bristol (UK). 
I am researching into China's educational aid to Africa. Specifically, the research 
asks people from both donor and recipient sides about their perception of China's 
action. Although it is overt research, in that it is intended that it will be published 
as a doctoral thesis and in academic journals, the anonymity of all participants and 
institutions will be preserved. I will record our interview and show your name in 
my thesis only when you permit. 
My supervisor at the University of Bristol is Professor Roger dale 
(r. dale@bristol. ac. uk). My supervisor at the University of Dar es Salaam is Dr. 
Hillary Dachi (dachi@edu. udcm. ac. tz). 
Please feel free to ask any questions about the nature of the research. If you agree 
to participate I would ask you to sign this letter below, acknowledging that you 
have understood the intentions of the research. 
Yours sincerely, 
Tingting Yuan Tingting. Yuan@bristol. ac. uk 
0044-780-9216699 (UK) 0714-670-150 (Tanzania) 
I have understood the nature of the research outlined above and agree to 
participate. I understand that everything I say will be treated 
confidentially, I may withdrawfrom the research and I may see a copy of 
the transcript of any interviewls in which I ant involved. 
I agree to have my interview audio recorded. 
r- YES r NO 
I agree that you use a pseudonym name instead of my real name in your thesis. 
r YES r NO 
Signed: Date: 
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Appendix 4 Research clearance letters 
THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA 
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
Cable: -ELIMU" DAR ES SALAAM Post Office Box 9121 
Telex: 41742 Elimu Tz- DARESSALAAM 
Telephone: 2J21287,2110146 
Fax: 2127763 
In reply please quote: 
Ref ED/E-P/ERCNOLI/ 108 Date: Wednesday. August 20,2008 
The Director, 
Department of Higher Education-MoEVT 
RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE FOR MS. TINGTING YUAN 
The captioned matter above refers. The mentioned is bonafidc PhD student of the 
University of Dar es Salaam, she is conducting research on the topic titled "Education 
Aid under Globalization and a Chin2-Africa Model: Features, Dynamics and 
Mechanism" as part of her Doctoral dissertation in PhD (Educational Planning and 
Administration) programme. 
The researcher needs to collect data and necessary infonnation from your office which 
related to Chinese educational cooperation %Nith Tanzania. 
In line %vith the above information you are being requested to provide the needed 
assistance that will enable her to complete this study successfuliv. 
The period by which this permission has been granted is from 20 1b Augu3t, 2008 to 314 
September, 2008. 
By copy of this letter, Ms. Tingting Yuan is required to submit a copy of the report (or 
part of it) to the Permanent SecrelaM Afinistryqf Education and Vocational Training for 
documentation and reference. 
Yours truly, 
Abdallah S. Nigodu 
For Permanent Secretary 
CC: Ms. Tingling Yuan 
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TUE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA 
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
Cable: "ELIMU" DAR ES SALAAM Post Office Box 9121 
Telex: 41742 Elimu Tz. DAR ES SALAAM 
Telephone: 2121287.2110146 
Fax: 2127 763 
In reply please quote: ,. "ýw 
Ref. ED! EP/ERC/VOLI/ 108 Date: Wednesday, August 20'h, 2008 
The Director, 
Department of Policy and Planning-MoEVT 
ATT: Ilead of subsection-Exterrial Aid Coordination 
RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE FOR MS. TINGTING YUAN: 
The captioned matter above refers. The mentioned is bonafide PhD student of the 
University of Dar cs Salaam, she is conducting research on the topic titled "Education 
Aid under Globalization and a China-Africa Model: Features, Dynamics and 
Mechanism" as part of her Doctoral dissertation in PhD (Educational Planning and 
Administration) programme. 
The researcher needs to collect data and necessary information from your office which 
related to Chinese educational cooperation%ith Tanzania. 
In line with the above information you are being requested to provide the nccded 
assistance that will enable her to complete this study successrully. 
The period by which this permission has been granted is from 20'h August, 2008 to 31" 
September, 2008. 
By copy of this letter, Als. Tingting Yuan is required to submit a copy of the report (or 
part of it) to the Perinanent Secretary, Affinistry ofEducation and Vocational Training for 
documentation and reference. 
Yours truly, 
Abdallah S. Ngodu 
For Permanent Secretary 
CC: Ms. Tingting Yuan 
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THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA 
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
Cable: "ELIMU" DAR ES SALAAM Post Office Box 9121 
Telex. 41742 Elimu Tz. DAR ES SALAAM 
Telephone: 2121287,2110146 
Fax: 2127763 
In reply please quote: 
Ref. ED/EP/ERCNOLI/ 108 Date: Wednesday, August 20`h, 2008 
The Permanent Secretary 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs 
P. 0. Box 9111 
Dar es Salaam 
ATT: Commissioner, External Finance. 
RE: RESEARCH CLEA]VONCE FOR NIS. TINGTING YUAN: 
The captioned matter above refers. The mentioned is bonafide PhD student of the 
University of Dar C3 Salaam, she is conducting research on the topic titled "Education 
Aid under Globalization and a China-Africa Model: Features, Dynamics and 
Mechanism" as part of her Doctoral dissertation in PhD (Educational Planning and 
Administration) programme. 
The researcher needs to collect data and necessary information from your Ministry which 
related to Chinese educational cooperation with Tanzania. 
In line with the above information you are being requested to provide the needed 
assistance that will enable her to complete this study successfully. 
Ile period by which this permission has been granted is from 20"' August, 2008 to 31' 
September, 2008. 
By copy of this letter, Nis. Tingting Yuan is required to submit a copy of the report (or 
part of it) to the Permanent Secretary, Afinisiry of Education and Vocational Training for 
documentation and reference. 
Yoprs truly, 
hLbk 
Abdallah S. Ngodu 
For Permanent Secretary 
CC: Ms. Tingting Yuan 
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UNIVERSITY OF DAR ES SALAAM 
Faculty of Education 
Department of Educational Planning and Administration 
Tel 022-2410594; 0784513439 PO Box 35048 
E-mail: epa@edu. udsm. ac. tz 
Dar es Salaarn 
Tanzania 
Otir Ref-EPA123 Date: Auzust 27.2007 
Your Ref- 
Principal, 
Dar es Salaam University College of Education, 
P. 0 Box 2329, 
Dar es Salaarn. 
RE: - YUAN TING TING 
The above captioned matter refers. 
This is to introduce to you the above named who is currently a PhD student in the 
Department of Educational Planning and Administration. 
The studenf s area of academic interest is, "Educational Aid under Globalization and A 
China - Africa Model: Features, Dynamics and Mechanisms" and would like to have an 
appointment with you to learn more about the Chinese Aid to education in Tanzania. 
Thanking you in advance for your support, 
Yours Sincerely, 
40(4 
Dr. H. A. Dachi, 
Head, 
Department of Educational Planning and Administration. 
C. C. PF 
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